




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


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
HISTORY OF GERMANY.

BOOK THE

LANDING OF GUSTAVUS

IN THE

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
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
VOL. I.—PART I.



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THE
CIVIL AND MILITARY
HISTORY OF GERMANY,

FROM THE
LANDING OF GUSTAVUS

TO THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA.

BY THE LATE
FRANCIS HARE NAYLOR, ESQ.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.—PART I.

LONDON:

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CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA.
V. 1

BY THE LATE
FRANCIS HARE NAWOR, ESQ.

IN TWO VOLUMES.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1816.

TO
LADY JONES;

THE
PRESENT WORK

IS
DEDICATED

**AS A TOKEN OF THE REGARD OF
THE AUTHOR;**

AND OF THE AFFECTION OF

THE EDITOR.

THE HISTORY OF

THE CITY OF

NEW YORK

FROM 1624 TO 1898

BY J. B. H. H. H. H.

THE HISTORY OF

ADVERTISEMENT.

FEW events in modern history are more remarkable, either on account of the circumstances with which they were attended, or the consequences they produced, than the “Thirty Years War.” But while our shelves are laden with narratives of every other contest, in which Europe has been engaged, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the “thirty years war” has not, in any language, at least with which I am acquainted, hitherto met with an historian to do it justice.

This consideration has tempted me once more to appear as a candidate for the indulgence of the public. During five years I have bestowed upon this Work all the diligence and attention, which it was in my power to afford; so that whatever faults it may possess, (and that it has many I am unfortunately conscious) I trust that negligence cannot, in fairness, be added to the number. The materials,

collected by the assiduity of others, I have copiously and cautiously used; and as the subject is in great measure novel, I have been careful to substantiate every important fact, either by extracts from, or references to, contemporary writers. The introductory chapters embrace the period of time which elapsed from the abdication of Charles V. till the reign of Ferdinand II. and thus form a connexion between the present Work and the entertaining history of Robertson.

The Author of the present Work had completed and consigned it to the press, previously to his leaving England in September, 1814, for Tours, where he died a few months afterwards. The delay which has arisen in its publication has solely proceeded from extraneous circumstances. No change whatever has been made in the original manuscript.

F. G. H.

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The second part of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of the various branches of philosophy. It begins with a discussion of logic, which is the study of the principles of reasoning. The author then discusses metaphysics, which is the study of the nature of reality. He then discusses ethics, which is the study of the principles of morality. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the various schools of thought in philosophy, such as Platonism, Aristotelism, and Stoicism.

The third part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the various applications of philosophy. It begins with a discussion of the philosophy of science, which is the study of the foundations of science. The author then discusses the philosophy of art, which is the study of the nature of art. He then discusses the philosophy of religion, which is the study of the foundations of religion. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the various ways in which philosophy can be applied to the study of the human condition.

THE
HISTORY OF GERMANY,

&c.

CHAP. I.

A general idea of the motives which influenced the conduct of Charles V. with respect to the Protestants.—Treaty of Passau.—Ferdinand I. His mild and opulent government.—Maximilian II. His amiable character.—Rodolph II. His schemes for the extirpation of the Protestant religion.—A Sketch of the constitution and government of Bohemia.—Aix-La-Chapelle and Donauwert put under the care of the empire.—Discontents of the Protestants.—Rise and progress of the Evangelical Union and Catholic League.

AMONG the most strenuous champions of the communion of Rome the House of Austria has ever held a conspicuous place, and even appears to have identified her own celebrity with that of the papal throne. Convinced that civil and religious liberty are destined by nature to keep pace with each other, the haughty soul of Charles V. recoiled at the political principles of the Protestants, though there are circumstances in his life, which tend to inspire a belief, that his strongest objection to the doctrines of Luther was, their propagating sentiments of freedom. Other motives, likewise, scarcely less impressive, concurred in recommending a strict

adherence to the ancient faith;* for it was easy to foresee, that the King of France would be ready to avail himself of any occurrence that might weaken the Austrian power in Italy, where interest and prejudice alike combined to attach the natives to the papal communion. Neither could it be expected, that the pride and bigotry of the German prelates, would suffer the imperial crown to repose securely on the brow of a heretic.

The rigorous proceedings of the diet of Augsburg gave rise to the Smalcaldic confederacy, which first united the Lutherans as a political body.† But all their hopes being annihilated in the battle of Mechlberg, the power of Austria obtained an ascendancy, which had nearly proved fatal to the liberties of Germany.‡ And such must inevitably have been the event, had not a champion unexpectedly arisen in a man whose interested ambition had till then supported the cause of tyranny. The genius of Maurice destroyed in a day the mighty fabric of Austrian grandeur, which the artful emperor had laboured to erect by a long series of crimes and victories. The treaty of Passau gave solidity to a communion, which had hitherto owed a precarious existence to the moderation or policy of Charles.§ These advantages were confirmed in 1555, when it was settled by treaty, that all the princes and states who had embraced the confession of Augsburg, should be allowed in future the unmolested exercise of their religion, on condition of their granting a similar indulgence to their subjects of the Catholic per-

* Robertson, ii. 121.

† In 1530. Sleidan, 142.

‡ Robertson, iii. 142.

§ Recueil des Traites, ii. 261.

suasion.* It was farther enacted, that those sovereigns, who, previously to the treaty of Passau, had appropriated to themselves the revenues of the church, should be suffered to retain them, without incurring the censures of the imperial chamber. This permission, however, was encumbered with a clause, restricting this privilege to that period, and declaring, that in future, every ecclesiastical prince, or prelate, who might abandon the ancient religion, should forfeit his benefice, and that a successor should be appointed, as if it had been vacated by a demise.†

By this pacification, which divided Germany into two distinct parties, the Protestants obtained a political existence, which they had never previously enjoyed. Yet, we should greatly deceive ourselves, were we to suppose, that these concessions arose from enlightened principles of toleration; on the contrary, they sprung from necessity alone, and were extorted from apprehension, not conceded by benevolence. This clearly appears from an article in the treaty, by which the adherents to the confession of Augsburg are the only members of the reformed church allowed to partake in the benefits of the act, while the Zuinglians and Calvinists continued liable to the penalties denounced against schismatics, by the sanguinary piety of the Vatican.‡ From this period the doctrines of Luther were sanctioned by law, and spread with rapidity over the north of Germany.

* The moderation, learning, and integrity of Melancthon, pointed him out as the fittest person for the execution of a task so arduous as that of defining limits for faith; and he was accordingly chosen to draw up the confession, which was presented to the diet of Augsburg.—Robertson, ii. 329.

† Fra. Paolo, lib. v. 17.

‡ Robertson, iii. 337.

It is a striking feature in this celebrated recess, and highly characteristic of the spirit of the times, that the choice of a religion depended solely upon the will of the sovereign; while the only privilege accorded to his subjects, was the right of removing, with all their property, to the territories of a prince, whose religious opinions accorded with their own. But no provision was made for the purpose of guarding against the abuses of tyranny, so likely to be resorted to by the violence of a bigot, when his faith and his pride were insulted.

The "Ecclesiastical Reservation" (as it is called by the Germans) afforded a momentary gratification to the catholics; because it gave a qualified superiority to their own communion, by preserving entire, to the church of Rome, the revenues and benefices of such prelates, as might hereafter abandon her tenets. The apparent equity of this decision, which seemed only to provide against the alienation of friends, from the purpose to which they were originally destined, at length silenced the opposition of the Protestants;* though they strenuously resisted it, when first proposed, from the conviction, that, by enlisting temporal interest in support of religious belief, it would operate more powerfully in favour of the Vatican, than the most elaborate arguments which her profoundest theologians could adduce. Subsequent events having confirmed these apprehensions, they positively denied, that they had ever assented to the proposal; pretending, that the question was of such infinite importance, that it had been reserved for future discussion.†

* Puffendorf de Reb. Suec. i. 14.

† Id. ib. Schiller, b. i. Mitbillier's Continuation of Risbek's History, iv. 4.

Hence the recess of Ausgburg ought rather to be regarded in the light of a truce, than in that of a definitive treaty; and so indeed it appears to have been considered by the contracting parties, since it was expressly declared, to be only a temporary expedient, to remain in force till a general council could assemble. And it was only in case that no permanent reconciliation should be then effected, that the validity of the treaty was to be finally established.*

The flame of war, though smothered for a time, was far from extinguished: each party was equally dissatisfied. The catholics, because they had conceded too much; the Protestants, because they had acquired too little.

The power of Austria, which had been raised so high by the craft and fortune of Charles V.† became far less formidable after his abdication. Divided into two separate branches, and subject to different sovereigns, whose views and principles were as remote from each other as the dominions over which they presided, it no longer possessed

* Id. ib. Schiller, b. i. Mitbillers Continuation of Risbek's History, iv. 4.

† The talents of Charles V. appear to me to have been greatly overrated. That he possessed political sagacity, in a very considerable degree, it is impossible to deny; but it is vain to look for marks of those transcendent powers, which have immortalized an Alexander or a Cæsar. Though uniting all the treasures of Mexico and Peru with Spain and Flanders, and extensive territories in Italy and Germany, his boasted armies were usually inferior to those at present maintained by the dependent sovereigns of Saxony and Bavaria; and, small as they were, they were generally destitute of every thing necessary for their subsistence. Compared with the volatile monarch of France, or the capricious tyrant of England, Charles certainly claims our praise; but, when opposed to Maurice or Soliman, he loses all pretensions to the character of a hero, and we almost wonder what qualities posterity can discover in the fugitive from Inspruck to extol and admire.

that vigour and activity, which made Europe tremble for her liberties. The mild virtue of Ferdinand I. formed a striking contrast with the intolerant bigotry of Philip II. The former, notwithstanding his Spanish education, and his known partiality for the Jesuits, endeavoured to appease the sectarian dissensions, which distracted the empire by conciliatory propositions,* while the latter disdained lenient remedies, as derogatory to the dignity of a sovereign, and attempted to enforce unconditional submission by the rack, the axe, and the faggot.

Yet, in spite of the loss of the Spanish crown, and its contingent treasures in America, the German branch still remained so formidable, that the most cordial unanimity could alone have enabled the protestants to support their independence. Unfortunately, however, they had already split into several sects, scarcely less hostile to each other's opinions, than to those of the papal communion. These unhappy dissensions (as Schiller observes with his usual sagacity) must† be ascribed entirely to the jealousy of the Lutherans, which led them to establish the Confession of Augsburg as the proper standard of religious belief. By prescribing limits to the spirit of investigation, they deprived the seceders from the Romish church of many advantages, which must otherwise have resulted from the renunciation of popery.

* Fulsit in omnibus imperatoris nostri Ferdinandi actionibus, judiciis, sententiis, vultu ac gestibus, etiam nativa bonitas, et moderatio ac clementia vere regia et divina.—*Chytræus in Oratione de Ferdinando Cæsare.* After making great allowance for the exaggeration natural on similar occasions, we must acknowledge this eulogium to be highly honourable.

† B. i.

The animosity, subsisting between the Lutherans and Calvinists, proved highly gratifying to the common foe, and no less injurious to themselves. What a field was opened for the display of wit,—that men should be found sufficiently presumptuous to prescribe to the world a new model of faith, before they had settled the articles of their own belief!*

The only rallying point that existed between the contending sects was their mutual dread of the catholics. This danger, though probably much exaggerated by the spirit of party, was still sufficient to justify the utmost precaution:† for, on what foundation could they rely? No oath, however solemn, deserved to be trusted, so long as the pope was supposed to possess the dangerous prerogative of dispensing with the most sacred obligations, and while the church of Rome continued to inculcate the diabolical tenet, that “no faith was to be preserved with a heretic.” Meantime, their apprehensions were continually revived by the indiscretion of the Jesuits, who affected to speak of the treaty as a measure dangerous to the Christian religion, negotiated in direct opposition to the wishes and remonstrances of the sovereign pontiff, and equally prejudicial to the glory and interest of the Catholic church.‡

Neither did the proceedings of the council of Trent tend, in the least degree, to dissipate their ap-

* Bossuet has managed this argument with his usual ingenuity, in his *Histoire des Variations de l'Eglise*; a work, which may teach a protestant logic, and a catholic divinity.

† See the able apology of Turretin, and the candid exposition of Limborch, a rational, sober, and inquisitive divine.

‡ *Les Lettres Provençales* have probably made the reader acquainted with the dexterous casuistry of that celebrated order.

prehensions. Notwithstanding the efforts of the imperial ministers, who persevered conscientiously in demanding a reform of those abuses, which had so long given scandal to Christendom, no attention had been paid to their representations.* Thus, the only benefit that accrued from this celebrated synod, was to display to mankind the duplicity of the Pope, the venality of the clergy, and the folly of the people, for having expected the amelioration of ecclesiastical discipline from a body of men, so materially interested in its corruption.†

Fortunately, however, for the protestants, the necessities of Ferdinand secured his adherence to the treaty of Augsburg; for, notwithstanding his boasted moderation and justice, his treatment of the Bohemians was not calculated to excite a very favourable opinion of his sincerity. Deserted by the narrow policy of Philip, it was impossible for him to have resisted the tremendous torrent, which rolled impetuously from the east, without the cordial co-operation of all the German powers: nor could this be obtained, without conforming implicitly to the literal stipulations of the treaty.

The unquestioned probity of Maximilian II. who succeeded his father on the imperial throne,‡ added to his secret inclination toward the opinions of Luther,§ inspired the protestants with the pious

* Schimdt has given a circumstantial account of Ferdinand's honest, but ineffectual endeavours, for that purpose.—*Neuere geschichte der Deutschen*. B ii. K. 10.

† Pallavicini and Sarpi have recorded its proceedings; the former with the accuracy of an historian, the latter with the sagacity of a philosopher.

‡ In 1564.

§ These opinions he is supposed to have imbibed from his preceptor, Wolfgang Severus, who was himself a convert to the Lutheran faith. Neither could this early impression be ever effaced by the exhortations

hope, of beholding their religion triumphantly seated on the throne of the Cæsars. This expectation was still farther strengthened, by the liberality with which he treated the members of the reformed church in his hereditary dominions,* to whom the exercise of their religion was freely conceded, though he was frequently admonished, of the pernicious consequences of toleration, by the sovereign pontiff.†

In spite, however, of the declaration which he formerly made, that “he was ready to sacrifice all worldly interests for the sake of salvation,” a due consideration for the tranquillity of the empire outweighed his private attachments; since it was hardly possible for him to have abandoned the religion of his forefathers, without exposing his country to all the calamities of civil war; because, in case of his recantation, the zealous catholics might have attempted to elevate the intolerant Philip to the imperial dignity.

But, unfortunately for Germany, that excellent emperor was not destined long to promote the happiness of mankind.‡ After a tranquil reign of twelve years, he was succeeded by his eldest son,

or example of Philip, King of Spain. On the contrary, it increased with increasing reason, and even tempted him to engage a protestant divine in the capacity of private secretary, from whom he is said to have received the communion under both kinds.—Coxe, i. 609.

* At a time when the true meaning of the word *toleration* was scarcely understood in any country in Europe, he was often heard to say, “that God alone possessed authority over the consciences of men.”—Schmidt, ii. 27.

† Barre Histoire d'Allemagne, ix. 132—Mitbiller, iv. 110.

‡ That virtuous emperor (says Pezel) listened with patience to the meanest and poorest of his subjects, received their petitions with benignity, and took care that they were treated with impartial justice. 627. *Nec enim illo ingenio mitius ullum regnis contigit.* Grotius Ann. Bel. ii. 42.

Rodolph,* a prince no less inferior to his father in understanding than in justice, moderation, and benevolence. Abandoned from his cradle to the care of the Jesuits,† he was educated by them in those illiberal principles which were calculated to render their illustrious pupil the slave and instrument of their ambition. Some historians pretend, that he was endowed with talents, which, if properly cultivated, might have reflected lustre on a throne; that he was passionately addicted to scientific pursuits, and was a liberal patron of genius. These are unquestionably among the noblest purposes to which wealth and power can be consecrated. But it was the misfortune of Rodolph to deviate alike from the path of prudence, whether employed in the pursuit of laudable objects, or in those of an opposite nature. Shut up in a laboratory, a stable, or an observatory, he was occupied in inspecting the solution of a metal, in caressing a favourite courser, or in watching the conjunction of a planet, when the critical situation of public affairs should have engrossed his undivided at-

* In 1576.

† It was the misfortune of Maximilian to be married to a woman of weak intellect, and blindly attached to the catholic faith. Mary, the daughter of Charles V. resembled her brother Philip in her narrow views of religion, and being imprudently entrusted with the education of her eldest son, till he had attained his twelfth year, she inspired Rodolph with such a superstitious veneration for her favourite tenets, as ultimately led to those calamitous scenes, which desolated Germany during the subsequent reigns. This early prepossession was afterwards confirmed by a long residence at the Spanish court. With a view of succeeding to the crown of Spain, by marrying the daughter of Philip II. who at that time had no male issue, he was sent to Madrid to be instructed in the arts of government by that sanguinary tyrant, whose intolerant zeal was eminently calculated to mature the seeds implanted in his bosom by the misguided piety of his mother.—Coxe, i. 655.

tention. Even the patronage which he afforded to men of science lost half of its merit, from being confined to those, who wasted their time in the puerile studies of alchymy and astrology. It may be even fair to doubt, whether the splendid endowments of Tycho Brahe would have entitled him to the imperial favour, had they not been degraded by charlatanism.* When the flames of war were spreading from the Baltic to the Alps, the emperor's ministers were often refused access to his person, and were even compelled, in order to procure an audience, to assume the disguise of a groom or a friar. Hence, the most important transactions were treated with indifference, and sometimes with total neglect. Abandoning the reins of government to his mistresses, or his favourites, he seldom gave himself the trouble to inquire in what manner their authority was exercised.†

Though destitute of an heir to his extensive dominions, he was so jealous of authority, that he could never consent to the election of a King of the Romans.

The successful resistance of the Flemings to the intolerant bigotry of Philip II. might have afforded an useful lesson to a monarch, capable of deducing a salutary warning from the crimes and errors of others. But, instead of endeavouring to assuage the bitterness of faction by prudence or equity, Rodolph was weak enough to make use of compulsion. At the instigation of the Spanish court, he attempted to curtail the authority of the imperial chamber, by transferring all causes, in which the

* The literary history of that age will account for his extraordinary death. See his life by Gassendi.

† Schimdt, iii. 13.

church was concerned, to the aulic council—a tribunal composed exclusively of catholics, and entirely under his own control.* Instead of conforming to the enlightened policy of his father, he rescinded many important privileges, by which Maximilian had secured the affection of the protestants. A precedent like this proved too seducing for bigotry to neglect, and we accordingly find the emperor's conduct adopted as a model by the partisans of Rome, in every corner of the empire. Deprived of their property upon frivolous pretences, and excluded from every office of emolument or honour, it is by no means surprising that the protestants should have indulged their resentment, whenever an opportunity occurred for retaliation. Few circumstances could have demonstrated, in a clearer light, the animosity existing between the rival sects, than the obstinacy with which the members of the reformed church rejected the Gregorian calendar, for no better reason, than because it was introduced by the pope.†

Notwithstanding the levity with which Rodolph varied his favourite pursuits, it was apparent to all men of penetration, that he was wedded to every practice of the catholic worship, with the illiberal bigotry of a Franciscan. For some time, indeed, his constitutional indolence silenced the fears of the Lutherans; but when they discovered that he was acting in concert with the Vatican, and that he affected to consider the obligations, contracted by the treaty of Augsburg, as virtually abrogated by the council of Trent, universal consternation prevailed; since none were so dull as not to discover,

* Coxe, i. 662.

† 1582. De Thou LXXIV. Barre, lx. 207.—Mitbiller, lv. 127.

that the liberties of Germany must stand or fall with the protestant worship.

Though Rodolph and his brothers were blindly devoted to the papal see, the same ardent zeal for the catholic faith was by no means common to their subjects. The new opinions had made considerable progress in the hereditary states, particularly among the higher classes, by whose influence and exertions the protestants had obtained a preponderating share in the municipal government. As the right of determining the amount of all subsidies resided entirely in the provincial diets, it was natural to expect that prudence, if not humanity, would have induced the imperial ministers to avoid every measure that might tend to impair the popularity of their master, or to weaken the confidence of his people. Yet, instead of endeavouring, by lenient remedies, to allay the ferment, they had rashly recourse to coercion, annulling at once, by one sweeping proscription, all the edicts which Maximilian had successively passed in favour of the protestant nobles.* Not satisfied with their imprudent act, they proceeded to remove them from all official situations. Encouraged by the incautious behaviour of the court, the catholics believed, that they were about to consummate their ardent wishes, and that an orthodox champion had been granted to their prayers, zealous to efface the disgraceful stain, which contaminated the purity of the Christian church, by the holy means of persecution. Anticipating the triumph of the righteous cause, they

* His concessions had been, perhaps judiciously, confined to the domains of the great nobility, from a wish to conciliate the higher orders, without endangering the public tranquillity.

exhorted the emperor to persevere with unabating constancy, till the meritorious work should be accomplished.

Had it been the study of Rodolph to undermine the foundation of Austrian greatness, a more convenient system could hardly have been devised. The uncertain tenure of the Bohemian crown had been often productive of civil dissensions, when the unpopularity or indolence of the reigning monarch prevented his obtaining, from that jealous people, the nominating of a successor. The throne of Bohemia was not only elective, but its constitution preserved, with laudable caution, many great and valuable privileges; which the king, at his accession, was compelled to ratify by a solemn convention. Thus the royal authority was circumscribed within narrow limits, the monarch being prohibited from imposing taxes, from making peace or war, or from introducing any change in the national code, without the concurrence of the diet. That assembly consisted of three estates—the great nobility, the equestrian order, and deputies from most of the towns and cities. Though the right of convocation was expressly vested in the king, yet, in turbulent times, the diet had been frequently known to assemble without waiting for the royal permission.*

Since the days of Huss, the kingdom of Bohemia had been never exempt from religious dissensions,

* The cortes of Castile and Arragon, the states-general of France, the parliament of England, and the diets of Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary, were originally possessed of constitutions nearly similar, and endowed with privileges almost equally extensive. "*Le beau systeme a été trouvé dans les bois.*" The genius of feudalism appears every where to have been the same. Happy the people, whose rigid adherence to the policy of their ancestors, has enabled them to maintain a steady course between the rocks of democracy and the shoals of despotism.

which, though occasionally appeased by a popular prince,* were ready to break out, with increasing violence, on the slightest provocation. No sooner, however, had Luther attacked the profligacy of the Vatican, than his doctrines were received with avidity in a country, where the mania of controversy was almost epidemical. Unable to combat the Saxon divine by rational arguments, the zealous indiscretion of Lewis had recourse to weapons more suitable to the feelings of bigotry, rashly attempting, by exile and torture, to silence those whom he found it impossible to confute. These intemperate proceedings compelled the Lutherans to shelter themselves under the tolerated name of *Calixtines*, and their accession contributed essentially to augment the wealth and influence of that formidable party.†

Such appears to have been the situation of the country when Ferdinand I. ascended the throne.‡ His treatment of the Bohemians was by no means calculated to heal the animosities which so generally prevailed, or to justify the high reputation of

* This was the case in 1483, when the moderation of Ladislaus effected a truce between the hostile sects, for the space of thirty-three years.

† The disciples of Huss, after the death of that martyr, divided into two powerful factions, distinguished by the names of *Calixtines* and *Taborites*. The former, so called from receiving the cup in the celebration of the eucharist, were a mild and peaceable sect, contenting themselves with enjoying their favourite privilege, without attempting to overturn the established religion. The appellation of the latter was derived from Mount Tabor. Their principles were those of wild enthusiasm, and they insisted, that all men should conform implicitly to their own extravagant theories—Mosheim, by Maclaine, iii. 448.

‡ Mr. Coxe has referred to such authentic sources, that, in this short sketch of the Bohemian government, I have relied with confidence upon his information; I do so the more readily, because I find it corroborated by the indefatigable industry of Schmidt.

moderation and equity, which his behaviour toward the Germans had acquired, and which we may therefore suppose to have been the result of policy, and not the spontaneous effusions of a benevolent heart. Too wise openly to attack privileges secured by treaty, and too rigidly attached to the papal communion, to behold with indifference the rapid progress of the Reformation, he persuaded the diet to issue a decree, prohibiting all farther innovations. Various other attempts were successively made to infringe the rights of the people, and to establish an hereditary claim to a crown, which he had solemnly acknowledged, by his coronation oath, to be held by the right of election.* It is the usual fate of similar engagements to be easily broken, but it is rarely the lot of an injured nation to oppose their violation with equal ardour. Yet in spite of their efforts, the success of Charles V. against the Smalcaldic league, gave so severe a blow to the protestants, that his brother was enabled to reduce the insurgents to unconditional submission. Having entered Prague, at the head of a victorious army, Ferdinand punished the leaders with such exemplary severity, that he had no longer any resistance to apprehend. His authority being established on the tremendous basis of terror, he proceeded to regulate the administration of justice on a system

* This claim was founded on his marriage with Anne, daughter of Ladislaus, King of Hungary and Bohemia. Being present at the coronation of an infant brother, (who never lived to inherit the throne) the young princess burst into a flood of tears, because she was not also to be crowned. Her grief was so violent, that nothing could appease it, till her father placed the diadem on her head. This circumstance being regarded as ominous by a superstitious people, they, by general acclamation, declared her heiress to the Bohemian crown, in case of her brother's demise.—Coxe, i. 603.

truly despotic ; and as he attributed the resistance, which he had already experienced, to the doctrines disseminated by the Lutheran divines, he called to his assistance a phalanx of Jesuits, hoping, by casuistical cunning, to counteract the poison of heresy.

By the tolerant spirit of his government, Maximilian II. so far regained the confidence of the Bohemians, that he prevailed on the diet to chuse his son for his successor. His behaviour, on that important occasion, deservedly entitles him to the highest praise ; as he managed the election with so much dexterity, that he avoided offending the delicacy of the states, without relinquishing the claim of hereditary right, so lately established by his father.*

Unfortunately for Rodolph, he was destitute of sagacity, to humour the temper of an unquiet people, though, at the commencement of his reign, he certainly acquired some degree of popularity, by fixing his residence at Prague. The sentiments of the nation, however, were materially changed when his character was better understood. From his refusal to confirm the edicts of Maximilian, the catholics and calixtines were the only tolerated religions ; the Lutherans and Calvinists being not only prevented from worshipping their Maker, according to the rites of their respective churches, but even excluded from every public office. Emboldened by success, Rodolph proceeded rapidly in the career of injustice, and even ventured to abrogate many important privileges, which were constitutionally enjoyed by the calixtines.†

The same odious system was extended to the em-

* Id. Coxe, i. 641.

† Pebrel.

pire, where Aix-la-Chapelle and Donauwert were deprived of their charters, and put under the imperial ban, as a punishment due to apostacy. In the former city, the electors of Treves and Cologne, to whom the execution of the sentence had been committed, contented themselves with deposing the protestant magistrates, and abolishing the reformed religion; but the latter was exposed to more intolerable hardships, being not only stripped of all its franchises, but placed under the dominion of the Duke of Bavaria, by whom it was treated with all the severity of a conqueror.*

The discontent occasioned by such despotic conduct was manifested in a diet held at Ratisbone in 1608, when the protestants refused to grant any subsidies for the prosecution of the Turkish war, till their grievances were completely redressed.†

Convinced that the crisis was rapidly approaching, when they must either submit to the Austrian yoke, or assert their independence with the sword, their leaders assembled at Anhausen in Franconia, to provide for their future security.

The origin of this association, which, under the title of “Evangelical Union,” was destined to act so distinguished a part in the annals of the times, may be traced to the year 1594, when, at the instigation of the Elector Palatine, a meeting was held at Heilbrun, which was attended by many of the protestant princes.‡ Having marshalled their complaints in a constitutional form, they presented a memorial to the emperor, in which they signified their determi-

* Schmidt, iii. 11 and 15. † Barre, ix. 369. Schmidt, iii. 15.

‡ The Count Palatine of Deux-Ponts, the Margraves of Baden-Dourlach and Anspach, and the administrator of Magdeburg, a younger son of the Elector of Brandenburg, were preserved.—Coxe, ii. 669.

nation to withhold all farther contributions till every cause of complaint should be removed.* The evils of which they complained regarded principally the infraction of their religious rights, and the unconstitutional interference of the Aulic council, in matters belonging to a higher tribunal. This confederacy might have an insuperable barrier to the ambition of Austria, had not the jealousy of the Calvinists prevented their leaders from uniting heartily with the Lutherans.† Too feeble to oppose the imperial power when left to themselves, the associated princes endured the mortification of beholding enormous supplies voted by the diet, without the smallest attention to their remonstrances.

Far, however, from being disheartened by want of success, they consoled themselves with having discharged an important duty to their country, and trusted to Providence for their remuneration. Meanwhile their popularity not only rapidly increased, but they acquired additional strength by the accession of the Duke of Brunswick, the Langrave of Hesse, the Prince of Anhalt, and the Count of Nassau; which more than compensated for the defection of the Duke of Wirtemberg, who basely deserted his party.

* Schmidt, iii. 9. Pfeffel Abregé Chronologique de l'Histoire d'Allemagne, ii. 236.

† Of the animosity prevailing between the different branches of the reformed church, we may judge from the following distich, addressed to Casimir, who was entrusted with the administration of the Palatinate, during the minority of the elector.

O Casimire potens, servos expelle Lutheri,
Ense, rota, ponto, funibus, igne neca.

Schmidt, iii. 5.

The death of the Elector of Brandenburg* proved a fortunate circumstance for the allies, because his son John Frederic immediately joined the confederacy, which had already obtained such political consequence, that Henry IV. King of France, no longer hesitated to declare in its favour. Animated by the support of so powerful a monarch, they ventured to proceed another step, and concluded a treaty at Heidelberg,† by which they solemnly covenanted to oppose the encroachments of the Aulic council; to resist every attempt that might be made by the catholics to resume the secularized property of the church; and finally, to defend their civil and religious liberties against every one who should dare to infringe them. Deputies were also appointed to reside at Heidelberg, to whom the management of all business was committed, and the contingents were fixed, which every member was to furnish in the event of hostilities.

These necessary precautions having been unanimously established, confidential agents were dispatched to France and Holland, for the purpose of communicating the result of their deliberations, and to request assistance in case they should be attacked by the catholics. A clandestine correspondence was likewise carried on with the disaffected subjects of Austria.‡

A subsequent meeting§ at the monastery of Anhausen, in the Margraviat of Anspach, decided

* In 1598. In the course of this and the following year, the members of the union successively assembled at Friedberg and Francfort.—Pfeffel, 238.

† In 1603.

‡ Henrich reichsgeschichte, vi. 159.

§ In 1608.—Pfeffel, 246.

further, that no difference of opinion, respecting religion, should impair the cordiality so happily established between the members of the confederacy. With a view to the possibility of aggressive warfare, it was likewise agreed, that in case any conquests should be effected by their united forces, they should be divided among the members in exact proportion to their respective contingents. The Elector Palatine being declared head of the league, Joachin, Margrave of Brandenburg, was appointed general, and Christian, prince of Anhalt, lieutenant-general.

The final arrangements were, however, reserved for a meeting at Hall, in Suabia,* when, after confirming all the resolutions already enacted, the confederates entered into a specific engagement respecting the disputed succession of Cleves and Juliers. By this agreement, it was stipulated, that the treaty of Dorinund should be preserved inviolate; that proper measures should be taken to determine the sequestration, and the imperial administration be compelled to retire. This assembly was honoured by the presence of an ambassador from Henry IV. who, in the name of his master,† engaged to send ten thousand men, whenever his assistance should be required. Ministers were also accredited to the courts of London and Copénhagen, and to the republic of Venice, Switzerland, and Holland, to solicit protection against the lawless tyranny of Austria.

Regarding it as indispensable to their future success, that all the protestant states should combine

* In 1610.

† Le Vassor, i. 18.

together against the common enemy, no efforts were spared to secure the co-operation of Saxony.* All their overtures, however, proved ineffectual, as the emperor had already gained over the elector by promising him the investiture of Juliers.†

The strength and consistency of the Evangelical Union spread universal alarm throughout the catholic states, who saw no probable means of resisting its influence, except by forming a similar association. A confederacy was accordingly organized, under the appellation of the "Catholic League," consisting of the three ecclesiastical electors, and most of the mitred princes of Germany, at the head of which was placed Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, the only secular member of distinction.‡ To this circumstance he was indebted for the extensive authority with which he was invested, and which was far more unlimited than what the jealousy of the protestants could allow them to grant to the Palatine. By this well-timed confidence, he was enabled to act with decision and vigour; while the protestant generals were compelled to waste moments, the most important for active service, in vain and tedious debates.§

The facility, which they experienced in raising supplies, was also highly advantageous to the catholics. The opulent prelates, who began seriously

* They are said even to have offered the elector a positive assurance, that the decision, respecting the contested succession, should not prove injurious to his interest.—Coxe, i. 715.

† Puffendorf, i. 17.

‡ Barre, ix. 390.—Schiller, dreissigjaehriges knig. i.

§ Ibid. The death of Frederic IV. Elector Palatine, was severely felt by his party, as his son was inferior to him in all those qualities which are necessary in turbulent times.

to tremble for the splendour and emoluments of the mitre, were easily persuaded to sacrifice a part of their superfluous wealth, in hopes of preserving the remainder. The protestants, on the contrary, experienced almost insuperable difficulties, in extorting even scanty supplies from their less rich, but less sagacious adherents.*

It is a singular circumstance, and highly characteristic of the general contempt in which Rodolph was held, that he was never consulted by the members of the League, though they were avowedly the champions of the catholic faith, of which he was officially the secular head,† from wearing the imperial diadem.

* Barre, ix. 390.—Schiller, dreissigjahriges krieg, i.

† Ibid.

CHAP. II.

Death of the Duke of Cleves.—Disputes concerning the Succession.—Pretensions of the different claimants.—Impolitic conduct of the Emperor.—Henry IV. of France declares in favour of the Evangelical Union.—His plan for humbling the Austrian power.—Rapacity of the Protestants.—Death of Henry.—Distress of his allies.—A treaty concluded with the Duke of Bavaria.—A general view of the Austrian government in Hungary and Transylvania.—Mathias.—His character, projects, and popularity.—Compels Rodolph to surrender Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, and to appoint his successor to the Bohemian throne.—Fresh troubles in Bohemia, which terminate in the resignation and death of Rodolph.

THE measures pursued by the rival confederacies operated so powerfully in producing the war, the events of which I have undertaken to describe, that it was essential to trace their rise and progress minutely. Neither could this be effected, without deviating a little from chronological precision, and postponing the consideration of the intricate disputes, occasioned by the death of the Duke of Cleves and Juliers, till the present opportunity.

John William, Duke of Cleves, Juliers, and Berg, dying without issue, various competitors laid claim to his dominions. Had the laws of inheritance been clearly defined, no subject for litigation could have arisen; since no question could possibly be more exempt from the intricacies of forensic confusion, than to determine, whether a fief should descend entire to the eldest of the female representatives, or be divided among all, who were equally connected by blood. Yet, so complex was the system of German jurisprudence, that the profoundest

civilians were puzzled to decide, whether or not an imperial decree ought to supersede the established customs of the empire. The subject, however, will be better understood, by stating the pretensions of the respective claimants.

The Elector of Brandenburg having married Anne, the only daughter of Mary Eleanor, the eldest sister of the deceased, demanded the duchies for his son, as the nearest male representative.* But Anne, the second sister, being still alive, endeavoured to establish a preferable title on the claim of nearer affinity. Anne was widow of the Count Palatine, of Neuburg, by whom she had a son, who, of course, was nephew to the late duke, to whom the hereditary Prince of Brandenburg was more remotely related by one degree. John, Duke of Deux-Ponts, and Charles of Austria, Margrave of Burgau, pretended likewise to the succession in right of their wives, who were also sisters of the deceased. The former, however, soon relinquished the contest; but the latter persisted with greater pertinacity, because he flattered himself to obtain from the partiality of a relation,† what it would have been weakness to expect from the equity of a judge.

The difficulty of determining to which of the competitors the contested territories should belong, seems to have arisen chiefly from the following circumstance; which, in the judgment of civilians, militated directly against the common laws of in-

* Putter's Historical Development of the German Constitution, by Dornford, ii. 35. Struvius, period. 10. sect. 7. p. 2057. Khewenhiller, vii. 201.

† He was cousin to the emperor.

heritance. Two declarations had been successively issued by the Emperor Charles V.* In virtue of the first, in case of the failure of the male line, the whole succession was to devolve to the Ernestine branch of the house of Saxony, descended from Sibilla, eldest daughter of John III. Duke of Cleves.† Mary, however, contended on specious grounds, that this provision was virtually abrogated by a subsequent edict, by which the duchies were rendered female fiefs, revertible to daughters, or their male representatives.

This confusion was aggravated by an act of Ferdinand I. declaring the inheritance to be indivisible, and re-establishing the succession according to the ancient rule of primogeniture.‡

Supposing the territories to be revertible to females (a supposition contrary to the leading principles of feudal descent), they ought of course to have been divided among the four sisters, or their representatives.§ But, as it became daily more probable, that the dispute must be ultimately referred to the sword, the princes of Deux-Ponts and Burgau thought it prudent to withdraw, convinced of their inability to contend against the superior resources of Saxony and Brandenburg: for the margrave's expectations were now completely frustrated, since a more fortunate competitor had outstripped him in the emperor's favour. The

* Bougeant, *Histoire du Traite de Westphalie*, i. 21.

† Schmidt, iii. 22.

‡ Coligny, *Histoire du Palatinat*.

§ It would have been easy for the author to have produced the authority of the most celebrated publicists, and to have encumbered his pages with the contradictory decisions of diets and universities; but it is no part of his ambition to rescue from oblivion works, which have long and deservedly been buried in obscurity.

Elector of Saxony, in consequence of his descent from the Albertine branch, appeared on the list of candidates, producing a grant made by Frederic III. to the descendants of Albert, in case the male line of Juliers should be extinct.

Though possessing power sufficient to give a colour of justice to the most desperate suit, the elector preferred to rest his pretensions on a more solid foundation; and, with a shew of submission extremely flattering to the vanity of Rodolph, appealed to his equity for redress, while Brandenburg and Neuburg prepared to assert their pretensions by arms.*

It would have been deviating essentially from those principles, which have almost invariably influenced the policy of Austria, had Rodolph neglected this favourable opportunity for extending the imperial authority. Under the fallacious pretence of administering impartial justice, he commanded the litigants to suspend hostilities, and either personally, or by representative, to appear before the imperial throne?† Meanwhile, he ordered the territories to be put under sequestration, and even nominated an administrator to carry this edict into immediate execution.‡

This vigorous measure, which betrayed the intention of annexing the contested territory to the hereditary states, for which many precedents of injustice might have been produced; or else of conferring it upon the Elector of Saxony, whose venal

* Coxe, i. 718.

† Bentivoglio has given a detail of these proceedings in a work entitled, *Relazione della Mossa d'arme per le cose di Cleves e di Juliers*.

‡ Barre, ix. 386.

friendship Rodolph was anxious to secure, brought the elector and the palatine to a speedy reconciliation. Convinced that their union was essentially necessary for the preservation of the country in dispute, they agreed jointly to govern the duchy, and with their aggregate strength to resist all intruders.*

In vain did the emperor prohibit the magistrates from doing homage to their new sovereigns, and depute Leopold of Austria to exercise the government as imperial commissary.† With the single exception of the town of Juliers, the whole country submitted to the protestant princes, while the representative of Rodolph was compelled to seek a precarious refuge in the capital.‡

From this time the contest assumed a different aspect. It was no longer regarded as an abstract question concerning the right of inheritance, but as involving interests of the highest magnitude. The possession of Juliers, however important, became a consideration of inferior moment, when compared with the eventful struggle for superiority between the rival religions of Rome and Luther. Whatever was calculated to stimulate ambition, to imitate pride, or to interest piety, inflamed the hearts of the combatants. If Austria triumphed, the liberties of Germany were sure to receive an incurable wound; and the modern Cæsars might possibly be enabled to establish a despotism, no less

* This agreement was signed at Dortmund, by the mediation of the Landgrave of Hesse, and under the quarantee of Henry IV. of France. —Schmidt, iii. 22.

† Londorp. iii. 15. Mitbiller, iv. 163.

‡ Ibid.

tremendous than that which had been formerly exercised by their ferocious predecessors in Italy.

For these reasons, the contest attracted the attention of all the powers in Europe, who had broken the fetters of the Vatican, or who beheld with abhorrence the overbearing ambition of Austria. It is, however, far from impossible, that the protestants, overawed by the dread of her superior resources, might have circumscribed their efforts to fruitless exhortations, had there not existed a man, whose sagacity anticipated the numberless advantages to be derived from uniting the members of the reformed church in one powerful confederacy, and who resolved to avail himself of the fortunate moment for humbling the imperial eagle.*

Henry the Fourth, King of France, had learned from experience, that there was nothing too base for Austrian ambition and Austrian bigotry to undertake. By deeds the most heroic, he had surmounted every obstacle which the subtle superstition of the Tiberius of Spain had been able to raise; and, when firmly seated on the Gallic throne, had displayed to the eyes of an admiring world, that rare phenomenon, a patriot king.

In every quarter of Europe, where gold could corrupt, or artifice deceive, the destructive effects of Spanish intrigues had scattered sedition and hatred. Implanted by nature in every breast in which the blood of Ferdinand of Aragon continued to flow, the insatiable spirit of dominion was neither glutted by an invariable current of success, nor extinguished by the rudest gales of adversity. As it degraded the weakest of Austrian princes, so it tarnished

* Schmidt, iii. 22.

the glory of the most illustrious. For more than a century the tranquillity of Europe had been constantly interrupted by their intrigues and usurpations. To oppose their attempts at universal empire, the plains of Europe had been covered with armies, her seas had been blackened with fleets. Her strength had been exhausted, and her industry fettered, by the enormous burdens, which the imperious dictate of self-preservation had compelled her sovereigns to impose. It was in vain to look for permanent tranquillity, or to form enlightened plans for the encouragement of those arts and manufactures which give vigour, and lustre, and stability to nations, while there existed a power in the very centre of Europe, continually occupied in fomenting jealousy or exciting revolts.

These considerations are supposed by many historians to have inspired the magnanimous resolution, embraced by Henry IV. of reducing the pride and power of Austria within limits so narrow, that it should no longer be able to trouble the repose of mankind. But, as the conduct of mortals, however wise it may appear to a careless observer, is seldom totally exempt from passion or prejudice, we may fairly infer, that ambition, envy, and personal pique, were not inactive in fomenting the animosity of Henry against the house of Austria.*

* Were it possible for posterity, to penetrate the real motives which have influenced the conduct even of the greatest men in the most important transactions of their life, we should frequently discover that caprice or anger, resentment or jealousy, had inspired resolutions, commonly attributed to disinterested magnanimity, patriotic enthusiasm, or refined policy. Thus, in the instance before us, a ridiculous attachment to the young Princess of Condé is supposed to have accelerated the preparations of Henry, impatient to rescue the fugitive beauty from the tyranny of a jealous husband and a bigoted archduchess. The account given by Sully

The weakness and unpopularity of Rodolph, together with the intestine divisions known to prevail in the imperial family, afforded an opportunity for humbling the German branch, too inviting for ambition to neglect; while the disputed succession of Cleves and Juliers, furnished Henry with a plausible excuse, for declaring himself the champion of the protestants. From his first accession to the throne, he had been constantly occupied in preparing for the execution of this important design. By the assistance of Sully, the most virtuous minister that ever directed the finances of any country, funds had been collected, sufficient for the maintenance of a numerous army during many campaigns,* and considerable force had been actually assembled on the frontiers of Germany, prepared to burst into the heart of the empire, when the signal should be given for hostilities.

Thus far the plan adopted by Henry was sagacious and intelligible. But it is difficult to reconcile with our ideas of prudence, the project imputed to him by Sully,† and scarcely less so to discover a

of his behaviour upon learning Conde's flight, serves in a great measure to confirm the suspicion. *Le Vassor, Historie de Louis xiii. i. 18.* — *Memoirs de Sully, Let. xxvii.* Of the former of these works, *Madam Du Defand* speaks in the following terms, *Letters ii. 114.* Je continue la lecture de *le Vassor*, et je'n suis toujours contente. Je ne me soucie pas de Louis xiii. mais je m'interesse aux evenemens de son regne; on y voit le dessous des cartes de tout ce qui se passait; et le style de l'auteur me plait infiniment; il doit paroître trop simple et ingenu aux beaux esprits; mais il est tel que le peuvent desirer les amateurs de la verité, on l'accuse d'être partial, et c'est ce que je ne trouve point; il l'est certainement entre le vice et la vertu; il loue les honetes gens, et tombe a cartouche sur les fripons, et les scelerats; en un mot, il dit ce qu'il pense, et n'écrit pas pour se faire admirer.

* Sully gives a very interesting account of a conversation that passed on this subject between the king and himself, *xxvii.*

† *Mem. xxx.*

satisfactory clue to that strange political enigma. That the king should have exerted every sinew to weaken the power of an hereditary rival we may consistently with reason believe. But to suppose him capable of cherishing the chimerical expectation of giving permanent peace to the world, by organizing Europe into a Christian confederacy, and establishing among its sovereigns a balance of power so nicely constructed, that its springs and movements could never be deranged, is to imagine the greatest of the Gallic monarchs, to have united the romantic folly of the hero of Cervantes with the visionary enthusiasm of Plato.

Desirous, however, of giving the appearance of justice to a contest, on the issues of which his future reputation in great measure depended, Henry directed the German ambassadors to explain their griefs and resources to the President Jeannin,* on whose probity and prudence he could rely. This formality having been complied with, and an opinion delivered completely in union with the wishes of the king, he graciously promised to undertake this defence with the zealous ardour of friendship.

Yet no sooner had he embraced that generous resolution, than various obstacles arose in a quarter, where he was least prepared to encounter them. Instead of experiencing the cordial confidence, to which his well-known integrity entitled him, he discovered, in the proceedings of his German allies, such evident symptoms of jealousy, as would have induced a soul, less magnanimous than his own, to have abandoned them instantly to destruction. Instead of adopting his schemes with zeal and una-

* *Negociations du pres. Jeannin, i. edit. in 12.*

nimity, they ungenerously attempted to confine their joint operations to the recovery of Juliers. Neither was their behaviour in the field less a subject of mortification to Henry.

In conformity to the plan, which he had sagaciously traced, religion was to be excluded from the dispute. This, indeed, was a necessary stipulation; both in order to prevent the contest from assuming that sanguinary character, too natural to wars undertaken in defence of speculative opinions, as well as to secure himself from the imputation of apostacy, to which his known predilection for the doctrines of Calvin might otherwise have given a semblance of veracity. But he unfortunately discovered, that he was connected with men, rapacious as avarice could make them; whose passions and enmities were equally insensible to the persuasive voice of reason, or the dictatorial mandate of authority. Stimulated by hatred, and the thirst after riches, they devastated the dominions of the ecclesiastical princes with the savage fury of banditti; burning the towns and villages with remorseless barbarity, and carrying away every thing that could tempt their rapacity.*

Terrified at the rapid progress of the enemy, who were already masters of Alsace, and of the greater part of the duchy of Juliers, the catholics began seriously to tremble for the issue of a contest, in which their religion and property were equally concerned, when they were suddenly relieved from all their disquietude by the knife of a desperate fanatic.† Henry, when upon the point of depart-

* Schmidt, iii. 24.

† Malgré les grands préparatifs du roi, la maison d'Autriche paraissait tranquille. On ne s'appercevait pas qu'elle pensait à se defendre contre

ing to join his army, was stabbed by an obscure assassin, in the midst of his capital, and in open day;* and with him expired that great and energetic spirit, which gave life and animation to the confederacy.

The loss of such a man must, at all times, have been considered as a serious misfortune to the world; but it proved doubly calamitous at a moment, when he was preparing to overturn the empire of superstition, and to check the ambition of Austria. Distressed and confounded at the greatness of their misfortune, the allies were overwhelmed with dismay. Though assisted by a body of Dutch, under the Prince of Orange, and by fourteen thousand French, commanded by the Mareschal de la Chatre, their operations were conducted with so much languor,† that nothing important was achieved. Troops, indeed, might have been procured for more extensive operations, but friends were wanting for their equipment. Though never deficient in expressions of zeal, when declarations alone were required, the free cities soon grew disgusted at the burthen to which they were subjected, and loudly complained, with a truly mercantile policy, that although they were constantly called upon for additional supplies, their advice was scarcely ever demanded.

Hence, the situation of the “Evangelical Union” became daily more precarious. Conscious of their

un armement qui la menacait ouvertement; soit *qu'elle attendait le coup que changea, bientôt la face des affaires*, &c.—Le Vassor, I. 25. What an insinuation is this against the honour of Austria!

* What an inconsistent people are the French? They murder the most humane and benevolent of princes, and suffer a tyrant to insult them with impunity.

† Bougeant, i. 29.

inability long to keep the field, and alarmed for the event of a negociation, their leaders were at a loss on what to determine; convinced that the difficulties attending protracted hostilities, were scarcely inferior to the danger of laying down their arms in presence of an exasperated enemy. Fortunately, however, for them, the pride and expectations of the catholic league were so much abated, that they listened with eagerness to the first proposals for an accommodation. Without deigning to attend to the emperor's orders, to drive the protestant army out of Alsace, and to reduce the sequestered provinces under his authority, the Duke of Bavaria concluded a treaty, by which it was stipulated, that Alsace should be evacuated, and the forces on both sides reduced as low as mutual security would admit; but the right of succession, the most important point in the estimation of Rodolph, was expressly reserved for future discussion.

Notwithstanding their consequence was materially improved by the death of their illustrious champion, the protestant league still continued to be formidable. Yet such was Rodolph's imprudence, that he allowed his passions to hurry him on from error to error, till they placed him in a situation more perilous than that from which he had so recently escaped.

In order that the reader may form a competent judgment of the dissensions which prevailed in the imperial family, it becomes necessary to revert to various occurrences, which it was impossible to introduce with chronological precision, without interrupting the chain of events.

Among the extensive dominions of the house of

Austria, none were more frequently convulsed by internal commotions, or more exposed to external aggression, than the half-civilized provinces of Hungary and Transilvania. The impossibility of protecting an extensive frontier against the formidable irruptions of the Turks, induced Ferdinand I. to resort to the dishonourable expedient of paying an annual tribute to the Porte, as the price of precarious peace.* This impolitic measure, by proclaiming the weakness of the Austrian power, served as an additional temptation to the turbulent barons to erect the standard of rebellion, whenever a favourable opportunity occurred for extorting fresh concessions from their feeble sovereign, under pretence of asserting their ancient immunities.

The Hungarian constitution was, however, far from despotic. When the nation submitted to the dominion of Austria, they reserved to themselves many valuable privileges, and particularly that of electing their sovereigns. This right, however, was frequently abused, by a people addicted to innovations of every kind, and impatient even of legitimate restraint. The facility of obtaining support from the restless ambition of the Ottomans, encouraged the Magnates to revolt the moment their pride was offended. Whenever they were disgusted at the severity of Austria, they threw themselves into the arms of the Turks: but, equally averse from every species of subordination, they no sooner felt the weight of the Mahomedan yoke, than they returned with alacrity to their former master. These frequent revolutions served to augment the general turbulence, and to weaken the attachment

* Isthuanfius, 277.

of a volatile people for any particular dynasty. Instructed, by experience, that little confidence was due to either of the rival empires, to which they alternately resorted for protection, they began to seek among their own nobility for wealth and power, and military skill, to justify the national suffrage. Yet such was the danger attending unsuccessful rebellion, that the aspiring chieftain was compelled to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Porte, ever ready to inscribe the royal suppliant on her list of tributary sovereigns.*

Ferdinand and Maximilian had exhausted the strength of their other dominions, to secure the tranquillity of Hungary and Transilvania, threatened alternately by the Ottoman arms and the flame of rebellion: nor could this be accomplished without rendering those unfortunate provinces the theatre of incessant hostilities. Provoked, that a spirit should any where exist, less servile than that which he had been taught, by the severity of German discipline, to consider as the only one becoming a subject, the Austrian soldier invariably treated the Hungarian peasants as rebels, unworthy of the protection of the laws; while penury too often compelled the sovereign to connive at the depredations of troops, whom he would otherwise have been unable to satisfy,

In this precarious state of anarchy and war, the crown descended to Rodolph, whose understanding and temper were equally unfit to provide an adequate remedy for the evil.† Desirous of curtail-
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* Schiller, as usual, draws an animated picture of this tumultuous scene. B. i.

† Isthuanfius, xxv.

the immense expense required for the protection of those distant possessions, he transferred the provinces, bordering on Croatia, as imperial fiefs, to his uncle Charles, Duke of Stiria, flattering himself, that the contiguity of that prince's territory might enable him to repel the inroads of the Turks with greater facility. Having constructed a fortress, which, under the name of Carlstad, is become the capital of Croatia, Charles parcelled out the territory, which had been ceded to him by the economizing timidity of his nephew, into various military fiefs, and conferred them on adventurers of every description, whose restless spirits, or daring crimes, had deprived them of a national asylum. These savage tribes, progressively spreading over the inhospitable forests of Sclavonia, increased so rapidly, that they soon supplied the Austrian armies with those formidable squadrons, which, under the barbarous denominations of Croats and Pandours, have since acquired an odious celebrity in the ferocious annals of plunder.

The eastern frontier being thus secured, Rodolph conducted himself with as much indifference to public affairs, as if the safety of Hungary had been the only object which deserved his paternal regard. Inattentive alike to the comforts and prejudices of a high-minded people, he neglected to gratify the vanity of the Hungarians, by appearing in person at the national diet. He likewise suffered the highest offices of the state, even that of Palatine, to remain vacant, at a moment, when by a judicious selection he might have secured the allegiance of the most potent families. And even when awakened from his natural indolence, the manner in which he disposed of those important posts proved a source

of universal discontent, as they were conferred on foreigners, in contradiction to the custom of former sovereigns, if not in direct violation of a constitutional statute. But, while thus shamefully indifferent to the welfare of his people in all temporal affairs, he was far from evincing the same inattention to their spiritual concerns: on the contrary, he attempted to fetter their opinions by a variety of edicts, no less odious for their severity than contemptible for their imprudence. He even permitted the governor, who, like most other ministers in despotic countries, studied to represent the folly as well as the authority of his master, to levy excessive fines on all who refused to conform to the established worship, and even to condemn to cruel and ignominious deaths such as presumed to murmur at his tyranny.

Anxious, however, if possible, to terminate the quarrel by negociation, before they had recourse to those efficacious remedies, which nature indicates as the ultimate resource of oppression, Stephen Botskai, a magnate, no less distinguished for eloquence than for military science, was sent to remonstrate with Rodolph;* but, upon his arrival at Prague, he was not only denied access to the imperial presence, but was treated by the ministers with so much contempt, that he abandoned every hope of redress. Convinced that submission is a relative duty, dependent on the enjoyment of protection, he resolved to vindicate the national honours, by means more consistent with the spirit of a soldier, than those which had been hitherto

* Isthuani. xxxiii.

employed. In an animated address, he exhorted his countrymen to assert their independence by arms, and offered to partake in every peril to which they might in consequence be exposed. No sooner had he erected the standard of rebellion, (if opposition to a tyrant deserve the name of rebellion) than he was joined by such numbers, that he was in a short time enabled to commence offensive operations. Equally disgusted with the despotism of the emperor, the Transilvanians solicited the aid of Botskai, and found him ready to extend his protection to all, who groaned beneath the yoke of oppression. The efforts of the insurgents were every where successful; and, with the assistance of the Turks, they soon compelled the Austrians to evacuate Transylvania.* This was a proud moment for the victorious Botskai; for he not only conquered, but refused a sceptre. By the command of Achmet, the grand vizier made a public tender of the Transilvanian crown to the triumphant chieftain; but his haughty soul, revolting at the idea of a dependent diadem, rejected with dignity the proffered favour, unless confirmed by the national suffrage; declaring with magnanimity, or at least with prudence, that the only glory, to which he aspired, was to rescue his country from the fetters of despotism.†

Thus, through the indolence and incapacity of the reigning emperor, the Austrian power declined so rapidly, that the most fatal consequences might be apprehended. This alarming crisis, as is usually the effect of augmented evils, produced its remedy, by tempting the members of the imperial family to

* Isthuanf. xxxiii.

† Barre, ix. 354.—Isthuanf. xxxiv.

suspend their private animosities, and cordially to unite in wresting the sceptre from the feeble hand, by which it had been so long disgraced.*

After the death of his brother Ernest,† Matthias (the third son of Maximilian II.) became the presumptive heir of the Austrian monarchy. Educated by the learned and virtuous Busbequius, he had not only acquired a competent knowledge of the most useful sciences, but had been taught to contemplate the actions of men with the enlightened eye of a statesman; while jesuitical artifice had purposely degraded his elder brother into the passive tool of superstition. It could hardly be expected that dispositions so opposite should long agree; and, we accordingly find, even from his early youth, that Matthias was a stranger at the court of Rodolph. Impelled by a bold and enterprizing genius, and the thirst after military renown, he rashly undertook to defend the Flemings against the persecuting bigotry of his uncle Philip.‡ But the result of his endeavours was far from satisfying his own expectations, or those of that brave and generous people, whose rights he attempted to vindicate. After relinquishing a post, which he had filled without credit to himself, or advantage to the nation, he retired to Lintz on a miserable pension.§

The embarrassment occasioned by his own imprudence having compelled the emperor to solicit the advice and assistance of his brother, Matthias again appeared on the political theatre.|| Though invested with the government of Austria, and entrusted with the command of the imperial forces in

* Schmidt, iii. 13.

† In 1595.

‡ In 1580.

§ Bentivoglio Guerra di Fiandra, parte ii. 2.

|| In 1592.

Hungary, at that time invaded by the Ottoman arms, he soon discovered that his return to power was the effect of necessity, and not of inclination; and that, however successful his operations might prove, he could never hope to eradicate from the breast of his brother that inveterate jealousy, which his natural timidity, and the envy of his ministers, had equally contributed to inspire. He therefore resolved, by splendid actions, popular manners, and a strict adherence in all religious disputes to the beneficent maxims of his father, to conciliate the affection of his countrymen, that he might have some foundation more solid to repose on than the precarious friendship of a monarch.

By this artful conduct, for it in reality proceeded from the calculation of interest, and not from the impulse of benevolence, he gradually acquired the public esteem, while Rodolph, degraded by pusillanimity and prevarication, became daily an object of greater contempt.

The moment, for which Matthias had secretly panted, was now arrived.* After repeatedly remonstrating with his infatuated brother respecting the folly of his proceedings, and tendering his services and advice, he considered all the forms of decorum to have been fulfilled, and ventured to throw aside the mask. Anxious however to sanction opposition by the imperious plea of necessity, he assembled the princes of the Austrian family at Presbury;† and, in a studied oration, expatiated on

* In 1606.

† The meeting consisted of his brother Maximilian and his two cousins, Ferdinand and Maximilian Ernest, of the Stirian branch. The resolutions, entered into by the different members, were afterward ratified by the Archduke Albert, at that time sovereign of the Low Countries.

the incapacity of Rodolph, and the consequent evils that must ensue. In this alarming crisis, he said, it became a paramount duty with those, to whom the glory of Austria was dear, to provide against the calamities which threatened to overturn the magnificent fabric, erected by the genius of their immortal progenitors.*

The wishes of his auditors proving in union with his own, Matthias was chosen to defend the dignity of a throne, disgraced and endangered by the indolence and imbecility of Rodolph: and, as a necessary step to the execution of this important trust, he was declared the head of the Austrian family, and invested with all the authority which his colleagues were able to confer; who further engaged to exert their influence, in order to secure his election as King of the Romans.†

Confident in the assistance of such powerful friends, Matthias hastened to avail himself of his popularity, for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to Hungary. By a treaty with Botskai, whom he knew to be labouring under an incurable disease, he allowed him, during life, to retain the whole of Transilvania, together with the eastern provinces of Hungary, upon condition, that after his disease they should return under the dominion of Austria.‡ Delighted as was natural with the successful issue of this negociation, he prevailed on Botskai to meditate a peace with the Porte; and, with his assistance, concluded a truce for twenty years, on terms no less

* Coxe i. 693. Schiller i. Schmidt iii. 13.

† This curious document is preserved by Goldastus, Appen. 223.

‡ Schmidt, 26. Isthuanfius, xxxiv.

honourable than advantageous.* Yet so jealous was Rodolph of his brother's reputation, that he positively refused to ratify the treaty, under pretence, that Matthias had exceeded his power, in granting toleration to the protestants; and that he had sacrificed the honour of the imperial throne to views of private ambition.† However just the accusation in many respects, it was certainly unfounded on the present occasion; and the folly of the emperor, in withholding his consent, was productive of serious mischief. On the death of Botskai, who did not long survive the return of tranquillity, the Transilvanians, disdaining to submit to a monarch who had so recently violated his faith, elected Sigismund Ragotsky for their sovereign.‡ Though highly injurious to the interests of Rodolph, this step was by no means equally prejudicial to the designs of Matthias, because it served to furnish him with a plausible pretext for levying troops: and, without the aid of an army, it was impossible for him to realize the mighty projects which he had conceived. The eyes of Rodolph being at length completely opened to the danger by which he was surrounded, he determined, by the advice of the Spanish court, to which Matthias was particularly odious on account of his conduct in Flanders, to secure the fidelity of the Styrian line, by procuring the reversion of the imperial crown for Ferdinand. With this intent he addressed a rescript to the Germanic states, inveighing in acrimo-

* Upon receiving the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, under the title of a voluntary donation, the Sultan consented to relinquish the tribute so disgracefully paid by Ferdinand I. and his son.—Isthuanfius, l. xxxiv. *Lento et tabifico, hydropes turgentibus omnibus membris, extinctus est.*

† Schmidt, 26.

‡ Ibid.

nious terms against the treachery and ingratitude of Matthias, and calling upon them to protect their constitutional chief against the nefarious machinations of a traitor.

The plan of the emperor was so far successful, that he gained over the Styrian princes, and reduced his competitor to the dangerous alternative of recurring immediately to open force, or renouncing for ever the noblest object of his pursuit. A mind inflamed with the thirst of dominion could not long remain in suspense; but, being fearful of shocking the national feeling by a bold avowal of his design, Matthias endeavoured to conceal his projects under the appearance of zeal for the public welfare. Secure of obtaining the concurrence of the people, if he could once persuade them that he was risking his life in defence of the national faith, he convened the states of Hungary and Austria at Presburg, under pretence of consulting what measures could be pursued to vindicate their honour and his own.* To procure from them the ratification of a convention, which secured their domestic repose, was far from an arduous undertaking; particularly, as he had previously conciliated most of the leading members by various grants, no less liberal than politic. Neither was it difficult to persuade the two nations to unite in a covenant, by which they mutually engaged, not only to carry the treaty into execution, but to regard as enemies to the public good, all who should presume to violate it in the most trifling article.†

Having thus secured the affections of the Hun-

* A. D. 1608.

† Strucius per. x. sect. 7.

garians, and gained over the protestants in Moravia and Austria, long disgusted with the bigotry of Rodolph, he assumed, in his intercourse with the imperial court, a tone of higher authority. In vain did Rodolph, alarmed at the gathering tempest, endeavour to atone for former errors by the most abject concessions. As a temptation to Matthias to suspend his warlike preparations, he offered to his adherents a general amnesty, promising henceforth to treat him with confidence and affection, to redress all the grievances of which his subjects complained, and to ratify the treaty of Vienna.* But it was too late to propose an accommodation, when Matthias, after receiving homage from all the Austrian states, was advancing rapidly toward the Bohemian frontier, at the head of a formidable army.†

Had Rodolph possessed either prudence or courage, his affairs might still have been retrieved; notwithstanding the numerous errors of his administration, the loyalty of the Bohemians was unshaken, and the whole nation would‡ have armed in his defence. But this effeminate monarch was destitute of courage, to avail himself of the enthusiasm, kindled by his distress. Ingloriously preferring the wiles of negotiation to a gallant appeal to the sword, he still continued to treat with the invader, flattering himself by promises to retard his progress, which he was too irresolute boldly to oppose. But though Matthias consented to listen to the proposals, nothing could induce him to suspend his march, or

* Schmidt, 26.

† Ibid.

‡ At the head of the dissidents was the celebrated patriot, Count Thurn, who is destined to act a distinguished part on the following pages.

even to signify his demands in clear and specific language. On the contrary, his claims progressively augmented, in proportion to the fears and weakness of his rival, till he at length extorted from the wretched monarch, a formal surrender of the Hungarian crown, together with the government of Moravia and Austria; and further, compelled his unfortunate brother, by a public document, to declare him successor to the throne of Bohemia.

Elated with the prosperous issue of a contest, in which he had succeeded beyond his most sanguine expectations, Matthias consented to evacuate Bohemia, and returned in triumph to Vienna.* But he shortly discovered, that it was an easier task to wrest a sceptre from the hands of indolence, than to satisfy the expectations of the ambitious nobles, to whose turbulent spirit he had been indebted for victory. The love of independence, which rendered that potent order averse to the government of Rodolph, tempted them to behold with increasing jealousy the authority of a prince, whose power was the effect of usurpation. The states of Austria, being convened for the purpose of taking the accustomed oath of allegiance, demanded the confirmation of many ancient privileges, which time and tyranny had nearly effaced; and farther, insisted that the most ample toleration should be granted to Christians of every description.† In vain Matthias attempted by caresses and promises to appease the gathering storm. The zeal of the petitioners was much too fervid for words to content; and their sovereign had taught them, by his own example,

* July 18, 1608.—Schmidt iii. 20.

† Ibid.

the proper means of obtaining redress. Closely uniting with the Hungarian sectaries, they flew to arms, and insisted upon being placed on an equal footing with the members of the Catholic church. Matthias, alarmed at the impending danger, had recourse to negotiation; an impolitic system, because, in proportion as he acceded to one demand, fresh claims were brought forward more decidedly hostile to the royal prerogative. In his situation, however, all opposition was useless; and, having yielded in one important point, no choice remained but to submit to every thing, or to risk the loss of his sceptre.*

Having thus established their liberties upon constitutional grounds, the states of Hungary declined to interfere in favour of those, with whose interests

* I will not trouble the reader with a minute enumeration of all the privileges which firmness extorted from fear; but shall content myself with mentioning a few of the leading articles, in order to shew, that the time has been, when the subjects of Austria understood the value of liberty. The most important point, and consequently that which was most reluctantly granted, regarded religious toleration; as the people not only insisted that every sect, which had abandoned the communion of Rome, should be allowed to celebrate its respective rites without the smallest restriction, but that the members of it should be placed upon an equal footing with the catholics with respect to all political privileges. The crown of St. Stephen (an easy concession) was never to be removed from Presburg, and a Palatine to be chosen out of four candidates to be presented to the king by the nation; this high dignitary was to exercise all the functions of government in the absence of the monarch, assisted by a council of regency, the members of which were to be alternately nominated by the sovereign and the states. All foreign troops were to evacuate Hungary, as soon as peace was concluded with Turkey. Neither were any fortresses to be garrisoned with Germans, except Raab and Comorn, and even those were to be commanded by Hungarians. And lastly, with laudable prudence it was required, that the Jesuits should never be introduced into the kingdom; and that each ecclesiastical authority in all its branches should be subject to judicial control.—Schmidt, iii. 20.

they had apparently identified their own. Confining themselves entirely to wishes and exhortations, they recommended forbearance to the Austrian deputies, who retired in disgust at their selfish policy, though far more inclined to profit by the example than by the precepts of their ungenerous confederates.

The storm had no sooner abated in one quarter than it collected in another: in Moravia and Austria a flame was kindling, which threatened to spread over all the adjacent provinces. The antiquated pretensions of prerogative, which had so long terrified mankind, were no longer capable of imposing upon the world. Superstition and tyranny march hand in hand; they are the growth of ignorance, and, like all prescriptive usurpations, cannot long resist the lights of philosophy. Matthias was no stranger to this important truth; and, by a popular edict, confirmed every privilege which had been granted to the protestants by Maximilian II.*

That there is no epidemic more contagious than that of liberty, the apprehensions excited in the breasts of courtiers, by the glorious prospect of expanding freedom, may serve to establish as a paramount principle in politics. The prosperous termination of the civil dissensions in Austria and Hungary, encouraged the Bohemians, by similar means, to aspire to similar advantages. In conformity to an engagement contracted with the nation, Rodolph no sooner found himself delivered from the perils of civil war than he assembled a

* Schmidt, iii. 20. Barre, ix. 379.

diet, for the express purpose of taking into consideration the differences which prevailed respecting religion.* Strong alike from unanimity and numbers, the protestants evinced the firm resolution of rejecting all partial concessions, convinced that upon every principle, both human and divine, they were entitled to an equal participation of all constitutional privileges. Misled by the pernicious counsels of the Jesuits, the timid emperor endeavoured to elude the demand ; but, perceiving that the members were too cautious to be deceived, and too honest to be seduced, he dismissed them with marks of displeasure. This hasty measure served only to increase the general ferment.

Without deigning to wait for the consent of their sovereign, the protestants appointed another meeting in the following spring, and actually assembled with the usual forms, notwithstanding the prohibition of Rodolph. The popularity acquired by this decisive step alarmed the weakness of that misguided prince, who, terrified at the idea of a fresh appeal to Matthias, consented to ratify by a solemn decree, or " Letter of Majesty," (as it was emphatically styled) whatever his subjects required. Religious toleration, in its most extensive form, was granted to the sectaries of every denomination, with permission to establish an ecclesiastical consistory for the management of their spiritual concerns, and to found schools and universities for the education of protestant children.† By way of additional security, they were authorized to nominate thirty delegates, who, under the modest appella-

* 609.

† Lotichius de rebus Germ. i. 12.—Schmidt, iii. 21.

tion of "Defenders of the Faith,"* were destined to protect the rights of the people against the encroachments of the royal prerogative. And, lastly, as the most powerful bulwark which prudence could oppose against despotism, a clause was added, annulling every edict that might be eventually issued by the successors of Rodolph, to infringe this great fundamental act, justly regarded by the Bohemians as the palladium of their liberties.†

The constitution of Bohemia had now undergone an entire change, having assumed a republican form. The emperor retained only the shadow of authority, all real power being vested in the deputies, who exercised their jurisdiction with the arrogance of men unaccustomed to rule, and ambitious of popularity, without attending to the means by which it was acquired.

Rodolph, however, was now so fallen, that he was daily exposed to fresh indignities. Scarcely had he signed the "Letter of Majesty," when a deputation arrived from the united protestants of Germany, upbraiding him with the miseries to which their country had been exposed through his neglect and incapacity, demanding redress for every grievance; and threatening, in case of the smallest delay, to proceed themselves to a general reform. Rodolph, as usual, attempted by promises to suspend the blow, solemnly engaging, within a limited period, to correct the abuses of which they complained. But, whether this was indeed the effect of contrition for past misconduct, or merely in-

* Puffendorf, i. 20.

† A detailed account of the whole transaction may be found in Goldastus, ii. apperi. 368.

tended to postpone the evil, it is difficult now to determine; because the troubles which embittered his latter days, would at all events have prevented his fulfilling the compact.

The injuries which the emperor had received from Matthias were too poignant for time to obliterate. All the united efforts of the Austrian family were hardly sufficient to smother the flame, which, in spite of their endeavours, was continually breaking out in fresh contentions. The object of the latter, in suffering his brother to retain even the shadow of power, was clearly to prevent the desertion of his adherents; while that of the emperor was evidently to deceive the adverse party, by an appearance of moderation, that he might avail himself of the confidence which his affected levity inspired, to crush Matthias at a moment when he was unprepared to resist.*

No sooner had the latter disbanded his forces,† than Rodolph, believing the fortunate instant to be at length arrived, formed a plan for his brother's destruction. The Archduke Leopold‡ was still at the head of a considerable army, originally intended to oppose the Evangelical Union. This prince was lately become a great favourite with the emperor; not so much on account of his personal merit, as because he was naturally the rival of Matthias and Ferdinand, both of whom Rodolph was desirous of excluding from the throne of Bohemia.§ The right of election, so highly cherished as the darling privilege of the nation, might

* Schmidt, iii. 25.

† 1610.

‡ Leopold was the younger brother of Ferdinand II.

§ Schmidt, *ibid.*

conduce, he thought, to facilitate this design; and, by prudently availing himself of a popular prejudice, he hoped at once to flatter the vanity of his subjects, and to gratify his own resentment. The only thing wanting was a military force, and that was fortunately at the disposal of Leopold. Under various pretences the troops were kept together till the plot was ripe for execution; but no sooner were the preparations completed, than the soldiers were purposely left destitute of all the necessaries of life, that distress might excite them to plunder. Rendered desperate by hunger, they made a sudden irruption into Bohemia, spreading terror and desolation like a destructive hurricane.*

Notwithstanding the solemn protestations of Rodolph, his well known duplicity excited a strong suspicion, that Leopold was acting with his approbation.† Convinced that, by the assistance of a mercenary army, he was preparing to annul the concessions so recently made, the defenders summoned the protestants to join the national standard, and sent to implore the protection of Matthias.‡

A request so agreeable to his secret wishes was obeyed with alacrity by that ambitious prince. Putting himself at the head of a numerous army, destined to reduce the insurgents in Hungary, he advanced toward Prague, which was immediately evacuated by the troops which Leopold had introduced into the city by treachery.§ Nothing now obstructed the progress of Matthias, who entered the capital amidst the shouts and acclamations of a delighted populace, who hailed him as

* Mitbillier, iv. 171.

† Schmidt, iii. 25.

‡ Ibid.

§ Coxce, i. 719.

the deliverer of their country.* But, previously to his arrival, Rodolph had been stripped of all authority, and confined a close prisoner in his palace.†

Having rescued the Bohemians from all their fears, it remained for the victor to receive the recompense due to his services. This, however, could not be effected, unless his pusillanimous brother resigned the crown; because several of the German princes had declared their intention of supporting Rodolph, in case rigorous measures should be employed. This threat, however, was in great measure illusory, since it failed to intimidate the states, secretly encouraged to accomplish the important work by the exhortations and offers of the "Evangelical League."‡ Sensible of the advantages to be derived from their present situation, the Bohemians resolved to reduce the royal prerogative within such narrow limits, that it should be no longer an object of terror. Incapable of asserting any right to the crown, except that of the national suffrage, Matthias was constrained to ratify the right of election, so warmly disputed by his predecessors, and to admit as constitutional the wildest claims which the enthusiasm of freedom could assert.§

Nothing now seemed wanting to confirm his authority, except the title of sovereign; and Rodolph was accordingly summoned, by a deputation from the states, to absolve his subjects from their allegiance. To fulfil a condition so humiliating to pride

* Schmidt, iii. 25.

† Pebzel, 654.

‡ Khevenhuller, vii. 102.

§ Barre, ix. 403.—Schmidt, iii. 26.

was a trial too severe for the degraded emperor; though destitute of courage to vindicate his authority, he was weak enough to betray his feelings with the petulant fury of a child. After repeated refusals to execute the deed, he subscribed his name in a transport of rage, then blotted the writing with his fingers, and, throwing down the pen, stamped upon it, as the passive instrument of his disgrace.*

Neither was this the termination of his misfortune. Unable to subsist upon the scanty pension allotted for his maintenance,† Rodolph implored the electors to interfere in behalf of their degraded sovereign, nor to suffer the chief of the Germanic body to languish in poverty and contempt; but, instead of receiving consolation, as he fondly expected, he met with bitter reproofs. They upbraided him with being the author of his own misfortunes, by listening to the advice of improvident ministers, of whose incompetence they had so frequently warned him; and concluded, by exhorting him to summon a diet, in order to take into consideration the disastrous state of public affairs, and to elect a king of the Romans.‡

This proposal gave a fatal blow to the hopes of Rodolph, who seems to have regarded it as a salutary admonition to abdicate a crown which he had so long dishonoured by his weakness. Too timid

* Schiller i.—Schmidt, iii. 26.

† According to Coxe, the annual sum of four hundred thousand florins (about forty thousand pounds) was destined for his support, with permission to reside in the palace at Prague. Schmidt reduces the pension to 300,000; but, provided a tyrant be deposed, it is not material what sum is allotted for his subsistence.

‡ Barre, ix. 405. Schmidt, iii. 27.

to repose, and too proud to submit, he attempted, by artifice, to elude their demand; but perceiving that his character was too well understood, for equivocation any longer to avail, the apprehension of losing the imperial crown occasioned so violent a dejection of spirits, that it soon conducted him to the grave.* That he should have parted with life without much regret, the misery which accompanied it may induce us to believe; but, that he should have displayed the serenity of a Christian hero, in his latest moments, as some writers affirm, is a fact which we cannot so readily admit; because he possessed neither fortitude to overcome the terrors of death, nor virtue to make it acceptable.†

* A. D. 1612.

† The character given of Rodolph, at the commencement of his reign, has, I conceive, been fully justified by his subsequent conduct; yet such is the force of flattery, that even this contemptible pageant of a king has found a panegyrist; and his administration has been celebrated by a Bohemian historian (not a contemporary one) as the golden age of his country. Was this intended as a satire upon his successors, or must we say with a lively poet—

“ Dans le pais des aveugles les borgnes sont rois ? ”

He is thus painted by Pleffel with characteristic brevity:—“ Il meurt haï des uns, méprisé des autres, abandoné de tout le monde, et plaint de personne.” ii.

CHAP. III.

Matthias succeeds to the imperial throne.—Difficulties to which he is exposed.—He, at length, yields to the demands of the protestants, and consents to the election of a King of the Romans.—Character of Ferdinand, Duke of Styria.—Fresh commotions in Bohemia.—The insurgents, headed by the Count of Thurn, at whose instigation the council of regency is deposed; its leading members being thrown from the windows of the castle.—Moderation of Matthias completely frustrated by the violent temper of Ferdinand.—Death of Matthias.

NO motive seems to have operated so powerfully upon the minds of the electors, in raising Matthias to the imperial throne, as the terror inspired by the Mahomedans. In that paramount passion all inferior considerations were absorbed; and, however they might fear the authority of an emperor, possessing Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria, their dread of the Turks was much greater.*

The talents displayed by the new emperor, in situations peculiarly trying, inspired hopes that the inglorious reign of Rodolph would be succeeded by one of prudence, vigour, and activity. But the conduct of Matthias soon dispelled the pleasing illusion, and proved to the world, that it is far easier for a man to censure others than to act wisely and virtuously himself.

Having attained the summit of his ambition, Matthias began to exercise his authority for the humiliation of those, to whose support he was indebted for a sceptre. It was by favouring the protestants that he supplanted his brother, and an

* Barre, ix. 413.—Schmidt, iv. 1.

ample confirmation of all their privileges was naturally expected in return. An enlightened spirit of toleration has rarely graced the scanty catalogue of Austrian virtues. Matthias had assumed it as an expedient necessary to facilitate his plans, but in his heart he was as much an enemy to religious freedom as the most bigoted tyrant of his family.* Relying on the deceitful basis of popularity, he flattered himself to direct the turbulence of contending sects, as caprice or interest might suggest; but the first diet which met manifested an attention to the public weal, which entirely frustrated the fallacious expectation. By prudently withholding pecuniary supplies, till all their complaints were redressed, the protestants shewed, that they were no less inaccessible to the temptations of interest than deaf to the suggestions of fear.

Persuaded of the impossibility of extorting money either from the generosity or the apprehensions of the Germanic body, Matthias addressed himself to his hereditary subjects: but the application was attended with no better success. Instead of finding them grateful for the privileges formerly conferred, as the recompense of their disloyalty toward his brother, he was surprised to discover that they still regarded him in the light of a debtor, and considered the diadem, which they had placed on his brow, as an obligation never to be requited. †

* Greatly as I admire the talents of prince Eugene of Savoy, I cannot subscribe to his opinion of the Austrian family. *Il n'y a pas un seul de la maison d'Autriche qui ait été méchant, excepté Philippe II. toute sa vie, et une ou deux fois, Ferdinand II.* With respect to the latter, I should reverse the sentence, and say, that there are very few actions in his life, which do not deserve the severest reprehension.—*Memoires du Prince Eugene*, 150.

† Schmidt, iv. I.

With opinions, differing so materially upon essential points, no permanent cordiality could subsist. In Bohemia and Hungary the same spirit prevailed: in the former, a diet was loudly demanded to examine into the national grievances, the minds of the protestants being sorely exasperated by some imprudent restrictions, which, if they did not amount to positive violations of their chartered rights, were highly offensive and impolitic. The latter had suffered too severely, from the calamities of war, to sanction a plan, submitted to the states by the Austrian ministers, for the recovery of Transilvania, where Bethlem Gabor, confiding in the splendour of the Turkish crescent, bade defiance to the eagle of Austria.*

Despairing of reconciling the discordant interests, or of conquering the prejudices of the nation, Matthias was compelled to abandon the brilliant projects, by which he aspired to signalize his government; and, availing himself of the amicable disposition manifested by the Porte, he renewed the truce for an additional period of thirty years.†

Hitherto the emperor's attachment to the catholic faith, though strongly suspected of bordering upon intolerance, had not been displayed in any overt acts of oppression.‡ But the treatment which he experienced from the different sectaries determined him no longer to preserve appearances, but to conform

* Schmidt, iv. 1. Heinrich, vi. 300.

† This treaty was signed in Vienna, in 1616, by a Turkish ambassador, the first who ever appeared in that city.—Coxe, i. 734.

‡ A general assembly of the protestants was held at Nuremberg, in 1614, in which the Elector Palatine, who had lately married Elizabeth, daughter of James I. King of England, was declared the head of that party, in the place of his deceased father.—Pleffel, ii. 264.

in future to the united wishes of Rome and Madrid. Of this decision no doubt could be entertained, when he imprudently revived the imperial bar against the protestants of Aix-la-Chapelle, who, taking advantage of the general confusion, had deprived the catholics of all share in the government, and transferred it to persons of their own persuasion.*

Persevering in the same oppressive system, he directed the princes of Brandenburg and Neuburg to dismantle Mulheim, which, as joint possessors of the duchy of Berg, they had strongly fortified, and endowed with a variety of religious privileges, to the annoyance and injury of the orthodox citizens of Cologne.† Thirty days only were allowed for the execution of the decree, rigorous penalties being denounced as the punishment of contumacy.‡

Imperial pride must however have contented itself with a new display of authority, had not the spirit of discord begun to spread among the members of the Evangelical Union. Connected alike by interest and fear, the sovereigns of Brandenburg and Neuburg adhered with fidelity to the treaty of Dortmund, while menaced by the armies of Leopold. But no sooner was the danger removed than they quarrelled concerning the division of the spoil, each of them pretending that his colleague enjoyed a larger portion of power than he could legally claim by the articles of partition. Alarmed at the detriment, which must inevitably result to the protestant cause from these unfortunate dissensions, their mutual friends suggested various expedients

* Struvies, 1797. Mitbiller, iv. 180.

† Barre, ix. 418.

‡ Ibid.

for an amicable termination of the dispute. A proposal to combine their discordant interests, by a marriage between the Palatine and the elector's daughter, was nearly brought to a prosperous issue, when their endeavours were frustrated by the violent temper of her father, who, heated with wine, gave a blow in public to his intended son-in-law.* Justly insensed at an insult, which hardly admitted of reparation, the Duke of Neuburg renounced his religion, and, as a means of obtaining the assistance of the Catholic League, embraced the tenets of Rome, and espoused a Bavarian princess.† Neither did his rival hesitate, by a similar sacrifice, to strengthen his cause; but, publicly abandoning the opinions of Lûther for those of Calvin, secured the protection of Holland. Together with the faith of the Vatican, the Palatine, having adopted its characteristic spirit of intolerance, announced his conversion by various acts of persecution. The immunities granted to Mulheim were accordingly revoked, and its fortifications razed, that it might no longer afford an asylum to heresy.‡ This ill-timed schism, converting the contest into a religious dispute, called forth the champions of the adverse creeds in aid of their favourite theories. While Spinola, at the head of a Spanish army, maintained the cause of orthodoxy and of Rome, the prince of Orange conducted his patriot bands to defend the tenets of Calvin.§

* Mitbillier, iv. 180. Schmidt, iv. 3.

† Ibid. Barre, ix. 433.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.*

§ The history of the Dutch revolution, the most glorious triumph of liberty and toleration over bigotry and despotism, might still afford an ample scope for splendid talents, notwithstanding it has been treated by

Both parties appealed to the emperor; the one against the violence of the Dutch, the other against the rapacity of the Spaniards. The infirmities of age had, however, so completely cooled the ardour of Matthias, that he trembled at the idea of involving Germany in the quarrel. Abandoned entirely to their own resources, the contending princes were reduced to the painful necessity of patiently submitting to the depredations of those, whose protection they had improvidently courted; and who, equally deaf to prayers and remonstrances, positively refused to evacuate the towns into which they had been admitted as protectors.*

Though grown indifferent to transactions, in which his personal safety was not immediately concerned, Matthias was far from beholding the interests of his family with equal stoicism. Destitute of children, as well as his brothers,† no prince remained of the house of Hapsburg, to preserve the honours of the German line, except Ferdinand, Duke of Styria. In him, therefore, it was probable that the Austrian dominions would ultimately centre; but it was not likely that he should obtain with equal facility the imperial diadem, unless secured by a previous election; because it was far

so many authors. Strada was biassed by prejudice, and Grotius misled by a pedantic imitation of a great, but affected historian. The compilations of Le Clerc are as dull and uninteresting as it is possible for such a subject to become. Watson's abilities were avowedly inadequate to the undertaking. Neither could the biographer of Philip II. be supposed to treat with adequate justice the disinterested heroism of the house of Orange. Bentivoglio, though perhaps the least defective of any, was restrained by professional shackles; yet it cannot be denied that he is generally candid, and sometimes philosophical, in spite of the Roman purple.

* Schmidt, iv. 3: Struvius, 1203.

† Maximilian and Albert.

from improbable that the King of Spain might become a candidate, in case of a vacancy.

The plan of proceeding immediately to the election of a king of the Romans appears to have originated with Maximilian, the next in succession to the reigning emperor; but many unexpected difficulties arose, before he could bring it to maturity. Matthias entertained so strong an antipathy to the Duke of Styria, that rather than consent to his elevation, he would have almost preferred the risk of having his family deprived of the imperial diadem. Neither was he without apprehensions, that if he should consent to the election of a king of the Romans, all homage would be directed to the rising sun, while his declining star would sink into obscurity, like that of his unfortunate predecessor.* This also was the opinion of Cardinal Klesel, his confidential minister, who strenuously exhorted him to oppose the design, and never voluntarily to expose his latter days to turbulence, neglect, or indignity.† The perseverance of Maximilian, however, ultimately triumphed, and extorted a reluctant assent.

Notwithstanding the prosperous issue of the negotiation, so far as it concerned the cabinet of Vienna, Maximilian had still to contend against the interested obstinacy of the Spanish court. Though delighted at beholding the imperial sceptre secured to a prince, so zealously attached to the catholic religion, Philip III. was by no means disposed, gratuitously, to sacrifice his personal interests even

* Schmidt, iv. 4.

† Ibid.—Khevenhuller, Anon. Ferdin. viii. 894.

to those of heaven itself: but his scruples were at length overcome by a promise, that in the event of the failure of male issue, the Spanish princesses should inherit in preference to those of the German dynasty.* It was also currently reported, that he received from Ferdinand the secret assurance of ceding to him, at his eventual accession, some part of the Austrian territories.†

All impediments being at length removed, by this mercenary compromise between pride and superstition, Matthias presented his cousin Ferdinand to the Bohemian diet, as a prince endowed with every quality requisite to promote the glory and happiness of the nation. His brothers, he said, being childless like himself, and having passed the meridian of life, they had agreed to resign all their pretensions to the Duke of Styria, upon his solemnly engaging never to interfere with the administration of public affairs, till he should be called by Providence to the throne.‡

This flattering appeal to the prejudices of the nation, accompanied by a promise on the part of Ferdinand, to ratify every privilege which had been successively granted to the Bohemians, by the prudence or generosity of his predecessors, pro-

* Schmidt, iv. 4.

† This treaty was signed June 16, 1617, and was the second of the kind concluded between the different branches of the Austrian family; the first having been executed at Brussels, in 1521, between Charles V. and his brother Ferdinand.—Dumont corps diplo. v. p. ii. 299.—Le Vassor asserts, but without naming his authority, that Ferdinand engaged to cede Alsace to Spain, though, on account of the jealousy of the German princes, the agreement was never carried into execution, iv. 86.

‡ Puffendorf, i. 24.

duced an appearance of unanimity, which, considering the character of the man whom they elected, is calculated to excite our astonishment.*

The Count of Thurn alone, with his usual sagacity, pointed out all the dangers to which the protestants might be exposed by conferring the crown upon a bigot; but his warning voice was heard with indifference, by an audience already deceived by the delusions of hope, or influenced by the suggestions of interest. The misery occasioned by the blind zeal of Rodolph seemed already forgotten, though likely to recur in a tenfold degree under the government of a prince, who, to a bigoted attachment to the catholic faith, united eminent talents, persevering industry, and unshaken energy of character. Educated at the university of Ingolstadt, under the direction of the Jesuits, the keen observation of that politic order anticipated the advantages which must infallibly accrue to the orthodox church, could they infect a soul, like that of Ferdinand, with the narrow prejudices of superstition. No effort was accordingly left untried to degrade a genius designed by nature to adorn and elevate the Austrian name; and so successful was the attempt, that he is reported frequently to have regretted, that his splendid destiny prevented him from embracing a monastic life, and exchanging a corruptible for an incorruptible diadem.

Thus trained to become the tool and champion

* According to Pfeffel, the royal bigot had no sooner retired into his private apartment, than he abjured the oath in presence of his confessor, a crafty Jesuit, and received full absolution from the hands of the hypocrite, ii. 269.—If this statement be correct, the title of *flagellum dei* is not applicable to Attila alone.

of the Vatican, it was natural for him to imbibe an inveterate animosity against religious innovators of every description, and often to confound the interests of heaven with those of the catholic priesthood. Such was the effect produced by this early impression upon his future conduct, that he was repeatedly heard to declare, that rather than suffer the purity of religion to be defiled, he would reduce his children to beg their bread from door to door, and perish himself by the axe of the executioner.* With such an education, assisted by the principles which he had before imbibed from his guardian, the Duke of Bavaria, nothing could have prevented him from becoming as odious and contemptible as Philip II. of Spain, but a vigour of understanding, which, under proper discipline, might have raised him to a level with the greatest sovereigns.†

Neither was this the effusion of youthful enthusiasm, but was so engrafted in his nature, that it formed the vital principle of all his actions. No sooner was his zeal emancipated from every restraint, by the death of his father, than he hastily revoked all the privileges which that prudent prince had humanely granted to the protestants, interdicting the celebration of any rites unsanctioned by the papal approbation. During a pilgrimage to Loretto, performed with the pious humility of a hermit, or the foolish fervor of an enthusiast, he solemnly engaged, by an inconsiderate vow, to extirpate heresy from every country, which should be eventually subject to his authority. Proceeding to Rome, he was consecrated by the hands of Clement VIII.

* See Schmidt, iii. 16.

† Ibid.

whose praises and exhortations still farther confirmed this pious resolution.*

The admonitions of the Pope were productive of fruits no less grateful to the Vatican than fatal to the repose of mankind. Upon his return from the capital of Italy, Ferdinand issued an order for the immediate banishment of all protestant divines, and the demolition of all heretical schools and churches; re-peopling the seminaries, which were thus deserted, with the orthodox learning of the Jesuits. Indifferent alike to the wishes and welfare of his subjects, when it came in competition with their external glory, he commanded all persons to evacuate his dominions, who hesitated to embrace

* Guil. Lamormainus, in his eulogium upon the virtues of this prince makes use of the following words, p. 3. "Annos natus non plures viginti, in ipso suscepti regiminis exordio, Laureti in agro Piceno, coram virgine matre, deo vovit, vel cum vitæ discrimine abacturum se in Stiria, Carinthia, Carnisla, sectas, sectarumque magistros. Tertio supra quadragesimum anno, Ugarlæ Bohemiæque jam rex, et Cæsar, idem se in Bohemia, illique regno adjunctis provinciis acturum, cellis (ubi in Stiria et Austriae finibus præcipua religione virgo colitur) sancte, constantique vivit. Tandem octo ante obitum anno obstrinxit se voto, nullis defuturum occasionibus, quas deus dignaretur offerre, quin fidem catholicam in Ungaria, olim ut catholicissima ac piissima, sic sub beatissimæ virginis patrocinio fortissima felicissimaque, protegeret, et modis mediisque licitis ac honestis propugnaret. Ad simile votum edendum innitavit, et induxit e consiliariis eum, cujus opera maxime utebatur, ut scilicet promitteret se advigilaturum, et pro viribus Cæsaris zelo cooperaturum. Haud segnius restituendæ religionis votum deo reddidit, quam concepit. Primo, ut alibi vidimus, Stiriam, Carinthiam, Carniolam, penitus expurgavit. Deinde ex Bohemiæ regno, et Moravia, et ex utraque Austria acatholicos prædicatores omnes dimisit, catholicosque suffecit, eo animorum proventu, ut nonnulli absque temeritate se affirmare posse existiment, Ferdinandi zelo (*crudelitate* might be a more proper expression) ac operacenties centena millia hominum ad ecclesiæ catholicæ gremium et aulas esse revocata; adeoque Ferdinandum omni jure posse, et debere harum provinciarum apostolum dici, aut *Apostolici Imperatoris* cognomento decorari.

the religion of Rome, though a considerable majority of the inhabitants were ardently devoted to the opinions of Luther. The vacuity occasioned by this improvident edict he endeavoured to fill by numerous draughts from the unenlightened forests of Wallachia. Yet so universal was the terror excited by his severity, that these impolitic schemes were carried into execution without producing any violent commotion; the states confining their indignation to fruitless exhortations, and the people expressing their dissatisfaction in ill-concerted insurrections, which served only to establish the authority of their sovereign on a more firm or formidable basis.*

Having secured the reversion of the Bohemian sceptre, Ferdinand addressed his solicitations to the Hungarian diet, where he experienced still fewer obstacles. The right of election being at least tacitly acknowledged by this formal appeal to the nation, all other considerations were hastily sacrificed to the attainment of that favourite object.†

The appearance of unanimity, which accompanied the elevation of Ferdinand, was too deceitful to continue. Scarcely had the Bohemians acknowledged his title, than they found cause to repent their indiscretion.

In the "Letter of Majesty," an article highly important to the safety of the protestants, had been, perhaps intentionally, worded with so little precision, that it was capable of very different interpretations. Though little doubt could be entertained

* Puffendorff, i. 21.—Khevenhüller, Ann. Ferdin. V. Schmidt, iii. 16.

† Schmidt, iv. 7.

that the real meaning of the clause was to extend toleration to every order of citizens; yet, by an illiberal construction, it was possible to restrict it to the possessions of the nobility alone, leaving no better security than the caprice of their masters, to those whom nature had degraded to the condition of vassals.* While the privileges of the people were thus loosely defined, it was natural that they should be exposed to various acts of oppression, particularly when subservient to the illiberal tyranny of an ecclesiastic. So long as power is exercised with a lenient hand, it will ever be entitled to respect; but there is a latent spark implanted by the Almighty in the breast of man, which oppression kindles into a flame; and dreadful is the conflagration, when civil wrongs are still farther aggravated by the fury of religious persecution.

In conformity to the opinion almost universally entertained of the advantages to be derived from the edict of Rodolph, protestant chapels were constructed at Branau and Klostergraben; the former of which was subject to the jurisdiction of an abbot, the latter to the Archbishop of Prague. Affecting to consider the extension of heresy as an infringement of their feudal supremacy, the mitred sovereigns, after ineffectually exerting their spiritual

* The article runs thus: "If any of the united states of the kingdom, who receive the communion under both kinds (i. e. the protestants) should be desirous of building more chapels or schools, in the towns or villages, or elsewhere, it may be done without hindrance or molestation, by the nobility, the members of the equestrian order, and the citizens of Prague, of Kuttenuburgh, and of *all other towns*."—*Maiestat. Briefe* Art. vi.—The words "all other towns," appear to convey a very extensive right, notwithstanding the limited construction of the Austrian civilians, to which Mr. Coxe seems inclined to subscribe, i. 747.

authority, applied to the emperor for redress ; little doubting, in virtue of that tacit compact, which had so long subsisted between the crosier and the sceptre, to find a ready champion in Matthias. A prohibitory mandate was accordingly issued, forbidding the workmen to proceed ; but, by the advice of the defenders, they neglected to obey ; and, force being employed to compel them to desist, a confederacy was formed among the Bohemian sectaries for their mutual defence.*

This decisive measure announced a spirit of independence, which rigour was sure to inflame, but which might possibly have been appeased by moderation. Moderation, however, though strongly inculcated by the precepts and example of the divine founder of the Christian dispensation, is seldom displayed in the actions of those to whom the ministry of that religion is committed. Debilitated by the infirmities incidental to age, the mind of Matthias no longer retained the energy which animated his youthful career. His was the shadow of power only ; every measure of government being, in fact, inspired, if not ostensibly directed, by the inflexible courage of Ferdinand. The system pursued, though less avowedly hostile to the rights of mankind than the unblushing despotism of Charles V. was founded on similar principles ; neither was it less pernicious for being disguised. It was under the prostituted forms of justice, and by the illegal decisions of corrupt tribunals, that the shaft was aimed against civil and religious freedom. The supremacy of the house of Hapsburg over all

* Puffendorf, i. 22.

other powers was the fundamental article of the Austrian creed, while long possession was supposed to have conferred a prescriptive right to the imperial diadem.* These pretensions, which vanity no longer deigned to conceal, were calculated to awaken the jealousy of men, who regarded the head of the Germanic constitution, not as an absolute monarch, presiding over vassals whom an hereditary title had subjected to his sway, but as the chief of a confederacy, composed of princes and states, whom their voluntary choice had deliberately raised to that elevated station, in order to give stability and lustre to the association.

Fortunately, however, for the house of Austria, a large proportion of the German princes still adhered with pertinacity to the papal see; and, though many of them beheld with envy and apprehension the preponderating power of Matthias and Ferdinand, they beheld the progress of the Reformation with still greater abhorrence. To these motives we are compelled to recur for a satisfactory explanation of many subsequent events, since we cannot account, upon any other principle, for the powerful support which princes so unpopular experienced.

The contempt manifested by the protestants for the imperial edict, respecting the demolition of the churches, though highly offensive to the pride of

* In a memorial presented to Matthias by his brother Maximilian, respecting the necessity of electing a king of the Romans, this claim is arrogantly avowed. "The succession to the imperial throne," says that ambitious prince, "depends necessarily upon that to the hereditary states; the one follows the other of course."—*Bedenken herzog Maximilians uber die Romische konigs-wahl*. Moser's *Diplom. und Historis. Belustigungen*. i. 368.

Matthias, might possibly have been suffered to pass uncensured, had not the bigotry of Ferdinand interfered. At his instigation a hasty mandate commanded the buildings to be levelled with the ground. This injunction having been executed by the archiepiscopal officers with little interruption, the abbot was encouraged to adopt a similar process at Brunnau : but his intention having been made public, the people assembled to oppose it. Unwilling however to confide entirely in their own exertions, they sent delegates to Vienna, to explain their motives, and to implore a mitigation of the decree. To listen to the remonstrances of a disaffected people being deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the imperial crown, the deputies were arrested by order of Matthias, and measures undertaken for the immediate suppression of the reformed religion in all abacial domains.*

This act of severity, being justly regarded as a violation of the constitutional act, excited a general ferment. Persuaded that no alternative was left between passive obedience and open resistance, the outraged protestants resolved to conduct themselves with the courage of men, who justly appreciated the value of freedom.

Henry Matthias, Count of Thurn, though descend-

* Barre, ix. 456.

† The precise limits of obedience, and the consequent right of resistance, have been variously fixed by the daring spirit of philosophy, and the subtle casuistry of despotism. *Non nostrum est tantas componere lites.* We will however venture to affirm, that the *people* are not often in the wrong; that the measure of their patience can only be exhausted by the most galling oppression; and that the patriot has oftener found cause to lament the extent of their acquiescence, than to censure the precipitancy of their opposition.

ed from a noble family at Goritz, possessed considerable estates in Bohemia, upon which he usually resided ; because he was there unfettered by many restrictions to which his native country was exposed. Trained to the hardships of a military life, he had acquired celebrity and experience in the Turkish wars. The affability of his manners was equally calculated to captivate admiration and to conciliate friendship. Generous even to prodigality, he gained by his liberality the suffrage of those whom his vigorous understanding and persuasive eloquence might sometimes fail to convince. No less bold in the conception than impetuous in the execution of every plan, he was accustomed from the cradle to the turbulence of faction, and inured to the arts of intrigue. Anticipating the commotions about to ensue, he looked forward with delight to that eventful period, when genius would outstrip the competition of birth ; for his enlightened mind disdained all distinctions, except those of personal merit. Yet while he courted popularity by defending the people against their oppressions, he was too prudent to reject the favours of royalty, when unpurchased by the sacrifice of principle. Hence he was not only entrusted with the custody of the regalia of the crown, a post of profit and honour, but was elevated to the dignity of Burgrave of Carlstein, one of the most conspicuous offices that regal kindness could bestow.*

It would be difficult for any man, endowed with the abilities and the principles of Thurn, long to retain the esteem of a despot, but he enjoyed what

* Schmidt, iv. 5. Schiller, i.

was far more valuable in a patriot's eyes, the esteem and confidence of the nation. The vehemence with which he opposed the election of Ferdinand occasioned the loss of his employment, of which the haughty heir of Austrian power, imprudently giving way to the impetuosity of his temper, deprived him in the heat of resentment. This hasty measure was pregnant with serious mischief; because it not only severed the tie which had hitherto connected him with the court, and softened his aversion to arbitrary power, but, by increasing his popularity, gave him ampler means of revenge. Determined that Ferdinand should repent his folly, he not only employed his versatile talents in augmenting the number of his partisans, but immediately entered into a clandestine correspondence with the malcontents in Hungary, Moravia, and Austria, and further endeavoured to strengthen his party by an alliance with the Evangelical Union.*

The impolicy of the court had opened to Thurn a career of glory which he ardently hastened to enter. In consequence of his office, as one of the defenders, it was his duty to protect the rights of the people against the encroachments of the royal prerogative; and he accordingly remonstrated, in terms of asperity, against the measures adopted by the Austrian government, for the suppression of the protestant worship. With manly eloquence he represented to the people, that nothing could save them from the chains preparing by the enemies of their religion, but fortitude, perseverance, and unanimity. He exhorted them accordingly to summon

* Coxe, i. 746.

a meeting of the friends of freedom, to be held at Prague, to which every circle should be invited to send six delegates, invested with ample powers to establish some plan for the general safety. Such an appeal to the feelings of a generous nation could hardly fail of success. On the appointed day, the deputies met in the capital of Bohemia,* and, after mature deliberation, declared the decree, imprudently issued at the instigation of Ferdinand, to be a fragrant violation of their constitutional rights, and prepared an address to be presented to the emperor, enumerating the grievances of which they complained, demanding complete and instant redress, and requiring that the deputies, who had been illegally imprisoned, should immediately be restored to their liberty.

These resolutions having passed with unanimous approbation, the meeting was adjourned to a future day, when the answer of Matthias was to be taken into consideration.† Meanwhile the delegates, returning to their estates, kept alive the flame which had been recently kindled by the usual arts of intrigue.

The system pursued by the cabinet of Vienna required little exaggeration to render it obnoxious. The reply of the emperor to the remonstrance of the Bohemians was couched in language precisely calculated to increase their apprehensions. Affecting to treat the proceedings of the assembly at Prague as the factious opposition of a disaffected party, he attempted to justify his own proceedings

* March 6, 1618, Schmidt, iv. 5.

† The 21st of May was fixed for that purpose, *ibid.*

by ancient precedents and absolute authorities. Expatiating with delight upon his equity and moderation, he accused his opponents of being actuated by views of personal emolument and the wildest schemes of ambition. Denouncing vengeance against every one who insulted his dignity, he strictly prohibited all public conventions, unless summoned by royal authority, and concluded by promising, that he would shortly visit his Bohemian subjects, and provide for their future security.*

But, lest the substance of his address should prove inadequate to rouse the national spirit, the manner in which it was conveyed to the public ear was the most offensive that arrogance could have chosen. Instead of being delivered, as it ought, to the representatives of the people, by whom the petition was framed, it was directed to the council of regency, an unpopular tribunal, and particularly odious to the protestants.†

The advantages to be derived from this improvident step did not escape the sagacity of Thurn. The insolence of the court, in disdaining the legitimate prayer of the people, afforded a copious theme for popular invective. Too prudent to offend the prejudices of the vulgar, by a direct attack upon the sovereign, that wary patriot levelled the thunder of his eloquence against the unanointed heads of the ministers, accusing them openly of being the authors of the reply presented to the nation in the name of Matthias. Incensed almost to madness by this inflammatory harangue, the minds of the populace appeared prepared for the most desperate un-

* Schmidt, iv. 5.

† Ibid.

dertakings. Dexterously availing himself of the enthusiasm he had excited, Thurn enlarged upon the crimes of the ministers, asserted that it was fruitless to look for the enjoyment of freedom, while Slavata and Martinetz were suffered to remain at the head of affairs;* artfully suggesting, that the propitious moment was arrived, when by imitating the glorious example of their ancestors, they might deliver their country from those inveterate foes to justice, religion, and liberty.†

Thurn was too well acquainted with the capricious movements of popular assemblies, to allow this ardour to evaporate. He gave the signal, and with tumultuary rage the people burst open the doors of the council chamber, where the members of the regency were in close debate. Thurn demanded in a manacing tone which of them had presumed to advise the emperor to treat the petitions of his people with neglect. "If the house of Austria," continued he, "pretends to reign with despotic sway over a nation accustomed to freedom, it becomes requisite for us to assert our rights by methods more efficacious than intreaties."‡

Too prudent to contend against the violence of the torrent by open force, Lubkowitz endeavoured to quell its impetuosity, by apparently yielding to the current. He admitted that the nation had reason to complain, and acknowledged that the royal edict of Rodolph had not been observed, on every occasion, with the strict attention which it merited; but at the same time he assured them, that this had

* The inhumanity of these men toward their protestant vassals had rendered them no less odious to the nation than favourites at court. Schmidt, iv. 5.

† Ibid. Coxe, i. 750.

‡ Barre, ix. 457. Schmidt, ib.

happened without the emperor's knowledge, and even contrary to his intentions ; adding, that all who knew him were convinced that his actions had been invariably dictated by the purest motives, that his heart was animated by the most ardent zeal for the happiness and prosperity of the Bohemians.

This sagacious appeal to the feelings of the populace being ably seconded by the persuasive eloquence of the Burgrave of Prague,* might possibly have produced a temporary calm, had not the haughty souls of Slavata and Martinitz disdained to temporize. Thinking it degrading to the dignity of their exalted stations, to listen to the murmurs of an insolent mob, they upbraided them with disaffection, for having presumed to arraign the actions of their sovereign, and to pry into the secrets of his government.

The fury of the populace was no longer to be restrained ; rushing forward with an impetuosity which nothing could withstand, they seized Slavata and Martenitz, and hurrying them to the window hurled them down with shouts and imprecations into the ditch which surrounded the castle. Fabricius, who occupied the post of secretary, and had been long the object of popular hatred, was consigned to a similar punishment.† Yet, amid the general indignation, the insurgents were governed by a sense of justice, which led them to exempt the burgrave and Lubkowitz from the rigorous chastisement inflicted upon their colleagues. As the

* Schmidt, iv. 5.

† This species of punishment was in some degree founded on ancient precedent, though it appears to have been inflicted upon none but traitors. Mitbiller iv. 186.

height from which they were precipitated exceeded eighty feet, it could hardly have been expected that they should survive the fall; but the ditch being filled with water and mud, they escaped without material injury; an event so extraordinary, that it allowed room for superstition to attribute their preservation to the miraculous interposition of Providence, in favour of men who had courted martyrdom in defence of the orthodox worship.*

This rash action, as might naturally be expected, appeared to the nation in very different lights, according to the views and principles of those by whom its merits were canvassed. By some it was extolled as the noblest effort of indignant patriotism, while others lamented the violence of a measure which precluded every hope of accommodation. That this was in fact the object of Thurn his subsequent conduct disclosed; for he was too well acquainted with the human heart to suppose it possible for imperial pride to accept of any atonement. Aware of the necessity of throwing away the scabbard, when the sword of rebellion was once unsheathed, he was resolved never more to confide in the clemency of a prince whom he had so grievously offended. He therefore ardently strove to convince his associates, that every avenue to negotiation being finally closed, no alternative was left, except to bow their necks like dastards to the axe of the executioner, or

* Lotichius, i. 14. Nani, a Venetian senator, and repeatedly entrusted by the republic with important missions, gives credit to the popular tale. *Il miracolo del successo è convinto dal sito, il cui aspetto dimentisce l'imprudenza di quelli, che con false invenzione hanno procurato di denigrarlo.* lib. iv. Nani's works are to be found in the collection of Venetian historians. T. viii.

to have recourse to arms for their defence. Mounting his horse, he paraded the streets haranguing the people, whose feelings were for the most part in perfect unison with his own. Many, even among those who had till then appeared most zealously attached to the papal see, grew alarmed at the impending storm; justly regarding the protection afforded to their favourite tenets by the bigotry of Ferdinand to be more than balanced by his despotism. Convinced of the danger to which their liberties must be exposed, should he ever mount the throne of Bohemia, they no longer hesitated to unite with the protestants, whose powerful resistance afforded the only hope of defeating his dangerous projects. The happy results of this formidable combination were displayed in the most vigorous counsels; the imperial ministers being deprived of all authority, a committee was chosen of thirty directors, impartially selected from the different classes, to whom all the direction of affairs was entrusted; the unpopular* ecclesiastics, by whose severity the insurrection had been excited, were banished as enemies to their country; the Jesuits were ordered to evacuate Bohemia without the smallest delay, and forbidden ever to return; and measures were taken for immediately placing all the national fortresses in a state of defence, and for raising a considerable body of troops, of which Thurn obtained the command.† Being prepared to resist, they attempted to reconcile the scruples of those, whose vacillating prudence recoiled at mea-

* Puffendorff, i. 22. Narie, iv.

† Schmidt, iv. 5.

sures so decisive, by a studied apology transmitted to the emperor in all the outward forms of respect.*

No external homage could however extenuate the guilt, or dispel the alarm it occasioned. Dismayed at the tempest which appeared to be gathering in every direction, Matthias looked around for consolation or for support, but all his researches were fruitless.† That the affections of the Bohemians were irrecoverably estranged by the intemperate piety of Ferdinand was clearly demonstrated by the alarming rapidity with which the flame of rebellion expanded; but he was still ignorant to what extent the ramifications diverged. Did the Bohemian insurgents act in concert with the protestants of Austria, Moravia, and Hungary? Would the princes, who refused obedience to Rome, espouse their cause? and would the friends of freedom, now thickly scattered over the whole of Germany, repair to the standard of independence? These were questions, which, though involving interests of the highest magnitude, were hidden in impenetrable obscurity. Yet when time or accident threw occasional light upon the gloomy

* The principles on which they attempted to justify the outrage are no less curious than original, as they clearly shew that the cant of fanaticism was by no means confined to the English puritans. "The punishment inflicted upon the imperial ministers," I copy the words of their defence, "is designated in scripture as a proper chastisement for atrocious criminals, and was inflicted upon Jezabel by the chosen people of God."—Schmidt, iv. 5.

† If we believe Lotichius, the remissness of the Emperor in preparing for war almost exceeds the bounds of credibility, since the troubles, which so long convulsed Bohemia, were previously announced by heaven in language too intelligible to be mistaken. These prodigies are related by the pious German with the credulity, if not with the elegance of Livy.—Lotichius de rebus Germ. i. 5, &c.

scene no ray of comfort appeared. The torch of liberty shed its genial light in every district; prescriptive tyranny had lost the magic charm which it derived from ignorance, and which ignorance alone could impart; and the understanding of men began seriously to investigate the origin and object of all legitimate government. Strong symptoms of disaffection were progressively displayed in the hereditary provinces, while preparations were making in various parts of the empire, which indicated a spirit of hostility.

It is said that Matthias, whose active genius was almost subdued by disease and infirmity, was desirous of attempting by lenient remedies to appease the general ferment. This pacific system was warmly recommended by Cardinal Klesel, his confidential minister, who endeavoured to mitigate the zeal of Ferdinand by wise and salutary counsels. But the natural impetuosity of that prince's disposition, when inflamed by religious enthusiasm, disdained the guidance of reason. To compromise with heresy was in his opinion the most heinous offence that an orthodox Christian could commit. Far from being terrified at the impending tempest, he rejoiced that the moment was at length arrived, when the church might recover its ancient splendour; and he returned thanks to the Almighty in a holy transport, for having selected him as the chosen instrument to efface the stain of apostacy. "The ingratitude of the protestants toward the mild Matthias, whose clemency had even exceeded the bounds of duty," he said, "would completely justify, in the eyes of Europe, the utmost severity to which imperial anger could resort. Not satisfied with enjoying more extensive privileges than sub-

jects ever before possessed, many of which were neither consistent with the glory of the sovereign, nor compatible with the safety of the state, they aimed at abolishing every remaining vestige of royal authority, and of establishing in its place that pernicious system of anarchy and licentiousness, which had invariably accompanied the doctrines of Luther and Calvin, when unfettered by salutary restrictions. Insubordination to legal power was the fundamental tenet of those wicked sects, which bid defiance alike to the divine Governor of the universe and to his anointed vicegerents on earth. With an enemy so active, it was both impious and dishonourable to capitulate; because, if from mistaken motives of humanity they were permitted to live, the throne and the altar must perish.* It was alone by extirpating the foes of religion that the catholic faith could be preserved. The crisis to which they were reduced by the temerity of their opponents, enforced the necessity of vigorous resistance, and was therefore to him a situation of triumph. By their own imprudence the insurgents had deprived themselves of the only plausible argument by which their fanatical preachers had hitherto inflamed the minds of their followers; since it must be evident to the world, that they were no longer contending for religious sincerity, but for uncontrolled and unconditional freedom. To the house of Austria, therefore, no alternative remained but tamely to surrender the numerous crowns, the rewards of valour and virtue; or to resort with confidence to those exhaustless re-

* The language of power is always the same, whether employed by the despot or the orator; whether veiled by the religion of Ferdinand or adorned by the fancy of Burke.

sources with which Providence had entrusted it for the glory and welfare of millions. In a contest undertaken in defence of the church they might confidently rely on the divine support, while the confiscated property would furnish abundant funds for defraying the expenses attending the struggle. Even supposing it possible for the rebels to prevail, it was more becoming the dignity of a sovereign to perish with arms in his hand, than, submitting without a struggle to a desperate faction, to fall ignominiously by the axe of the executioner."†

To this system of rashness, which was probably honoured by superstition and pride with the title of dignified and energetic, though strenuously seconded by the vanity of Maximilian, the ambition of the Jesuits, and the bigotry of Spain, Matthias opposed the sober dictates of wisdom, experience, and moderation. Apprehensive, however, that any pacific overtures might be attributed to fear, unless offered at the head of an army, he ordered troops to be levied with the utmost expedition, and appointed Dampierre to command them, a veteran officer, who had acquired a high reputation in Italy. This army, amounting to ten thousand men, was to be reinforced by a band of Spanish veterans, conducted from Flanders by the Count de Bucquoy, a Flemish general, trained to arms by the example and precepts of the accomplished Spinola, and who, after the junction, was destined to assume the chief direction of the campaign.‡

Convinced that, when backed by so formidable a

† Schmidt, iv. 6. Khevenhuller, ix. 82. Schiller, i.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.*

force, he must escape the imputation of cowardice, in preferring entreaty to coercion, Matthias solemnly protested that he had never entertained an idea of infringing the edict of Rodolph, declared himself ready to disband his troops, and to give the Bohemians the most satisfactory pledge for their future security, provided they laid down their arms.*

The character of Ferdinand, however, proved an insuperable barrier in the way of accommodation ; for how was it possible for the protestants to repose the smallest confidence in the promises of a prince so blindly devoted to the Jesuits, that he was supposed to have adopted, in its fullest extent, their diabolical tenet, “ that no promise ought to be binding when made to a heretic.”† Neither was his behaviour at this important juncture in the least calculated to diminish their apprehensions. No sooner did he find himself unable to overcome the pacific resolutions of Matthias than he resolved to remove his confidential minister, to whose advice he imputed this unexpected opposition. Cardinal Klesel was accordingly arrested in the imperial palace, with the knowledge and approbation of Maximilian, and being stripped of his robes without the smallest respect for his sacerdotal dignity, was forcibly conducted to a fortress in the Tyrol, and there detained in the strictest confinement. The rage of the emperor, when informed of the insult thus offered to his authority, deprived him at first of the

* Schmidt, iv. 6. Lotichius, i. 17.—Puffendorf does not quite agree in this statement, but asserts that Matthias required the Bohemians to lay down their arms, in order to entitle them to his clemency. If this be so, it is difficult to deny that they were fully justified in refusing, i. 23.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.*

power of utterance. But a little reflection convinced him, that the indignity to which he was exposed was entirely the result of his own imprudence, in having yielded too easily to the importunities of his family, and consented to the elevation of Ferdinand. That fatal step having deprived him of every thing except an empty name, he thought it most prudent to submit in silence, since he wanted the ability to resist.†

Ferdinand having now obtained a permanent ascendancy in the imperial councils, the Austrian generals received orders to treat the insurgents with all the severity of martial law. Neither were they remiss in obeying the command, but marked their progress in characters of blood, laying waste the country through which they paraded with the wanton barbarity of savages. This ferocious system, far from producing the desired effects, served only to increase the general ferment. Instead of being dismayed at the terrors of war, the spirit of the people augmented with the dangers by which they were surrounded; for they distinctly foresaw the miseries which awaited their unhappy country should the power of Austria be permanently established. Almost every town in the kingdom declared in favour of the defenders, and by vigorous exertions prepared to second the cause of freedom, so that the army of Thurn in a few weeks amounted to upwards of ten thousand men, and was daily receiving additional reinforcements. Desirous of fulfilling the expectations of his countrymen by some signal exploit, that gallant commander determined

† Schmidt, iv. 7. Khevenhuller, ix. 202. Narie, iv.

to attempt the reduction of Budweiss, Krummau, and Pilsen, the only places of strength which still maintained their allegiance to Austria. The second was surprised with little loss; but the activity of the garrison, and the obstinacy of the inhabitants, rendered abortive every effort to reduce the former.* Frustrated in his endeavours to take it by assault, and prevented by the approach of Dampierre from commencing a regular siege, he attacked and defeated the imperial commander in two successive engagements.† Nothing, therefore, was left for the general of Ferdinand, but to remain on the defensive, till the arrival of Bucquoy, who was rapidly advancing to his assistance. This, however, was attended with greater difficulty than the pupil of Spinola expected; because it is inconsistent with the vanity of regular troops to suppose that undisciplined courage can arrest their career. But he found the defiles so strongly guarded, that he was compelled to fight at every step, while the opposing army was continually drawing additional levies from the resentment of the natives, rendered desperate by the outrages of the imperial soldiers.‡

The unpopularity of Ferdinand had prepared the minds of all, who were destined to submit to his haughty dominion, to resort to the standard of freedom. Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia successively declared in favour of the insurgents; but what was considered by their leaders as far more essential to ultimate success, they received considerable reinforcement from the protestant league.

* Lotichius, i. 25.

† First at Czaslau, and then at Lomnitz.—Coxe, i. 756.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.*

With secret satisfaction the members of the Evangelical Union had beheld from its commencement this struggle for independence, and firmly persuaded that their own stability depended upon the event of the contest, they wisely determined to assist the Bohemians. Elated with the honour conferred upon him by being placed at the head of the protestant party, and vain of his alliance with the vainest of kings, the Elector Palatine already indulged in those chimerical projects, which were ultimately productive of such bitter distress. Without deigning to balance the efforts of a confederacy, whose obedience was voluntary, and of course precarious against the gigantic resources of a mighty empire, which had threatened all Europe with fetters, he suffered himself to be guided by the sanguine delusions of hope, expecting, by the assistance of British gold, to be enabled to wrest the imperial sceptre from Ferdinand, and procure a crown for himself.* The Count of Mansfeldt was selected as the fittest emissary to conduct the negociation with the Duke of Bavaria, to whom the crown of the Cesars was offered; neither was a doubt entertained that the splendid prize would induce Maximilian to break his engagements with the Austrian court. The co-operation of a prince so highly esteemed for sagacity and courage, would have given additional lustre to the confederacy, and the influence which he possessed in the electoral college would have tended greatly to facilitate the execution of their designs. The Archbishop of Treves was his younger brother, and of course his suffrage was secure; the Elector of Brandenburg

* Schmidt, iv. 8.

was so firmly attached to the protestant cause, that his support was regarded as certain; and when Frederic mounted the Bohemian throne, which he doubted not of effecting after the death of Matthias, two other votes would be united in his own person. According to this calculation the protestants were secure of obtaining a majority at the approaching election, even supposing Saxony, with characteristic meanness, should sacrifice religion at the shrine of interest. Thus far the plan had a plausible appearance: one important consideration however had been hitherto overlooked, and that was the consent of Maximilian. Too wise to be dazzled by the blaze of glory, which burst so unexpectedly upon him, that prudent prince deliberately weighed in the scale of reason the many difficulties which accompanied the undertaking. The event of the contest was at best uncertain, even admitting his allies to act with greater unanimity than is usual in similar situations. But allowing every thing to succeed according to their fondest expectations, what happiness could he derive from a triumph, which must infallibly ruin the catholic party, and exalt a rival religion on its ruins? Such were the motives which induced the Duke of Bavaria to decline the perilous honour, though eagerly pressed by the protestants.†

Though frustrated in his attempts to seduce the cautious Bavarian, Frederic resolved never to aban-

† Barre, ix. 475. Schmidt, iv. 14.—According to Le Vassor, a warm debate took place in the French cabinet, respecting the policy of transferring the imperial sceptre to the house of Bavaria. But the timidity of Lewis presented obstacles which no arguments could at that time overcome.—*Histoire de Louis*, xiii. 220.

don the design of excluding Ferdinand from the imperial throne; and he accordingly addressed himself to the Duke of Savoy, whose unbounded ambition, stimulated by inveterate animosity against the Spanish court, seemed to promise better success. Undecided at first what course to pursue, that crafty statesman for some time fluctuated between ambition and prudence; and even when the latter prevailed, he wanted candour to declare his resolution. The advantages to be derived from attracting the attention, and the forces of Spain, to objects remote from Italy, were inducements too powerful for Cisalpine politics to resist, even when purchased at the expense of integrity. He accordingly determined not to frustrate the expectations of the protestant princes by a hasty refusal, but by protracted negotiations which he might terminate at pleasure, to establish, if possible, a permanent interest with the party.† Anxious also to attach them more firmly to his cause by the ties of gratitude, he furnished subsidies sufficient for raising a body of four thousand men, to be left at the disposal of the Elector Palatine, and commanded by Mansfeldt.

Mansfeldt, so deservedly celebrated among the greatest warriors of that warlike age, is commonly supposed to have been the natural son of Ernest, Count of Mansfeldt, who succeeded the Duke of Parma in the government of the Netherlands;‡ but, according to the opinion of some historians, his birth was legitimate, though his mother was induced from prudential motives to conceal her marriage, lest her

† Coxe, i. 758.

‡ Bentivoglio Guerra di Fiandra, iii. 1.

husband should be injured in his sovereign's opinion, for having contracted an alliance with a plebeian beauty.*

At all events, it is immaterial to investigate a subject which can lead to no important results; since all that he inherited from his father was an illustrious name. By nature, however, he was more kindly treated, since she endowed him with every heroic quality that can adorn or elevate the human mind; and thus highly gifted, sent him into the world to make his fortune by courage, genius, and his sword. By several of the catholic writers he has been compared to Attila, and in some points the comparison may hold. No less brave and enterprising than the King of the Huns, he considered nothing too arduous for valour to accomplish. Without fortune, without territories, and without troops, he bade defiance to the stupendous power of Austria, and, in spite of all the difficulties which he had to encounter, supported the contest, with various success, through many bloody campaigns. When compelled to yield to superior numbers, he rose like a giant refreshed by sleep; while his reputation, augmented with every defeat, because no disaster could ever reduce him so low, that he ceased even for a moment to be formidable. Not less prompt in discovering some unexpected resource, than rapid in the execution of his plans, he conducted a retreat with such masterly skill, that he often eclipsed the glory of the victor. Disdaining repose, and the inactive pleasures of a luxurious life, he turned his thoughts exclusively to military studies. The bustle

* Schmidt, iv. 8.

of a camp was congenial with his feelings; the thunder of cannon was music to his ear. Capable of supporting, with unwearied patience, the meridian ardour of an Italian sun, or the nocturnal blasts of a Bohemian winter, neither fatigue, nor hunger, nor the longest marches performed on foot, could subdue his constancy. Bred from the cradle to the profession of a soldier, he commenced his military career in the Austrian army, and served under Leopold against the Evangelical League: but being either dissatisfied at finding his merit neglected, or induced by his partiality toward the tenets of the reformers, he shortly abandoned the Imperial service, to enter into that of the Union.* Such a man was eminently calculated to shine amid the storms of civil commotions; but, unfortunately for mankind, his inventive genius imparted to the world a fatal lesson; which, matured by the ferocious ambition of Wallenstein, increased the resources and the horrors of war.

No event could have proved more gratifying to the protestant leaders, than the offer made them by the Duke of Savoy, since it afforded an opportunity of assisting the Bohemians, without subjecting the people to additional burthens. Mansfeldt had no sooner assembled his troops, than he entered Bohemia; and, being joined by numbers of the warlike natives, he determined to open the campaign by some signal exploit, and laid siege to Pilsen, the second fortress in the kingdom,† which surrendered after an obstinate defence. By this acquisition, he not only secured to his army a safe retreat,

* Barre, ix. 462. Schmidt, iv. 8.

† Lotichius, i. 37.

in case of any sudden reverse, but totally disconcerted the schemes of the enemy, by compelling Dampierre to fall back upon Austria, and Bucquoy to seek shelter under the cannon of Budweiss.*

Persuaded of the impossibility of intimidating men who fought in defence of their dearest rights, Matthias at length prepared to vindicate by arms his insulted authority. Relying upon the apparent justice of his cause, he convened together the Austrian states, in hopes of obtaining the necessary supplies; but, instead of meeting with servile addresses of thanks, for the honour which he had done them in explaining his necessities, complaints and remonstrances were only heard; for experience had shewn, that the only effectual way of procuring redress was to withhold subsidies till it was granted.

Neither was the application made to the catholic princes productive of better success. Alarmed at the prospect of civil commotions, they warmly recommended an accommodation; and in the critical situation in which Matthias was placed, a wish was almost equivalent to a command. Convinced that nothing but ruin could result from a contest commenced under such unfavourable auspices, the emperor began seriously to think of accommodating every difference by negociation. Many difficulties however occurred during the treaty, both from the bigotry of Ferdinand, and the turbulent temper of the Bohemians. These obstacles being surmounted by patience and perseverance, it was mutually agreed, that plenipotentiaries should immediately repair to Egra, and continue the conferences under

* Schmidt, vi. 2.

the mediation of the Electors of Mentz and of Saxony, and the Palatine and the Duke of Bavaria.*

This flattering prospect was suddenly clouded by the death of Matthias, whose debilitated constitution was unable to struggle against the evils to which he was exposed. With his latest breath he recommended moderation;† but it is rarely the lot of such exhortations to produce a lasting impression, particularly when the admonition has been uniformly contradicted by the former practice of the expiring penitent; and, unfortunately for the world, neither the example of Matthias, nor the disposition of Ferdinand, was calculated to give them a better chance of success.

* Puffendorf, i. 25. Lotichius, i. 39.

† Barre ix. 466.

CHAP. IV.

Accession of Ferdinand II. Critical situation in which he was placed.

His firm and resolute behaviour.—The Bohemians renounce their allegiance, and confer the crown upon the Elector Palatine. Bethlem Gabor declares in his favour, and enters Hungary.—Vienna besieged.—Measures adopted by the Union and by the League.—Imprudence of Frederic strongly contrasted with the wisdom and perseverance of his rival.—The Hungarians defeated, and Vienna saved.—The protestants arm, and their example is immediately followed by the catholics. Dissensions which prevail among the former conduce to the success of the latter.—The Duke of Bavaria invades Bohemia.—Measures pursued by James I. King of England, and by Lewis XIII. King of France.—Spinola enters the Palatinate, and meets with little opposition.—Distress of Frederic; he is compelled to retire to Prague, and being defeated by the Imperialists in a decisive battle, abandons his kingdom for ever.

THIS introductory sketch will supply the reader with such preliminary information as may be requisite to prepare him for the stormy scenes which are about to ensue. In future I shall proceed with greater circumspection, and endeavour to represent succeeding events under all their different bearings.

The accession of Ferdinand to the imperial throne may be regarded as the signal for that sanguinary contest, which depopulated Germany during the calamitous period of thirty years, reducing to ashes many of her noblest cities, and converting her luxuriant and populous plains into wild and solitary deserts.

Having previously obtained the Hungarian sceptre, and a reversionary title to the throne of Bohemia, Ferdinand naturally considered himself as the legitimate sovereign of both kingdoms, after the

demise of Matthias. Maximilian also was dead, and Albert having renounced every claim to Austria, Ferdinand flattered himself that nothing could resist his authority, but that the wished-for period was at length arrived, when the religion of Rome was about to triumph over every sect, which had been impiously suffered to insult its purity, by the weakness or the indifference of his predecessors.*

Such appear to have been the feelings of Ferdinand, but those of his subjects were widely different. Considering themselves to be released from every tie by the death of Matthias, they resolved to establish their constitutional rights on a solid foundation.†

In the kingdom of Bohemia the arms of the insurgents had been every where triumphant; and, of all her cities, Budweiss alone afforded a solitary example of loyalty. Inflamed with similar zeal, Moravia was preparing to shake off the yoke; Silesia and Lusatia were already in arms, incensed at the refusal of the court of Vienna to concede to the protestants the free exercise of their rites, and an equal participation in all civil immunities. The malcontents of Hungary were ready to avail themselves of the general confusion, and were formidable, alike from the popularity of their cause, and the powerful support of Bethlem Gabor. In Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, the scourge and gibbet had hitherto prevented the numerous sectaries from openly avowing their opinions, but they now felt eager, by a bold confession of their faith, to efface the stain of apostacy. Upper Austria had joined

* Barre, ix. 467.

† Puffendorf, i. 25.

the confederacy, and, by seizing the passes which led to Bohemia, obstructed the movements of the imperial troops. While in Lower Austria the flame of insurrection was scarcely suppressed by a numerous army, and the vigorous exertions of the catholics,* this melancholy picture of domestic confusion was rendered more gloomy by the dread of foreign aggression. The conduct which France might eventually pursue became an object of serious alarm; because, notwithstanding the weakness and superstition of her sovereign, there were men in her cabinet capable of appreciating the true interests of the nation, and of acting with wisdom and energy.† The republic of Holland had openly espoused the cause of the insurgents, while most of the protestant parties, either avowedly supported, or clandestinely encouraged, their enterprise. Even the timid and pedantic sovereign of Britain, with all his aversion to blood, was not expected to behold with indifference a contest, in which the interests of religion, the safety of his daughter, and his own personal honour were so deeply concerned.

Availing himself of the advantages already obtained, Thurn advanced without opposition to the

* Puffendorf, xi. 25. Schmidt. iv. 13.

† These apprehensions indeed were soon removed, when it was found, upon trial, that neither the admonitions of Savoy, nor the exhortations of the Venetians, could rouse the timidity of Louis, nor counteract the effects which Spanish gold had produced on the minds of some of his ministers. To the Italian ambassadors that pusillanimous monarch replied, in the language of fear, "That the house of Austria alone was capable of supporting the dignity of the imperial diadem, or of defending Europe against the Ottomans. From these considerations," he said, "he was induced to sacrifice his personal interest to the general welfare of Christendom, and determined to favour the election of Ferdinand."—Le Vassor, iv. 447.

gates of Vienna, then totally unprepared for sustaining a siege, and ready to rise in his favour.* In the opinion of his enemies, the fall of Ferdinand was no longer doubtful. Hurlled from his throne by the anger of an avenging deity, they destined him to pass the remainder of his days within the gloomy solitude of a cloister, the austerities of which seemed perfectly suited to his rigid ideas of devotion. Separated from their father, and thus preserved from the contagion of bigotry, his children, when educated in the pure principles of protestantism, might perhaps be suffered to reign over part, at least, of their hereditary dominions, without endangering the rights of mankind.

Under these circumstances no ordinary portion of fortitude was required to brave the storm; and the resolution, embraced by the successor of Matthias, to remain undaunted at the post of danger, must be ascribed entirely to his own intrepidity: for, in the estimation of his friends, no alternative was left but immediate flight, or pretended compliance: the former was recommended by his wisest counsellors, the latter secretly instilled by the Jesuits; by the one he would be saved from the fury of the rebels, by the other he would be enabled to deceive them; and, when securely seated on the throne of his ancestors, it would be meritorious to retract those dangerous concessions, to which necessity had forced him to consent. Ferdinand, however, with becoming dignity rejected both. By abandoning his capital, he might, indeed, have secured the enjoyments of life; but, by the sacrifice of every thing which can render life

* Grionsard, *Histoire de Gustave Adolfe*, i. 41.

desirable in the estimation of honour, the loss of Austria must have been the inevitable consequence of an ignominious retreat, and with it he must have relinquished the imperial crown; because it would have been the excess of folly to have expected the electors to confer that exalted dignity upon a man, incapable of defending his hereditary dominions.* Yet he equally disdained to owe his preservation to a negotiation, which must have degraded him for ever in his own opinion: in spite of the lessons of casuistries and deceits, which he had imbibed from those who superintended his education, a sentiment of honour still lurked about his heart. In the protection of Providence he therefore resolved to confide, little doubting that Heaven (for such is the usual language of bigots) would assist the cause of the righteous.

This determination was scarcely embraced, when the doors of the apartment flew violently open, and gave admission to a band of men clad in armour. These were persons of rank and consideration among the disaffected party, and came as delegates from the circle of Austria, to demand permission for the states to confederate with the Bohemians. Though firmly resolved to endure every indignity, rather than subscribe to an instrument which would have invested rebellion with legal authority, Ferdinand expostulated with the deputies upon the impropriety of their behaviour, in presenting their petition in so unconstitutional a manner. "Ferdinand, wilt thou sign?" was the laconic reply; while, seizing his robe, the spokesman insinuated,

* Schiller, i. Schmidt, iv, 14.

by a menacing gesture, that a refusal might be attended with personal hazard.*

At this perilous crisis, when called upon to decide between honour and life, the trampling of horses was distinctly heard in the court of the palace. The breast of Ferdinand beat high with hope that some unexpected succour was arrived. That hope was converted into certainty, when the trumpets sounded with a triumphant flourish, announcing victory.† Overwhelmed with consternation, the intruders fled, nor thought themselves secure, till they had found an asylum in the camp of the besiegers.‡

For this lucky escape, which gave a sudden turn to the tide of ill fortune, Ferdinand was indebted to the activity of Dampierre, who embarked five hundred cavalry on the Danube with so much secrecy, that they descended the river unobserved by the enemy, and entered Vienna by an unfrequented gate, which had been left unguarded. The unexpected arrival of this little troop struck the disaffected citizens with dismay, as their numbers were equally magnified by the fears of one party, and the policy of the other. Encouraged by the appearance of a military force, augmenting rapidly by the junction of additional squadrons, the Burghers vied with each other in displaying their loyalty, by forming themselves into civic corps, and were immediately joined by the students of the university,

* Schmidt, iv. 14.

† It is said, that the party which arrived so opportunely to the assistance of their sovereign, was headed by Wallenstein, and that to this circumstance he was indebted for the commencement of his splendid fortune.

‡ *Ibid.* Schiller, i.

who flew in crowds to the standard of despotism, with an ardour truly unphilosophical. By their joint exertions, the mutinous spirit was entirely repressed—tranquillity restored, and every exertion made for resisting the foe with the fairest prospect of success.* This happy event was shortly succeeded by another still more important. By the defeat of Mansfeldt Thurn was compelled to raise the siege, and to hasten to the protection of Prague.†

This was a fatal blow to the Bohemian patriot, who felt so confident of reducing the capital of Austria, that he had prepared a constitution for the enfranchised province, which, according to the opinion of many historians, would have borne a strong resemblance to that of England.‡ But, while indulging his vanity in these visionary schemes, the fabric was destroyed by the activity of Bucquoy; who, while the Bohemians were engaged in distant enterprises, quitted his intrenchments under the walls of Budweiss; and, having surprised Mansfeldt, compelled him to retire with precipitation. The defeat of this brave and intelligent officer exposed Bohemia to the incursions of the Spaniards, and even endangered the safety of her capital. The approach of Thurn, however, impeded their progress, as the victorious Fleming, too weak to hazard another battle, returned to his former position.§

The events of the campaign having constrained the protestants to evacuate the defiles, from whence they interrupted all the communication between

* Schmidt, iv. 14.

† Lotichius, i.

‡ Puffendorf, i. 25. Barre, ix. 473.

§ Ibid. Lotichius i. 58. Puffendorf, ibid.

Vienna and Frankfort, Ferdinand set out upon his journey with a numerous retinue ; having previously to his departure invested Leopold with the viceroyalty of his dominions.

No object could be more important to the protestant interest than to prevent Ferdinand from voting in the electoral college ; and a deputation was accordingly dispatched from Prague to contest his right, upon pretence, that as he had not yet taken possession of the Bohemian throne, to which that privilege was attached, the right must necessarily devolve to the nation. The majority of the electors being inclined to favour the pretensions of Ferdinand, affected to consider this objection as destitute of solid foundation, insisting that the ceremony, upon which the enemies of Austria attempted to rest their opposition, was merely an outward formality ; and that the Duke of Styria, having been legally chosen successor to Matthias, ought, according to every principle of equity and reason, to be regarded as the legitimate sovereign. Without condescending to enter into any farther discussion, or even listening to the representation of the ambassadors, they proceeded to dispose of the vacant sceptre, and Ferdinand was accordingly elected emperor without one dissentient voice.*

Incensed at the contempt with which their remonstrance was treated, the states of Bohemia assembled at Prague,† where, in conjunction with deputies from the adjacent provinces of Moravia, Silesia,

* Finding it impossible to influence the decision of his colleagues, the Elector Palatine was unwilling to incur the disgrace of a defeat by a solitary negative.—Bougeant, i. 51. Barre, ix. 478.

† On the 17th of August, 1619.—Lotichius, i. 69.

and Lusatia, they declared that Ferdinand had forfeited the crown, and appointed a day for the election of another sovereign. Orders were in consequence issued for public prayers, according to the fanatical spirit of the times, to implore from Heaven the requisite light for the due execution of that important function. For in spite of all which the nation had suffered from the tyranny of kings, they were still attached to a monarchical government, by a prejudice no less strange than unconquerable.*

Though four different princes were proposed as candidates for the vacant throne, it is probable that this was only artifice, to conceal the designs of the anti-Austrian party. The forms of election were however strictly observed, and the deserts and demerits of every claimant, in appearance at least, impartially canvassed. The power of Denmark presented many allurements, but they were more than counterbalanced by its remoteness, which prevented it from affording the speedy succour, which the exigency of the moment required. The same objection, but with additional force, applied to the Duke of Savoy, though Nani affirms, that he refused the sceptre with voluntary prudence.† This assertion, however, must be received with caution, when we reflect that he was vain enough to aspire to the imperial dignity, and even to the papal tiara. To give permanence and consistency to their labours, it became indispensable to elect a sovereign, whose extensive resources, and contiguous territory, might oppose an insuperable barrier to the indignation of Ferdinand. These were con-

* Le Vassor, iv. 471.

† Nani *Historia Veneta*, iv.

siderations which recommended the Elector of Saxony; but his devoted attachment to the Austrian family, joined to the selfish character which he universally bore, created a suspicion that he might be easily tempted to abandon their interest. Neither was diversity of religion without its effect in excluding him from the throne of Bohemia. John George was the head of the Lutheran party, and the opinions of Calvin had taken firm root in Bohemia.* But while the popular virtues of the Elector Palatine attracted the admiration of the people, considerations more weighty induced the nobility to make him an offer of the sceptre. Frederic, which his greatest enemies never attempted to deny, was blessed with humanity and benevolence: his manners were affable, his conversation lively, and his generosity unbounded, though his attempts to render himself popular often degenerated into familiarity.† As acknowledged head of the Evangelical Union, he might be supposed to possess sufficient influence with that formidable body, to have their forces entirely at his disposal. His near connexion with the Duke of Bavaria inspired a hope that the ambitious Maximilian might

* According to Galetti, the Duke of Bavaria and Bethlem Gabor should be added to the number of candidates for the Bohemian throne. Galetti's *Geschichte des Dreyssigjahregen Kriegs*, i. 14. This work was published at Gotha in 1791, and forms part of the *Algemeine Welthistorie*. See the first volume of Meusel's *Bibliotheca Historica*, for an account of this extraordinary undertaking.

† Der könig macht sich mit den leuten, mit den landhern, und frauenzimmer ganz gemein, begleitet sie aus seinen zimmer, und zeucht seiner hut ab fast gegen jedermann. Wenn jemand zu ihm kommt, fragt er allezeit seinen ober-cammerer hern von Ruppa, was er thun soll, und sagt zu ihm, was rath hätt der herr. Er geht oft spazieren ganz hinaus in den thiergarten, mit einen jungen, und lacqueyen. Auctor des greuels der verwüstung, apud Londorp, i. 926.

be persuaded to remain a tranquil spectator of the approaching contest. As nephew of Maurice, Prince of Orange, he was entitled to the support of a consummate general, and of a rising republic, the natural enemy of Austria; and as son-in-law to James, he might expect to be assisted by the armies and the treasures of Britain.* These advantages, chimerical as they proved, being magnified by the zeal and the partiality of the Calvinists, a solemn embassy was dispatched to Frederic, with a formal tender of the sceptre.†

Though the decision of the diet was clearly anticipated at the court of Manheim, Frederic requested time to consult his allies before he returned a definitive answer.‡ That his resolution, however, had been previously taken, there is the strongest reason to believe; and, without injustice to his reputation we may fairly infer, that the apparent hesitation with which he received the Bohemian ambassadors arose entirely from the natural weakness of his character, which prompted him to wish for the approbation of others, though predetermined to reject their advice, unless it accorded exactly with his own ambitious projects. By the sovereigns of Brandenburg, Bavaria, and Saxony, he was admonished of the danger which awaited him, should he rashly engage in the enterprise with resources so inadequate to the attempt. The influence of his mother, the wise and virtuous Louisa Juliana, was

* Puffendorf, i. 27. Schiller, i.

† 1619. Barre, ix. 479. Schmidt, iv. 15.

‡ Notwithstanding the assertion of Spanheim, it is difficult to believe that Frederic was unprepared for the offer.—Memoires de Louise Juliane, 143.

also strenuously exerted to the same effect;* while the King of England declared, that no considerations should tempt him, by patronizing rebellion, to undermine all legitimate authority.†

Frederic's determination, however, if ever vacillating, was confirmed by the approbation of his uncles, Maurice and the Duke of Bouillon,‡ both consummate statesmen, but who probably suffered their zealous attachment to the protestant cause to bias their sober judgment. This opinion was seconded by the inconsiderate ardour of his confidential minister,|| by the pride and presumption of the Calvinist preachers, who arrogantly predicted success,§ by the animosity and violence of Bethlem Gabor, who eagerly grasped at every opportunity of humbling Austria, without deigning to reflect

* Struvius, Corpus. Hist. Germ. Period x. sec. ix.

† Mr. Hume's partiality toward the house of Stuart has led him to defend the timidity of James. But, with all due respect for such high authority, I cannot admit that the determination of the king to abandon his son-in-law was the result of policy. With greater propriety it may be ascribed to the weakness of his understanding, which revolted at a measure tending to overturn his favourite theory, of the divine and indefeasible right of kings. Had I ever doubted that it is for the interest of England to take an active share in the politics of Europe, I should no longer hesitate on the subject. The question, in my opinion, has been completely decided by the repeated efforts of her inveterate foe, to exclude her entirely from the continent.—Hist. of England, c. xl.

‡ The duke was so delighted with the idea of seeing his nephew seated upon a throne, that in a letter to one of his friends, by whom he had been informed of the intrigues carrying on at Paris, in order to obtain the *cordon bleu*, he says, *pendant que vous penser a faire des chevaliers, je travaille à faire des rois.*—Le Vassor, iv. 528.

|| Comerarius displayed the condition of a civilian in his animated apology for his master's conduct. But the talents of a lawyer are widely different from those of a statesman.

§ Struvius, *ibid.* Brachelius XV. calls him “*princeps moderatæ indolis; sed pravi senatores* (he continues) *et promissa astrologorum in ancipitiâ consilia juvenem impulerunt.*”

upon the difficulties which presented themselves ; and lastly, by the vanity of a wife, whom he adored with almost idolatrous affection, who seems seriously to have believed, that the illustrious blood of the Stuarts was destined by Providence to instruct and govern the world.*

Advocates like these, when pleading in unison with personal inclination, could hardly fail to persuade. Frederic was also stimulated by a romantic sentiment of honour, to hazard every thing in defence of a nation, which had selected him for its guide and champion. The votaries of a religion, oppressed by bigotry, had addressed themselves to him for protection. Could he then consistently with the dictates of generosity abandon them to the fury of a despot, prepared to revenge the insult offered by an apostate and rebellious people to their sovereign and their God.

Under such circumstances it was in vain for reason to assert her claims, because ambition simultaneously whispered, that in proportion to the danger the glory would increase : with these sentiments he repaired to Prague, where he was crowned with unusual pomp by the hands of a Calixtine divine, because the archbishop, a zealous catholic, refused to perform that ceremony.†

Satisfied of the propriety of explaining to the world the real motives of their conduct, the states,

* Barre, ix. 480. Struvius, Corpus. Hist. Germ. Period x. sec. ix. Lotichius, i. 77. Puffendorf, i. 27. Thoroughly acquainted with the weakness of her husband, she called in devotion to the aid of love, declaring with a pious enthusiasm, well calculated to produce the desired effect, that she would willingly sacrifice every jewel she possessed, rather than abandon a cause so just and righteous as that of the Bohemians.—Le Vassor, iv. 528.

† 1619. Barre, *ibid.* 481. Lotichius, i. 89.

in conjunction with their new sovereign, prepared a manifesto, enumerating the reasons by which they had been induced to change the order of succession. "Ferdinand," they said, "had violated the engagements solemnly contracted in face of the nation, when he was chosen successor to Matthias. By a sacred promise, he at that time covenanted never to interfere with the administration of affairs, till called to the throne by the death of his predecessor; and even when that event should occur, he undertook to confirm, in their fullest extent, all the privileges derived from the bounty of their former sovereigns, or from the constitutional laws of the kingdom. By the breach of these articles he had annulled the compact, and forfeited his title to the throne, even supposing the election to have been originally conducted with every requisite formality. The arrestation of Klesel in the royal palace was no less offensive to the dignity of the nation than to the personal feelings of its monarch. The introduction of foreign mercenaries was a palpable infringement of the fundamental principles upon which the rights of the people reposed; while the convention signed with the Spanish court, by which the Bohemian sceptre might be eventually transferred to that tyrannical race, was an indignity too flagrant to be borne with patience by men, who were not educated in the trammels of slavery.*

To these allegations Ferdinand replied by denying the right of election; insisting that it was only a conditional privilege, which never existed, when an heir could be found lineally sprung from the

* Schmidt, iv. 15.

royal stock. His claim, as he pretended, was founded entirely upon hereditary descent, as the legal representative of the Princess Ann, who married his grandfather, Ferdinand I.* The language which he employed, however, was more mild and moderate than might have been expected from a prince, possessing notions of prerogative no less wild and extravagant than those of the British monarch. Convinced that the succession must ultimately be decided by the sword, he endeavoured to secure the support of the catholic league, and entered into negotiations with all the European powers, who still adhered to the papal communion.

Frederic, on the contrary, commenced his reign under the most favourable auspices. The protestants universally exulted at the prospect of being governed by a monarch, whose religious opinions

* Bougeant, i. 48, and Barre, ix. 468, make use of the same expressions. Both have probably copied from the same source, without taking the trouble to alter a syllable. The futility of this argument might however be easily shewn by a reference to the national annals; from whence it will appear, that when the regal title was first bestowed on Ottocar, by the Emperor Frederic II. during the thirteenth century, it was accompanied by a grant, conferring upon the nation the privilege of electing its future sovereigns, who were bound to receive the investiture from the hands of the emperor; and we accordingly find in the following century, that the Bohemians elected John, son of Henry VIII. the reigning dynasty having failed. That prince, being desirous of exchanging his newly-acquired sceptre for the palatinate, applied to the states for their consent, which they refused upon the specific grounds, *that such a transaction would deprive the nation of its elective franchise.* The same principle prevailed upon another occasion. The Emperor Sigismund, being last in descent from John of Luxemburg, and leaving no male issue, the crown was given to Albert, who had married a daughter of the late king; and he also dying without a son, it was offered by the diet to the Duke of Bavaria, upon his consenting to tolerate the Calixtines. That pious sovereign, however, with more fervour than wisdom, rejected the gift, declaring, that he *had rather die than accept a throne upon the condition of countenancing heresy.*—Le Vassor, iv. 479.

coincided with their own; while the majority of those, who still adhered to the see of Rome, rejoiced at being delivered from the iron yoke of Austria. Anticipating all the blessings of the golden age, which they fondly believed was about to receive, they gazed with admiration upon a sovereign, whose graceful person and affable demeanour formed a striking contrast with the haughty reserve, which has almost invariably characterized the descendants of Rodolph of Hapsburg.*

Venice was the first of the European states to acknowledge the title of Frederic. Her example, however, was shortly followed by most of the northern potentates.† But the hopes of the Bohemians appear to have rested with greatest confidence on the active valour of Bethlem Gabor, that formidable foe to Rome and Ferdinand. Not satisfied with having established an independant throne on the ruins of the Austrian power, that artful chieftain caught with alacrity at the present opportunity, of extending his authority in Northern Hungary, from the banks of the Teiss to the gates of Presburg. Perfectly secure from any interruption from the Ottoman power, whose projects accorded with his own, he concealed his intentions from the imperial court under the warmest professions of amity; assuring Ferdinand that his alliance with the Bohemians was fallacious; and that the moment he obtained a stable footing in that rebellious country, he would throw aside the mask, and co-operate with him

* Barre ix. 481.

† Sweden, Holland, Denmark, together with several of the German potentates, *ibid.*

in reducing the insurgents to obedience.* How far the emperor may have been deceived by these professions it is immaterial now to investigate ; because the disastrous situation of his affairs must have imposed the necessity of concealing his suspicions, had he in reality entertained any ; delay was to him of such infinite importance, that to procrastinate the contest was almost equivalent to a victory. No precautions, however, could long protract the fatal moment ; for, upon entering Hungary, the rapacious Waivode no longer deigned to dissemble. Preceded by the terror of a mighty name, he traversed that kingdom in uninterrupted triumph ; while the disaffected flocked in thousands to his standard, and were rewarded for their treachery by being allowed to share in the plunder of a sovereign, whom they had basely deserted in his distress ; while those, who, in spite of example and interest, still maintained their allegiance, were punished by tortures or confiscation. Destitute of forces to arrest the progress of the invaders, Homonai, the imperial general, was compelled to save his little army by a precipitate retreat, leaving Presbury exposed to an attack. Cassau, Neuhausel, Tiernau, and Nietra, successively opened their gates,† and thought themselves happy to obtain a formal confirmation of all their local immunities, as the recompense of early submission. The Palatine of Hungary had retired to the capital, to shelter himself from the fury of the tempest ! but, scarcely had he began to prepare for its defence, when he received a summons from the victorious Transilvanian. Far more remark-

* Schiller, i. Schmidt iv. 15.

† Lotichius, i. 102.

able for prudence than for courage, and more attentive to interest than fame, Forgatzzy requested a short delay before a final answer should be returned, alleging in excuse, "that it was impossible for him to decide upon so momentous a question without previously consulting the other generals." The council being summoned, and coinciding in opinion with their timorous chief, a capitulation was signed, by which the town and citadel being ceded to Gabor, religious toleration was established in its fullest extent, and Forgatzzy confirmed in his former dignity, after taking an oath of allegiance to the conqueror.*

Meanwhile the Bohemian army, under the orders of Thurn, again advanced into the heart of Austria, with the intention of joining the victorious Waivode under the walls of Vienna. Alarmed for the safety of the capital, Leopold deemed it advisable to disarm the inhabitants, many of whom were known to carry on a clandestine correspondence with the insurgents. By repeated couriers he solicited Bucquoy to hasten to his assistance, and to endeavour, if practicable, to prevent a junction between the hostile commanders, to whose united strength no adequate force could be opposed. These directions were executed by the Flemish general with no less address than activity. Having entrusted Barameda with the defence of Budweiss, he ordered Dampierre to meet him on the confines of Moravia. Far from being discouraged at finding that their combined armies scarcely exceeded twelve thousand men, he gallantly resolved to give battle to the

* Puffendorf, i. 28. Lotichius, i. 107.

enemy, though nearly triple in numbers. The contest, though supported with desperate resolution during too successive days, would ultimately have proved of no essential benefit to the cause of Ferdinand, had it not been accompanied with more important success in another quarter.* Homanai in returning to the theatre of war with a numerous reinforcement of cossacs, surprised and defeated a corps of Transylvanians, which had been left by Gabor, under the command of Ragotzy, to preserve the communication with the interior of Hungary. This unexpected reverse determined Bethlem to raise the siege of Vienna, that in a more secure position he might refresh his troops, completely exhausted by continual fatigue, the severity of the weather, and the total want of provisions.† Walenstein who had been exiled from Bohemia, together with several other nobles, for their opposition to Frederic, distinguished himself during the siege in repelling the attacks of the assailants.‡

The departure of his colleague rendering it impracticable for Thurn to continue the siege, he retired into the mountains of Bohemia, where he dispersed his troops into winter quarters. The efforts of the Austrians having been exclusively directed to the safety of Vienna, Mansfeldt had resumed offensive operations with his accustomed energy, and by the capture of Piseck reduced the enemy to the greatest distress.

* Grimoard *Histoire des Conquetes de Gustave Adolfe*, i. 51.—an author who contemplates the operations of war with the critical eye of a soldier.

† Lotichius, 112. Coxe, i. 772.

‡ Galetti, i. 18.

Ferdinand had no sooner obtained the imperial crown, than he flew to the defence of his capital, which, though relieved for a while from immediate danger, could never be regarded as perfectly secure, while the forces of the enemy were superior. During his residence at Francfort, however, the situation of his affairs had materially altered for the better, and he could now look forward with well-founded confidence to future success. Till then he was uncertain how far he might depend upon the assistance of the Catholic League. The views of Maximilian were likewise involved in impenetrable mystery; who, notwithstanding his attachment to the papal see, might possibly be allured by the charms of ambition to behold with pleasure the humiliation of Austria, as a preparatory step to his own exaltation. But these apprehensions were now entirely dissipated; the mercenary disposition of the Duke of Bavaria had been tempted by offers too seducing to be resisted, and in the event of a war he had not only promised reinforcements to the imperial army, but had even undertaken to command it in person. Ferdinand also had engaged to indemnify him for any losses which he might eventually sustain in the course of hostilities, and actually mortgaged a part of his hereditary dominions by way of additional security.*

The influence of Maximilian decided the conduct of the Catholic League; and a treaty was concluded between the emperor and the ecclesiastical electors, by which they engaged to support

* Barre, ix. 487. Schmidt, iv. 16.

with all their authority the orthodox champion of the Vatican.*

Though he had secured the co-operation of such valuable allies, Ferdinand was aware that, in a struggle like that in which he was engaged, it was of the utmost importance to conciliate the affection of his subjects, and he accordingly determined by a public declaration to efface every cause of complaint. In a spirited address, so artfully worded that it appeared to flow from humanity and not from apprehension, he signified his intention of allowing them in future to conform to the confession of Augsburg, and of re-establishing them in the enjoyment of every privilege, which had been granted them by the policy or the benevolence of Matthias. This prudent appeal to the strongest propensities of the human heart, contrasted so strongly with his former violence, that foreseeing the probability of its being imputed by his adversaries to sinister motives, he wisely accompanied it with the denunciation of the most rigorous punishments against all, who rejecting his proffered clemency, should adhere to the standard of rebellion. This politic mixture of concession and severity contributed essentially to appease the ferment, by impelling numbers by the powerful incentives of hope and fear, to acknowledge the authority of their legitimate sovereign, rather than expose their fortunes to the hazard of a defeat. The same rapid

* A prince more sagacious than Frederic, who had been placed at the head of the Evangelical Union, would have converted his quarrel with Austria into a religious dispute; but he unfortunately persuaded himself, that by an opposite conduct, he should deceive the catholics and prevent them from assisting Ferdinand.—Galetti, i. 20.

change in the current of popular opinion was no less visible in the proceedings of the Hungarian diet. So long as victory accompanied the waivode of Transilvania, his cause was regarded as the road to fortune, and embraced as the decision of Heaven. But no sooner was he compelled to measure back his way with diminished glory, than the zeal of his partizans abated, and they began seriously to calculate the evils, which might ensue from favouring the projects of a desperate adventurer. Impatient to atone for their former errors, the members of an assembly convened expressly to confer the crown on Gabor now hesitated to proceed, and evinced by their timidity that his visions of greatness were for ever dissipated. Disgusted at the weakness and the ingratitude of a people, on whose attachment he could not depend, he resolved to abandon them to their destiny, and accordingly consented to a truce with Ferdinand, which enabled the latter to direct his undivided attention toward the turbulent scenes in Bohemia.*

It was evident, however, that the event of the contest must in great measure depend upon the conduct of the Evangelical Union. That the inclination of the protestants would induce them to side with the Bohemian monarch there was every reason to believe; but whether their religious attachment would prove strong enough to counteract the baneful effects of jarring interests and personal jealousies, and allow them to act with concord and confidence, was a question of a very different nature. Distrust and disunion, the fatal consequences of sectarian schisms, were known to prevail in an

* 1619. Coxe, i. 777. Le Vassor, iv. 491.

alarming degree between the followers of Luther and those of Calvin, who beheld the eccentricities of each others opinions with as much abhorrence, as they did the idolatrous pageantries of the Vatican.

Having gratified his vanity with the empty splendour of royalty, Frederic repaired to Nuremburg, to be present at an assembly of the protestant princes, hoping by his influence and exhortations to involve them in hostilities with Austria; but against this his antagonist had previously provided, who aware of the difficulties to which he must be exposed, should a personal contest for the Bohemian crown be converted by fanaticism into a religious dispute, had addressed* an elaborate memorial to the states, complaining of the injustice with which he had been treated, and boldly asserting that, from motives of humanity, he had left nothing unattempted to appease the troubles which disaffection had excited in Bohemia. Though strongly characterized with firmness and decision, his language was that of moderation. Of the insubordination of his people he complained in terms of asperity, but still preserved a decorous silence respecting the behaviour of Frederic.†

To this address the convention replied, by recapitulating the grievances of which they had so often complained, and which they boldly imputed to the intolerant principles of the catholic faith, the despotic conduct of the Austrian family, and the preponderating influence of the Vatican. After sup-

*The Count of Hohenzollern.

† Barre, ix. 485. Lotichius, i. 115.

plicating the emperor, in a respectful tone, to listen to the remonstrances of the Bohemians, they declared their resolution to protect the palatine, if attacked in his hereditary dominions, and concluded, by urging him to give to the world an unequivocal proof of moderation, by compelling the league to disarm; assuring him, that they were ready to follow their example, from the anxious desire of preventing a war, of which, if once unfortunately kindled, no human sagacity could foresee the extent.*

Though foiled in his endeavours to seduce the members of the Evangelical Union, Ferdinand had little reason to be dissatisfied with the general aspect of his affairs. Alarmed at the proceedings of the protestant diet, the league, in a meeting held at Wurtzburg, declared their decided resolution of protecting the orthodox faith, inseparably connected with the power of Austria. Considering hostilities to be unavoidable, they proceeded to regulate the quotas to be furnished by every member, and appointed Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, generalissimo of the catholic armies.

Though the emperor had disclaimed, in his address to the protestants, every idea of a religious contention, it is confidently asserted, by the most credible historians, that he gave the pope a positive assurance that he would never lay down the sword till he had extirpated heresy in Germany; and that in return for this pious resolution, he received a grant of the tenth of all ecclesiastical property in Spain, in Flanders, and in Italy; a donative less

* *Memoires de Louise Juliane*, 150.

offensive to the avarice of the Borghesi than any personal sacrifice of riches. A contest, undertaken in defence of the church, soon roused the superstition of the court of Madrid, whose bigoted sovereign requested permission to consume the remaining strength and treasures of his exhausted dominions in that meritorious struggle. The restless spirit of the Duke of Lorraine added another member to the conspiracy.*

No sooner were these resolutions imparted to the protestant leaders, than they dispatched a confidential agent to Munich, with positive directions not to abandon the court, till he should have obtained from Maximilian a satisfactory explanation respecting his future intentions. Disdaining concealment, when he had nothing to risk by disclosing his projects, the duke defended his conduct on the plea of expediency, insisting that it would be an unpardonable error in policy, for the catholics to remain in a defenceless posture, when the agitation prevailing in all the protestant states so plainly indicated that some important enterprise was in contemplation. Notwithstanding this answer clearly proved that hostilities were about to commence, yet still a parsimonious spirit of commerce prevented several of the imperial cities from contributing to an undertaking, from which no adequate returns could be expected. Their constant opposition to the suggestions of those whom experience and study had qualified for the discretion of great political concerns, so far impeded the movement of the machine, that a resolution was

* Grimoard, i. 55. Barre, ix. 486.

passed, restricting the confederacy to a defensive system, and prohibiting its members from furnishing either men or money to their protestant brethren in Bohemia. By this impolitic vote, Frederic was abandoned to his own resources, and left singly to defend the reformed religion against the gigantic power of Austria.*

The defection of Saxony gave a fatal blow to the hopes of Frederic, as notwithstanding the selfish character of the elector, he would never believe that the descendant of a prince, the champion and victim of the Lutheran faith, would desert the cause of religion. To account for an action at once so repugnant to his honour and interest, we must suppose that John George was seduced by the flattering offers of Ferdinand; since it is impossible to admit that any being, endowed with the faculty of reason, should have given credit to an assertion, which represented the quarrel to be nothing more than a contention for power, and totally unconnected with the welfare of the church. This assurance, it is true, was corroborated by the duplicity of the ecclesiastical electors, and by the protestation of Maximilian, who solemnly declared, that they did not entertain the smallest hostility toward the protestant worship, nor even harboured a thought of ever attempting to recover the secularized property of the convents. Such artifices, however, were too shallow to beguile, unless received with voluntary credulity; but to the breast of the Saxon they found easy access. Jealous of the ascendancy obtained by Frederic he con-

* Le Vassor, iv. 535.

templated his distress with secret satisfaction, in hopes that his ruin might accelerate the fall of the Helvetic antichrist, which he detested scarcely less than the Roman. Neither could his sordid heart forgive the triumph accorded to a rival by the Bohemians; for though he wanted fortitude to undertake the arduous enterprize, he was offended that another should excel in qualities of which he was totally destitute.*

Though by no means deficient in personal courage, the character of Frederic was little calculated for a situation, where pre-eminent talents were required. If we attentively examine his actions, during the short period that he wore a royal crown, we shall find him no less culpable for what he did, than for what he neglected to do. By the alliance contracted with Bethlem Gabor, the friend and dependent of the Ottoman Porte, he offended the delicate scruples of the pious, by whom he was accused of sacrificing the peace and security of the Christian republic to the chimerical pursuits of ambition. His zealous attachment to the doctrines of Calvin led him also to the adoption of measures, scarcely less offensive to the followers of Luther, than the iconoclastic fury with which he overthrew the images of saints and martyrs, proved abhorrent to the feelings of the catholics.† The unbounded prodigality of their new sovereign formed another source of complaint, and was beheld with feelings little short of disaffection by a parsimonious people, whose economy would have revolted at every burthen, which necessity compelled him to

* Schiller, i. Coxe, i. 775.

† Lotichius, i. 126.

impose. The ardour of the nobility, who overrating their services had anticipated rewards proportionate to their vanity, began rapidly to abate when they found their calculations erroneous. Even Thurn and Mansfeldt, the firmest pillars of the revolution, were justly offended at seeing themselves deprived of those military honours to which their talents and services entitled them, and subjected to the command of the Prince of Anhalt, an officer indeed of acknowledged merit, but totally unconnected with Bohemia. It was the misfortune of Frederic to be extremely defective in those solid virtues necessary to confirm the favourable impression, which a graceful figure and popular manners hardly ever fail to inspire.* Instead of devoting his attention to public affairs, and prudently endeavouring to provide resources to meet the impending storm, he lavished his revenues in balls and festivals, and in improvident largesses to undeserving favourites.

While the fortune of Frederic thus rapidly declined, the situation of his rival progressively improved. Having secured the neutrality of some of the German princes, who adhered to the protestant faith, and purchased the alliance of others, Ferdinand directed his attention to external objects; convinced, that if he could succeed in preventing France and England from taking an active part in the contest, he should find little difficulty in reducing Bohemia to subjection. At the English court he was prepared to encounter almost insuperable ob-

* Constantinus Peregrinus affirms, "Fridericum Pragæ prope molen-dinum magnum, magna omnium indignatione, cum sæcæ populi lavantem visum fuisse."—Koeler, 49. A curious method of courting popularity.

stacles, but to his inexpressible astonishment he found the prejudices of James in perfect unison with his own wishes; for it was a paramount principle in the British monarch's political creed, that it was utterly impossible for subjects to be in the right, when they opposed the will of their sovereign. In support of this contemptible theory of folly and despotism, he not only sacrificed the glory of Britain, but endangered the safety of the protestant church. Taking advantage of the foibles of the royal pedagogue, the Spanish minister assured him that the exalted reputation for justice and moderation which he universally enjoyed, would induce the emperor to submit to his arbitration in the present difficult crisis. He was also easily persuaded, that the intimate connexion, which he was about to contract with the court of Madrid, by the marriage of the Prince of Wales with the Infanta, might enable him to prevent the ruin of his son-in-law, without risking the lives of his people. For so excessive was his vanity, that he never suspected that his inactive virtue was despised as much as it was extolled.*

Having moulded to his satisfaction the arrogant imbecility of the British king, Ferdinand dispatched an ambassador to Paris, in hopes that by alarming the scruples of the timid monarch, and flattering

* Mr. Hume (c. xlviii.) says every thing in defence of James that human ingenuity can suggest, but still I contend, that a more despicable monarch is scarcely to be found in the annals of history. James prided himself upon his wisdom, and reduced to theory the intricate science of government; but if we refer to his actions (which indisputably afford the fairest test) for a practical illustration of his precepts, we shall find the boasted science of king's-craft to be nothing more than a miserable compound of pedantry, folly, and cowardice.

the pride of his self-sufficient favourite, he might present the degenerate son of Henry the Great from adhering to the plan which his illustrious father had traced for the splendour and the prosperity of his kingdom. Furstemberg, who was selected for that important mission, was powerfully seconded by the venality of the courtiers, many of whom were actually the pensioners of Spain; by the intrigues of the Jesuits,* who artfully predicted the ruin of the catholic faith, and by the clamours of the bigots, who seriously believed it in danger. To so formidable a cabal, operating upon the fears and superstition of an imbecile mind, it was fruitless for those, who had been taught to appreciate the true interests of their country by the first and the greatest of the Bourbon line, to oppose the dictates of prudence; insisting, that it was incompatible with every principle of enlightened policy to support the natural rival of the nation. Having secured the co-operation of a venal faction, the Austrian plenipotentiary, by calumniating their motives, attempted to invalidate the hostility of all who shewed themselves adverse to his pretensions. For this purpose he circulated a pamphlet, in which he endeavoured to prove, that a conspiracy was formed by the secret enemies of monarchical government, for the destruction of all legitimate authority, the degradation of rank, and equalization of property.†

* Le Pere Arnoux, who was confessor to Lewis XIII. exercised an unlimited influence over his weak understanding.

† Le Vassor, iv. 538. It is curious to trace in the clumsy labours of a German civilian the groundwork of one of the most splendid efforts of human eloquence. Furstemberg and Burke, though as remote from each

Notwithstanding this attempt to impose upon mankind met with merited contempt, from all who were able impartially to appreciate its absurdity, yet so strong was the empire of prejudice, that not a member of the council had the courage to propose to the king to acknowledge Frederic as sovereign of Bohemia, though their sentiments were divided respecting the conduct which it might be proper to pursue with regard to Austria.

Half measures have always been the favourite resources of little minds. Too prudent to shock the public feeling by abandoning principles which ancient habit has sanctified, and equally destitute of courage and of capacity to keep pace with the progress of the human understanding, when its faculties are stimulated by some extraordinary concussion, men of ordinary abilities, if unfortunately placed in prominent situations, endeavour by palliatives to postpone the evil which they tremble boldly to encounter. Acting under the impulse of a similiar incentive, the influence of the favourite* determined his master to recur to negociation when the most vigorous measures were necessary. It was accordingly resolved by a splendid embassy to attempt the reconciliation of the contending parties, whose ambition was about to desolate Europe.†

other as the sublimity of Newton from the arrogance of Kant, were both impelled by the same spirit of hostility toward every thing that could lead to innovation; both studied to enrol the prejudices of the great in support of the cause which they defended; but unfortunately for mankind the success of the latter proved more decidedly fatal to the cause of liberty, and has eventually contributed to erect a power, the most tremendous of any which ever threatened the world.

* The Duc de Luines, a minion almost as despicable as any of those, on whom James I. lavished the treasures and the dignities of England.

† The Duc d'Angouleme, the Comte de Bethune, and the Abbé de

The prosperous results of the enlightened system pursued by Ferdinand, soon manifested to the world the superior wisdom of his councils; but together with his fortune his language altered. In a manifesto addressed to the German potentates, he strenuously exhorted them to remain tranquil spectators of the impending contest, and concluded by recommending, in a menacing tone, to the Elector Palatine, to relinquish a crown, which he had seized in defiance of the laws of justice, and which he could not retain without exposing his country to civil convulsions.†

Since the defection of Saxony, the prospects of Frederic had gradually assumed a darker hue. Not content with refusing his assistance to those whom he had formerly treated as his dearest allies, John George resolved by active service to merit the wages of treachery. Throughout all his dominions preparations were made for an active campaign. The regiments were recruited and new ones raised; the arsenals were replenished with military stores, and magazines collected in all the principal fortresses. These extraordinary exertions demanded explanation, and the Bohemians in consequence sent an embassy to Dresden, to inquire their object, and earnestly to solicit the

Chateauneuf, men of rank and ability, were selected for the mission, because the favourite was desirous by the characters of the negociators to give consequence to a measure, no less dishonourable from its motives than contemptible for its folly. Though apparently occupied with the interests of Europe, he was in fact indifferent to every thing that passed, provided he was suffered to insult the nation by retaining a place to the duties of which his talents were totally incompetent.—*Le Vassor*, iv. 567.

† 1620. *Puffendorf*, i. 30. *Lotichius*, i. 134. *Schmidt*, iv. 28.

elector's support in defence of a cause equally interesting to all the friends of the Reformation. "They were contending," they said, "for the existence of a religion, of which the Saxon princes had ever been regarded as the political leaders. Should the emperor be permitted to extirpate (what he impiously denominated) heresy, in Bohemia, little doubt could be entertained that he would extend the persecution to every sect, which deviated from the papal communion, till he succeeded in establishing his idolatrous worship throughout every province of Germany."

Incensed at an insinuation, tending equally to inculcate the soundness of his understanding and the purity of his heart, the elector gave vent to his indignation by loading the deputies with bitter reproaches, for having presumed to proceed to the election of a king, after Ferdinand had been acknowledged by the electoral college as the legitimate sovereign of Bohemia. The alliance contracted with Bethlem Gabor became next an object of reprehension; which he affected to consider as no less disgraceful to the dignity of the nation than dangerous to the general welfare of Christendom. "Though bound to acknowledge no superior authority, except that of Heaven and of the imperial throne," continued the Saxon, in a tone of defiance, "I have no hesitation in declaring, that I am induced to arm by a due attention to the safety of my subjects. Warlike preparations are carrying on in every state between the Alps and the Baltic; and the empire is inundated with foreign mercenaries. Under such circumstances to remain inactive would be no less derogatory to

my personal glory than prejudicial to the interests of my people.*

Had the plans of the elector been previously involved in obscurity, this bold avowal was sufficient at once to dissipate the cloud, even in the estimation of men, most disposed to contemplate the transactions of the world through the delusive medium of hope. At a subsequent assembly of the catholic princes,† his intentions were manifested in less ambiguous language. Under pretext of appeasing the commotions in Bohemia, all the members professed the most unqualified devotion to Ferdinand; but being anxious to disguise their real motives under the mask of equity, they resolved to preface hostilities with a monitorial address to the Palatine. After expressing their abhorrence of his disloyalty toward the legitimate chief of the Germanic constitution, they exhorted him “no longer to listen to the pernicious counsels of designing men, who flattered his ambition with chimerical projects, not from any attachment to his sacred person, but from motives which they blushed to avow.” Having thus far complied with the forms prescribed by diplomatic duplicity, they plainly intimated that, “in case he should neglect this salutary admonition, they were bound by their allegiance to assist the emperor in recovering a sceptre, to which he was justly entitled by every claim that could give validity to power.” After expatiating at large upon the inadequacy of the elector’s resources to contend against the strength of Austria, they concluded by conjuring him to

* Lotichius, i. 140.

† Held at Mulhausen, 1620.

renounce an undertaking, which must eventually lead to the ruin of his family, and the loss of his hereditary dominions.*

This exhortation was followed by a second, addressed to the Bohemians, in which the same arguments were still more strongly enforced by a vivid picture of the unavoidable calamities to which the nation must be exposed by protracted resistance.

In a third manifesto, the Evangelical Union was admonished of the pernicious consequences, inevitably resulting to all legitimate governments, from the fatal example delivered to the world by openly patronising insurrection. The cause of Ferdinand was represented as that of all rightful sovereigns, "should his rebellious subjects be suffered to prevail, the basis must be sapped upon which the authority of princes had hitherto reposed, and nothing but anarchy could in consequence ensue.†

Confident of the support of a powerful party, Ferdinand ventured at length to throw aside the mask of moderation, and in the dictatorial language of an irritated master, commanded the Palatine to lay down his arms, and to evacuate Bohemia within the space of a month, under pain of incurring the severest penalties which imperial anger could inflict.

To these addresses the Bohemians replied with manly dignity, boldly asserting their right to dispose of the vacant throne, and disdainfully rejecting all foreign controul. In support of a privilege, so

* Lotichius, i. 140. Barre, ix. 489. Puffendorf, i. 30.

† Barre, *ibid.* Lotichius, i. 145.

dearly cherished, they contended, that the national courts had ever been regarded as independent tribunals, adequate to decide the most momentous questions, without being liable to any appeal. They farther shewed, that their laws and constitution differed no less essentially from those of Germany, than the language and customs of the inhabitants; and that to attempt to subject the decrees of the diet to any revision, or even to doubt its competency to exercise the highest functions of legislation, would be to degrade the nation to a state of vassalage, too humiliating for any but slaves to endure.*

While the civilians were sedulously employed, either in elucidating or perplexing the case, the commanders on both sides were occupied in labours more likely to bring it to a decision. The Duke of Bavaria, at the head of twenty-five thousand well-appointed troops, crossed the Danube at Donauwert, while the Marquis of Anspach (now acting as general of the protestant army) assembled his forces in the vicinity of Ulm. Thus the important hour seemed rapidly approaching, when the destiny of the empire was to be decided, and limits prescribed to the rival religions, which it would be dangerous for them to transgress. Yet at this tremendous moment, when the minds of all men were turned toward the plains of Swabia, where every thing most sacred in the eyes of piety, or dearest to the feelings of freedom, was about to receive a fatal blow, or to be permanently established on the rock of victory, a convention was unex-

* Barre, 489.

pectedly signed, by which both armies separated without ever firing a cannon.*

By this treaty, effected by the mediation of France, it was stipulated that both parties should in future abstain from hostilities; the protestants engaging to leave the emperor at perfect liberty to assert his claim to the Bohemian throne, upon condition that the catholics should not attack the Palatinate.†

It is natural to inquire into the causes which produced this sudden reverse. The question, though frequently canvassed, is still involved in considerable obscurity. In similar cases it is usual to resort to treachery, in order to discover a satisfactory solution. Whether it operated at all upon the present occasion, or to what extent it was employed, it is by no means easy to ascertain; but, without recurring to any except ostensible motives, we may fairly ascribe the triumph of catholicism to the zeal and activity of Maximilian, which enabled him to bring into the field an army far more formidable than the vacillating economy of the adverse party would allow them to levy. The terror, excited by the superiority of the catholics, both in numbers and in discipline, was greatly augmented by the approach of Spinola, hastening at the head of his veteran bands to inundate the almost defenceless Palatinate.

The treaty of Ulm having neutralized the forces of the "Evangelical Union," Ferdinand was enabled to direct his resources against the Bohemians. Availing himself of the consternation universally disse-

* July 3d, 1620. Schmidt. iv. 18. Barre, 489. This treaty is given in detail by Le Vassor, iv. 653.

† Pfeffel Histoire d'Allemagne, ii. 287. Schmidt, *ibid*.

minated by the defection of their allies, the Duke of Bavaria compelled the insurgents in Lower Austria to lay down their arms, and to do homage to the emperor as their legitimate sovereign, upon his consenting to confirm all their religious privileges.

History affords few examples of a more rapid revolution than now took place in the fortune of Ferdinand. Bethlem Gabor, his most dangerous foe, was prevented from marching to the assistance of Frederic, by the scientific dispositions of Dampiere, while the Margrave of Jagerndorf, a Bohemian general, was compelled to evacuate Lusatia by the Elector of Saxony. Meanwhile the main operations were directed against the Palatine by Maximilian in person, assisted by Tilly, so celebrated for courage, superstition, and cruelty.* After forming a junction with Bucquoy, his force amounted to fifty thousand men; a body too vast to be supported in a country where provisions were far from abundant. In order, therefore, to obviate the distress arising from inadequate supplies, it was resolved that the duke should march against Bud-

* Tilly, who was undoubtedly one of the most conspicuous personages at an era so fertile in splendid talents, is said to have been originally designed for an ecclesiastical life, and to have been educated under the direction of the Jesuits. After performing his noviciate with considerable applause, he quitted the order for the more active profession of arms, for which he always entertained a strong predilection, and served with distinction in the Netherlands. Impelled by the holy zeal which he had imbibed in a monastery, he followed the Duc de Mercœur into Hungary, eager to assist in the extermination of the unbelievers. The reputation which he acquired, by his sagacity and valour, attracting the notice of Rhodolph, he was raised to the rank of general; and peace being soon concluded with the Turks, he entered into the service of the Duke of Bavaria, with the title of Commander-in-Chief; and, by his indefatigable exertions, soon established in the army the most perfect discipline, in which till then it had been greatly defective. *Coxe, i. 778.*

weiss, while the Flemish commander, advancing by a circuitous route, should endeavour to join him under the walls of Piseck ; an important fortress, the capture of which was expected to decide the ultimate success of the campaign.

Bucquoy, being punctual to his engagement, a summons was sent to the Governor of Piseck, who immediately entered into a negociation ; but while the articles of capitulation were settling, the Walloons and Cossacs, indignant at the idea of being defrauded of their booty, rushed toward the ramparts with spontaneous fury, and were already masters of the city before their commanders were apprised of their intention. The dreadful carnage which ensued, with all the military relaxations of rape and robbery, created such consternation in the adjacent country, that all men endeavoured, by unconditional submission, to avert a similar destiny.*

It would have required talents very different from those which Frederic possessed, to have provided a remedy adequate to his distress. Destitute of any ally on whose fidelity he could depend, since the ungenerous desertion of the Union, he knew not to whom to apply for advice. In spite of the solemn promise given by the Duke of Bavaria to the protestant chiefs, as an excuse, or compensation, for their baseness, Spinola continued to advance ; while the Margrave of Anspach, though at the head of an army expressly destined to cover the Palatinate, remained a tranquil spectator of his progress. It has been urged, in justification of the unfortunate elector, that his ruin was less to be im-

* Coxe, i. 778.

puted to his own misconduct than to the treachery of those in whom he confided ; and, in support of this opinion, his partisans have argued, that had Anspach protected his hereditary estates, and the reinforcements which he expected from England and Holland arrived in time, the issue of the contest might have been different. This, however, is nothing more than to exculpate him from the charge of temerity, at the expense of his understanding ; since it was folly to expect the co-operation of a monarch, who, by the mouths of his ambassadors at Madrid, at Brussels, and at Vienna, had publicly expressed his disapprobation of Frederic's conduct. Neither can we, without subjecting him to the same imputation, believe him deceived by the fallacious appearance of deference and respect, so ostentatiously manifested by the Austrian cabinet, for the wisdom and equity of the British Solomon ; because it required no greater portion of penetration than falls to the lot of the meanest capacity, to discover that the sentiments entertained of the royal pedagogue, by all the continental powers, were those of contempt.*

But even were it possible to excuse the supineness of Frederic, with respect to his electoral territories, the negligence with which he prepared for the defence of his newly-acquired kingdom, can admit of no palliation. Exclusively of the national militia, whose ardour was greatly abated, and Mansfeldt's army left entirely destitute of every resource except what plunder casually supplied, the whole force which was collected to dispute with Austria the sovereignty of Bohemia, comprehended only a

* Le Vassor, iv. 667.

body of eight thousand cavalry, for the most part Hungarians, and a few regiments of German infantry.* His popularity also was rapidly declining, as it became every day more apparent that his accomplishments were merely external; and that, with the exception of personal bravery, he was totally destitute of every quality requisite to struggle against adversity. No treasures arrived from the English court, to reward the venal services of his adherents, who gave vent to their disappointments in loud complaints, on account of his partiality toward the Germans, upon whom every office of emolument and honour was improvidently bestowed. His imprudent attachment to the evangelical simplicity of the Calvinistical rites was equally offensive to the Calixtines and Lutherans; while the licentious excesses of an undisciplined army exasperated the peasants to the highest degree.† Still this ill-advised prince was so infatuated with the ephemeral splendour which irradiated the dawn of his tempestuous reign, that he beheld with indifference the gathering storm; wasting his time and revenues in festive pomp, as if the gratification of personal vanity had been the only object for which he coveted royalty.‡

He probably was led by the same inordinate passion to mistake for affection the enthusiasm of triumph which greeted his arrival, and which induced him to believe that the whole nation would rise in defence of a sovereign, whom they had spontaneously raised to the throne. But when called upon to protect the object of their choice, even the citi-

* The whole, according to Barre, did not exceed thirty thousand men, ix. 499.

† Puffendorf, i. 33.

‡ Ibid.

zens of Prague, his most zealous partizans, shewed little inclination to hazard their fortunes in defence of a prince so unworthy to govern. Neither was the intelligence which arrived from the army better calculated to console him; mistrust and despondency seemed universally to prevail: the commander suspecting the fidelity of the troops, the soldiers depreciating the talents of their commander. Nothing therefore remained for the unfortunate monarch, but to repair to the camp, and to endeavour by his presence to inspire courage and confidence.*

However repugnant to the dictates of prudence the behaviour of Frederic may appear, that of Lewis XIII. was scarcely less calculated to excite contempt and astonishment. Though he was actually at the head of a numerous army when he received intelligence of the march of the Spaniards, he appears to have beheld their ambitious projects with an indifference bordering upon insensibility; and, in his excessive zeal for the propagation of the catholic faith, to have buried every sentiment of generous pity for the fate of an ancient and faithful ally. And his conduct upon this occasion became still more inexcusable, because the invasion of the Palatinate was a flagrant violation of the treaty of Ulm, so lately concluded under his own mediation. Instead of resenting an insult thus openly offered to the dignity of his crown, the pusillanimous monarch remained satisfied with the assurance that the operations of Spinola were intended solely to compel the elector to recal his troops for the defence of his hereditary states, and not undertaken with a view of conquest. It was in vain for the chiefs of the pro-

* Coxe, i. 781.

testant party to expatiate upon the danger which threatened Europe, in case Austria should be permitted to establish in Germany the same arbitrary power which she had already erected in Spain. Totally occupied with plans for the extirpation of heresy, Lewis contemplated with delight the gigantic strides which Ferdinand was making in the career of despotism, because they tended directly to the destruction of principles which he held in pious abhorrence.*

No sooner was it ascertained that the forces of Spinola were directed against the Palatinate, than the Duke of Wirtemberg, in the name of the Evangelical Union, wrote to the French ambassador at Vienna, requesting him to inform the imperial ministers, that in case the Spanish army should act offensively against any of its members, they should consider themselves as released from every obligation imposed by the late convention. This menace, however, was mitigated by the assurance that nothing could be farther from the intention of the allies, than to refuse a passage to the imperial troops, provided they were destined for the recovery of Bohemia; it being their decided resolution never to interfere with the internal politics of that distracted kingdom, but to confine their efforts entirely to the preservation of the tranquillity of the German empire.†

A declaration, couched in such ambiguous terms, demanded a candid reply. But equivocation was the language of the Austrian cabinet; and the answer returned was, in consequence, mysterious as that of the Delphic oracle; for though it abounded

* La Vassor, iv. 685.

† Ibid.

in general professions of amity, it left every thing open to the ambition of Ferdinand, without a positive breach of veracity.

Such was his conduct towards the ambassadors of France. Toward England he behaved with equal indignity; but though his treatment of the British monarch was highly insulting, it was at least exempt from the imputation of duplicity. Upon the first intelligence that arrived of the armaments equipping in Flanders, James required an explanation from the court of Brussels respecting its object, and received for answer, that it was assembling in consequence of directions from Vienna; but that the projects of the emperor had not been imparted to Archduke Albert, though they might possibly be known to the commander. The English minister now addressed himself to Spinola, but without procuring additional information. The general assured him, with an air of candour, that his orders were sealed, and were not to be opened till he arrived at Coblentz, where the troops were appointed to rendezvous; but promised the ambassador, if he would accompany him thither, to communicate his instructions without the smallest reserve. The invitation was accepted, and the engagement fulfilled; when it appeared, that he was instructed to levy war against all who supported the Bohemian rebels. Though the destination of the armament could no longer admit of the smallest doubt, yet so excessive was the vanity of the credulous monarch, that, in spite of conviction, he persevered in believing that the dominions of his son-in-law would be spared, out of respect for the wisdom and virtue of his father. Not satisfied with remaining inactive himself, he prevented the Dutch

from taking part in the war, by assuring them that, notwithstanding all hostile appearances, the Palatinate was perfectly secure.*

The folly of the king, egregious as it was, would have failed to produce its full effect, without the concurrence of Anspach, whose conduct, at this important crisis, is difficult to be accounted for, except by supposing him blinded by Spanish dollars.†

While Spinola, availing himself of the supineness of his foes, forced every barrier that impeded his progress, the protestant princes were entirely occupied with internal disputes, accusing each other of negligence and treachery—a reproach justly merited by the majority.

The vanity of James prevented him from discovering the ridiculous part he was acting. No proofs could convince his understanding, no insults could rouse his resentment. Instead of manfully vindicating the honour of the nation, he continued to address himself to the justice and moderation of a prince, to whom moderation and justice were strangers; directing his ambassador to propose to Ferdinand to terminate the dispute respecting Bohemia by a treaty. Unwilling to offend his credulous friend by a positive refusal, and equally resolute not to accept it, the emperor contented himself with evading the demand by the convenient excuse, that he could not decide upon so important a measure without consulting his allies.

The representative of a sovereign less pacific than James, would have instantly quitted the Aus-

* La Vassor, 689. Puffendorf, i. 32. Hume, xcvi. Rushworth, i. 14.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.* Lotichius, i, 190.

trian court, and considered his mission as terminated; but Wotton was too well acquainted with his master's infirmity, to risk his displeasure by a dignified action.

The success, which had attended the imperial arms in other quarters, was suddenly clouded by the death of Dampierre, who fell in a gallant attempt to surprise the city of Presburg. Confounded by the loss of that able commander, the troops, though upon the point of entering the town, were seized with a panic, and fled in disorder. This unforeseen disaster afforded an opportunity for attacking the Austrians before they recovered from the shock, and the wary Transilvanian with his accustomed activity availed himself of the confusion, to cut off some scattered detachments, and to capture Hainbourg, a place of considerable importance.*

Whatever hopes might have been entertained by the friends of Frederic, while revelling in the joys of the capital, the scene which presented itself upon their joining the army was calculated to dissipate them immediately. Destitute alike of clothing and of pay, the soldiers in loud and tumultuous murmurs expressed their indignation at being exposed to hardships too severe for human patience to endure. A difference of opinion prevailed also among the commanders upon a question of the highest importance. By some it was proposed, with more zeal than prudence, to hazard a general battle, lest the hardships, incidental to a protracted campaign, should induce the troops

* Lotichius, i. 196. Schmidt, iv. 20.

to quit their standards—an event by no means improbable. This plan, strongly recommended by the ardent courage of the younger Thurn, was as warmly opposed by Anhalt, unwilling to confide to the decision of arms, what he flattered himself to accomplish by cautious delay. The enemy, he maintained, must suffer most from the scarcity of provisions, and as winter approached, would be compelled to retire from want of subsistence. The opinion of the commander prevailed, and it was determined in consequence to avoid an action. Proposals were even sent to the Duke of Bavaria for an amicable termination of the contest, but the weakness of the enemy was too notorious to allow of his treating upon any terms consistent with the honour of Frederic. The instant renunciation of the Bohemian sceptre was insisted upon, an indispensable article, a degradation to which he was certain the elector would never consent, unless reduced to unconditional submission.*

The Fabian tactics adopted by the Bohemian army obliged it to fall back, and sometimes with a rapidity not totally consistent with discipline, till it reached the suburbs of Prague; and as its decaying ramparts precluded the possibility of a regular defence, intrenchments were thrown up on the summit of a mountain, which commands and covers the city.† The natural strength of this position, augmented hourly by additional works, presented obstacles, which, if judiciously employed, might have proved insuperable.

On the 8th of November, after reconnoitring in

* Schmidt, iv. 18.

† The Weissenberg, or White Mountain.

person the position of the enemy, Maximilian resolved to storm their lines. In the beginning of the action, some trifling advantage was obtained by Anhalt's cavalry, which was prematurely considered by Calvinistical presumption as a certain omen of victory. But the delusion was momentary, and served only to embitter the pangs of disappointment. Thrown into disorder by the impetuosity of the Austrians, the Hungarian horse fled precipitately. Their dastardly behaviour became contagious, and in the space of an hour the hopes of Frederic were levelled with the ground, his forces dissipated, his artillery taken, his reputation tarnished, and nothing left him but the disastrous prospect of irretrievable ruin, and the empty title of King. From the walls of his capital, where he retired before the battle, he beheld the slaughter unfortunately increased by the precaution of Anhalt, who, as an incentive to his soldiers to fight with desperation, had ordered the gates to be barricaded.*

It would have been more consistent with the character which he was proud to assume, had Frederic sought in the field of glory an honourable termination to all the calamities, into which rashness and vanity had plunged him. Yet instead of partaking the danger like a hero, even at the tremendous moment when fortune and glory were at stake, he is said to have been indulging his taste

* Lotichius, i. 210. Coxe, i. 782. Schmidt, iv. 81.—Galetti, i. 11. who seems strongly to suspect Anhalt of treachery.—The citizens of Prague offered to defend the town, and the younger Thurn supported the same opinion, as seventeen battalions were still unbroken, 8000 Hungarians were on their march to Prague, and Mansfeldt was at Pilsin with his whole army. *ib. id.*

for ostentation in giving a splendid entertainment to the English ambassador. The alarming intelligence, which arrived from the field, roused him at length to a sense of danger. Quitting the banquet, he rushed toward the ramparts, where he beheld a scene which overwhelmed him at once with despair and consternation. Scarcely conscious of what he did, he ordered the gates to be thrown instantly open, that the fugitives might find an asylum. He then retired to the palace where, being joined by Anhalt and Hohenlove, he at their recommendation sent an officer to the victor, requesting a suspension of arms till the following morning. This demand was haughtily refused; but, after some expostulation, a truce was accorded for eight hours, upon condition that he should consent by a public document to renounce every claim to the Bohemian sceptre. With this humiliating demand, the vanquished sovereign was happy to comply, because it afforded him an opportunity of escaping with his family, the only object to which his fallen ambition seemed any longer to aspire.*

So precipitate was his flight, that he neglected even to carry away the crown for which he had paid so dearly. Anhalt also left behind him a treasure of greater value, his private papers, which served as a foundation for the curious collection, which still derives its appellation from its original owner.†

* Puffendorf, i. 34. Schmidt, iv. 18. "There are virtues," said the unhappy fugitive to one of the gentlemen who accompanied him in his flight, "in which adversity alone can instruct us! It is the sad destiny of princes to be totally unacquainted with their real character, till they are taught it in the school of misfortune!" Barre, ix. 502.

† "Anhaltischen Kantsley"! Schmidt, *ibid*.

It is probable that Maximilian, in granting a respite to his fallen foe, intended to favour his retreat; and the shortness of the truce was exactly calculated to produce the desired effect. Suspicion is the child of misfortune, and we accordingly find that every moment which Frederic was constrained by the preparations necessary for his departure, to pass within the walls of his capital, appeared an age to his distempered imagination, which anticipated the calamity of being delivered up to his rival by an ungenerous people, as an atonement for all their transgressions, and he was too well acquainted with the implacable temper of Ferdinand to question the efficacy of such a sacrifice.

CHAP. V.

Distress of Frederic after the battle of Prague.—Maximilian resigns the command.—Bethlem Gabor resolves to continue the war.—Internal state of Hungary.—A general review of the situation of the different European powers, with respect to their political interests and resources.—Despotic conduct of Ferdinand; he deposes the Palatine without the formality of a trial, and resolves to deprive him of his hereditary dominions.—His cruelty to the Bohemians.—The Evangelical Union dissolved.—Heroical behaviour of Mansfeldt.—James I. interposes in favour of his Son-in-law.—Frederic joins the army commanded by Mansfeldt.—The Margrave of Baden and Christian, Duke of Brunswick, take up arms; exploits and character of the latter.—Frederic, being persuaded to disband his forces and throw himself upon the Emperor's clemency, is deprived of the electoral dignity.

IT is in the nature of man to exalt the successful far above the level of their intrinsic deserts, and to depreciate the unfortunate in an equal degree. Hence the conduct of Frederic, after the battle of Prague, has afforded abundant materials for animadversion, and scarcely met with a single apologist. According to the opinion of many respectable writers, the capital might have been defended, notwithstanding the dilapidated condition of its fortifications, and the war protracted till terms could have been obtained, neither incompatible with the honour of the sovereign, nor fatal to the liberties of the people. Mansfeldt's army had not been engaged, but maintained its position at Pilsen. The restless ambition of Bethlem Gabor might have been roused with facility, and by a powerful diversion have compelled the Emperor to recall, at least, a part of his army for the defence of Hungary. The panic, excited by the recent defeat, must have

gradually subsided ; when the Bohemians, impelled by every motive capable of inspiring the human heart with intrepidity, might have resumed their arms with an enthusiasm becoming the descendants of Zisca. The enemy, on the contrary, had equally to contend against the inclemency of the season, and the rooted animosity of the inhabitants. Cold, sickness, and famine are formidable foes, which set both valour and prudence at defiance.*

These advantages, however, were entirely thrown away by the flight of him, whose presence was requisite to encourage his partisans. After the departure of their sovereign, Thurn and his adherents retired into Silesia, hoping to find a safe asylum till the fate of their country should be decided. But circumstances occurring, which led them to suppose that the place of their retreat was discovered, and thoroughly persuaded that the vindictive spirit of Ferdinand would leave nothing unattempted to effect their destruction, they withdrew into Transilvania, confident of meeting with an amicable reception from the inveterate enemy of Austria.

The situation of Frederic was equally insecure. After remaining a short time at Breslau, he fled to Berlin,† from whence, being dissatisfied with the reception given him by the elector, he removed into Holland, where he was assured of experiencing protection and sympathy from the affection and generosity of the Prince of Orange.

The misery of Bohemia seemed almost hopeless:

* Schmidt, iv. 18.

† Puffendorf, i. 34.

though it still remained uncertain whether the conqueror would attempt to conciliate the hearts of the people by moderation and clemency, or to establish his authority on the tremendous basis of terror. Forsaken by the man whom they had chosen for a protector,^{*} the citizens of Prague had no alternative left, but to throw themselves unconditionally at the feet of the victor, and trust to his humanity for pardon. No time was allowed for deliberation, as the ferocious Spaniards were actually preparing to scale the walls, and could hardly be restrained by the threats and intreaties of their commander.*

Though the humanity of Maximilian protected Prague from the horrors inseparable from an assault, no further indulgence was granted; and even that was subject to the degrading condition, that they should immediately deliver up their arms, dissolve the confederacy, and submit to the authority of their legitimate sovereign.† Having thus completed the subjugation of this unfortunate people, Maximilian resigned the government of the conquered country into the hands of Prince Charles of Lichtenstein, appointed by the emperor to succeed him; and, leaving Tilly behind with a force sufficient to repress rebellion, he returned in triumph to Munich.‡

The example of the capital was immediately fol-

* Barre, ix. 502.

† Coxe, i. 785. *Ambassade d'Angoulene*, 378.

‡ Coxe, ib. Galetti, l. 38.—Immediately after the surrender of Prague, all books were publicly burnt, and the re-establishment of the Jesuits was the first act of the emperor.

lowed by the principal towns, such only excepted as were actually occupied by Mansfeldt, who, by a splendid example of persevering valour, resolved to elucidate the folly of Ferdinand in preferring a general so decidedly his inferior.*

The victories of Ferdinand were celebrated by the catholics as religious triumphs in almost every country in Europe; and the blood, profusely shed by the axe of the executioner, was regarded by them as a propitiatory sacrifice, no less grateful to Heaven than to the Jesuits.† The protestants, on the contrary, both at London and Paris, refused to give credit to the report, affecting to treat it as an artifice of the enemy to damp the national ardour.

The waivode of Transilvania was in the vicinity of Presburg, occupied with preparations for his approaching coronation, when he received intelligence of the defeat of his ally. The fall of Frederic gave a fatal blow to all his prospects, because it enabled Ferdinand to concentrate his forces for the recovery of Hungary. But what added greatly to his affliction was the bitter reflection, that the ruin of his friend was occasioned by his own imprudence.

* Puffendorf, i. 34. Schmidt, iv. 18.

† The words of Lotichius deserve attention. “Certe Ferdinandus II. imperator, quem moribus parthenium, pietate sanctum fuisse accepimus, potius precibus, sacrificiis, processionibusque solemnibus, loco debitæ erga deum gratiarum actionis, operam dedisse, quam choreis, tripudiis, epulisque aut poculis vacasse, evincitur. Ille igitur fastigio imperator, devotione sacerdos, sanctitate patriarcha, non absque religiosa devotione, non sine mitissima, humilissimaque submissione, clericorum choris mistus, à splendore aulico sequestratus, processiones suo modo sacras celebravit.” i. 214. This man certainly mistook his vocation when he mounted a throne!

Had he continued in arms; it would have been impossible for the emperor to have assembled an army adequate to the conquest of Bohemia, without abandoning Hungary entirely.

Though he had treacherously consented to a suspension of hostilities, Gabor however had not wasted his time in total inactivity, but had conceived a plan in concert with the Porte for the annihilation of Austria. To his sanguine temper nothing appeared more easy than to realize that chimerical project, and as a prelude to more arduous undertakings, it was resolved to commence the important work by his assuming the regal title.*

Notwithstanding the resources of the Transilvanian were greatly overrated by his ardent disposition, they were still sufficiently formidable to excite considerable alarm at Vienna. Having once experienced the benefit of French mediation, Ferdinand was desirous of persuading the ambassadors of Lewis to open a negotiation with Gabor. This honour, however, they wisely declined, without a positive order from their court; and addressed to the king an able memorial, representing the impolicy of permitting the German protestants to be oppressed.† No remonstrances, however, were able to overcome the religious scruples of their master. Instead of attending to their advice, Lewis directed them to assist in promoting a reconciliation between Austria and the invader of Hungary; but it soon became evident that neither party was sincerely desirous of peace, but that they were employed by the emperor as instruments of deception,

* 1620, Schmidt, iv. 19.

† Ambassade d'Angoulene, 348.

and not of conciliation ; and that the imbecility of its sovereign had so completely degraded the dignity of France, that it no longer retained its proper weight in the general balance of Europe. Animated by the exhortations and the example of Thurn, Gabor resolved to recommence hostilities, without waiting for the reinforcements which he expected from Turkey. Advancing at the head of a considerable force, he spread terror and desolation to the gates of Vienna ; but as the prudence of Ferdinand had swept the country of every thing requisite for the maintenance of troops, he was compelled to retire after the vain parade of having insulted the capital of Germany. Falling back upon Tirnau, an important post, he carried away the crown and the regalia of Hungary, to which the natives attached the most superstitious veneration. This circumstance created a suspicion that he intended to maintain the title of king, though in fact his real motive was only to deprive his rival of a treasure, essentially necessary, in the eyes of the vulgar, to give a legal sanction to his authority.* Delay was to him of the utmost consequence, as he had nothing to lose by protracting the contest, and when inclined to sheath the sword, was perfectly secure of obtaining advantageous conditions ;† and should any revolution of fortune restore his ally to the Bohemian throne, he, in that case, looked forward with well-founded expectation to the pos-

* This prejudice extended so far, that the Hungarians would never have regarded any prince as their legitimate sovereign, who had not been invested with the crown of St. Stephen.—Lotichius, i. 230.

† The edict, by which he annulled the proceedings of the Hungarian diet, is given at length by Lotichius, i. 221.

sibility of establishing a permanent dominion in the eastern* provinces of Europe.

Such was the situation of Hungary: let us now direct our attention to that of Bohemia. The triumph obtained over the electoral army had raised the power and arrogance of Ferdinand to an alarming height; the future destiny of Germany depended entirely upon his decision. By a generous oblivion of every injury, he might have given happiness and security to an admiring nation; but in the intoxication of success he aimed at completing the mighty plan ascribed to the ambition of Charles V. and, though luckily for mankind he failed in the attempt, he overwhelmed his country with a series of calamities, to which history scarcely furnishes a parallel.†

At this momentous crisis, when all the powers of Europe were about to engage in a sanguinary conflict, progressively extending devastation and misery from the frontiers of Poland to the banks of the Rhine, and from the shores of the Baltic to the Alps, it may be advantageous to examine the internal situation of the Germanic body, both in a religious and political view, and to comprehend in the inquiry the contiguous states; so far at least as they were concerned in the memorable struggle.

The doctrine of the reformers had gained such numerous proselytes in the northern provinces of the empire, that they almost balanced the strength of the catholics. For though the latter were undoubtedly superior in numbers, and possessed many

* Lotichius, i, 221.

† Schiller, i.

advantages from which their rivals were excluded by the ancient constitution, they had also various difficulties to contend with, which prevented them from acquiring a permanent ascendancy. The dominions of the protestants lay contiguous to each other, and were governed by princes whose abilities rose above mediocrity. Under a wise administration they had made a rapid progress in science, commerce, and manufactures; while the catholic states adhered to the prejudices and abuses of ancient times, with the pertinacious blindness of superstition. The free cities of Germany, enriched by trade, and uncontested masters of all the northern coast from the Elbe to the Vistula, were almost exclusively followers of the Lutheran doctrines. It was probable, indeed, in the event of a war, that the bigotry of Spain and Italy would arm in support of a party blindly devoted to the papacy, but the new sectaries might look forward with equal confidence to the assistance of many of the northern powers, and might even reckon among their allies the impetuous valour of the Turks. In the electoral college, they could oppose to the three ecclesiastical votes, those of Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Palatine. The resources of the Union, if sagaciously employed, might have rendered the contest dubious; but, unhappily the jealousies, which prevailed among the different members, prevented them from acting with zeal and unanimity. Those possessed of courage to encounter danger were deficient in power; while those who were formidable from their natural resources, wanted prudence, activity, and resolution.

The splendour reflected upon the Saxon family, by the talents and services of Maurice, had accus-

tomed the protestants to consider the chief of that illustrious house as their political leader. John George, being fully aware of the importance attached to his conduct, resolved to sacrifice every consideration to personal interest. Having formed a plan for his own aggrandisement at the expense of his party, he endeavoured to conceal his selfish designs under the mysterious veil of irresolution, apprehensive that a premature disclosure might depreciate the value of treachery, as he expected less from the gratitude of the emperor than he hoped to extort from his apprehensions. Had he been really blessed with that enlightened judgment, with which some of his biographers have endowed him,* he would have rejected the temptation so artfully thrown out by the interested policy of Ferdinand; but he was weak enough to believe that, when a bigot should have established the most unlimited despotism on the ruins of the protestant faith, he would act with justice and generosity towards him; not considering, that by fulfilling his promise, he must violate every principle most venerable in his eyes, both as a king and a theologian.

While avarice tempted the Saxon to abandon his honour, his friends, and his religion, fear operated no less powerfully upon the Elector of Brandenburg, by impelling him to embrace a system of in-

* Schiller, b. ii. speaks of him as a prince governed solely by prudential maxims of policy, and superior to religious enthusiasm; but it is difficult even for the talents of that ingenious writer, to defend his probity, without sacrificing his understanding. No wise man could have given credit to the assertion of Ferdinand; no honest man would have assisted him without it.

decision, which was equally prejudicial to his interest and his reputation.

The house of Hesse was divided by religious opinions, as well as by political attachments ; for while the princes of Darmstadt adhered to the confession of Augsburg, those of Cassel had embraced the tenets of Calvin. Ever faithful to the example of his illustrious progenitor, so celebrated for courage and misfortune, and regardless of danger when faith and freedom were at stake, the latter stood forth the intrepid champion of toleration, while the former bartered fame and independence for a miserable pension. Endowed with firmness which nothing could shake, when the safety of his country was concerned, the Langrave of Cassel was the first German prince who formed an alliance with the Swedish hero, and afforded a glorious example to his contemporaries, which few of them had spirit to imitate.

While the liberties of Germany were basely sacrificed by many of those most intimately concerned in protecting them, the necessity of the times created heroes for their defence. Those prominent situations, however, which ought to have been occupied by the splendour of the electoral houses, were filled by Mansfeldt, by Christian of Brunswick, and by a race of warriors, sprung from the Ernestine branch of the Saxon family, so justly hostile toward Austria.

This example of magnanimity, however, was in great measure thrown away, since neither exhortation nor precedent were able to rouse the compromising timidity of the Dukes of Wirtemberg, of Mecklenberg, of Luneburg, and of Pomerania. —Overawed by the superior resources of Ferdi-

nand, they deemed it prudent to avert the impending danger by tamely submitting to his authority.

In the person of Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, the catholics possessed an able leader. Cool and persevering in the pursuits of glory, he became the defender of the ancient faith, from worldly motives. He fought the battles of the church, because he foresaw that his personal aggrandisement was identified with that of the papal communion. The other princes devoted to the see of Rome, seemed destined by nature to act in subordinate stations, the tools and dependents of Austria. Educated for the most part in the narrow prejudices of a religion, whose leading tenet prohibits the free exercise of the understanding, and raised sometimes from a cloister to a throne, the mitred sovereigns became the advocates of intolerance, rather from the dictates of perverted reason, than from innate depravity of heart. Slaves alike to Ferdinand and the Vatican, they displayed their hatred of the reformers in petty acts of personal hostility against individuals, endeavouring to compensate for the paucity of their means by the violence of their persecution.

The tremendous power established in Spain by Charles V. and gradually undermined by the bigotry of his successor, rapidly declined during the feeble reigns of Philip III. and IV. The splendid fortunes, suddenly acquired by the plunder of America, and which almost entirely inverted the natural order of society, by elevating adventurers from the meanest stations to the enjoyment of every thing that riches could procure, diverted the attention of all men of daring tempers from commerce and agriculture to

military enterprize. For this reason, the victories of Cortes and Pizarro proved scarcely less fatal to the prosperity of Spain than destructive of the happiness of the Americans. Meanwhile the merchants of Flanders, of Genoa, and of Venice, amassed honourable wealth, by wisely employing the resources so improvidently wasted by the haughty indolence of the Castilians. The loss of population, occasioned by the conquest of a new hemisphere, and the expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula of the Pyrenees, those memorable achievements of ferocity and superstition, converted into desarts some of the most fertile provinces in Europe; while the boasted treasures, extracted from the blood of a devoted people, were prodigally lavished in fruitless endeavours to extirpate freedom in Holland, to exclude a hero from the throne of France, and to overturn the power of one of the greatest sovereigns that ever swayed the sceptre of England. Alarmed at the debility which their folly had produced, the Spanish monarchs endeavoured to conceal it from the eyes of the vulgar, under the vain display of Asiatic magnificence, and by assuming a tone of arrogance in all foreign negociations, which would have proved no less offensive if accompanied with adequate power, than it appeared weak and ridiculous without it. Guided entirely by the counsels of upstart minions, or of ignorant monks, they ventured to offer their presumptuous incapacity as a model for the imitation of Austria; encumbering their protection with so many burthensome conditions, that it might have afforded matter for serious reflection, whether it was really worth that extravagant price. Yet under every disadvantage, it was still difficult for a power to cease to be formidable,

which comprehended under its sway such extensive dominions in either hemisphere; whose numerous armies, highly disciplined, were commanded by generals of consummate talents and great experience, and whose boundless ambition, adhering from habit as well as from inclination, to the system pursued by Ferdinand II. his grandson, scrupled not to resort to the dagger of the assassin, when bribes and artifices no longer availed, nor hesitated to degrade the representatives of the Castilian despot into public incendiaries. The object which at that time most immediately occupied the court of Madrid, was to find an equivalent for the loss of Holland, by an extension of territory in Italy; persuaded that in case they could unite their possessions with those of Austria, by subjugating all the country between the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, an empire would be erected in the south of Europe, too formidable for any thing to resist.

Terrified at a project so destructive to their schemes of petty conquest, the native sovereigns, too feeble and disunited to resist the torrent, regarded their ruin as inevitable. Under his twofold character of sovereign and pontiff, the vicergerent of heaven was often constrained to act with inconsistency. As the supreme head of the catholic church, he officially cherished the bigotry of Spain as the firmest prop of his spiritual authority; but, as a temporal monarch, he beheld her encroachments with the utmost jealousy and dismay. As successor of St. Peter, he was impelled by interest, no less than by duty, to pray for the success of the Austrian arms; but, as sovereign of Rome, he was equally tempted to dread the destruction of the German protestants, because their fall would annihilate

the only power capable of opposing the oppressors of Italy. Each of these sentiments seems alternately to have prevailed, exactly in proportion as hope or fear, ambition or piety, were his predominating passions. The danger of the moment was invariably the strongest; and the enemy who triumphed appeared of course the most formidable. It would have been inconsistent with nature to have acted otherwise; because the dread of losing a present advantage is always more active than the wish of escaping a distant peril. This explanation affords a clue to many incongruities in the papal conduct; nor can we any longer be surprised that the vicar of Christ should at one moment unite with Spain and Austria for the extirpation of heresy, and be found at another clandestinely favouring the friends of the Reformation. Had it been possible for the jarring interests of theology and politics to have been so united, as to have allowed the pope to exert his undivided power for the consummation of one important object, the most fatal consequences might have ensued.

With Henry IV. the splendour and influence of the Gallic throne sunk prematurely. A stormy minority relaxed all the sinews of government. A vain and ambitious regent, incapable ministers, and undeserving favourites, squandered in dissipation and intrigue the treasure collected by the economy of Sully, and destined by his master to the noblest purposes. Surrounded on every side by jarring factions, and exclusively occupied in a selfish contention for the spoils of the nation, they had neither leisure nor inclination to attend to foreign affairs. The same impolitic spirit of intolerance, which had armed one half of Germany against the other, had

also kindled in France the flame of rebellion; so that when Lewis assumed the reins of government, he found his kingdom convulsed by domestic dissensions, and destitute of external consideration. Repressed by the wisdom and the humanity of his father, the Hugonots had availed themselves of the weakness incidental to a divided government, to give extent and stability to their power, and had rendered Rochelle, a strong and commercial city, the centre and capital of rebellion. Too superstitious to employ the only adequate remedy, an enlightened system of toleration, and destitute of resources to carry into execution the injudicious plan, which he foolishly resolved to adopt, the son of Henry was shortly reduced to the humiliating expedient of purchasing the allegiance of haughty nobles, whom he was no longer able to control; thus rendering rebellion the surest road to honours, wealth, and authority. His impolicy in deserting the German protestants has been already discussed. Such ill-directed measures tended equally to undermine the prosperity of France, and to degrade her national character; but, fortunately for the glory and aggrandisement of a country destined eventually to support so illustrious a part on the splendid theatre of the universe, the schemes projected by the wisdom of Henry IV. were about to revive with increasing energy under the vigorous administration of Richelieu.

While the splendour of France was sullied by the feebleness and venality of her government, the republic of Holland, having gloriously broken the fetters of Spain, established the fabric of her commercial prosperity on the solid basis of freedom. The enthusiasm of liberty, infused into every bosom by

the glorious example of the princes of the house of Orange, transformed a mercantile nation into a nation of heroes. Grateful for the assistance which they had formerly received from the German protestants, they felt eager to repay the important obligation; convinced that, by contributing to their emancipation, they must eventually raise an insuperable barrier against the despotic projects of Austria. But their exertions were circumscribed by necessity. To resist the machinations of the Spanish court demanded every effort of strength and understanding that the infant commonwealth could command. Yet the anxiety to assist an unfortunately overcame every minor consideration, which might have fettered the activity of more powerful states; and we accordingly find a Dutch army prepared to co-operate in the defence of the palatinate.

Notwithstanding the crowns of England and Scotland were at length united, no real accession of strength had accrued to the British nation. On the contrary, the consideration which she had enjoyed under the politic administration of Elizabeth, was quickly impaired by the timidity of her successor: Convinced that the stability of her own throne depended upon the success of the protestant cause, the daughter of Henry consented to sacrifice one of the strongest propensities of her heart, the love of economy, in support of every enterprise which tended to circumscribe the influence of Spain. To have persevered in a scheme of such consummate prudence, required talents very different from those with which the son of Darnley was endowed. Taught by the pedantry of his education to consider wisdom as consisting in the knowledge of words, or the systematical arrangement of a syllogism, he ren-

dered himself despicable in the eyes of Europe by the pompous imbecility of his measures ; neglecting every object that ought to have occupied the attention of a prudent prince, for the pursuit of trifles equally undeserving of his notice, as a man, a scholar, or monarch. While the frugal Elizabeth, with well-timed generosity, poured forth her treasures in aid of the Dutch, and assisted in placing a protestant hero upon the throne, James abandoned his daughter and her unfortunate husband, to the malice of their inveterate enemy. Absorbed in deducing the regal authority from the special appointment of heaven, he totally forgot that the absurdity of the attempt endangered the claim which he foolishly wished to establish.

Such was the prelude to those disastrous scenes, which, overwhelming England with discord and blood, in the struggle between prerogative and privilege, prevented her from interfering with continental politics. The storm had been long collecting, and burst with a fury that nothing could resist. Whether the greatest talents, combined with the greatest moderation, could have averted its impetuosity, must ever remain matter of speculation; certain, however, it is, that the system pursued by the misguided Charles had a directly opposite tendency. Impressed by his father with the most extravagant notions concerning the divine authority of kings, and possessing courage and cunning for the attempt, he rashly undertook to realize the preposterous theory. Hence arose that war, which (as Mr. Fox observes, with his usual discrimination,) “has been so intemperately denominated a rebellion,” and which terminated in the death of the king, and the extinction of monarchy.

The situation of Sweden will come under consideration at a future period, with greater propriety; and respecting Denmark, it may be sufficient to remark, that the active genius of Christian IV. by creating a navy, introducing discipline and order in the management of the army, and establishing a regular system of economy in the internal administration, had given security, consideration, and energy to his country.

In conformity to the pressing solicitation of his allies, Ferdinand had postponed the gratification of his resentment, till enabled by victory to be unjust with impunity. But when the battle of Prague had subjugated Bohemia, and annihilated all the hopes of his rival, he no longer set bounds to his vindictive temper, but determined, by one decisive blow, to gratify his hatred of Frederic, and of heresy.

On the 21st of January, 1621, an edict appeared, by which, without assembling a diet, or even attempting to conceal the iniquity of the proceeding under the prostituted forms of law, Frederic and his adherents were subjected as traitors to the bar of the empire. By this violent act, no less repugnant to the spirit than insulting to the members of the Germanic constitution, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Jägendorf, the Prince of Anhalt, and the Count of Hohenlohe, were deprived of their honours and territories.* The execution of the sentence was committed to Archduke Albert, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, as protector of the circle of Burgundy, and to the Duke of Bavaria; the former of whom was directed to invade the Lower Palati-

* Lotichius, i. 231. Barre, ix. 507. Schmidt, iv. 19.

nate, while the Upper was occupied by the troops of Maximilian.

This vigorous measure spread universal consternation among the protestants, while it was applauded by the catholics with exaggerated praise, as the consummation of wisdom and virtue. There were not wanting, however, even in the Austrian cabinet, men sufficiently enlightened to discover the impolicy of deviating from judicial precedents, and to foretel the consequent dangers. Hohenzollern, the president of the Aulic council, refused to be present at the ratification of the decree, alledging, in his excuse, that his conscience forbade him to sanction a measure, which invested a man with the functions of judge in his own cause, in which the execution had preceded the sentence.* And this was literally the case, as the invasion of the Palatinate was undertaken previously to the condemnation of the elector, and in direct violation of the treaty concluded with the "Evangelical Union." Neither was the system pursued less contrary to the forms than subversive of the principles of jurisprudence. Frederic had been condemned without being suffered to plead in his own defence, or even being cited to appear before any tribunal; and yet Ferdinand, upon his accession to the imperial throne, had signed a capitulation, by which he solemnly engaged never to issue the ban against any member of the Germanic confederacy, without strictly adhering to every formality usual in forensic processes. Circumstances, however, were now materially altered, and, as he no longer wanted support, he scarcely deigned to

* *Memoire de Lerneise Julianæ*, 175. It is said that Ferdinand, upon this occasion, was governed entirely by the advice of the Spanish court.

offer any apology for this flagrant breach of his coronation oath, or even attempted to palliate an action, which could not be defended on any grounds, except the tyrant's plea of necessity.

That a sovereign, educated according to the maxims of the Spanish court, should regard terror as the readiest instrument of government, it is consistent with reason to expect: we cannot therefore be astonished to learn that the Bohemian insurgents were treated with relentless severity. Three months, however, were suffered to elapse, after the battle of Prague, involved in awful suspense. This mysterious silence tempted many, who had fled in the general confusion, to return again to their estates; and so great was the delusion, which universally prevailed, that numbers remained at home in perfect security, though secretly admonished of the impending danger by Tilly.* At length, however, the tempest burst in all its fury: at the same hour precisely, and in the dead of night, forty-eight of the leaders of the disaffected party were seized in their beds, and being brought to trial before a special commission, seven and twenty were condemned to suffer upon a scaffold, and their property ordered to be confiscated.† Being for the most part persons in opulent circumstances, it may be presumed that the sentence was regarded by their judges as a financial expedient. Those who escaped with their lives were either doomed to banishment, or to per-

* Though this fact is mentioned by Coxé, upon the authority of Pelzel, it is not easy to believe, that the callous breast of the plunderer of Magdeburg was ever accessible to pity.

† Piacsius speaks thus of the execution of the Bohemian nobles, "*suppliciis, non Christiano solum homini, sed quantumvis barbaro, ob immanem crudelitatem, execrandis,*" 350,

petnal imprisonment, accompanied with the sequestration of their fortune. The rage of party being thus far satiated with the destruction of those, who had imprudently trusted to a tyrant's humanity, a citation was issued, commanding the emigrants to appear before the imperial tribunal within a limited period; and their neglect being construed into a proof of criminality, they were declared guilty of treason, and incurred in consequence the penalty of death and confiscation. Among these was Thurn, and several other noblemen, conspicuous for talent and probity.*

Had the proscription been confined entirely to those, who had taken an active part in the war, it might have been easy for flattery to have extenuated inhumanity by precedents of the highest authority; but for the atrocities which ensued, no precedent could be found since the days of the second triumvirate. An edict, devised with more than inquisitorial severity, commanded all landholders, who had been concerned in opposing the authority of the emperor, to make an ample confession of their guilt before commissioners appointed to receive their depositions, under pain of incurring the most rigorous punishment. Terror now pervaded every condition of life; because a field was opened for malice and delation to which loyalty the most unshaken had nothing to oppose. Persuaded that the penalty attached to discovery would be less rigid than that denounced against concealments, above seven hundred persons of noble birth

* Lotichius, i. 235.—After the detail he gives of this bloody tragedy, the reader cannot but be surprised to meet with an eulogium upon the clemency of Ferdinand.

inscribed their names on the list of delinquents. To these unfortunate victims of credulity, imperial clemency (for so it was insultingly styled in the partial language of the court,) condescended to grant their lives and titles ; but as justice required that such atrocious crimes should not escape with impunity, their estates were confiscated, either in part, or wholly, according to the measure of their offence ; and thus were many of the most opulent families reduced to absolute penury.*

Having satisfied resentment, and filled his treasury, Ferdinand resolved to avail himself of the general consternation for the extirpation of the protestant tenets. Yet being apprehensive of the consequences, which might naturally be expected from a sweeping edict of unconditional proscription, he deemed it adviseable to proceed by progressive steps, though his unbending temper revolted at the idea of even a temporary compromise with heresy. The first effects of his indignation were accordingly levelled against the unorthodox preachers of the capital, who received positive injunctions to evacuate Bohemia. The part which they had acted during the late revolution, by exciting the people in seditious sermons to persevere in the righteous cause, was alledged as the motive for their banishment, because the emperor was still anxious to conceal from the protestants the extent of his secret designs.† His zeal however was much too intemperate for prudence long to restrain it ; and we accordingly find that the exercise of every religion,

* Pelzel, 731.

† Lotichius, i. 240. Puffendorf, i. 36.

except the papal, was shortly forbidden by an imperial rescript.*

In the political constitution of Bohemia he made few alterations.† Some historians indeed affirm, that he commanded the documents, from which the national privileges were derived, to be delivered into his hands, and that he immediately burned them with many expressions of contempt. This accusation however reposes upon no solid foundation, as the original deed is still in existence. The seal and signature of Rodolph are torn off from the "Letter of Majesty," but all the other acts are entire; nay more, were confirmed by Ferdinand himself, in 1627, at his son's coronation, ‡ with the additional concession, that no contributions in future should be imposed upon the Bohemians, without the concurrence of their representative.§

Notwithstanding the enormous sum of forty millions of florins, || is supposed to have entered the imperial coffers, from the forfeitures levied upon the adherents of Frederic, yet so prodigal was the emperor in his donations to the clergy, and so insatiable were the Jesuits in their demands, that he found it impossible to recompense the services of his friends, without resorting to fresh confiscations. To find an adequate reward for the deserts of Maximilian was indeed a difficult task; but to satisfy his expectations was impossible. Previously to the commencement of hostilities, the emperor had

* 1621. Puffendorf, i. 36.

† Hist. Persecut. Eccles. Bohem. 294.

‡ Schmidt, iv. 19.

§ Pelzel, 753.

|| About four millions sterling.

engaged by a solemn contract to reimburse him for the expenses which he might incidentally incur in his defence. The hour of retribution was now arrived ; but the treasures extorted from the plundered nobles were already lavished. In this dilemma, the spoils of the Palatine afforded the only resource. By transferring the honours and territories of that unfortunate prince to the house of Bavaria, he gratified at once all the meanest propensities of his nature ; by crushing a rival he indulged his pride and resentment in their fullest extent ; he rewarded Maximilian without the smallest sacrifice at which avarice could repine ; and satisfied every scruple with which a conscience more delicate might have allayed his triumph by promoting the glory of orthodox Christianity.

The “ Evangelical Union,” so unworthy of the appellation which it ostentatiously assumed, and of the cause it undertook to defend, began now to experience the fatal consequences of its former indecision. With an indifference, almost surpassing the limits of human imbecility, the members had beheld the ruin of their leader, who, if permanently seated on the Bohemian throne, and properly supported by his allies, might have become the firmest pillar of the protestant church, and established it upon a foundation too solid for despotism or bigotry to undermine. Having imprudently suffered the propitious moment to escape, no alternative remained but to endeavour to purchase precarious safety by the derilection of every principle for the protection of which they had coalesced. Terrified by the example of Frederic, they hastily concluded a treaty at Mentz, by which they abandoned that unfortunate prince to his unhappy destiny ; and, as

a convincing proof of their pacific intentions, consented immediately to disband their forces. By this dishonourable act the confederacy was dissolved and no attempt was afterwards made to revive it.*

Though shamefully abandoned by his former colleagues, Frederic still possessed a friend, who served him with fidelity under every reverse. Secure behind the ramparts of Pilsen, Mansfeldt bid defiance to the whole power of Austria. Though uncertain of ever receiving the smallest reward, he defended the town with heroical courage, till the soldiers actually began to mutiny for want of pay. Destitute of funds to satisfy their importunity, and too weak to enforce obedience, he left the command to an officer of experience, upon whose fidelity he thought he could rely, and repaired to Heilbron, where the protestant princes were assembled, in hopes of obtaining a scanty subsidy, to alleviate his immediate necessities. But while he was exerting every effort in support of a cause, to which his reputation and honour were pledged, Tilly prevailed upon his lieutenant to surrender. This disastrous event was soon followed by the loss of all the Bohemian fortresses.†

In the opinion of his contemporaries, that gallant adventurer had now terminated his eccentric career; but, at the moment when he was supposed to be irretrievably ruined, he suddenly appeared in the Upper Palatinate, more an object of terror than ever. Having received a scanty supply from Denmark and England, and more extensive powers

* Lotichius, i. 242. Schmidt, iv. 19.

† Lotichius, i. 251. Schmidt, iv. 23.

from Frederic, he collected an army of twenty thousand men, the greater part of whom had been recently dismissed by the Evangelical Union. So formidable a force, depending entirely upon their rapacity for sustenance, and commanded by a general of consummate ability, whose only fortune consisted in his sword, could not fail to excite universal dismay. By many it was believed, that an attempt would be made to recover Bohemia before reinforcements could arrive from Vienna. To others, however, it appeared more probable, that Mansfeldt would direct his vengeance against the unprotected members of the Catholic League; and by levying contributions on all ecclesiastical property recruit his ruined finances. But whatever in reality might have been his intentions, little time was allowed him for carrying them into effect, as the Duke of Bavaria, after forming a junction with Tilly, marched with the utmost celerity to the succour of his allies. Incapable of opposing the overwhelming torrent, Mansfeldt was compelled to fall back upon Franconia, whose unexhausted fertility promised abundant supplies. But scarcely had he taken a strong position in the vicinity of Nuremberg, when the Bavarian army appeared. His situation was now become critical in the extreme, as he was equally in want of provisions and ammunition, should his camp be invested by Maximilian. Neither could he attempt to extricate himself by a precipitate retreat, without exposing his harassed and disheartened troops to inevitable destruction. Nothing, therefore, remained, except to endeavour by stratagem to overreach the foe, and to this he accordingly resorted. A confidential officer communicated to the Duke of Bavaria, under the seal

of secrecy, his commander's determination to abandon a cause rendered desperate by the disunion of its leaders; and further hinted, that he might be induced by an adequate offer to enter into the imperial service. The prospect of gaining over such a formidable adversary was too seducing even for the wary Maximilian to resist; and, without further hesitation, he sent back the officer with unlimited powers to treat. A negotiation so delicate could not be concluded without some deliberation. The electoral troops were destitute of every thing necessary for their subsistence; and, if not immediately relieved, might desert. The honour of Mansfeldt was at stake; and money and provisions were in consequence dispatched from the Bavarian camp sufficient for the exigency of the moment. This was exactly the object at which Mansfeldt had aimed. His soldiers were refreshed, their arrears were discharged, the enemy was lulled into security. Availing himself of their supineness he decamped in the night; and, though pursued by Tilly with the utmost celerity, he gained the Lower Palatinate in safety.*

Though the contemptuous neglect with which his remonstrances had been treated shewed plainly that nothing could be expected from negotiation, still the timidity of James revolted at the idea of involving the nation in hostilities. Allured by the offer of a marriage between his son and the Infanta,† he patiently suffered himself to be amused by promises repeatedly broken, and no sooner broken than

* Barre, ix. 508.

† In this celebrated transaction, it is difficult to determine which most deserves contempt, the credulity of James, the romantic folly of Charles, the insolence of Buckingham, or the duplicity of Spain.

renewed. When he addressed his complaints to the court of Madrid, he was assured that directions should be immediately given to the Governor of the Netherlands to refrain from farther depredations. At Brussels he was referred to the Austrian cabinet with the strongest protestations of amity;* and had he been only half as sagacious as vain, he might have discovered that forms and compliments were the only favours which he was likely to obtain at Vienna.†

Lord Digby was sent with all the pomp of an ambassador to solicit the pardon of Frederic, and to promise that he should submit to any reasonable penance which imperial pride might impose, provided the emperor would consent to reinstate him in the possession of his hereditary dominions. To this equitable proposal the Austrian minister replied, with his wonted duplicity, that "it was the sincere wish of his master to give complete satisfaction to all the potentates who interested themselves in favour of the elector," assuring him that "the af-

* Hume, xlix.

† If we give credit to the editor of Sir Dudley Carlton's Letters, we may infer that the king was almost the only person in England who gave credit to the professions of Austria. "It was soon discovered by the ministers of England, that if the restitution of the Palatinate was made the *sine qua non* of the treaty, it would never be concluded. The court of Spain had it not in their power, nor indeed in their inclination, to procure the establishment of the palatine-house," Preface, xlii. In a letter to Secretary Naunton, Sir Dudley leaves no doubt respecting the duplicity of Spain: "Here," says he, "we are informed that all (*meaning the German princes*) arm, both great and small, ecclesiastical and temporal; but the opinion is, many of them will not declare themselves, but as they shall be swayed by their belief of the strength of each party; which the Spaniard knowing, doth already use his accustomed artifice, first by bruit spread abroad of his correspondency and friendship with his majesty, which he doubts not still to entertain by his wonted overture of the match." 403.

fair would be amicably terminated, the moment the King of England should have compelled his son-in-law to make proper atonement for his misconduct." He farther added, that "as the emperor had hitherto acted by the advice of his allies, it was necessary for him to consult them upon the present occasion. The result of their deliberations he promised to communicate to his Britannic majesty, without the smallest reserve, immediately after the conclusion of the diet. It was, however, requisite," he said, "to observe, that the contending parties, being unequal in rank, they could not treat on terms of equality. Notwithstanding the nature of the war, (a war between a rebellious vassal and his legitimate sovereign) still the clemency of Ferdinand was disposed to pardon every insult offered to his authority, provided the Palatine would produce undoubted proofs of the sincerity of his repentance, and give security for his allegiance in future.*

Digby, who had too much penetration to mistake the meaning of this declaration, no sooner heard of the movements of the Bavarian army than he renewed his remonstrance in more urgent language; and, being referred to Maximilian, as the only person invested with powers to conclude an armistice, he set out immediately for Munich. Upon opening the business, and assuring the duke that the emperor had consented to a suspension of arms, that artful prince jocosely told him, "that it was superfluous to enter into any negociation, because hostilities had actually ceased; and I doubt not," continued he, with a triumphant smile, "to prevent any

* Le Vassor, v. 230.

farther commotions, by keeping possession of the Palatinate, till a permanent peace shall be established.”*

Such insolent treatment could not fail to excite the indignation of any man, who felt for the honour of England, and Digby accordingly complained to the emperor, with a spirit becoming a Briton. Ferdinand asserted, “that the conduct of Maximilian was strictly conformable to the laws of war; and that he had done his duty in protecting his allies against the incursions of Mansfeldt, who had invaded their territories at the head of an army, avowedly in the pay of the elector.”†

The truce having expired between Spain and the Dutch, Spinola was recalled from Germany, in order to take the command of an armament destined for the invasion of Holland. Gonsales de Cordova, his successor in the Palatinate, anxious to distinguish himself by some splendid achievement, invested Frankendahl with a degree of precipitation more creditable to his courage than to his capacity. The vigilance of Mansfeldt was always ready to take advantage of the errors of an opponent; and as the operations of the siege too plainly indicated that the troops were no longer under the direction of Spinola, he determined, by a bold and unexpected blow, to revive the lustre of the electoral arms. With him a project was no sooner conceived than it was carried into execution. The army was instantly put in motion, and by hasty marches surprised Gonsales, who being unprepared for their reception, abandoned the siege with the utmost precipitation.

* Hume, xlix.

† 1621. Le Vasser, v. 234.

Though highly glorious to the military reputation of Mansfeldt, this splendid action was attended with no permanent benefit, because he found it impossible to support himself in a country completely exhausted by former depredations; but as Frankendahl was rescued from imminent peril, and the garrisons of Manheim and Heidelberg were reinforced, he quitted his position with less anxiety. Directing the torrent of his arms against the ecclesiastical principalities of Strasburg and Spires, he swept every thing before him with the impetuosity of a deluge. Those wealthy provinces, which as yet had experienced only a scanty share of the horrors of war, afforded the necessary refreshment for his harassed soldiers, and ample funds for the prosecution of hostilities.*

To follow minutely this active commander through all his various enterprizes would lead into useless details; because, though characterized by the most striking illustrations of genius, they seldom led to important results. Suffice it to remark, that notwithstanding he was endowed with abilities which have rarely fallen to the lot of mortal, and which frequently give to the best authenticated facts the equivocal splendour of romance, he was scarcely less indebted to the jealousies which prevailed between Tilly and Cordova, than to his own unrivalled talents for success. Had they heartily co-operated in one regular plan it would have been impossible for him long to have resisted; but he was saved by their private dissensions; and when compelled by their approach to evacuate one province, or over-

* Schmidt, iv. 20.

whelmed in appearance by a host of foes, either by the celerity of his movements or the fertility of his invention, he always found means to escape.

The indolence of James had been at length stimulated to send a small body of English to assist in the defence of the Palatinate. Their commander, Sir Horace Vere, though at the head of no more than six thousand men, compensating by courage and activity for every deficiency,* rendered himself so formidable to the imperialists, that Frederic began once more to cherish the delusive hope of recovering his dominions. Impelled by a disposition naturally sanguine, and the transient gleam of prosperity, he quitted his asylum in Holland, and arriving in disguise in Mansfeldt's camp, conferred the sanction of an illustrious name upon the operations of a predatory banditti. Encouraged by the success of the British troops, and anxious to shew their beloved sovereign to a brave and loyal people, Mansfeldt crossed the Rhine,† and uniting with the Margrave of Baden-Dourlach, prepared for a vigorous campaign.‡

* We may fairly conclude, that the ambassador of James would not voluntarily disparage his exertions, and we may consequently give unbounded credit to the following statement, transmitted in a dispatch to secretary Naunton. "The new English troops, commanded by my Lord general Vere, began to rise this day out of their several garrisons, where they have lain thus long for want of good arms; those which were provided them by such as were put in trust, being unserviceable; and now I have procured them to be well and sufficiently furnished out of the states magazines, with all other helps fit for their journey." 485.

† At Germesheim.

‡ Lotichius, i. 302.—Before he ventured to declare war against the emperor, the Margrave resigned his dominions to his son, with positive injunctions to observe the strictest neutrality; by which precaution he flattered himself to prevent the ruin of his family, in case of his own defeat.

While the western provinces of the empire were alternately ravaged by friends and foes, another adventurer arose in the north, more fierce and sanguinary than any commander who till then had wielded the sword of plunder. Christian, of Brunswick, a younger brother of the reigning duke, and himself administrator of Halberstadt, instructed by Mansfeldt in the important secret of maintaining soldiers without any natural resources, erected his standard in Lower Saxony; and, being joined by crouds, whom want or profligacy had rendered desperate, soon collected a formidable army. Animated by an ardent passion for military renown, and by hatred no less violent against the papal religion, because his own revenues being derived from the secularised property of the church depended on the stability of the protestant communion, he pillaged the wealthy prelates of Saxony with the inexorable rapacity of a barbarian. Yet the same man, who carried his detestation of popery to such a pitch, as to coin money out of the plate of which he plundered the convents, with the following ludicrous inscription—"Christian of Brunswick, the friend of God, and the enemy of priests," affected all the patriotism of an ancient German, and all the chivalrous gallantry of romance.* Enriched with ecclesiastical spoils, and strengthened by numerous reinforcements, he shaped his destructive course toward the banks of the Rhine, hoping, by a junction with the electoral army, to render his power irresistible. The ex-

* 1622. His admiration for the Electress Palatine is represented by all historians as unbounded.

pectations of the protestants began now to revive ; they no longer contemplated the resources of Austria in sullen despair, but looked forward to victory and retaliation.*

The conquest of the Palatinate, and the destruction of a rival, were objects so dear to the emperor, that every thing was sacrificed to their attainment. He therefore felt happy to conclude a truce with Bethlem Gabor, upon terms not inconsistent with honour, in order that his troops might be at liberty to act upon the banks of the Rhine ; convinced that his losses in Hungary would be easily recovered when the fate of Frederic should be finally decided.

Since the death of Bucquoy, killed in a skirmish with a foraging party,† the affairs of the emperor had gradually deteriorated in Hungary, because it was impossible to discover among the Austrian generals a commander of equal capacity. The Poles having also been defeated in a sanguinary battle with the Turks, the latter now remained at liberty to turn their impetuous valour against Austria. These considerations tempted Ferdinand to abandon all power and patronage to Gabor, provided he was suffered to retain the regal title.‡

* The princes of Hesse Cassel and of Wirtemberg were the first who began to prepare for war. The greater part of the money coined by Christian was derived from twelve silver statues of the apostles, which the bigotry of preceding ages had consecrated in the cathedral of Munster. When accused of impiety by some of his followers, he sheltered himself under the authority of scripture, and pretended to have only realized the ancient precept,—“ Go hence into all the parts of the earth.”

—Galetti, i. 52.

† Lotichius, i. 256.

‡ Almost the only article of importance obtained by Ferdinand, in re-

No sooner, however, was peace concluded, than a revolution at Constantinople threw the Turkish empire into such confusion, that all the apprehensions of Ferdinand were removed. The insolence of the Janizaries had risen to such an alarming height, that the sultan was little more than a titled slave, whose authority, and even life, depended entirely on their caprice. Eager to escape from this ignominious thralldom, Osman was supposed to have formed the project of conducting the greater part of those undisciplined bands into a distant province, under pretext of a pilgrimage to Mecca, and then abandoning them to the fury of the provincial troops, collected in numbers to destroy them. Whether founded in reality, or propagated merely as an incentive to insurrection, the report was received with avidity, and excited the fury of the pretended victims to such a degree, that they rushed into the seraglio with tumultuous violence, deposed the trembling sultan, whose dastardly behaviour proved him unworthy to reign, and elevated in his place the stupid Mustapha, whom a former revolution had hurled from the throne, but whom the clemency of his successor and his own insignificance had preserved. This wretched puppet, whose propensity to gluttony would have induced him to barter the Ottoman sceptre for a favourite dish, was too contemptible even for the contemptible office allotted him by a mutinous soldiery, who valued him only on account of those qualities, which rendered him

turn for many valuable concessions, was the re-establishment of the Jesuits in Hungary; and this was subject to the condition that the reformed religion should enjoy the most ample toleration.—Lotichius, i. 271.

an object of universal derision. A government so despicable could not long exist; and a party being formed in favour of Amurat, a younger brother of Osman, created such dissensions in the Turkish councils, that they had neither leisure nor inclination to disturb the repose of Christendom.*

The presence of Frederic, by giving reputation and courage to his troops, excited fresh alarm at Vienna. In case a junction should be effected between the three protestant armies, which pillaged the provinces between the Rhine and the Elbe, it was far from impossible that hostilities might be carried into the hereditary provinces of Austria. It was therefore determined by splendid offers to tempt the venality of the hostile generals. Isabella, governess of the Spanish Netherlands, was accordingly instructed to enter into a negociation with Mansfeldt; and the overtures made him were no less gratifying to his vanity than advantageous to his fortune. A principality supported by an adequate revenue, a large sum of money to be advanced immediately by way of gratuity, the rank of marshal in the imperial service, with five thousand horse at his own disposal, were strong inducements to a soldier, who had nothing in the world that he could call his own. The proposal, however, brilliant as it was, failed of success, and it is even matter of doubt, whether it was ever seriously listened to. Like a man accustomed to subsist on the uncertain produce of gaming, Mansfeldt could not bring himself to renounce the visionary prospect of precarious power for the tranquil comforts of rational repose.†

* Nani Historia Veneta, lib. v.

† Schmidt, iv. 21.

Encouraged by the presence of a legitimate chief, this daring adventurer compelled Tilly to abandon the siege of Tilsberg, and to fight him upon disadvantageous terms ; and, after defeating that experienced veteran with considerable slaughter, he completed his glory, by conducting Frederic in triumph to the electoral palace at Heidelberg.

The same spirit of jealousy, which had rendered abortive the designs of Tilly, proved scarcely less fatal to the protestants. While Mansfeldt continued with the Margrave of Baden, the Austrians were too feeble to oppose them ; but after the armies separated, they were no longer equal to offensive operations. It is impossible to attribute this destructive measure to want of foresight ; the talents of the commanders refute the accusation. We must therefore suppose, either that the surrounding country was so thoroughly drained as to be incapable any longer of affording supplies for their united forces ; or, what is still more probable, that the haughty soul of Mansfeldt, inflated with victory, and the proud conviction of transcendent merit, disdained to decide the command with a colleague, whose rank prevented his serving in a subordinate station, though decidedly inferior in abilities.*

While Mansfeldt remained to defend the Palatinate, the margrave undertook to divert the attention of Tilly, by a sudden irruption into Bavaria. That vigilant general, however, prevented by his activity the completion of a project, which must have greatly embarrassed his future operations. No

* Puffendorf, i. 38.

sooner had he penetrated the designs of the enemy, than he invited Cordova to sacrifice for the present their private animosity to the public service, and to co-operate in an enterprize, which, if carried into execution with vigour and success, could not fail to reflect the greatest honour on both. The Spaniard, unwilling to be outdone in generosity, accepted the proposal; and, hastening to the assistance of his rival, they intercepted the margrave in his march, and defeated him at Wimpfen* after a sanguinary battle.

The event of the contest, which deprived the vanquished of all his military resources, proved still more disastrous from its political effects. The vindictive temper of Ferdinand never lost an opportunity of insulting the distress of a prostrate foe; and he accordingly availed himself of a dispute, between the protestant and catholic branches of the house of Baden, respecting the right of succession to certain bailiwicks, to adjudge the litigated property to the orthodox claimant.†

The calamitous consequences of the margrave's temerity were in some measure repaired by the diligence of Mansfeldt, who, crossing the Rhine with unexampled celerity, defeated a considerable body of Austrians, which had taken advantage of his absence to lay siege to Haguenau, a strong fortress in Alsace, and on that account selected by the electoral general as a secure asylum for plunder.

Elated with victory, and eager to punish a de-

* 1622. Puffendorf, i. 38. Lotichius, i. 304. Schmidt, iv. 21.

† Theatr. Europ. i. 678. Puffendorf, *ibid.* Barre, ix. 521.

generate member of the reformed church, he directed his march along the banks of the Rhine, and pouring all his vengeance upon the defenceless territory of Darmstadt, surprised the capital, which was abandoned to the fury of a licentious soldiery, as a recompense worthy of their toils, and seizing the langrave in the midst of his little court, conducted him a prisoner to Manheim.*

Terrified at the vicinity of such formidable neighbours, the mercantile timidity of Francfort hastened to offer a moderate ransom under the precarious title of donation ; but the approach of the imperialists suspended the negociation, and compelled the elector and Mansfeldt to regain the Palatinate, an undertaking of difficulty and danger.

But the loss sustained during a hasty retreat was far from proving the greatest calamity which this predatory enterprise occasioned. The Austrian commanders being now secure from any attempts on their rear, directed all their efforts against the Duke of Brunswick, and falling in with him as he was preparing to pass the Maine, at Hoechst, near Francfort, took all his artillery and baggage. Pursuing this advantage with masterly skill, Tilly followed him into the Palatinate ; and though unable to prevent his junction with Mansfeldt, it was not long before he obliged them both to evacuate the electoral territory, and to seek security and subsistence in the more fertile province of Alsace.†

* *Theatr. Europ.* i. 678. *Puffendorf*, i. 83. *Barre*, ix. 521.

† It is curious to observe with what inveteracy the orthodox and pious Caraffa directs the vengeance of Providence against heretics. Speaking of the defeat of Christian, he emphatically says, "ecclesiasticos pecunia

The prospects of Frederic became now so gloomy, that the margrave deemed it prudent to avert impending ruin, by withdrawing entirely from the stormy scene. Having embraced this resolution, he disbanded his troops, and repairing with a few attendants to the castle of Hochberg, his favourite residence, he resolved to pass the remainder of his days in the tranquil enjoyments of retirement. The fortitude of Mansfeldt, however, was not to be subdued by the rudest shocks of adversity; while he had a single regiment equal to the active duties of a campaign, or a single enemy to plunder, his persevering courage looked confidently forward to better times, conscious of deserving the admiration of his contemporaries, and of occupying a conspicuous place in history.

While he was diligently employed in providing sustenance for his followers, at the expense of the pillaged Alsacians, Tilly completed the conquest of the Palatinate by the reduction of Manheim and Heidelberg. The former indeed offered little resistance; but the latter was defended with a determined courage, which should have entitled the inhabitants to a milder destiny. Humanity, however, was not among the virtues of Tilly; and he probably regarded it as an effeminate quality, disgraceful to the character of a soldier. The city at length being carried by assault, and given up to plunder, was treated with all the insolence and barbarity which

multavit, ecclesiæ thesaurum invasit, et sacra Lipsana sancti liborii optimo argento et auro inclusa profanavit, aureamque thecam sacriligè furatus, in stipendia militum insolentissimorum post cusam monetam effudit; quod sacrilegium non occultè deus in principe tam iniquo ulcisci voluit; nam notarunt nonnulli, post tam probosum, scelestumque facinus, nunquam postea victoriam aliquam reportavit." 117.

rapine or bigotry could inflict. The calamities occasioned by the devastation of arms, may, in general, be repaired by time and industry; but, during the sack of Heidelberg, there perished treasures which it was impossible ever to replace. The electoral library, one of the richest in Europe in curious manuscripts, and formed at an enormous expense, was irrecoverably mutilated, by the ignorance of men, incapable of appreciating its inestimable value. The greater part of the books, however, being luckily preserved, were afterwards distributed by the Duke of Bavaria, as marks of friendship to his allies;* and the rarest works being allotted, with pious prodigality, to the papal library, were carefully deposited in the Vatican.†

This unwearied course of prosperity, however, proved insufficient to calm the apprehensions of Ferdinand, who looked forward with dread to an approaching reverse, while Mansfeldt and Brunswick were in arms; for he was no stranger to the intentions of the protestant princes: he knew that from necessity, as well as inclination, they were hostilely inclined, and were ready to declare in favour of the elector, whenever it could be done with impunity. These considerations determined him to work upon the credulity of the English monarch, and thus render him instrumental to the ruin of Frederic. James's aversion to blood had induced him

* Caraffa is unable to conceal his contempt for the Germans, for having permitted this valuable collection to be carried out of their country: "Dum electores variis imperii negociis intenderent, ego, impetrata a Bavariæ electore bibliotheca Heidelbergensi, quæ et copia librorum, et raritate manuscriptorum omnibus aliis in Germania, et forsân in Europa, antecellebat, Roman transmittendam. curavi." 150.

† Lotichius, i. 320. Bougeant, i. 91. Barre, ix. 528.—This valuable collection has been removed to Paris by Bonaparte.

to listen, with childish facility, to the treacherous overtures of the imperial cabinet; and, finding his efforts for the restoration of peace, not only seconded by Denmark, but even openly supported by the Saxon court, he began to flatter himself that the moment was at length arrived, when his endeavours would be crowned with success. Though determined to elude the demand, Ferdinand listened with benignity to the English ambassador, expressing his anxiety to bring the contest to an amicable issue, but declining to enter into any specific engagements, alledging, that it would be derogatory to the imperial dignity, to pardon a prince who still resisted his authority, laying waste the most populous provinces of the empire, and setting its laws and constitution at defiance. While the elector retained in his service men justly proscribed for the enormity of their crimes, it would be fruitless, he said, to offer plans of conciliation; but the moment Frederic should dismiss Mansfeldt and Brunswick, those foes to religion and social order, he would be ready to accede to any equitable arrangements which might lead to a general pacification.*

Persuaded that the emperor was for once sincere, though he had invariably deceived him in every negotiation, James prevailed on his son-in-law to disband his forces, and entirely to submit his future destiny to the precarious issue of a treaty.† Though no longer sanctioned by legalized appointments, the electoral generals were not disheartened, but resolved to continue a piratical warfare. Mansfeldt, indeed, was forced to relinquish the chimerical hope

* 1622, Puffendorf, i. 39.

† Schmidt, iv. 21.

of erecting for himself an independent principality in Alsace; but the world was open before him; the lustre of his reputation, and the relaxation of discipline, which distress compelled him to tolerate, drew to his standard adventurers of every nation; and to plunder he trusted for supplies. Determined boldly to face the persecutions of fortune, he collected the treasure deposited at Haguenau, and, in conjunction with the romantic admirer of the Electress Palatine, directed his course toward the frontiers of Lorraine, at the head of an army, consisting of eighteen thousand foot and eight thousand horse, with fourteen pieces of artillery, and attended by a prodigious concourse of women, whose profligacy and prodigality added greatly to the general confusion. Accustomed to subsist, like a horde of banditti, on the precarious produce of pillage, and to consider as their own whatever inflamed their cupidity, they equally derided the municipal institutions of civilized society and the divine commands of the Almighty. Proceeding onward in the career of devastation, they crossed the Moselle, and laid the opulent dioceses of Metz and Verdun under heavy contributions.

It now became requisite to make a selection between various plans, which presented themselves to the option of the commanders. The duchy of Luxemburg abounded in every thing to tempt avidity; the army might there repose in plenty from all its fatigues, and when their excesses should have exhausted that fertile province, there was nothing to obstruct their march towards Holland, where the bold adventurers had little doubt of meeting with a reward commensurate with their merits. Meanwhile the archduchess had renewed her invitation,

in the name of the Spanish court. Ferdinand also endeavoured to appease the resentment of Mansfeldt, by the most seducing proposals of dignity and emolument; while the King of England conjured him, with prayers and presents, not totally to abandon a cause, of which he was the firmest support. The Venetians were desirous of conferring upon him the supreme command of their armies; his services were even courted in France, where the Duke of Bouillon attempted to interest his active genius in defence of the Calvinists. Terrified by the exaggerated reports which daily arrived of the horrid excesses committed by his followers, the court likewise opened a negociation for conferring upon him more solid advantages in the royal service. Never, perhaps, was mortal placed in a more extraordinary situation. Without a single acre that he could call his own, without property of any description, without rank or connexions, and even without any decided religion (for it was always dubious to what sect of Christians he belonged), by transcendant talents, and heroic courage, he had exalted his reputation to so elevated a height, that the greatest potentates contended for his favour.*

The character of Ferdinand was little calculated to overcome the scruples of Mansfeldt, and his pride revolted at a subordinate station though inferior only to Spinola. The prospects which presented themselves in the Dutch service were more analogous to his disposition; yet circumstances affording a favourable opportunity of extorting money from France, his necessities induced him to seize it,

* Bôugeant, i. 94. Barre, ix. 530.

and he accordingly listened with apparent complacency to the proposals made him by Bouillon. Louis was at that time absent from his capital, occupied entirely with the senseless project of extirpating heresy in the south—the northern frontier was left unguarded. The queen-mother, to whom he had entrusted the management of affairs, grew alarmed at the danger to which she was exposed, anticipating all the horrors which awaited Paris, when a ferocious banditti should be in possession of the Louvre. Too feeble to assume a menacing aspect, the ministers had recourse to intrigue, and conceiving their only safety to consist in delay, they directed the Duke of Nevers, at that time governor of Champagne, to enter into a treaty with Mansfeldt, and to endeavour, by presents or promises, to retard his progress, till a force could be collected to oppose him. The attempt was less difficult than it at first appeared, because that eccentric hero had never entertained a serious thought of invading France, but intended merely by the terror of his name to tax the timidity of a fearful woman. The design however was not concealed with sufficient art to elude the penetration of Nevers, who protracted the negociation under various pretences, till the enemy, reduced by disease and desertion, was constrained to retire precipitately. Having forced a passage through the Spanish army which attempted to impede his career, Mansfeldt persevered in his original plan of offering his services to the Dutch, and pursuing his way through an enemy's country, continually harassed by flying parties, and frequently reduced to the utmost distress for food and forage, he reached at length the frontiers of Holland, with

diminished numbers, but augmented fame ; his retreat being admired by all competent judges as a masterpiece of military genius. After forming a junction with the Prince of Orange, the combined army was strong enough to compel Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom.* This important enterprize being accomplished, the disorderly behaviour of their new allies alarmed the frugality of the Dutch, who caught with eagerness at the first opportunity of getting rid of such troublesome champions. Dismissed and rewarded by the sagacious republicans, Mansfeldt returned to the theatre of his former exploits.†

Though the heart of Louis XIII. was a perfect stranger to all the finer feelings of humanity, yet had it not been equally callous to the suggestions of prudence, he could not have contemplated without serious alarm the increasing influence of Austria. Few of his ministers indeed were blest with discernment duly to appreciate the danger, which threatened Europe, should Ferdinand be permitted to proceed undisturbed in his ambitious career. The sage Lesdiguières alone had spirit to combat the disgraceful system of temporising imbecility adopted by the cabinet of Paris : with an energy becoming his rank and experience, that gallant veteran represented to the king, that it was no less inconsistent with the interest than derogatory to the honour of his crown, to remain a tranquil spectator of the ruin of a prince, the firm friend and ally of his father. To this enlightened counsel his secret advisers opposed ideas more

* Lotichius.

† Barre, ix. 530. Schmidt, iv. 21. Puffendorf, i. 39.

analogous to the prejudices of the monarch, and more consistent with their own incapacity. Devoted from interest to the court of Madrid, or subjected through bigotry to the papal see, they endeavoured to persuade their master that the aggrandisement of Bavaria was a favourable circumstance for France, because the destruction of the protestants, a necessary consequence, would deliver his kingdom from every danger with which it must be threatened, while that restless sect should be able to abet his rebellious subjects in all their most desperate attempts. Addressing their arguments to the weakness of his intellect, they contended, that heresy could no longer maintain its impious dominion in France, when capable of deriving no farther assistance from the parent fountain. "What motive," they asked, with an air of triumph, as if proud of the important discovery, "could render the prosperity of Maximilian prejudicial to the welfare of France." He alone, among the catholic princes of Germany, was capable of balancing the power of Ferdinand. By opposing his views of personal aggrandisement, the king would necessarily oblige him to unite his interests by closer ties with those of Austria; but by favouring his pretensions to the electoral dignity, he could not fail to establish a permanent ascendancy in the Bavarian councils, and to secure for ever the friendship of a prince, whom nature intended for his ally.*

Though totally destitute of solid foundation, and even repugnant to the most obvious principles of policy, this mode of reasoning had an air of

* *Lc Vassor*, v. 337.

plausibility capable of misleading a man superior in sagacity to Louis; and he accordingly resolved to remain a tranquil spectator of the ruin of Frederic.*

That ill-advised prince was so completely stripped of his possessions, that he had nothing to lose except the electoral dignity; and to deprive him of that, without the consent of a diet, was too bold an infringement of the Germanic constitution, even for the arrogance of Ferdinand to attempt. A diet was accordingly convened at Ratisbonne, to which the apostate members of the protestant party were invited: for weak and divided as that party was, it was expected that their fears would render them subservient to the will of the emperor. The opposition of Saxony could alone prove formidable; but whatever might be the elector's personal feelings respecting the deposition of Frederic, he could not dispute the power of Ferdinand to depose a rebellious vassal, without invalidating his own claim; because he was indebted to a similiar transaction for his seat in the electoral college. Still, however, he declined to sanction by his presence the injustice of a proceeding for which no precedent could be produced, except that of his ancestor Maurice. This resolution would have been highly creditable to the character of John George, had it proceeded from patriotism alone, and not been polluted by the sordid passions of avarice and superstition. But bigotry took fright at seeing the Lutheran divines involved in the Bohemian proscription, while covetousness murmured at the negligence of Ferdinand

* Le Vassor, v. 337.

in delaying so long the promised reward. The vacillating policy of the Elector of Brandenburg rejoiced at finding in the behaviour of his colleague an excuse for his own inactivity; and their example was followed by the less powerful sovereigns of Brunswick and Pomerania, who refused even to send their representatives.*

Though the absence of many of the German

* Bougeant, i. 99.—The jealousy of the protestants had been lately excited by an intercepted letter from the emperor to Don Balthasar Zuniga, who, during his embassy from Spain to the court of Vienna, had gained the confidence of Ferdinand. This curious document having fallen by accident into Mansfeldt's hands, was immediately published; and, as it contributed to throw additional light upon the projects of Ferdinand, I have made the following extracts. After attributing the success of his arms with affected humility to the favour of Providence, propitiated by the purity of his faith, he thus proceeds—"with the Elector Palatine, its firmest prop, the abomination of heresy must be overthrown, unless we should be tempted with unpardonable lenity to take the sleeping serpent into our bosom. After the injuries which he has already sustained, no reconciliation with Frederic can be sincere. Besides, it is the very essence of Calvinism to regard no action as criminal, which can tend to disseminate its impious principles. The catholic religion, and the house of Austria, can never look for security, while they leave the power of injuring them in the hands of a rival at all times ready to exert it."

To this letter, written by a confidential secretary, a postscript was subjoined by Ferdinand himself; as he probably considered the concluding paragraph of too great consequence to be entrusted to any except Zuniga. "Could we obtain (I translate with literal precision, because the passage transcribed seems clearly to prove that in the breast of a bigot superstition may be a passion subservient to pride,) another vote in the electoral college, we might depend upon seeing the imperial crown immoveably fixed upon the brow of a catholic, and probably upon that of an Austrian prince, because gratitude would induce the Duke of Bavaria, to devote himself entirely to the aggrandisement of a family, to which he is indebted for his own elevation."—Schmidt, iv. 22. This inference is by no means just, but the whole epistle presents a strange medley of sense and bigotry, of humility and presumption, of hypocrisy and resentment. It served however to elucidate two essential points of the utmost importance to the friends of the Reformation; first, that it was the intention of the Austrian court to tolerate no religion except the papal; and secondly, that it had formed a regular plan to render the imperial dignity hereditary.

princes, upon whose support he had confidently relied, proved a sensible mortification to the emperor, he had still the satisfaction of finding his conduct approved by a numerous assemblage of catholics. Encouraged by the servility, or the venality, of the audience, he opened the session in a studied harangue. After expatiating largely upon the extent and nature of the imperial prerogative, and his own moderation in exercising it, he adverted particularly to the case before them, the excesses committed by the Palatine troops, and the insult offered to his own authority. He then proceeds to state that as the merited retribution for such enormous offences, and in virtue of the power entrusted to him by Providence, and the unanimous assent of all the German states, he had thought proper to deprive a rebellious vassal of the electoral dignity, and to transfer that honour to the Duke of Bavaria, as a recompense due to his important services, as well as to his zeal for the orthodox religion.

To this splendid donation, with mercenary munificence, the Upper Palatine was annexed, in exchange for that part of the Austrian dominions which had been mortgaged to Maximilian.* An ample portion of the Lower Palatine was at the same time conferred upon the Duke of Neuberg, by way of compensation for his claim to the electorate, and the remainder was given to the Spaniards.†

A measure so decisive could not fail to excite the most enthusiastic delight in the bosoms of all who were blindly devoted to the papal see, but the im-

* Bougeant, i. 100.

† 1623. Ibid. Puffendorf, i. 40. Schmidt, iv. 22.

pression made on the minds of the protestants was widely different. The former contended that Ferdinand, by the exemplary punishment inflicted upon a bold and contumacious rebel, had not transgressed the bounds of his legitimate authority, but had merely fulfilled a sacred obligation, which in quality of guardian of the Germanic constitution he owed to heaven and to his country. The latter on the contrary censured the whole proceeding, as being essentially deficient in the necessary formalities, if not totally repugnant to the established principles of justice. To pass judgment upon an elector belonged alone to the electoral college; nor could any sentence be valid, unless confirmed by the unanimous assent of the whole order. But, in the present instance, that invaluable right had been grossly violated; as the first prince in the empire had been tried and degraded, without the participation of his compeers, and even without being cited to appear before any tribunal whatever, a privilege conceded to the meanest criminal.*

Such were the sentiments entertained by the contending sects; but even when divested of religious enthusiasm, and unbiassed by the spirit of party, we calmly investigate the conduct of Ferdinand, it is difficult to justify it upon any principle of enlightened policy. Let us again recur to the arguments employed by his adversaries. After having clearly shewn that he had not only transgressed the forms universally prescribed in all criminal trials, but had even violated the engagement solemnly contracted with the whole German people at his coro-

* Schmidt, iv. 22. Lotichius, i. 342. Barre, ix. 538.

nation, they proceeded to examine the wisdom of his decision, as conducing to accomplish his designs. "The object of the emperor," they said, "as he has publicly declared, is to restore tranquility to the empire; but is it probable that this should be effected by an action tending directly to inflame every hostile passion? Can it be supposed that Frederic will tamely submit to his unmerited destiny, while he has the means of continuing hostilities? Rigour, therefore, even admitting it to be founded in justice, is not the way to appease his resentment. By clemency indeed his anger might be disarmed. A generous oblivion of every transgression would not only awaken the gratitude of Frederic, but it would also serve to exalt the glory of the emperor, more than all the victories which he has obtained.*

"But even allowing that the Palatine by seditious practices has forfeited his hereditary honours, it would be the height of injustice to involve his innocent children in their father's disgrace. They have never transgressed the statutes of the empire; they have never rebelled against its sovereign."

However discordantly such well-established truths might sound in a despot's ear, prosperity had raised his presumption so high, that he rashly resolved to accomplish his purpose, in spite of the censure of mankind. Yet he so far condescended to sacrifice resentment to the public feeling, that he left open a door for reconciliation, assuring the friends of the degraded elector, that in consideration of their solicitations, he would not refuse to receive that unfortunate prince into his imperial favour, provided

* Barre, ix. 544.

he should immediately return to his duty, and make proper atonement for his past offences. He farther consented, that the transfer of the electorate to the house of Bavaria should not affect the rights of Frederic's children, nor those of the collateral branches of the Palatine family; but that they should be at perfect liberty to assert their claims after the death of Maximilian. To this delusive concession a declaration was annexed on the part of the Duke of Bavaria, expressing his readiness to ratify the compact by a specific engagement.*

Nothing now was wanting except the ceremony of investiture, which took place on the twenty-fifth of February,† in the presence of many catholic princes, and was conducted with extraordinary magnificence. Neither the Saxon nor Prussian deputies could be tempted to be present at this solemnity. Even the Spanish ambassador refused to attend, as his court affected to disapprove the deposition of Frederic, and had even protested against it. This device however proved too shallow to impose on any one, except the credulous successor of Elizabeth, who seemed delighted to find that his superior wisdom had at length met with the respect which it so deservedly merited.‡

* Londorp, x. 135. Barre, ix. 544.

† 1623.

‡ Memoires de Louise Julianc, 262.

CHAP. VI.

Consternation excited by Ferdinand's violence.—Religious persecution commenced in the Palatinate.—Mansfeldt and Brunswick continue hostilities. Attempt of the latter to recover Bohemia frustrated by the vigilance of Tilly.—Sudden change in the politics of England and France.—Treaty of Marriage between the Infanta and the Prince of Wales broken off, and an alliance contracted with Henrietta of France.—Growing power of Richelieu.—Disputes concerning the Valteline between the courts of Vienna and Paris.—The vigour and decision of the Cardinal.—Vast projects of Ferdinand excite the jealousy of all the Protestant states. A league formed to oppose him; and the command of the army entrusted to the King of Denmark. Imprudence of the choice in great measure ascribable to Charles I. of England. Activity of the Emperor.—Appearance and Character of Wallenstein; he levies an army at his own expense, seizes the bridge at Dessau, and repulses Mansfeldt, while Tilly defeats the Danish monarch. Mansfeldt rallies his forces, penetrates into Hungary, where he effects a junction with Bethlem Gabor. His death.

THOUGH the protestants had beheld the ruin of Frederic with apparent insensibility, they were at length awakened from the disgraceful torpor by the presumptuous insolence of the conqueror. The solemn mockery of justice, by which the liberties of Germany were in fact annihilated, gave a decided preponderance to the papal religion in the electoral college; and thus threatened to render the imperial crown hereditary in the Austrian family.* This however was a distant evil, and could affect only a part of the existing generation. But there were

* The protestants had only two votes, Brandenburg and Saxony, to oppose to those of Bohemia, Bavaria, Mentz, Treves, and Cologne.

other calamities, whose grievous pressure might be immediately felt, and toward these they looked with a degree of horror, bordering upon despair.

Ferdinand having humbled his personal enemies, had leisure to direct his fury against those whom he regarded as the enemies of God; and a violent persecution was accordingly commenced in the hereditary states against every description of sectaries. The papal religion was also forcibly established in the Palatinate, and declared to be the only one which would be tolerated in future. This rash proceeding clearly indicated that a plan was in contemplation for the total extirpation of protestantism; and that, with the freedom of worship, its followers would be deprived of all the secularized benefices.

Notwithstanding the alarm became general, it is highly probable that it might have been productive of nothing more formidable than complaints, and even those "not loud but deep," had not Brunswick and Mansfeldt been still unconquered. In spite of the heavy losses sustained in various encounters, no sensible diminution appeared in their ranks, as the chasms were instantly filled. The unbounded licentiousness in which their troops were indulged, the rich booty collected by those who survived, even the toils and chances of a military career, gave a zest to life, more congenial to the feelings of desperate men, than the regular enjoyments of domestic society. The characters of the commanders were also admirably calculated to attract the confidence and affection of beings, who considered valour as the most eminent of all human endowments. Invariably foremost at the post of danger, they shared in every hardship with the meanest soldier, when

money and provisions ran short; but when fortune smiled upon the adventurous enterprize, they also partook in his rudest gratifications with apparent delight. Thus the popularity of their manners, together with the advantages arising from indiscriminate plunder, attracted volunteers to their standards, while those of the regular and better disciplined armies could hardly procure a single recruit.*

After separating from his colleague, Mansfeldt supported himself for a considerable period by ravaging the fertile province of Friesland; till having reduced it by rapacity to extreme distress, he accepted a gratuity of three hundred thousand crowns, as a compensation for the humanity with which he had treated the inhabitants.†

Meanwhile the Duke of Brunswick had retired into Lower Saxony, where he was amicably received, upon promising not to molest the catholics. Convinced, however, that repose was abhorrent to his restless temper, the directors of the circle conferred upon him the command of the provincial militia, flattering themselves that the innocuous amusement of a parade might compensate the fatigues of more active service; but all endeavours to restrain the impetuosity of a man, designed by nature to shine amid the wreck of empires, were as ineffectual as an attempt to chain the winds, or to prescribe bounds to the ravages of the ocean. To personal friendship for the unfortunate elector, with whom he had been intimately acquainted in Holland, he united a romantic attachment for the daughter of James, which in the true spirit of chi-

* Schmidt, iv. 23.

† Ibid.

valry he proclaimed to the world, by substituting in the place of his ancient device the following motto: "For God and Her." Animated by the desire of restoring a sceptre to the object of his adoration, he formed the bold design of penetrating into Bohemia, and having united his forces with Bethlem Gabor under the walls of Prague, to replace Elizabeth and her husband on the throne.* The brilliant prospect thus presented to the enterprising courage of the Transilvanian by the ardour of Christian, and supported by the eloquence of the elder Thurn, who had been long exerting his powerful talents to rouse the jealousy of the Porte, was too seducing to be withstood, particularly as he was assured of the concurrence of several independent bashaws, who had been gained by the Bohemian patriot.†

Confident of adding to his former laurels, the waivode advanced to the frontier of Moravia with a formidable force, in full expectation of being received with open arms by an oppressed and irritated people; but the star of Austria again prevailed. The projects of Christian had been prematurely frustrated by the vigilance of Tilly, who, suspecting that some important plan was in agitation, suddenly quitted his cantonments in Hesse, and watched the valorous champion of religion and beauty so closely, that he was compelled to abandon his original scheme, and to endeavour to fortify himself

* Elizabethæ conjugii Frederici ereptam de manibus chirothecam pileo suo accommodans, juraverit, non demissurum se symbolum illud e capite, priusquam regem Fredericum solis pragensi redditum vidisset.—Brachel. Hist. 58.

† 1623. Schmidt, iv. 23.

by a junction with Mansfeldt. Tilly, however, being aware of the design, pursued him with accelerated speed; and having overtaken him at Statlo, in the bishopric of Munster, a sanguinary conflict ensued, in which the gallant defender of Germanic freedom was severely wounded, and totally defeated, with the loss of all his artillery. Among the prisoners taken by the victorious army were the Dukes of Weimar and Altenburg, both officers of promise, and sincerely devoted to the protestant party.*

The result of this important triumph was no less fatal to the hopes of the vanquished† than it was honourable and advantageous to the victor. No longer in a condition to act offensively, Mansfeldt was reduced to the humiliating necessity of suffering Lipstadt to be taken before his eyes. The emperor, on the contrary, was left at liberty to employ all his resources for the defence of Bohemia. Gabor advanced, without interruption, to the gates of Brunn, and burned the suburbs with wanton ferocity. That, however, proved the extent of his depredations, as the imperial general, Montenegro, after routing his detachments in various skirmishes, reduced the main body to such distress, that sanguine expectations were entertained at Vienna of its being forced to surrender at discretion. Though decidedly inferior to the Austrian commander in tactics, Gabor greatly surpassed him in the arts of intrigue: when unable any longer to contend against his antagonist in the field, he had recourse to nego-

* Barre, ix. 549. Puffendorf, i. 42. Lotichius, i. 358.

† The remains of the army took refuge in Holland, where many of them entered into the service of the republic. Barre, *ibid*.

ciation, with his wonted duplicity; till, by concessions and promises, to which he never meant to adhere, he induced Montenegro to consent to a suspension of arms, which speedily terminated in a peace.*

This temporary calm (for no engagement contracted with that perfidious enemy could be regarded as permanent) was of essential benefit to Ferdinand, since it extricated him from a situation so pregnant with danger, that he is said seriously to have lamented his own want of sagacity, in having reduced the Palatine to despair. So great was his apprehension from the gathering storm, that, according to the assertion of contemporary writers of acknowledged veracity, he had actually conceived the design of repairing the injustice of his former conduct, and even made a proposal to his friend Maximilian, respecting the establishment of an eighth electorate, to be given to him as an equivalent for that which he had unjustly usurped, and which he was now invited to restore. But the sudden change which had taken place in the aspect of affairs, having appeased the terrors of Ferdinand, every sentiment of compunction subsided, and left his breast accessible only to its accustomed inmates, resentment, pride, and superstition.†

Mansfeldt and Brunswick being no longer in a situation to continue offensive operations, and the animosity of Gabor having abated, Ferdinand appeared to rule with uncontrolled authority over a nation of slaves; proudly mistaking for abject submission the sullen torpor of despair. The scene, however, was about to change, and fresh actors

* 1623. Schmidt, iv. 23.

† Ibid.

were preparing to mount the ensanguined theatre. Hitherto we have beheld the kings of England and France degrading the honour of two warlike nations by their contemptible policy; but events had occurred, which not only roused the constitutional indolence of James, but even excited Louis to unsheath the sword against a sovereign who professed himself the champion of the Vatican.

James had hitherto sacrificed the glory and welfare of his kingdom to the ridiculous project of marrying his heir to a Spanish princess; but the insolence of Buckingham having broken off the treaty, by insulting the delicacy of Castilian pride, in the person of Olivares, all the influence of the favourite was excited to promote a rupture with the court of Madrid. Though the vanity of the king was deeply concerned in the event, and, in order to promote it, had consented to terms no less repugnant to the prejudices than prejudicial to the interests of his people, yet, so great was his weakness, that he was unable to resist the united intreaties of Charles and Buckingham. It is the characteristic of folly to be always in the extreme. James, till then, had trusted for the restoration of his son-in-law to the generosity of Spain; but he, on a sudden, resolved to act with vigour, and to obtain by arms what he had vainly attempted to procure by negotiation. For this purpose, however, it was necessary to recur to a measure most hateful to the House of Stuart, and to summon a parliament. The money granted by his subjects, for the recovery of the Palatinate, had been squandered, as usual, with childish prodigality; but as the unpopular alliance with a catholic princess was abandoned, he flattered himself that the expenses incidental to a war, under-

taken in conformity to the wishes of the people, would be liberally provided.

To account, however, for this sudden alteration in the politics of the court, and to explain the motives which led to a quarrel with Spain, without exposing the favourite to universal indignation, required no little dexterity; but as artifice, and not genius, was the characteristic of the Scottish line, Buckingham was commissioned to lay before the parliament a varnished narrative, which, by suppressing some facts, and misrepresenting others, in some measure satisfied the nation, and saved the favourite from merited disgrace. Lest suspicion, however, should attach to the assertion of a man, not more remarkable for veracity than for humility, the Prince of Wales was brought forward to prostitute his sacred word, in confirmation of a premeditated falsehood.*

Notwithstanding the glaring contradictions contained in Buckingham's statement, it answered the purpose for which it was intended; for so eager was the nation for war, that generously overlooking every inconsistency, they expressed their joy by illuminations and bonfires.† The rupture with Spain having deprived the Prince of Wales of one bride, it became requisite to provide him with another; yet, in spite of the antipathy manifested by all ranks and conditions of men against an alliance with a pa-

* Mr. Hume contents himself with remarking, that "it is difficult fully to excuse the conduct of these princes." A more impartial writer would probably have said, "that it is impossible to find expressions adequate to express the contempt which such infamous prevarication deserves." It is in the breasts of sovereigns that truth and justice ought to find an asylum, when banished from the commerce of the world.

† Hume, xlix.

pist, the vanity of James revolted at the idea of admitting any female, except the daughter of a king, to the chaste embraces of his son. Henrietta of France was accordingly selected to replace the infant in the affections of Charles; and so eager was the English monarch for the completion of the ceremony, that he consented to entrust her with the education of her children, till they should attain the age of thirteen. To which imprudent concession we are probably indebted for being delivered from a family, which their warmest partizans are forced to acknowledge to have been the decided enemies of freedom.

The period, however, for active interference had been suffered to escape; yet, in spite of every obstacle, it was resolved, by the warlike council of this pacific monarch, to reconquer a country situated in the heart of Germany, defended by numerous and well-disciplined armies, and so entirely surrounded by potent enemies, that it had no communication whatever with England. But when ministers are ambitious of acquiring the reputation of vigour, no difficulties can deter them from an undertaking; and they frequently embrace it with greater avidity, in proportion to the obstacles which attend it. Mansfeldt was accordingly taken into the English pay, and an army levied, consisting of twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, which was destined to unite with a powerful reinforcement, supposed to have been promised by Louis. Relying confidently upon professions which, if ever made, were intended only to deceive, the troops were embarked, and sailed to Calais, where, instead of meeting with the friendly reception which James's credulity had anticipated, they were refused

permission to land, and obliged in consequence to direct their course toward the more hospitable coasts of Holland. But no previous intimation of the destined voyage having been communicated to the Dutch government some objections were made to receiving them, which occasioned considerable delay; and a pestilential malady having broken out in the fleet, more than half the troops fell victims to its fury, before permission arrived for their disembarkation; and the wretched remnant appearing unequal to the arduous attempt, the expedition of course was abandoned.*

The councils of France had likewise experienced a total change. The genius of Richelieu having triumphed at length over every competitor, was paving the way for that paramount influence which he afterwards exercised to enslave and aggrandise his country. Unwilling openly to engage in the tempestuous scene of German politics, till he had subdued every domestic faction, he confined himself entirely to intrigues and promises, and occasional subsidies. The lofty soul of this aspiring prelate, however, felt too tenderly for the honour of a crown, of which he was destined to become the firmest prop, to permit the smallest insult to escape with impunity. This manly spirit, so different from that which had till then enfeebled the resources of France, was first displayed in his decisive conduct respecting the Valteline.

A religious dispute, fomented by the selfish ambition of Spain, had exposed the romantic vallies of the Valteline to all the horrors of civil commo-

* 1623. Hume, xlix.

tions.* These dissensions afforded an opportunity for the court of Madrid to attempt the subjugation of a province, highly important as a military station, under pretence of vindicating the violated authority of the Grison league.† After forcibly seizing the principal passes, the Duke of Fera, at that time governor of Milan, ordered fortresses to be erected to defend them; thus flattering himself to secure an easy communication between the Spanish possessions in Italy, and the hereditary provinces of Austria. The timidity of the Italians, justly alarmed at an event so pregnant with ruin to their degraded country, had immediate recourse to France; endeavouring to excite the jealousy of Louis, by representing the action as making part of a general system to subvert the liberties of Europe. But the degenerate son of the immortal Henry was too much occupied with the paltry cabals of a court, to have leisure to attend to foreign affairs. Yet as it would have been totally inconsistent with the dignity of a powerful nation, the friend and protector of the Helvetic confederacy, to remain a tranquil spectator of its ruin, an ambassador was sent with unlimited power, for the purpose of mediating a reconciliation. After various subterfuges a treaty was concluded, by which Spain engaged to demolish the forts, and to evacuate the country. Nothing however could be more remote from her intention than faithfully to execute the contract; and a thousand excuses were in conse-

* There is a short account of this transaction, which took place in 1620, in the History of the Helvetic Directory, to which I beg leave to refer, iv. 523.

† Marshal Bassompierre was sent to Madrid in 1621.

quence framed to elude it. A proposal however being at length made to surrender the castles into the hands of the Pope, for the express purpose of being destroyed, the piety of Louis induced him to acquiesce; and though it was manifest to the world that the holy father was blindly devoted to the court of Madrid, his abject spirit was terrified at the idea of entering into a dispute with the vicegerent of heaven. This bold attempt was reserved for one of the chosen pillars of the church. Cardinal Richelieu was no sooner placed at the head of affairs, than all the measures of government were directed with a degree of activity and resolution unknown since the days of Henry the Great. Indignant at the degradation to which France was reduced by the weakness and venality of its rulers, he recalled Sillery from Rome, under pretence that he had exceeded his powers, boldly insisting that the treaty of Madrid should be fulfilled in every respect.* This decisive step was followed by measures equally vigorous. An alliance was concluded with Venice and Savoy for the recovery of the Valteline, accompanied by a promise on the part of Louis, that if the contingents furnished by the contracting parties should prove inadequate, an ample subsidy should enable Mansfeldt to make a powerful diversion in Germany.† The Marquis de Cœuvres was at the same time entrusted with an important mission to the Helvetic government, which he executed with so much address, that permission was granted to levy troops for the expulsion of the Spanish and papal forces. Having overcome the

* Bougeant, i. 108. Le Vassor, v. 654. † 1624. Ibid. vi. 99.

scruples of the catholic cantons, and secured the co-operation of the protestant, he laid aside his diplomatic character, and putting himself at the head of ten thousand men, he compelled the enemy to evacuate the Valteline, while the Duke of Savoy commenced offensive operations against the Genoese.*

Considering that the object of the confederates was widely different, the result of their measures was far more favourable than under similar circumstances might have been expected. Their ultimate success ought however to be ascribed to the commanding genius of Richelieu, who had equally to contend against the fears of his master, and the prejudices of the zealous catholics. Predetermined never openly to engage in a foreign war till he had reduced the Hugonots to submission, it became necessary, in order to avoid a rupture with Spain, that the French should assume the modest title of auxiliaries, acting in conformity to an ancient treaty, as the allies of the Grison confederacy. The army confided to the command of Cœuvres was accordingly composed almost entirely of Swiss, reinforced by two French regiments.†

Persuaded that the security of their own republic depended upon the expulsion of the Spaniards from Italy, the Venetians artfully endeavoured by intrigues and entreaties to extend the sphere of hostilities. The restless ambition of the Duke of Savoy induced him warmly to second this project, in the hope of obtaining an augmentation of territory.‡

* 1624. Bougeant, 109. Le Vassor, vi. 101.

† Ibid. 93.

‡ Ibid.

The insult offered to the papal authority by an officer in the service of France, excited the resentment of Urban VIII. who had the prudence however to confine his anger to official complaints, and to reject the proposals of the Spanish court for a general league against Lewis.* For he wisely preferred trusting to the piety of that feeble monarch, rather than to his own exertions for redress, and an ambassador extraordinary was accordingly sent with special instructions to flatter his vanity, and alarm his religious scruples. But the ascendancy of Richelieu was now so great, that neither the usual modes of negociation, nor the dignified character of Cardinal Barbarini, the nephew and favourite of the sovereign Pontiff, were able to shake his resolution.† The forts remained in the posses-

* The bold genius of Richelieu is clearly developed in a conversation between him and the Spanish ambassador, detailed at length by Le Vassor, iv. 105. Unacquainted with the real character of the cardinal, the Marquis of Mirabel endeavoured to alarm him by expatiating upon the injury which would accrue to his reputation from espousing the cause of heresy. "Sir," replied the minister of Lewis, not a little piqued at the insult thus offered to his understanding, "I trust I am capable of distinguishing between a political and a religious dispute. Though a catholic and a cardinal, I am also the minister of a powerful monarch, and as such I am bound to promote the glory of my master, instead of rendering myself subservient to the interests of Spain, from an ill-founded apprehension of offending the Pope. When the king was engaged in the laudable enterprize of extirpating the protestant opinions in France, you took advantage of the opportunity to attack our allies; is it then improper for us to avail ourselves of a moment of domestic repose, to afford them assistance in their distress? You are now acquainted with our intentions, and are at perfect liberty to shape your conduct accordingly. We have no apprehensions respecting the event, the Hugonots are no longer a formidable body; and in spite of all the efforts of the Spanish court, the power of the king is sufficiently great, to preserve the internal tranquillity of his kingdom."

† Lewis was so well tutored by his minister, that he could be no longer terrified like an infant. Relying upon his weakness, the pontifical

sion of France, till finally restored to the Grison league by the treaty of Moncon.*

The occupation of the Palatinate by the Spanish troops was likewise an object of jealousy to France, whose enlightened minister could not behold with indifference that ambitious power establishing itself in a country so calculated to furnish increasing means of annoyance.

Such was the origin of that formidable league, which when matured by the genius of Richelieu, and conducted by the heroism of Gustavus, gave a blow to Austria from which she never recovered. At present, however, her prospect was serene, though clouds were gathering in every quarter. No enemy was any longer in arms; and the authority of Ferdinand appeared firmly established on the tremendous basis of terror. This therefore was the moment for disbanding his forces, had security been his only object. But no hints were given of a similar intention; no preparations were made to effect a reduction. An army of upwards of one hundred thousand men, under the command of Tilly, and other experienced officers, spread terror and desolation from the banks of the Rhine to the frontiers of Bohemia. A general alarm was in consequence excited, and little doubt entertained

ministers, (Nari and Spada) expatiated largely upon the outrage offered to the sacred character of their master in language as lofty as ever was employed by the proudest of his predecessors in the darkest ages of superstition. "I will consult my council," was the laconic answer returned by the king, desirous of being freed from the persecution of men, toward whom his fears of the cardinal, and his fears of the pope, made it equally difficult for him to act with propriety. *Le Vassor*, ii. 131.

* Signed in 1626 by the Duc d'Olivares, and the Marquis du Fargès, the French ambassador. *Dumont*. *Corps Diplom.*

of the designs of the emperor to render his authority despotic in Germany, and to convert an elective into a hereditary monarchy.

A crisis so extraordinary was calculated to awaken all the energies and passions of the human heart. The pride of the league looked down with contempt upon a prostrate foe, though their hatred diminished with their apprehensions. The union on the contrary, confounded at the degradation into which they were fallen, and overwhelmed with the humiliating reflection that it was the merited recompence of disunion and imbecility, scarcely ventured to cherish the most distant expectation of ameliorated fortune, though they panted after an opportunity of revenging the injury to which their religion and liberties were exposed.*

The project of James for the recovery of the Palatinate were resumed with vigour by his son, who told his parliament, with greater sincerity than was usual with him in similar communications, that he had prevailed upon his uncle, the King of Denmark, to enter into a war with Austria, by promising to support him with the troops and treasures of England. That warlike monarch, he said, would no sooner erect his standard in the north of Germany, than it would be resorted to by all who were desirous of emancipating themselves from the fetters of Austria.† A confederacy had been formed with the greatest secrecy between Christian IV. the Dukes of Brunswick and Mecklenburg, and all the states of Lower Saxony, with the exception of Lüneburg, for the express purpose of compelling Tilly

* Schmidt, iv. 24.

† 1624. Hume, l. Clarendon Hist. of Rebell.

to evacuate the circle, now completely exhausted by the imperialists. Preparations conducted on so extensive a scale as became necessary for the success of the undertaking, could not escape the notice of so vigilant a commander. Anxious to stifle the kindling flame, Tilly addressed a menacing letter to the states, commanding them to suspend all farther levies, under penalty of incurring the emperor's displeasure, and being treated with all the severity of military execution. Undismayed at the threat, they calmly replied that their object was solely precautionary. While surrounded on every side by numerous armies, not accustomed to observe the strictest discipline, it would be inconsistent with prudence to remain unarmed ; but they at the same time protested that they entertained no hostile designs against any member of the Catholic League, and least of all against Ferdinand.* Too wary to be deceived by professions when positively contradicted by facts, Tilly repeated his injunction in still stronger terms, and prepared to enforce their obedience.

Delay however was of so much importance to the opposite party, that they endeavoured by every expedient to postpone the conflict. Troops indeed were levied, and magazines were provided, but opinions disagreed respecting the commander to whom the defence of the reformed religion should be confided. It was universally acknowledged that the only two princes capable of undertaking that momentous charge were the Kings of Sweden and Denmark ; for to England as usual they looked for

* Puffendorf, i. 44. Schmidt, iv. 24. Lotichius, i. 414.

subsidies, and subsidies only. The military talents which Gustavus Adolphus had already displayed in the Polish war, and the celebrity he had acquired in different negotiations, seemed to point him out as the fittest champion of protestantism. Christian, on the contrary, was far more distinguished for the qualities of a statesman, than for those of a soldier; but the proximity of his territory, and the actual possession of the rich province of Holstein, were powerful inducements, and in the opinions of many, outweighed the superior talents of the Swedish monarch. The political views and attachments of both were directed by the same leading principles. To both the aggrandisement of Austria was an object of almost equal alarm; to both, the protestant tenets were equally precious, and both appeared equally interested in preventing the emperor from establishing a naval force in the Baltic.*

The elector of Brandenburg, who began seriously to repent his folly in having remained a tranquil spectator of the ruin of Frederic, and who was among the warmest admirers of Gustavus, made the following proposals to the English court, in the name of that illustrious monarch.

1st. "That the powers allied in defence of the

* Christian was also influenced by personal motives of hostility toward Austria, besides the interest which he took in the fate of a prince so nearly allied to him as Frederic. The rich sees of Bremen and Verden were designed by the King of Denmark as a provision for the younger branches of his family; and it was more than probable that these would be irrecoverably lost, should the emperor be suffered to establish absolute authority in Germany. The permission granted by the court of Vienna to the courts of Schaumburg to assume the arms of Sleswick annexed by Christian I. in 1459, to the royal domains, was another subject of complaint.—Coxe, i. 799.

Germanic constitution should use their utmost endeavours to prevent any armament from being assembled at Danzig with hostile intentions toward Sweden."

2d. "That the King of Denmark should engage not to attack Sweden, while she was occupied in hostilities against Austria."

3d. "That an English fleet, consisting of not less than seventeen ships, should unite with the Swedes."

4th. "That Gustavus Adolphus should maintain an army of twelve thousand foot, and two thousand horse, at his own expense."

5th. "That the allies should pay twenty-four thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, to be levied in the name, and subject to the orders of the King of Sweden, to whom they should take an oath of fidelity."

6th. "That a free passage should be granted to the Swedish army through all the territories of the allies."

7th. "That no member of the confederacy should enter into any treaty, with the court of Vienna, or with any of its adherents, without the consent of the other members."

8th. "That Bremen and Verden should be delivered into the hands of Gustavus for the reception and security of his military stores, and in order to preserve the necessary communication with his hereditary dominions."

9th. "And lastly, in case a reverse of fortune should compel the protestants to conclude a peace, they should do every thing in their power to facilitate the retreat of Gustavus."

Gustavus required an early answer, that in case

his offers should be accepted, he might have time to negotiate a prolongation of the truce, which was nearly expired with Poland, before his treaty with England should be made public.*

This project having been communicated to the court of France, was strenuously supported by Richelieu, who as an additional inducement to facilitate the negotiation, offered a liberal subsidy in the name of his master; though he declined to become an active member of the confederacy. He farther suggested the propriety of restricting the alliance to the procuring a fair and honourable peace, and establishing a balance between the rival religions, which alone could tend to preserve it. And with this view, he proposed that in case of a negotiation, the Kings of France and England should be chosen joint mediators.†

Envious of the reputation which the Swedish her was about to require, Christian resolved to deprive him of the command, and, in consequence, proposed to undertake the charge and conduct of the war upon far more reasonable terms. The artifice succeeded, and being warmly seconded by the recommendation of Charles, his offers were accepted by the allies. Fears, however, were entertained, that this imprudent preference might offend Gustavus; but his elevated soul, superior to every selfish feeling, and anticipating the result of this inconsiderate choice, replied with dignity to the communication made him, that he wished the King of Denmark the utmost success; ironically adding, "that the choice of the commander appeared to him a favourable pre-

* 1625. Grimoard Hist. de Gustave Adolfe, i. 247.

† Ibid. 251.

sage, as it furnished an unequivocal proof of discernment.*”

The incapacity of Christian for a great military undertaking, though known to Gustavus, was not even suspected by himself. With a presumption, by no means uncommon to men who suppose themselves capable of the most arduous enterprises because they have excelled in the management of less important concerns, he flattered himself at once to terminate the contest, and to reduce the power of Austria within the bounds of moderation, in the course of a single campaign. Appointed generalissimo of the armies of the confederates, he soon found himself at the head of sixty thousand men; and being joined by considerable reinforcements from Brunswick and Mecklenberg, he thought nothing too difficult to be accomplished.

The intentions of the confederates could no longer be disguised, and it was apparent to the world that they had more in contemplation than a system of cautious defence. The measures concerting with England and Holland, and the clandestine communications with France, evidently embraced a sphere of action more extensive than that of internal security, and clearly indicated the intention of attempting the re-establishment of the Palatine, and the humiliation of Austria.†

Too cautious to be deceived by empty professions,‡ and too haughty to yield to compulsion, Ferdinand determined, by vigour and decision, to de-

* Grimoard *Histoire de Gustave Adolfe* I. 427.

† Schiller, ii.

‡ All doubts respecting the real intentions of the confederacy were entirely dissipated by an intercepted letter from Frederic to the Count of Thurn, which fell into Tilly's hands.—Schmidt. iv. 24.

stroy the confederacy before it attained to maturity. Tilly therefore received instructions to commence hostilities, and to endeavour by every means in his power to prevent the King of Denmark from forming a junction with the Duke of Brunswick and Mansfeldt, who were levying troops with their accustomed activity. Such an object was worthy of the talents of a soldier renowned alike for foresight and courage. Tilly accordingly, by rapid marches, took possession of the passes in the mountains contiguous to Hesse, as he had received undoubted intelligence that it was the intention of Christian to advance towards Cassel, and that the Landgrave was ready to declare in his favour. While uncontested master of the left bank of the Weser, Tilly laid the whole country under contribution; the king confined his operations to the right, but wishing to diminish the sufferings of his allies, he weakened his army by numerous detachments, at a time when measures the most decisive were indispensibly requisite, to give confidence and courage to his adherents.*

The emperor had hitherto employed the troops of the League for the subjugation of the Palatinate, and the conduct of the war had been entrusted entirely to the Elector of Bavaria, as commander in chief of the army of execution, and by him had been delegated to Tilly. To a man of boundless ambition, such a state of dependence could not be satisfactory; for though splendid success had hitherto crowned every enterprize, he could not but feel that power, supported by extraneous exertions, was sub-

* 1625. Schiller, ii.

ject to various chances, and that a collision of interests might at any time endanger the stately fabric they had erected. Neither was it probable that the attachment of the catholic party, or even the gratitude of its leader, would induce them to second the extensive schemes with which victory had inspired the Austrian cabinet. If they had hitherto assisted in depressing the protestants, it was in the cause of religion they had combated. Maximilian had now attained the most exalted dignity that imperial bounty could confer. Enriched with the spoils of his ruined friend, he had nothing more to expect from the hands of the emperor, and would consequently behold, with an eye of jealousy, the rapid aggrandisement of Austria. A formidable army, supported entirely at his own expense, and thus rendered independent of all foreign controul, was necessary for the execution of Ferdinand's designs, and to aid in establishing that paramount authority over all the members of the empire, to which his despotic temper aspired.*

However essential to his projects such a measure appeared, the difficulties attending it seemed almost insurmountable. His territories were impoverished, his treasury was exhausted, his subjects were discontented; yet all these obstacles were unexpectedly removed, and an army assembled, more formidable than any which till then had supported the catholic cause, by the eccentric genius of a hero.†

Count Waldstein, or Wallenstein, as he is more frequently called by the German historians, was one of the most extraordinary personages of this extra-

* Schmidt, ii.

† 1625. Ibid.

ordinary era. Descended from an ancient, and once opulent family, in Bohemia, he was born at Prague, in 1583; destined by his parents to receive a learned education, he was sent to the university of Padua, where he gave himself up to the study of mathematics and of judicial astrology, the fashionable folly of his contemporaries. This latter pursuit, to which he was addicted with a puerile credulity, led him imperceptibly to regard the position of the planets as inseparably connected with the destiny of man; and probably first suggested to his ardent imagination those splendid visions, which enabled him, without family connexions or hereditary wealth, unsupported, and even frequently opposed, by the government he served, to dictate laws to the Germanic confederacy, and even to render himself formidable to the court of Vienna. The pedantic regularity of a college, however, in a short time disgusted a temper proud and turbulent in the extreme, and panting after distinctions more rapid and tangible than those of literature. Indignant at the restraints of scholastic discipline, he resolved to devote himself to the profession of arms, and, as a preparatory step, entered into the service of the Margrave of Burgau, in quality of page; where he acquired every accomplishment ornamental to a gentleman, or necessary for a soldier.

A disposition naturally severe and gloomy is best adapted for the reception of those enthusiastic impressions which are apt to degenerate into superstition. Wallenstein was educated by his father in the protestant tenets, but having fallen into the hands of an artful Jesuit, during his residence at Inspruck, he imbibed a strong predilection for the religion of Rome, whose pageants and miracles were

far more congenial to his heated fancy than the evangelical simplicity of his primitive faith. An accident, however, determined his conversion: having escaped unhurt from a perilous fall, and being taught to consider his preservation as a warning from heaven to abandon his former errors, he obeyed the call with alacrity.

The narrow sphere of a Tyrolian court soon ceased to excite the emulation of a man stimulated by the resistless impulse of genius, and an implicit confidence, in astral culminations to aspire ultimately to a regal diadem. Taking leave of the Margrave, he successively visited France, Holland, England, Italy, and Spain, that he might study the interests and relations of the different European powers in a school commensurate with their importance. With the enlightened eye of a statesman he examined the progress of each of these nations in arts, in science, and in commerce, inquired into their resources, their political alliances, the strength and discipline of their armies and navy, the temper and pursuits of their inhabitants, the form of their government, and the power and capacity of their sovereigns, overlooking nothing that could gratify curiosity, or enlarge the sphere of his understanding.

Thus qualified to support an eminent part in every situation of life, he returned to his native country, eager to distinguish himself in that profession by which Hannibal and Cæsar had acquired immortality. Pride however revolted at the idea of appearing in the field without those brilliant accoutrements which were the characteristics of rank, but which his straitened income was unable to procure. But having improved his fortune by marrying a widow in the decline of life, he deter-

mined to indulge his reigning passion, and give unbounded scope to his military genius.

During the war in the Friuli between the Venetians and Ferdinand, before he obtained the imperial crown, Wallenstein raised a regiment of cavalry at his own expense, and distinguished himself so much by his enterprising spirit and judicious execution, that he rose high in the favour of Ferdinand. After the conclusion of peace, he passed a winter at Vienna, and having lost his wife whom he never loved, he contracted an alliance more suitable to his inclinations and interests, by marrying the daughter of the Count of Harrach, who at that time filled an important post under the Austrian government. The insurrection in Bohemia opened a wider field for his ambition. On either side there was ample room for exertion.* But his connexions and principles leading him to embrace the defence of despotism, his property was sequestered by the opposite party, and he himself condemned to exile as a rebel to his country.† But after the battle of Prague, where he added materially to his military reputation, he was nobly rewarded for his services by the princely liberality of the conqueror, who bestowed upon him a considerable portion of the confiscated estates.

* The following passage from Gualdo deserves notice on account of its absurdity, but which the author probably admired for its eloquence. "Di privato divenuto poi principe, di colonello assonto al generalato, di pazzo scopritosi savio, diè a conoscere, che il suo studio non fu per cambiar pensiero, ma per mutar conditione e che non meglio si può difender da i colpi dell'invidia, e della malignita, che col nome di prudente, che colo piovono i favori della fortuna, ove sono le nubi della stravaganze, i. 267.

† 1625. Galetti, i. 16.

In a man destined to support so conspicuous a part, every thought and action becomes peculiarly interesting ; I shall therefore paint him as described by Sarrazin, a contemporary writer.* To boldness or rather temerity in the conception of his plans, he united prudence and activity in their execution. His countenance, though intelligent, was rather majestic than agreeable. By nature temperate, and an enemy to indulgence, he allowed himself little time for sleep, and when awake was constantly occupied either with business or in writing. Endowed by nature with a robust constitution, he was alike indifferent to heat or cold ; and though his table was covered with the choicest viands, it was from ostentation, not from sensuality, since he took nourishment only because it is necessary to the support of life, and not for the indulgence of appetite. No man was ever less communicative in company, or more sparing of his words in conversation. When he spoke, it was generally in the language of command ; to dictate orders, and not to canvas opinions. All dispatches of consequence were invariably written by himself ; for so regular was he in the distribution of business, that he never wanted leisure for any occupation. Inexhaustible in expedients for regulating the internal economy of an army, he always found soldiers on every emergency, as well as the means of supporting them. Severe to punish the smallest relaxations in military discipline, he was no less liberal in remunerating merit, but always regulated his favours by the scale of desert, and not by the impulse of caprice. Jea-

† His work entitled *La Conspiration de Valstein*, was published in 1635.

lous in the extreme of his own reputation, he beheld with envy the brilliant actions of his contemporaries, from a delicate apprehension that they might obscure the lustre of his own exploits. His anger was always more easily kindled than appeased; and when once seriously offended, his resentment became implacable. Passionately addicted to external pomp, which he considered as a powerful instrument for inspiring respect, or captivating popularity, the splendour of his household, of his equipages, and of his retinue, was conducted on a footing of Asiatic magnificence. However repugnant his actions might sometimes appear to those established principles which pass with the timid for prudence, even when they deviated most essentially from moral rectitude, they were the result of calculation, and usually disguised under the imposing garb of a patriotic attachment to his country. Though naturally credulous, he seems to have regarded both religion and morality as duties subordinate to ambition, yet he frequently assumed the mask of piety as a covering to his blackest designs. His penetration, however, was equal to his dissimulation; for, while his own intentions were involved in the profoundest mystery, he dived with facility into the hearts of those whose thoughts he was desirous to discover.* Yet this impenetrability of character was hardly suspected by many of his most assiduous attendants, as he affected unbounded ad-

* It is difficult to read the character of Wallenstein, as described by Sarrazin, without recollecting the following passage from Sallust: "*Animus audax, subdolan, varius, cujuslibet rei simulator ac dissimulator, alieni appetens, sui profusus.*—*Vastus animus, immoderata, incredibilia, nimis alta semper cupiebat.*"—*Bellum Catilin.* 5.

miration for candour and sincerity, to which he allotted an elevated rank in the scale of moral virtues.*

Such was the man, whose extraordinary talents were destined to raise the imperial prerogative to the highest pitch that it ever attained, and who would have tyrannized over Germany with unlimited sway, had not his mighty projects, most fortunately for mankind, been frustrated by the superior ascendancy of a monarch, whose military genius exceeded his own, and who stood alone and unrivalled in the proud career of justice, moderation, and virtue.

Confident in the fertility of his own resources, and relying upon his fortunate stars, which predicted success in every undertaking, Wallenstein submitted a project to the court of Vienna, by which he offered to raise and equip an army at his own expense, and to maintain it without any charge to the imperial treasury, provided he was permitted to augment it to fifty thousand men, was entrusted with the absolute command, and allowed to dispose of all the commissions, independently of every control.†

That a plan so romantic should ever be realized far exceeded the bounds of probability. And we accordingly find, that the ministers of Ferdinand‡ affected to treat it as the chimera of a heated ima-

* Besides Sarrazin I have consulted Schiller, ii. Schmidt, iv. 25. Grimoard, i. 259. Coxe, i. 802. Galetti Bougeant, i. 115. Gualdo, i. 266. The latter always speaks of this celebrated man with the partiality of a Jesuit.

† Kheuenhiller, x. 802. Galetti, i. 67.

‡ It is but justice to except the Prince of Eggenberg, who was a friend and admirer of Wallenstein. Schmidt, *ibid.*

gination, without deigning to reflect, that an ardent genius, unshackled and undebased by the trammels of official forms, was capable of actions at which their littleness of mind was astonished. But as no precedent could be produced in the Austrian archives to sanction the grant, they would have willingly suffered this glorious opportunity to escape, rather than transgress those rules, to which they adhered with the pertinacious pedantry of long established habit. Ferdinand, however, more capable of appreciating the efforts of genius, was not disposed to reject a project as impracticable, because it was attended with difficulties which appeared insurmountable to common understandings. He had besides suffered too severely from the activity of Mansfeldt, not to admit the possibility of extending a system so ably conceived; and he was also too well acquainted with the character of the projector to doubt his accomplishing whatever could be achieved by activity or perseverance. He felt, also, the importance of the service to be performed, should the offer be fulfilled only in part. A favourable answer was accordingly returned, particular districts in Bohemia were allotted for the purpose of enrolling recruits, and the title of Duke of Friedland was conferred upon the general, to give dignity and consequence to the undertaking.*

Having in a few weeks assembled twenty thousand men, Wallenstein quitted the Austrian territory; and as the popularity of his name, and the brilliant advantages held out to his soldiers attracted crowds of adventurers to his standard, his army was so rapidly augmented during the march,

* 1625. Schmidt, iv. 25. Schiller, ii. Coxe, 804.

that it amounted to more than thirty thousand, when it entered Lower Saxony. Even sovereign princes, stimulated by an ardour for military renown, or impelled by less honourable motives, offered to levy regiments in support of the imperial cause; so that in a short time, the forces assembled for the destruction of the protestants considerably exceeded the stipulation.*

An Austrian army, penetrating into the heart of the empire, though calculated to excite universal consternation throughout all the protestant states, was an event by no means agreeable to the catholics. The Duke of Friedland had instructions to form a junction with Tilly, that their united forces might overwhelm the King of Denmark, before Mansfeldt and Brunswick could join him. But jealousy of Tilly, to whose veteran talents he knew the success of the campaign would be universally ascribed, made Wallenstein resolve to conduct his operations on a separate plan, that the glory which he anticipated might be without competition. Unwilling however to proclaim his designs by an unqualified act of disobedience, he advanced towards Gottingen by hasty marches, apparently for the purpose of co-operation; but instead of waiting for Tilly, in conformity to his orders, he turned suddenly northwards, and by a rapid movement made himself master of the bridge, at Dessau, which secured a passage over the Elbe. The object thus accomplished, though it obstructed for a time the operations of Tilly, was ultimately attended with

* Among this number were even some of the protestant persuasion, viz. Adolphus, Duke of Holstein, the Prince of Lauenburg, and George, Duke of Luneburg.—Schmidt, iv. 25.

beneficial results to the common cause, and productive of immediate and most important advantages to himself. The rich country extending on both sides the river lay open to his incursions, and as it had not hitherto been visited by the hostile armies, it afforded ample resources for plunder and contributions. The command of the Elbe also enabled him at pleasure to fall on the rear of the Saxons, or to penetrate without opposition into the hereditary dominions of their general.*

The King of Denmark's position was now become critical in the extreme, and it required talents very different from those which Christian possessed to escape from so perilous a situation. Alarmed at the impending tempest, the states of Lower Saxony weakly endeavoured to avert it by the arts of negociation. Under the joint mediation of Saxony and Brandenburg a congress was opened during the winter at Brunswick; but no sooner had the momentary panic subsided, than impediments arose in arranging the articles of peace, which victory alone could surmount.† Presumptuously confiding in his own resources, Ferdinand insisted upon unconditional submission, while the King of Denmark, who from the beginning had shewn himself averse to the treaty, and had not only formed an alliance with Transilvanian waivode, but received a promise of subsidies from England and Holland, was more anxious than ever for continuing hostilities. The confidence he inspired by exaggerated representations of the probable results of another campaign overcame the scruples of the states, and

* Schmidt, iv. 25. Schiller, ii. Lotichius, i. 419. Galetti, i. 72.

† Barre, ix. 556.

it was accordingly resolved, in conformity to a plan which he laid before them, to recommence offensive operations with increasing activity.*

Being now joined by Mansfeldt and the Duke of Brunswick, Christian found himself at the head of sixty thousand men, a force superior to that of either Tilly, or Wallenstein, while acting separately, but totally inadequate to contend against them, should they be suffered to unite. To prevent their junction became therefore indispensably necessary to the success of the campaign; and Mansfeldt accordingly undertook with a strong detachment to keep Wallenstein in check, while the main army should attempt to force a passage into Hesse and the Palatinate.

This enterprise, though planned and conducted with all the celerity and judgment for which Mansfeldt was so conspicuous, was frustrated by the vigilance of his opponent. Undismayed by the vast superiority of the enemy, the protestant commander imprudently attacked Wallenstein in his intrench-

* 1626. Barre, ix. 556. Lotichius, 426.—On the part of the emperor, it was required "that the protestants should immediately disband their army, indemnify the emperor for the expenses of the war, and deliver into his hands the Count of Mansfeldt, Christian, Duke of Brunswick, together with some others of inferior quality, who had been subjected to the imperial bar; that the King of Denmark should immediately retire out of Germany, and undertake to make good the losses to which the Duke of Luneburg had been exposed by the invasion of his territories; that the circle of Lower Saxony should enter into an engagement never more to oppose the imperial authority, or to give countenance or assistance to his enemies."

In answer to these extravagant demands, the states offered to disarm provided the imperialists would evacuate the circle, make compensation for the damage they had occasioned, and promise never again to molest the protestants on account of their religious opinions, or to attempt any innovations in the government. Ibid. 438.

ments at Dessau; convinced that if he could drive him from that important post he should paralyze his exertions during the rest of the campaign. No efforts of valour, however, could succeed against a general, who knew how to avail himself of every advantage, arising equally from situation and numbers. Repulsed with the loss of three thousand men, but formidable, even after his defeat, Mansfeldt retired into the Electorate of Brandenburg, where he allowed his army a little repose. Being joined by the Duke of Weimar, with considerable reinforcements, he made a sudden irruption into Silesia, determined, by one adventurous effort, to carry terror and devastation to the gates of Vienna.*

Meanwhile Tilly was occupied in preparing for the reduction of all the towns and fortresses on the Weser, an enterprise which required a force far more considerable than that which was actually at his disposal. This project was frustrated by the jealousy of Wallenstein, who refused to detach a few regiments to his assistance, under pretence that he wanted them to maintain his communication with Bohemia.†

The King of Denmark, on the contrary, had opened the campaign with the capture of Peina and Lalenberg; while the Duke of Weimar, at the head of a separate corps, overran the Bishopric of Osnaberg, and compelled the chapter to elect his son coadjutor. Having no enemy opposed to him of strength sufficient to arrest his progress, it is possible he might have laid the whole adjacent

* Schiller, ii. Schmidt, iv. 25. Pfeffel, ii. 298.

† Galetti, i. 72.

country under contribution, and even have planted his standard on the walls of Munster, had he not suspended his operations, without any intelligible cause, and rejoined the army. The motives for this decision were so little understood, that they were almost universally imputed to venality.*

No sooner had a detachment of the Saxon army approached the frontiers of Hesse than the landgrave declared in favour of the allies, and sent a reinforcement of seven thousand men to join the Duke of Brunswick. This decisive example of honour and courage excited the resentment of Tilly, who immediately quitted the banks of the Weser, and took possession of Minden and Göttingen. The Duke of Brunswick's position being no longer secure, he fell back in haste upon Wolfenbüttele, where he shortly after died of a malignant fever.†

Tilly was less successful in an attempt on Nordheim, being compelled upon the approach of the Saxon army to raise the siege; but having at length received a strong reinforcement from Wallenstein's army, he recommenced offensive operations, and by a masterly movement cut off the King of Denmark from Thuringia, where he was endeavouring to penetrate; and having pursued him to Lutter, near Goslar, completely defeated him, after an obstinate engagement. Having left five thousand men upon the field of battle, besides a considerable number of prisoners, and abandoned his artillery

* Grimoard, i. 276.

† 1626. As in those days it was impossible for a person of distinguished character to die by natural means, the court of Vienna was accused of having hastened his death by poison, *ibid.* 278. Lotichius, i. 450.

and baggage, Christian fled towards the Elbe, at the head of his cavalry, which had sustained no material loss; and, after a retreat, attended with infinite difficulty, returned to Holstein, having plainly proved to the world, that he was not designed by nature for a hero.*

Mansfeldt's project for the invasion of Austria is supposed to have been originally suggested by the elder Thurn, who anticipated the most important results from the undertaking, provided Gabor could be persuaded to break the truce with Austria, a measure to which he was always sufficiently inclined. The government of Ferdinand, no longer induced by prudential motives to restrain his natural arrogance, was grown so unpopular, that in various districts the peasants were actually in open rebellion. A large body of insurgents, after pillaging several towns, on the banks of the Danube, laid siege to Lintz, and were supposed to carry on a clandestine correspondence with the malcontents in Hungary and Bohemia. Though frustrated in the attempts to capture a city, which would have given lasting reputation to their arms, the insurgents continued to support the contest with unabating energy, till the return of Papenheim from Italy. After the cessation of hostilities between France and Spain, that gallant officer received directions to march against the rebels in Upper Austria, with a few regiments which had been serving under his orders in Lombardy.† The character of the war

* Grimoard, 290. Puffendorf, i. 49. Pöffel, ii. 301.

† This celebrated commander had received, like Wallenstein, a learned education; and, like him, had visited most of the European courts, before he embraced the profession of a soldier. Destined to act a distinguished

was now totally changed; every enterprise was combined with judgment; every attack was conducted with vigour; till being routed in a battle with the loss of their leader, the undisciplined band was so entirely dissipated, that they never afterwards attempted to assemble.*

The consternation occasioned by the approach of an enemy, whom the hatred and fears of the catholics had honoured with the appellation of the modern Attila, induced Ferdinand to dispatch courier after courier to recal Wallenstein to the defence of his capital; but every exertion of that active commander was frustrated by the vigilance of his antagonist. In spite of all the impediments which valour or artifice could oppose, Mansfeldt continued to advance, and after cutting in pieces a strong detachment of the imperialists at Oppela, and capturing Ratibor, Iægerdorf, and Troppau, effected a junction with Gabor, in the vicinity of Presburg. The restless ambition of that enterprising chieftain, stimulated by the eloquence and the ardour of Thurn, by whom the condition of Mansfeldt had been artfully painted in the most flattering colours, had recommenced hostilities with Austria. But previously to the arrival of the fugitive hero, the disastrous intelligence of Christian's defeat had clouded the hopes of the Transilvanian; who, when instead of a conqueror, enriched

part in the sanguinary contest about to ensue, he gave an early presage of his future celebrity. At the battle of Prague he was covered with wounds, and left for dead. Progressively raised by superior merit, he was entrusted with the command of a considerable corps in Italy, during the contest between the courts of Paris and Madrid, respecting the Valteline. Coxe, l. 806.

* 1626. Lotichius, 460.

by the spoils of plundered states, and accompanied by a numerous army, he beheld a miserable wanderer, destitute of all resources but what he might be able to derive from the generosity of a friend, began seriously to reflect that the issue of a contest commenced under such sinister auspices was not likely to prove advantageous. He accordingly resolved as soon as possible to get rid of a guest, whose situation did not promise to be productive of benefits commensurate with the expense he must occasion.*

Mansfeldt too late discovered that there is a tide in human affairs, against which it is in vain even for heroic courage to struggle. Confiding in the powers of an unbounded genius, he trusted to the resources of his own mind, without deigning to attend to difficulties, which the greater part of mankind would have deemed insuperable. Had he confined his system of predatory warfare to the theatre of his early exploits, he might not only have avoided destruction, but might even have added to his abundant laurels; but by grasping at objects too vast to be accomplished by human ingenuity, he rendered himself subservient to the fluctuating counsels of caprice and interest, and in some degree obscured the lustre of a life, which, considering the situation in which he was placed by nature, and the extraordinary actions he performed, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of history. Cut off from Germany by an army too formidable to be attacked without imminent danger, abandoned by the calculating policy of a mercenary warrior, whose friend-

* Schmidt, iv. 25. Grimoard, i. 295. Lotichius, 452.

ships and enmities were equally venal, and destitute of funds for supporting an army in a country where plunder was less easily obtained than in the opulent dioceses of Germany, he resolved to embrace the only scheme which appeared likely to restore him to glory. Having disbanded his handful of men, and sold his artillery and warlike stores, he set out for Venice with a retinue suitable to his humble fortunes. The offers repeatedly made him by that republic induced him to hope that he might shortly resume a distinguished part on the splendid theatre of Europe. But his career of glory was about to terminate. Worn out with exertions too excessive to be borne by the fragile frame of a mortal, irritated by disappointments, and the acrimonious string of frustrated ambition, and debilitated by the increasing progress of a malady which had long preyed in secret on his athletic constitution, he was compelled to stop at a miserable village in the vicinity of Zara in Dalmatia. Perceiving that his end was rapidly approaching, he dressed himself in one of his richest uniforms, and girding on a favourite sword which he constantly wore in battle, summoned all his officers to attend him. Supported by two of them, whom he wished to distinguish for their unshaken fidelity, he exhorted them to persevere in the pursuit of glory, and in their inveterate hostility toward Austria. With the indifference of a man preparing for a journey of no extraordinary importance, he continued tranquilly to converse with his friends to the latest moment of his existence. His body was interred with military pomp, at Spalatio in Dalmatia, at the expense of the Venetians. Thus was the emperor delivered from an enemy, who though often defeated, never

ceased to be formidable ; and whose transcendant genius was so fertile in resources, that without the smallest funds to support the expenses of war, he maintained an honourable contest during seven campaigns against the most powerful monarch in Europe.*

* Schmidt, iv. 25. Nani *Historia Veneta*, iv. Schiller, ii.—Two anecdotes related by Barre (ix. 566) are not unworthy of the heroes of Plutarch. Having discovered that Cazel, an officer in whom he particularly confided, betrayed his plans to the enemy, Mansfeldt made him a considerable present in money, and dispatched him with the following letter to Buequoy, “ Finding that Cazel prefers your interests to mine, I send him to you, that you may profit by his talents.” His generosity toward an apothecary, who had undertaken to poison him was no less characteristic of magnanimity. Being discovered in the act of preparing the fatal potion, he was brought before Mansfeldt, trembling at the prospect of a cruel death ; but instead of treating him with the severity which he so justly merited, the hero thus addressed him in the language of mercy,—“ As I cannot persuade myself that a man whom I never injured should wish to deprive me of life, necessity must have induced you to undertake the crime. That motive shall no longer exist ; take this and be honest in future.” After this short admonition, he presented him with a purse full of gold, and dismissed him. Nani, who was no admirer of his character, pays an involuntary eulogium to his memory. “ Uomo per altro, che senza invidia può chiamarsi celebre, è senza biasimo celebrarsi per grande in un secolo, nel quale son alcuni stati eletti dal cielo ministri della divina giustizia, è delle pubbliche calamità. Egli ardi di provocare solo, è con auspitii privati la tremenda potenza degli Austriaci. Fà sempre vinto in battaglia, ma per la felicità di rimettersi niente meno celebre de vincitori. Nel negotio superiore a grandissimi ingegni ; audace nel incontrar i pericoli, accortissimo nel sottrarsene ; amatore di torbidi, è novità ; sofferente della fame, delle vigilie, è dell’ intemperie ; eloquente è sagace ; profuso del suo, cupido del altrui, visse trà grande speranze, è disegni ; morì senza stati, è senza thesori.”

CHAP. VII.

Conduct of France with respect to Germany.—Ambitious projects of Ferdinand; success of Wallenstein; distressed situation of the King of Denmark; the Dukes of Mecklenberg put under the imperial ban, and deprived of their dominions.—Exactions of Wallenstein; he obtains the dukedom of Mecklenberg; he aims at establishing an independent power; means employed for that purpose.—Negociations for peace; pretensions of Ferdinand; offers made by Frederic.—Diet held at Muhlhausen.—A proposal for recovering the secularized benefices.—Fruitless attempt to procure the election of a King of the Romans.—Wallenstein aims at establishing a naval force in the Baltic, and endeavours to get possession of Stralsund. Gustavus Adolphus having taken that city under his protection, compels the Duke of Friedland to raise the siege.—Congress assembled at Lubec; peace concluded with Denmark.—Views and policy of Cardinal Richelieu.—Mantuan war.—Negociations of Charnace in German.—Wise policy of Maximilian.

THE deaths of Mansfeldt and Brunswick delivered the emperor from two of his most formidable enemies without increasing the prospect of peace. On the contrary, it became probable, from the general aspect of affairs, that the flame of war was about to extend over a wider surface.

Though seriously occupied in the siege of Rochelle, the capture of which was essential to the success of his projects for reducing the Hugonots, Richelieu still found leisure to attend to northern politics. For the present, however, he resolved to confine himself to clandestine intrigue, till the moment should arrive when he might safely throw aside the mask, and declare it was hardly possible to afford such assistance to the protestants as was necessary to prevent their utter destruction, without risking a rupture with Austria.

The ambitious projects of Ferdinand were no longer concealed under the veil of mystery, but presumptuously blazoned in the face of the universe. Emboldened by victory, his partizans and dependents proclaimed the design, long harboured in secret, of establishing throughout every province of Germany, that unity of worship which he deemed no less essential to his future happiness, than unity of power to his present security. Nothing, he thought, was wanting to complete his glory, but to extirpate heresy, and to reduce every member of the Germanic confederacy under the authority of an hereditary sovereign. With characteristic insolence, Wallenstein boasted, "that the moment was approaching, when the electors would be reduced to the rank of Spanish grandees."^{*} Neither was this the empty menace of arrogance, but confirmed by a series of concurring circumstances, too notorious to be misunderstood. The troops of Tilly and Wallenstein levied contributions indiscriminately in the catholic and protestant states, indifferent alike to the claims of justice, the dictates of compassion, and the common forms of decency.

Another attempt, simultaneously made, served still more to increase the general alarm. The Archduke Leopold having been tempted to abandon the ecclesiastical profession for an advantageous marriage with Claudina de Medici, widow of the Duke of Urbino, the emperor invested William, one of his younger sons, with the valuable bishoprics of Strasburg and Passau. This indeed was a natural exertion of patronage, and found a ready excuse in

* 1627. Barre, ix. 571.

one of the strongest propensities of human nature. But his subsequent conduct was without palliation, and plainly demonstrated, that he was resolved to avail himself of the terror inspired by his numerous armies, to procure for the younger branches of his family all the benefices which had been wrested from the catholic church, since the treaty of Passau. The diocese of Halberstadt being vacant, by the death of Christian, Duke of Brunswick, the chapter was compelled to elect the new Bishop of Passau for their diocesan. A bull was also obtained from the Pope, conferring upon him the archiepiscopal mitre of Bremen, together with the rich abbey of Hirschfeld, both of which had been secularized, and were actually enjoyed by princes of the protestant persuasion.* Not satisfied with this flagrant abuse of authority, while any thing remained for avidity to grasp, he declared the wealthy see of Magdeburg to have been vacated by the rebellion of Christian William of Brandenburg, who enjoyed its revenues under the title of administrator. Supposing the former incumbent to have forfeited all claim to that exalted dignity, there was still another obstacle to be overcome, before it could be transferred into the imperial family. According to a practice long established in Germany, a coadjutor was chosen to all episcopal sees, during the life of the occupant, who succeeded of course upon a vacancy. Unfortunately for Ferdinand, the destined successor was the son of the Elector of Saxony; he was therefore reduced to the distressing dilemma, of either renouncing the tempting prize, or of offending a prince

* Barre, ix. 571. Nani Historia Veneta, vi.

with whom he was as yet unwilling to quarrel. Yet, notwithstanding every obstacle which impeded his wishes, recourse was had to the papal authority, and a bull procured, annulling the former election. But as neither the canons nor the Saxon were likely to pay much attention to the decrees of a man whose religion they despised, and whose power they derided, an imperial rescript was issued, forbidding the son of John George to accept the appointment. To persuade the elector to abandon his interest, however, proved a less easy task than to persuade him to abandon his friends. A warm contest ensued, which ultimately terminated in a compromise, Augustus being allowed to retain possession of the see, in the name and under the authority of the archduke.*

With an unbroken force at his disposal, and assisted by the advice of one of the ablest generals of modern Europe, the King of Denmark had been unable to contend with Tilly upon equal terms: what then could be expected from his exertions, with an army no less disheartened than diminished by its recent defeat, and destined to oppose the legions of Wallenstein, united with those of the League? After following Mansfeldt to the banks of the Danube, without being able to obtain any decisive advantage, the Duke of Friedland directed his efforts against an insulated corps left for the protection of Silesia, under John Ernest, Duke of Weimar; but the command of which, after the death of that gallant prince, had devolved on the younger Thurn. Too weak to resist the imperialists, the pro-

* Barre, ix. 571. Coxé, i. 115.

testants fled from post to post, abandoning every fortress at the approach of Wallenstein, who, after driving them before him into the march of Brandenburg, compelled the elector to revoke the protest which he had formerly issued against the proceedings of the diet of Ratisbonne.*

The hereditary dominions of the house of Austria being thus delivered from all appearance of danger, the whole resources of that powerful monarchy were concentrated in the northern provinces of Germany, and destined exclusively for the dissolution of a confederacy already verging to decay. With the confused rapidity of a flight, rather than the organized movements of a well-conducted retreat, the Danes had abandoned all their posts upon the Weser, the Elbe, and the Havel. Having received a reinforcement of six thousand English, under the command of Colonel Morgan, the king resolved to defend his hereditary dominions; but every attempt to arrest the progress of the victor proved fruitless, and he was compelled to abandon all the fortresses of Holstein, with the single exception of Gluckstadt. After dictating laws to the Elector of Brandenburg, in his capital, the Duke of Friedland advanced to the theatre of war, anxious to share with the veteran general of the League in the glory of terminating the campaign. In his march towards Sleswick, whither the King of Denmark had retired, he took possession of the duchies of Mecklenburg; as the allies of Christian, both its dukes† were declared to have incurred the penalty of treason, and in conse-

* 1627. Puffendorf, i. 50.

† The Mecklenburg family was, and is still, divided into two reigning branches—that of Schwerin, and that of Strelitz.

quence of this illegal sentence, they were put under the ban of the empire.* Thus was the defence of the Germanic constitution against the violent attack of despotism, punished with all the severity which it would have been possible to inflict on crimes of the blackest atrocity. Without deigning to attend to the common forms of justice, without citation, or trial, the emperor presumed, in the plenitude of power, to proscribe and depose two of the most ancient sovereigns of Germany, and shortly after to transfer their dignity and states to the ready instrument of his iniquity.

The behaviour of Wallenstein now disclosed to the world the extent and nature of his projects. The astonishment originally occasioned by his offer to the imperial court was converted into despair, when the resources were discovered by which he intended to fulfil his apparently extravagant promises. It had been a leading principle in Mansfeldt's politics, "that one war must be supported by another." His troops had been fed at the expense of the country where they happened to be quartered, without the smallest consideration to the religion, the principles, or the politics of the inhabitants. These predatory incursions were however necessarily attended with many vicissitudes, arising out of the system itself. When one province was exhausted, they were compelled to remove to another, like the Tartarian hordes in search of booty; and sometimes were forced to abandon the undevoured harvest by the approach of a superior force. Yet in spite of every obstacle that art or nature could prevent, the capital of

* Schiller, ii. Bougeant, i. 131.

Austria had been made to tremble by a troop of banditti. If such were the achievements of an unprotected soldier, the child of fortune, it was not difficult to anticipate the wonders that might be achieved by an army strong enough to enforce unconditional submission; commanded by a general unrestrained by the compunctuous feelings of pity, the ties of morality, or the dictates of justice, and secure of impunity in every enterprize; since the haughty wearer of the imperial crown no longer scrupled to degrade his paramount dignity by embracing a system of rapine and confiscation, which a needy adventurer had been constrained to follow from necessity rather than from inclination.

Wallenstein had attentively studied the Mansfeldtian tactics before he submitted his plan to the cabinet of Vienna. He knew that the facility of the execution must augment in proportion to its apparent difficulty, because a numerous army, by the terror it inspired, would extort supplies from the timidity of those, to whose compassion an inferior one might petition in vain for assistance. The more violent the oppression exercised by the commander, the less cause he had for apprehension; because the fruit of extortion, if properly applied, was certain to purchase indemnity. By open rebellion most of the northern provinces had incurred the resentment of Ferdinand, and the most vigorous treatment might in consequence be justified by the casuistry of civilians. Toward those who adhered to the imperial throne through interest, attachment, or fear, he resolved to act more humanely, unless constrained to exceed the bounds of moderation by the irresistible plea of necessity.

This politic gradation in the scale of iniquity kept alive a spirit of jealousy, sufficient to prevent the different members of the empire from combining for their mutual security; while the exhausted situation to which they were reduced, precluded the possibility of insulated resistance. Thus was Germany converted into an immense magazine for the use of the imperial troops, and the authority of the emperor rendered no less despotic in Swabia and Saxony, than it was in Austria and Bohemia. A general cry of indignation was raised in every state unawed by the presence of an army, against the tyranny of Ferdinand; but still more against that of the Duke of Friedland, who exceeded the limits prescribed to his authority by acts of unqualified violence. Too weak to oppose the overwhelming storm, the wretched victims of oppression appealed in crouds to the imperial throne, against the exactions of a general, who was supposed to enjoy the unbounded confidence of his master, and to act in conformity to his secret instructions; but whatever might have been the inclination of Ferdinand, he had no longer the power to restrain a man, whom riches, and honours, and unlimited authority had rendered completely independent.

Though the exhausted resources of the protestant states might inspire the hope of a speedy termination to the war, Wallenstein continued to augment his forces, till he found himself at the head of a hundred thousand combatants. Elated with success, he then began to enlarge his views, and endeavoured in consequence to gain both officers and men, by excessive largesses, and a rapid promotion; surrounded with more than regal pomp, he

gave away money with the liberality of a man who never experienced any difficulty in procuring it. Large sums were expended in corrupting the army, and larger still in well-timed applications to the excessive venality of the Austrian cabinet. All this however was easily effected without ever recurring to the imperial treasury, by the enormous contributions promiscuously levied upon friends and foes; for he no longer deigned to make the smallest distinction between them.* Indifferent alike to the murmurs of despair, or the compunctions of conscience, he knew that in proportion to the extent of his exactions his means of remuneration must increase, so long as he had the power of rewarding his followers, he never doubted their attachment. Thus his very enormities secured him from danger, because they enabled him to bid defiance to justice.

It is alleged by some of the German historians, from a wish to extenuate the guilt of Ferdinand, that he was unacquainted with the atrocities committed by his troops; though they confess that he was almost daily assailed by the complaints of those, who were the devoted victims of their oppression. It is generally admitted that his ministers were in the pay of the Duke of Friedland, that they in consequence endeavoured to conceal the truth, and represented the remonstrances of a

* The sums raised by Wallenstein in Germany are so ridiculously exaggerated by the hatred of some, and the admiration of others, that no rational calculation can be formed. Schiller talks of sixty thousand millions of dollars levied in the space of seven years; I am however inclined to think that this must be a typographical error, and that it should have been sixty millions instead of sixty thousand; which would amount to about one million, five hundred thousand pounds sterling a year.

ruined people as the murmurs of disaffection. But the character of Ferdinand is little calculated to justify the supposition. His failings, though many, were not those of indolence. Ever active and vigilant, he seems to have chosen Charles V. for his model, and like him to have been guided by his own judgment, more frequently than by the advice of his ministers. All that can possibly be alleged in the emperor's justification, is, that he had raised the power of his general so high, that he was no longer able to control it. With secret satisfaction he beheld the conduct of Wallenstein, so long as he maintained his allegiance to the imperial throne, equally indifferent to the sufferings of the people and the complaints of the nobility. Delighted to see the princes of the empire depressed and humbled, and satisfied that when all intermediate gradations of rank between the throne and cottage should be swept away, no resistance would be offered to his authority, he never suspected that the Duke of Friedland's intention, in making him the sole dispenser of law, was to tyrannize with impunity as his representative. On the contrary, he believed, that like a dependent satellite, Wallenstein must sink into obscurity, when deprived of his reflected lustre. But the plans of his general were too artfully combined to be subject to the vicissitudes of a sovereign's caprice. He knew that the power of the emperor was entirely the work of his own creation, and believed that with a single blow he might dash it in pieces; but he also felt that his own ascendancy was inseparably connected with that of his master. The countenance of a mighty name was no less essential to the execution of his designs than his army to the pre-

potency of Ferdinand. He therefore resolved to involve him in a maze of difficulties, from which he thought it impossible for him ever to escape. By pretending to act in strict conformity to orders from Vienna, mitigating their severity so far as was consistent with the duty of a faithful subject, he rendered the emperor's name supremely odious, convinced that in proportion to the hatred inspired, the value of his own services must augment. To emancipate the emperor from the forms and shackles of the Germanic constitution was the second object of his ambition, the first was to keep him dependant upon himself.*

The facility with which he had obtained the title of duke emboldened him to look forward to higher and more substantial honours; and he accordingly demanded possession of the duchy of Mecklenberg, by way of security, for the money advanced to the emperor during the preceding campaign.† Though most of the Austrian ministers were blindly devoted to the interest of Wallenstein, there were still some who contemplated the extent of his ambition with jealousy, and endeavoured accordingly to prevent their master from consenting to a proposal, no less dangerous to his authority than derogatory to his glory. "The house of Mecklenberg," they said, "one of the most illustrious in Germany, derived its origin from the remotest antiquity, and was allied to most of the reigning

* Schiller, ii.

† 1627. Acquainted with the penury of the imperial treasury, he applied for payment in the most urgent terms, convinced that Ferdinand must of necessity consent to gratify his ambition, though at the expense of justice.—Galetti, i. 84.

families in Europe. Hence it must be expected, that many powerful protectors would rise in their defence. Neither was an act of such uncommon severity less repugnant to the precepts of equity than to the common dictates of prudence. The conduct of the Dukes of Mecklenburg was, in no respect, more reprehensible than that of all the members of the circle to which they belonged. To deprive them of their territories would in consequence excite a general alarm; and not only create additional obstacles to a peace with Denmark, but might eventually draw the forces of Sweden into the heart of the empire.”*

The partizans of the Duke of Friedland, on the other hand, maintained the necessity of stifling every spark of rebellion by some signal act of severity, since the punishment inflicted upon the Elector Palatine had failed of intimidating the disaffected. The services performed by their favourite hero afforded an ample theme for panegyric, and were represented as deserving the most brilliant rewards. But, should gratitude be suffered to plead in vain, there was another monitor they said, whose counsels required attention. An opportunity occurred, of eternally binding the greatest military genius of the age by the indissoluble ties of gratitude and interest; whereas, a refusal might tempt him in disgust to abandon the service—a loss which could never be repaired.†

With respect to the danger attending compliance, they affected to treat it with utter contempt. The

* Galetti, i. 84.

† Schmidt, iv. 27.

subserviency of the diet had been so clearly manifested upon recent occasions, that it would be unjust to doubt of their loyalty. The King of Sweden, they said, was so completely occupied in the Polish war, that he had neither leisure nor inclination to interfere with the politics of Germany; while the Danish monarch would be happy to regain his conquered territory by any concessions. In addition to these important considerations another was urged more cogent still. It was triumphantly argued, that as the northern shores were the seat of heresy and rebellion, it would be no less advantageous to the cause of religion, than to the private views of the emperor, to transfer the sovereignty of those disaffected provinces to an orthodox member of the catholic church, on whose courage and fidelity he could rely, and who would be ready to act with vigour and ability in every emergency. By his aid and co-operation, a marine might be created, capable of dictating laws to Sweden and Denmark, and of gradually engrossing the whole commerce of the Baltic.†

Wallenstein, however, was too dexterous a negociator to trust solely to argument for success. Thoroughly acquainted with the emperor's weakness,—against that he directed his attack. Though decidedly hostile to the Jesuits, more probably from political than from religious motives, he determined to avail himself of the unbounded ascendancy which they were known to possess over the scrupulous conscience of Ferdinand; and to secure their interested support, he promised to

* Schmidt, iv. 27. Galetti, i. 85.

erect a magnificent college for the use of the order in his ducal domain, and richly to endow it out of the secularized property of the church. A splendid establishment on the shores of the Baltic, from which they had till then been excluded with meritorious caution, and whence they flattered themselves to be enabled to scatter the seeds of conversion, and reclaim the heretical North, proved a temptation too alluring to be resisted. From the opponents they suddenly became the partizans of the Duke of Friedland, and by a happy application of that ingenious casuistry, which is the striking characteristic of the fraternity, soon convinced the emperor that he was in conscience bound to consent to Wallenstein's claim, since gratitude held a most distinguished rank in the scale of Christian virtues.*

It was impossible for Europe to behold with indifference the ambitious projects of Ferdinand, which plainly tended to establish an unbounded despotism throughout all the regions of the north. Yet France and England, the only powers by whom they could be opposed with a well-founded prospect of success, were too much occupied with internal dissensions to have leisure for the arduous undertaking. Various attempts indeed had been ineffectually made, to induce Louis to grant an asylum in France to the eldest son of the unfortunate Palatine. Alarmed at the prepotency of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria had endeavoured to penetrate the intentions of Richelieu respecting Germany, artfully insinuating, that he should not

* 1627. Schmidt, iv. 27. Galetti, i. 85.

be averse to concur in any measure proposed by that enlightened statesman, for preserving the balance of Europe. Even the Elector of Treves had applied to France for protection, as the only means of preserving his affrighted subjects from the insolence and tyranny of the Austrians.*

These repeated addresses were no less flattering to the vanity than conformable to the views of the cardinal; but being resolutely bent on accomplishing the destruction of the Calvinists, before he engaged in a contest with Austria, he contented himself with offering the mediation of France, and proposed the assembling a general congress. Convinced that, by allowing the electoral prince to reside within the dominions of Louis, he should hasten a rupture which he wished to delay, he eluded the request, under pretext that it would be utterly inconsistent with the dignity of his master, to countenance that unfortunate youth, without openly declaring himself his protector; a step which would of necessity prevent him from consenting to any treaty which did not extend to the complete restoration of the Palatine family. Nothing could be more ingeniously devised to silence all farther applications, as this was a point concerning which the opinions of the protestants were greatly divided; many of them considering that, under existing circumstances, no hope could be entertained of effecting it.†

The situation of the allies, however, was grown so desperate, that it required no little dexterity to suspend their total destruction, till the period

* Le Vassor, vii. 612.

† Barre, ix. 573.

should arrive for active interference. Richelieu therefore determined, by liberal promises, and a moderate subsidy, to preserve them from utter despondency. Marcheville was also dispatched upon an ambulatory mission to the German courts, with directions to endeavour, by every artifice, to impede the election of a king of the Romans, which Ferdinand was anxious to accomplish. He was at the same time instructed to offer the mediation of France for the re-establishment of peace, or if that could not be obtained, at least for a suspension of hostilities.*

But as the main object of Richelieu was to detach Maximilian from the protestant interest, Marcheville was directed to flatter his ambition with the prospect of obtaining the imperial diadem; whenever a vacancy should occur, while he artfully insinuated to the other electors the danger which threatened the Germanic constitution from the overgrown power of Austria. As the only means of avoiding this increasing evil, he suggested the necessity of electing for their chief a prince possessed of less extensive dominions, whose projects of aggrandisement, should he rashly attempt to infringe their prerogatives, would consequently be more easily defeated. The cardinal, however, was too well acquainted with the weakness and venality of the German cabinets, and with the state of humiliation to which they were reduced, to flatter himself that he should be able to inspire them with the courage necessary for his purpose; but he determined, if possible, to

* 1627. Barre, ix. 573.

Le Vassor, vi. 612.

prevent them from proceeding to the election of a king of the Romans. With this view he represented to the electors the impolicy of consenting to the emperor's proposal; for, while something remained for them to bestow, Ferdinand would be induced to treat them with greater lenity; but the moment he should have secured the reversion of the imperial sceptre, he would give unbounded scope to his haughty temper, and no longer consider them in any other light than that of dependants and vassals.* This latter argument, as more particularly applicable to the interests of the moment, having produced the desired effect, and excited suspicions in the breasts of the electors, which neither bribes nor persuasions could overcome, the election was deferred till a more favourable opportunity. Though defeated in a plan so dear to his vanity, Ferdinand endeavoured to console himself by compelling the Bohemians to confer their crown on his son, who had previously obtained the Hungarian sceptre. The ceremony of a coronation was the only thing required, as he would not permit the nation to proceed even to the prostituted forms of a compulsory choice; and by this act of injustice, a fatal blow was given to the expiring liberties of Bohemia, which was in future considered as an integral part of the hereditary dominions of Austria.†

While the imperial generals were successfully employed in subjugating the north of Germany, Ferdinand continued to amuse the courts of London and Paris with the prospect of a speedy paci-

* Barre, ix. 573. Le Vassor, vi. 612.

† Barre, ix. 573.

fication. The Dukes of Lorraine and Wirtemberg, assuming the sacred character of mediators, repaired to Colmar in Alsace, where Frederic was tempted by the fallacious hope of recovering his dominions, to depute two of his confidential friends as negociators. It appeared, however, that the pretensions of the imperial court were dictated by a spirit of overbearing pride, which precluded every expectation of a favourable issue. Not satisfied with the Palatine's renunciation of all his claims to the Bohemian crown, Ferdinand insisted upon his relinquishing the electoral dignity in favour of the Duke of Bavaria. It was further required, that the catholic religion should be established in the Palatinate, with all its appendages of indolence and celibacy; that he should indemnify the emperor for the expenses of the war, and in particular discharge the heavy debt for which Lusatia and Upper Austria had been mortgaged to the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria: and, lest any thing should be wanting to complete his degradation, Frederic was expected to acknowledge in a public diet the clemency of the conqueror.*

Terms so unreasonable could never be acceded to by any one not totally insensible to the dictates of honour, or destined by nature to become a slave. Anxious, however, to evince to the world the sincerity of his intentions, Frederic offered to abandon his pretensions to the contested throne, and, through the medium of an ambassador, to implore forgiveness for his past imprudence, provided no concessions should be required derogatory

* 1627. Le Vassor, vii. 622. Nani, vi. Grimoard, i. 305.

to the character of an independent sovereign ; and that he should be immediately reinstated in his dominions. With respect to religion it was proposed, to place it exactly upon the footing on which it had existed previously to hostilities ; but the impoverished condition to which the Palatinate was reduced, was strenuously urged as an excuse for rejecting every pecuniary demand. To the proposal concerning the electoral franchise, the following answer was returned : that Frederic would consent to its being alternately exercised by Maximilian and himself, during the life of the former, provided that at his death it should be exclusively attached to the Palatinate.

Every attempt to soften the resentment of Ferdinand having proved ineffectual, with the haughtiness of a conqueror he signified to the mediators that his ultimatum had been delivered at the commencement of the negociation, from which it was his unalterable resolution never to recede. Desirous, however, of concealing the implacability of his disposition, he attempted to cast the odium of a rupture upon his unfortunate rival, by attributing it solely to his unreasonable pretensions.* In a letter addressed to the Duke of Wirtemberg, he expatiated upon the obstinacy of Frederic in rejecting his equitable offers, though it was evident, that by accepting them he would have exposed his family to the greatest distress, impoverished his dominions, and forfeited every claim to the sympathy of mankind, by sanctioning his own degradation.

* Le Vassor, vi. 612.

The protestants were now so overwhelmed with confusion, that the Duke of Brunswick endeavoured to avert the ruin which threatened his party, by placing his territories under the protection of Ferdinand. This fatal instance of temporising prudence convinced the King of Denmark that it was no longer possible to continue the contest; and he accordingly applied to the Elector of Saxony for his mediation. A diet about to assemble at Mulhauser in Thuringia afforded an opportunity for making the attempt, notwithstanding the views of the emperor were too generally known for any rational hopes to be entertained. This opinion was fully justified by the event—since the efforts which were made for healing animosities, tended only to envenom their rancour. Ferdinand, however, being desirous of conciliating the electoral chamber, directed his ambassador (Baron Strahlen-dorf) to open the conferences with a specious display of moderation, but cautiously to avoid fettering his actions by any specific engagements. He accordingly expatiated with more zeal than judgment upon the justice and clemency of his master, lamenting that his endeavours for restoring tranquillity to his distracted country had been hitherto frustrated by the intrigues and ambition of his enemies; he next intreated the assembly to deliberate upon the means of terminating a contest, no less destructive to the happiness and prosperity of Germany than repugnant to the inclinations of the emperor; and concluded by exhorting them, as a necessary step toward permanent repose, to consent to the election of a king of the Romans. Marcheville also, who had lately assumed the character of plenipotentiary, exhorted the assembly in a

studied oration to put an end to the calamities of war; while the electors endeavoured by professions and flattery to appease the resentment of Ferdinand.*

The spirit displayed by some of the members, unworthy as it was of so glorious a cause, proved no less surprising than unexpected to Ferdinand, who flattered himself to meet with no opposition; but no sooner did he find that neither bribes nor promises could procure the election of his son than he altered his language, affecting to treat as seditious every allusion made to the ancient liberties of Germany, though the insolence of power was in some measure tempered by the dictates of prudence, a distinction being made in favour of those whose friendship it was important to conciliate.†

The emperor's intentions, however, were more plainly demonstrated in this assembly than at any former period of his government. Conceiving the moment to be at length arrived, when the long meditated blow might be struck with safety, a petition was presented by the catholic prelates, demanding the restitution of all the ecclesiastical benefices usurped from the church since the treaty of Passau. A measure, productive of so material a change in the relative situation of the rival communions, was calculated to produce the utmost consternation, or excite the warmest applause, according to the views and interests of the parties concerned. And we accordingly find, that it was immediately sanctioned by the approbation of the

* Schmidt, iv. 26. Barre, 573. Nani, vi. *Memoires de Louis Juliane*, 283. Galetti, i. 105.

† 1627. Barre, 573.

catholic princes, and no less strenuously resisted by the protestants. Ferdinand, however, no sooner perceived that he had miscalculated the influence of terror, than he ceased to press the demand, satisfied with obtaining a material advantage, in having submitted the proposal to the consideration of the diet, and resolved to resume it at some future period, when the spirit of opposition should be completely subdued.*

But as this could not be accomplished at present, he deemed it advisable to dismiss the assembly, lest any steps should be taken to limit his authority; since he clearly saw, that prudence and policy considerably outweighed the claims of gratitude in the breast of Maximilian; and further discovered, that there were certain concessions, for which the pliant timidity of the catholic prelates were as yet unprepared.†

Meanwhile the imperial generals had proceeded in an almost uninterrupted career of victory. Lubec and Bremen had been constrained to abandon the protestant party, the Electorate of Brandenburg was reduced to indigence by the devastations of Wallenstein; while Arnheim at the head of a powerful detachment, compelled the fortresses of Pomerania to receive Austrian garrisons.‡

Having driven Christian out of Germany, the active genius of Wallenstein was occupied in a plan for transporting his troops to Copenhagen. Even the want of a fleet was by no means an obstacle that appeared insuperable to his enterprizing courage; for

* Puffendorf, i. 51. Barre, 573. Schmidt, iv. 26. Lotichius, i. 499. Pfeffel, ii. 302. Galetti, i. 105.

† Barre, 573.

‡ 1627. Grimoard, 322.

he fondly persuaded himself, that the terror of his name would compel the cities of the Hanseatic confederacy to furnish shipping. A demand was accordingly made for transports, and certain commercial privileges were offered in return, provided they would in future confine their navigation to the Spanish and Austrian harbours. But the daring spirit of mercantile enterprize could neither be blinded by illusory hopes, nor checked by ambiguous menaces. Unfettered freedom is the soul of trade, and every legislative regulation, whether dictated by jealousy under the name of restriction, or inspired by avarice as an unnatural stimulative, argues narrowness of capacity, and a total misconception of the fundamental principles of all commercial speculations. Of this the northern merchants were so fully convinced, that they rejected the proposal upon the enlightened plea, that to a people whose prosperity depends upon their intercourse with foreign nations, war is the bitterest of all human calamities.*

This unsuspected disappointment, far from damping his passion for maritime renown, seems rather to have inflamed it with additional ardour. Not satisfied with possessing the uncontrolled direction of the imperial armies, he procured a patent from Vienna, appointing him Admiral of the Baltic. An empty title however was by no means calculated to content the ambition of Wallenstein, who deeming nothing too arduous for perseverance to accomplish, resolved upon creating a navy, and rendering the emperor no less formidable by sea than he had al-

* Harte's *Life of Gustavus Adolphus*, edit. in Oct. 1767, i. 96.—Puffendorf, i. 52.

ready made him on the continent. With indefatigable industry he directed his operations against the northern ports, and having reduced them to obedience, constructed docks, engaged by ample salaries the most experienced artificers, and turned all the energies of his active mind to naval architecture. The possession of Stralsund however appeared essential to the final completion of his extensive projects; as it would furnish him at once with a well provided arsenal, numerous vessels for transporting his troops, and immense magazines of provisions. Once master of that important place, he foresaw no impediments to the conquest of Denmark, and anticipated the glory to which he should attain, when the imperial flag floated triumphantly in the northern ocean.*

Alarmed at the danger with which he was threatened, should the Duke of Friedland be suffered to establish a formidable marine in the Baltic, the King of Denmark determined in secret to oppose the execution of a project so hostile to his future tranquillity; and he accordingly sent a Scottish regiment, commanded by Lord Rea, to the defence of Stralsund, assuring the inhabitants that all his forces, if necessary, should march to their relief. Aware of the difficulties attending a siege, Wallenstein had recourse to a stratagem, and sent directions to Arnheim to demand winter quarters for a part of his army; determined, if he once should be able to obtain admittance, never more to evacuate the city. But neither the character of the general, nor the behaviour of the troops, was calculated to inspire con-

* 1628. Puffendorf, i. 52. Harte, i. 96.

fidence. Suspecting his intentions, the magistrates declared that it was totally inconsistent with the privileges which they enjoyed to be burthened with the expense of a foreign garrison. This excuse being founded on ancient precedent, afforded no pretext for coercion, and Wallenstein therefore resolved if possible to exasperate the magistrates by petty annoyances, till some act of hostility on their part might afford a plausible excuse for attacking the city. Convinced that in the estimation of a mercantile people, loss of money is a misfortune inferior only to the loss of liberty, he demanded a heavy contribution. As the requisition might have been eluded under various pretexts, Wallenstein expected a refusal; but, contrary to his wishes, the money was paid: for these commercial politicians were too expert in calculation to question the policy of a temporary sacrifice for the attainment of permanent repose.*

No sacrifice however, except that of independence, could satisfy Friedland, and he accordingly had no sooner received the money than he ordered the city to be invested. Convinced that their preservation must depend entirely upon their own exertions, the inhabitants resolved to bury themselves underneath the ruins of their houses, rather than part with their freedom. Troops were not wanting to man the fortifications, and the magazines overflowed with provisions; but the most essential article was wanting for defence,—a sufficient stock of ammunition. A letter addressed to the Danzickers, announcing the deficiency, and requesting a supply, fell by accident into the hands of Gustavus

* Harte, i. 323. Grimoard, 323. Puffendorf, ii. 5. Loitchius, i. 559.

Adolphus, who immediately dispatched an abundant cargo.* This important present, accompanied with assurances of the generous interest which he must ever feel in their welfare, would have been sufficient to inspire the most timid with courage; but to a people predetermined vigorously to resist, it seemed at once to dispel their apprehensions. This noble resolution was speedily shewn in the reception given to the imperial forces, who rashly ventured on a general assault.†

Nothing indeed could be more absurd than an attempt to capture a strong maritime city, accessible only by a narrow causeway, without being able to blockade it by sea; but the obstinacy of Wallenstein augmented in proportion to the obstacles which he encountered. Finding that Arnheim made little progress, he imputed his failure to want of ability, and resolved in person to direct the opera-

* The letter which accompanied this valuable present is preserved by Lotichius, i. 560.—Suecorum Rex oc S. P. Q. Stralessunddensi. “Ex autographo vestro, ad Dantiscanos directo, nobisque e portu transmissio, intelleximus, vos hoc tempore periculi pleno masculam parare defensionem, sed rei tormentariæ, pulverisque nitrati, apparatu destitui. Intuitu igitur religionis, et libertatis, vestraeque erga nostrum inclinationis, intermittere non debuimus, quin et sympathiam nostram contestaremur, et quam aegrè nobis accidat, vos de libertate ac securitate vestra periclitari, declaremus. Mirari ergò subit, vos eos esse, ut cum finitimis et vicinis in consilium administrandis, hactenus nihil delibaretis. Quid enim salutaris, quam cum periculis nascentibus amicorum uti consiliis? Nihilominus, ut appareat, quam optimè vobis cupiamus, ecce! quantitatem desiderati pulveris pyrii submittimus. Plus enim pro tempore clargiri præsens non permisit expeditio nautica. Interim adhortamur vos, animum super libertatis, atque *evangelicæ religionis*, securitate vindicanda, semel commasculatum, deinceps constanti fortitudine tueamini. Nec dubium est Deum omnipotentem hos pios vestros conatus secundaturum esse. Si quacunque re libertatem vestram conservare possimus, credite, vobis ordine hoc petentibus, non de crimine. Valete. Dabantur apud classem nostram apud Landhantum, iii. Non. Mai. 1628.

† Grimoard, i. 342.

tions of the siege, swearing "that he would make himself master of the city, though it were suspended from heaven by a chain of adamant."*

He soon discovered, however, that it was less easy to accomplish the presumptuous threat than vanity had led him to anticipate. The energy of the inhabitants, and the gallantry of the garrison, defeated every attempt successively made by the persevering courage of the besiegers. Fearful, however, of trusting entirely to their own exertions, the government endeavoured to depreciate the resentment of the emperor by the most dutiful assurances of attachment; and as nothing could be more acceptable to imperial pride than a decent pretext to abandon an undertaking rendered hopeless by repeated repulses, he sent orders to Wallenstein to decamp. But it was no longer in the power of the Austrian court to regulate the actions of that imperious chieftain; the commands of his sovereign were not only treated by Friedland with contemptuous neglect, but the operations were pursued with renovated vigour, as if he had been desirous of proving to the astonished world that he acted independently of all control. The authority of Ferdinand he might defy with impunity, the lives of his soldiers he might waste with indifference, but the resistance of a people resolved to perish rather than to submit, it was not in his power to overcome. The Danish troops being diminished by continual fatigue, Christian advised the magistrates to apply to the King of Sweden. Ever ready to shelter the distressed, that magnanimous prince immediately sent a consider-

* Lotichius, 562. Puffendorf, ii. 6. Loccon. Hist. Suco. vii. 556.

able reinforcement to their assistance, by whose skill and bravery Wallenstein was compelled to abandon the enterprise, after having sustained very considerable losses.*

The check thus given to the imperial arms was of infinite importance to the northern powers, as it prevented Ferdinand from establishing a navy in the Baltic. Had the attempt proved successful, neither Denmark nor Sweden would have been any longer secure against the ambitious projects of Wallenstein; and the measures adopted for the protection of Stralsund clearly manifested that they were aware of the danger. While they acted in concert it was impossible for the emperor to extend his conquests beyond the coasts; but could any expedient be devised to secure the co-operation of Christian, sanguine hopes might be entertained of excluding Gustavus from ever interfering with German politics, and even of planting the Austrian eagle on the walls of Stockholm. Such, at least, was the plan which the Duke of Friedland conceived for his own aggrandisement, and which he artfully presented to the imperial court, as no less easy than glorious. The promises made by this extraordinary man, though they seemed to embrace impossibilities, had been so frequently realized, that even the most cautious of the Austrian ministers scarcely ventured any longer to oppose his designs. He accordingly experienced but little difficulty in persuading Ferdinand to enter into a negotiation with Denmark, and to invest him with authority for terminating the con-

* 1628. Lotichius, 564. Schiller, ii. According to the former, the loss of the imperial army amounted to upwards of ten thousand foot and twelve hundred horse.

test, without prescribing the conditions to be proposed.*

The power of Wallenstein depended so much upon the prolongation of hostilities, that at first sight it appears a little surprising to behold him the advocate of peace; for even supposing his influence at the imperial court to have been sufficient to procure the ratification of all the grants which had successively recompensed his military achievements, as Duke of Mecklenburg, he was still inferior in political consequence to many of the German potentates; whereas, while he remained at the head of the army, he exercised an authority, unrestrained by law, over all the northern circles. Nothing, however, could be farther from his intention than to lay down the office of dictator. His object was to change the theatre of contention, and not to extinguish the torch of discord. The fame of Gustavus had excited his jealousy, and he vainly flattered himself, by the conquest of Sweden, to give a lustre to his character more permanently splendid than had illuminated the actions of any general since Julius Cæsar; besides, with the acquisition of the duchy of Mecklenburg, his views had suddenly altered. Till he had obtained a seat among the sovereigns of Germany, it was his study to render the emperor despotic; but no sooner was his brow encircled with a ducal crown, than he began seriously to reflect that he was labouring to degrade an order which it was now become his interest to exalt.†

* Schiller, ii.

† According to Schmidt (iv. 27.) this opinion is conformable to a declaration made by himself in 1632, as appears from the following passage:

“Nec negaui ipse, cum die 18 Febr. anni 1632, in familiari colloquio

For the purpose of accomplishing those mighty projects, which he was generally supposed to have entertained, and which probably embraced the formation of an independent kingdom in the north, of which Mecklenburg was destined to become the centre, an alliance with Denmark was indispensable. The friendship of Christian was therefore to be secured by sacrificing the interests of Austria.* This supposition explains many parts of Wallenstein's conduct, which otherwise appear enigmatical; and we now discover a reason why, in the distribution of commissions, a preference was always given to protestants; why no Austrian subject was ever elevated above the rank of colonel; and why, in defiance of repeated orders from Vienna to reduce the army, he continued recruiting with increasing activity.†

Though it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty of Copenhagen, that neither Sweden nor Denmark should conclude a separate peace, the overtures of Wallenstein, for opening a negociation, were received by Christian with a degree of avidity, which plainly shewed that he would never hesitate at any sacrifice, which personal interest might recommend. Notwithstanding the opposition of England, France, Holland, and Sweden, who were unanimous in their endeavours to protract the war, a congress assembled at Lubec, from which the Swedish plenipotentiaries, who came expressly to intercede in fa-

cuidam viro principali Znoimæ narraret; uti sibi in consiliis aliquando fuerit, imperii monarchiam Cæsari acquirere, mutasse hanc mentem, dum Megalopolitanæ dux crearetur."—*Alberti Fridlandi perduellionis chaos, sive ingrati animi abyssus.* 1634.

* Schmidt, iv. 19.

† Ibid.

vour of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, were dismissed by Wallenstein with studied marks of contempt: the unlimited power entrusted by the emperor to his general was employed by the latter for the advancement of his own private concerns. All the conquests made by the imperial arms were restored to Denmark, upon condition that she engaged never more to interfere with the affairs of Germany, though, as Duke of Holstein, Christian was materially interested in almost every transaction. He was likewise compelled to renounce all claims to the disposal of certain bishoprics, the patronage of which had belonged to his family ever since the abolition of popery; and was further called upon to pay to Austria a considerable sum, by way of indemnification; but the most degrading concession was his consenting to abandon the Dukes of Mecklenburg, who had taken up arms at his instigation, and whom he scandalously deserted in their distress. At the intercession of Wallenstein he was spared the humiliation of expressly agreeing to their deposition, their names being purposely omitted in the treaty, though, by a leading article, the title of Maximilian to the electoral dignity was recognized. Thus, by the sacrifice of every principle that ought to be most precious to the heart of man, and most sacred in the eyes of a sovereign, did Christian regain possession of his continental dominions; the claims of the emperor to certain bailiwics, which were considered in the light of imperial fiefs, being reserved for future discussion. Nothing, however, could induce him to consent to the proposal of furnishing a squadron to act in concert with the Austrian fleet, under pretence of securing the free navigation of the Baltic. But it is highly probable, that

this requisition was never seriously made, and was inserted solely to persuade the world, that there were degradations to which the spirit of the humbled Dane was too haughty to submit.*

Peace had been concluded in direct opposition to the wishes of Richelieu, who had no sooner succeeded in reducing Rochelle, than he directed all the energy of his active mind against the overgrown power of Austria. The daring projects of that enterprising minister being conceived with an extent of genius too vast to be embraced by vulgar understandings, his plans, when submitted to the examination of the council, were treated by his colleagues as chimerical. "The despotic authority now exercised by Ferdinand over the whole of Germany, placed at his disposal a mass of power, against which it would be madness to contend." Such were the objections raised by Cardinal Berulle and Marillac,† to alarm the timidity of Louis, and to conceal their real designs. But, in spite of their artifices, the weakness of their arguments was too apparent to escape even the limited penetration of the king, when they proceeded to defend, in the language of bigotry, the conduct of the emperor toward the protestants. "The intention of that great and enlightened prince," they unblushingly argued, "did equal honour to his zeal and discernment. He fought in defence of the orthodox faith, and aimed only to rescue from the grasp

* 1629. Puffendorf, i. 54. Harte, i. 101. Grimoard, i. 377. Schmidt, iv. 28.

† Marillac was keeper of the seals, and so great a favourite with Mary of Medici, that he was in hopes of undermining the power of Richelieu. Le Vassor, viii. 1.

of heretics, domains, which had been consecrated by pious Christians to its glory. With what colour of justice, therefore, could a Christian monarch oppose a measure so advantageous to the common interests of Christendom? Instead of rashly attempting to obstruct the progress of Ferdinand, it would be far more consistent with the dictates of religion to second the meritorious undertaking; and, instead of wantonly engaging in a doubtful contest, to secure and merit the admiration of mankind by extirpating heresy in his own dominions."

These insinuations were exactly calculated for the weak understanding of Louis, and were regarded by his mother with as profound a veneration as if they had been communicated directly from heaven. Her political attachments being now in perfect unison with her religious prejudices, she endeavoured to persuade her bigoted son, that by acting in concert with the imperial and Spanish courts, he would forward the designs of the Almighty.*

Fortunately, however, for the prosperity of France, the ascendancy of Richelieu was too permanently established to be shaken by folly or faction. Confiding in the superiority of an enlightened genius, he bid defiance to their clandestine attacks, resolved by his actions to merit the dignity to which his ambition aspired. No minister ever formed a more magnificent plan, or executed it with greater ability. While to the generality of mankind the colossal power of Austria appeared

* Le Vassor, viii. 3.

erected on a basis too solid even for the united efforts of Europe to overthrow, he plainly discerned its inherent defects, and secretly determined, with the assistance of Sweden, to subvert it. The other members of the administration regarded Maximilian as inseparably bound to the interests of Austria by the ties of gratitude; but he, appreciating the feelings of the human heart with the acuteness of a man deeply versed in worldly intrigue, was fully aware, that in elevated minds ambition keeps pace with power, and that envy towards those in more exalted stations usually operates as a stronger stimulus than the sense of past obligation. For these reasons he did not despair of seducing the Duke of Bavaria, and even the venal piety of the ecclesiastic electors, from their present connexion with the imperial court, as they had already shewn some striking symptoms of alienation. Neither were his fears excited by the apprehension of danger on the side of the Pyrenees; for he knew that the finances of Spain, though actually possessing all the treasures of Mexico and Peru, were in a state of embarrassment, which precluded the possibility of her furnishing subsidies to the emperor.* As a prelude, therefore, to more important enterprises, he persuaded Louis to declare himself the protector of the Duke of Mantua.

Vincent II. Duke of Mantua, being no longer able to cherish the hope of transmitting his crown to a legitimate heir, married his niece to the Duke of Rhetolois, eldest son of Charles Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers; and, in consequence of this union, de-

* Le Vassor, viii. 5. Exclusively of the marriage Nevers was the nearest in blood.—Nani, vii.

clared the latter, by a public act, successor to all his dominions. After the death of Vincent,* who did not long survive the ceremony, Nevers repaired to Italy, to receive the homage of his new subjects. But scarcely was the pomp of inauguration finished, than his title was disputed by various competitors. The aspiring soul of Olivares beheld with regret so fertile a province in the hands of a prince inviolably devoted to France. The Duke of Savoy, frustrated in his expectations of establishing an antiquated claim to Montferrat, by uniting his son with the destined heiress of Vincent, beheld with indignation the important prize transferred to a more fortunate rival. Cæsar, Duke of Guastalla, collaterally descended from the ducal stock, asserted an hereditary title, though he depended less upon the regular transmission of blood than upon the interested protection of Austria. Contenting themselves with dismembering from the plundered duchy whatever best suited their convenience, the courts of Madrid and Turin espoused the cause of Cæsar, because they were persuaded that inherent weakness would prevent him from reclaiming their usurpations; and they accordingly prevailed on Ferdinand to confer upon him the investiture of Mantua, in quality of a fief of the empire.†

This being regarded as the signal for hostilities, the Duke of Savoy entered Montferrat with a force too numerous to be resisted, while the Spaniards

* According to Nani, the dispensation did not arrive from Rome till the duke was in the agonies of death; but the ceremony was performed the moment he had breathed his last, with necessary, perhaps, but indecent haste, vii.

† Nani *Historia Veneta*, vii. Barre, ix. 582. Bougeant, i. 135.

laid siege to Casale, a strong fortress, entrusted to the valour of a French garrison, as the defence of his capital was more than sufficient for the contracted resources of Nevers. By the vigour of his measures, however, he endeavoured to compensate for the paucity of his means. An imperial commissary, deputed to sequester the contested states till the rights of inheritance could be decided, was refused admission into Mantua. Troops were levied with unabating activity, and every castle, capable of arresting the progress of the invaders, was immediately furnished with troops and provisions. From the Venetians, whose interests were connected with his own, Nevers received considerable reinforcements, and was even permitted by Louis to enrol his subjects, though he refused to interfere more openly in his favour till after the fall of Rochelle.*

The policy, if not the compassion, of the papal court was deeply interested in preventing Italy from becoming the theatre of war; yet, notwithstanding every effort to promote an accommodation the ambition of Spain proved inexorable. The siege of Casale was pressed with so much vigour, that it was difficult even for the heroical resistance of the garrison to protract its fall, till Louis had leisure to assemble troops for its relief. No sooner had he planted the royal standard on the walls of Rochelle, than believing himself formed for military renown, and anxious to emulate his father's glory, he resolved to cross the Alps at the head of an army strong enough to dictate laws to Italy. This

* Bougeant, i. 135.—Nani draws a striking picture of the timidity and indecision of his countrymen, in the beginning of the seventh book of his valuable history.

project was no sooner embraced than it was carried into execution with a celerity, which proved that the resources of France were no longer crippled by venality, indecision, or bigotry. Before the duke was aware that Louis had quitted his capital, he had actually entered the defiles of Savoy, and was advancing towards Turin by hasty marches. The forces stationed to guard the important pass of Susa were instantaneously dispersed, upon which Charles Emanuel hastened to conclude a separate peace as the only means of preserving his capital.*

The approach of the French compelled the besiegers to abandon Casale. Reduced by the perfidy of Charles Emanuel to a situation of imminent danger, the Spaniards felt happy to avail themselves of the stipulation inserted in the treaty, at the express desire of their treacherous friend, who hoped to cover the turpitude of his secession by procuring for them a safe retreat. But they were too well acquainted with his real character to attribute this precaution to generosity; on the contrary, they knew that a rejection of the terms would gratify his insatiable ambition, which would catch with avidity at any pretext to indemnify himself

* 1629. The following conditions were dictated by the victorious cardinal, "that the Duke of Savoy should grant a free passage to the French army, and furnish provisions and military stores for the relief of Casale; that, as an additional security, the citadel of Susa (an impregnable fortress) should be delivered into the hands of Louis, upon his undertaking to procure from the Duke of Mantua the cession of Trino to Charles Emanuel, by way of compensation for the loss of Montferrat, and to guarantee the integrity of his other dominions; this latter article, however, was subject to the condition of his joining the League for preserving the independence of Italy."—Dumont Corps Diplom. v. 2d partie, 571.

for his recent disappointment, even at the expense of a plundered ally.*

In subscribing the conditions imposed by Richelieu, Charles Emanuel with premeditated duplicity resolved not to observe them a moment longer than he was compelled by necessity to be honest. Fatigued with the monotonous regularity of a camp, Louis had no sooner signed the treaty than he panted after the pleasures of Paris; desirous of appearing in the midst of a delighted capital, surrounded with all the emblems of victory. Scarcely had he reached the banks of the Seine, when he was suddenly roused from the enchanting dream by the important intelligence, that a formidable army, commanded by Colalto, a veteran officer, was advancing to vindicate the authority of Ferdinand: while Spinola, at the head of the Spanish forces, was preparing to resume the siege of Casale. Neither could it be doubted that the Duke of Savoy must henceforth be added to the hostile list, since interest and resentment alike conduced to render him unfaithful to his recent engagements.†

The active genius of Richelieu, incensed at being overreached by Italian duplicity, was not to be intimidated by difficulties. Resolved to recover the ascendancy of France, yet anxious if possible to postpone the conflict till he could meet it with greater effect, he determined not to unsheath the sword till he tried the result of a negociation. Perceiving however that nothing could be obtained from the fears or the moderation of the imperial

* Le Vassor, viii. 89. Nani, vii.

† Bougeant, i. 137. Le Vassor, viii. 241. Grimoard, i. 388.

cabinet, he prepared for open hostilities. In spite of his energy, Casale was invested before he could march to its defence, and Mantua taken by assault. The fertile banks of the Po, laid waste by the ravages of a licentious soldiery, rendered the name of Ferdinand no less hateful in Italy than it was become in Germany by the exactions of Wallenstein. The consternation was general, and every petty state from the Alps to Calabria, anticipating a destiny severe as that, which the haughty conqueror of Christian continued to inflict upon the miserable victims of his ambition, called down curses on the head of their oppressor; even the Roman conclave, sacrificing pride, and ambition, and jealousy to fear, is supposed to have offered up a silent prayer for the success of the protestant arms.*

Meanwhile the negotiations of Charnace, charged with an important mission to the German courts, were conducted with various success. To separate Maximilian from the Austrian interest was the leading object of his endeavours. Though evidently jealous of the power of Ferdinand, the prudent elector still hesitated to accept the proposals of Louis. "What security," he asked, "could possibly remain for the members of the Catholic League, in case the protestants should ultimately triumph?" To this question no answer could be returned likely to remove the apprehensions of Maximilian. For nothing was more evident than that the re-establishment of the Palatine would be the necessary consequence of victory.† The policy of Ferdinand,

* Schiller, ii.

† Le Vassor, viii. 123.

in dismembering the territories of that unfortunate prince, became now more apparent than ever; because, by dividing the spoils among the strenuous supporters of the catholic church, he secured their co-operation, and chained them indissolubly to his triumphant car by the adamantine fetters of interest.

Yet indifferent as they seemed to every consideration, except that of personal aggrandisement, it was impossible even for the warmest partisans of the Vatican to deny, that the authority of the emperor was rapidly attaining that tremendous height, when it might bid defiance to all legal restraint; and when the electors themselves, degraded from the rank of independent sovereigns, would be reduced to a level with the Spanish grandees. The penetration of Maximilian had long beheld the approaching danger with dismay, and the remedy which he applied affords a convincing proof of his sagacity. Anticipating the ruin which must necessarily result to the catholic cause, should Ferdinand be compelled to disarm, he secretly determined to oppose the execution of such a proposal, should it be brought forward as was expected at the approaching diet. He resolved however to set bounds to his despotism by depriving him of the services of the only man, in whose hands that despotism was truly formidable. If Wallenstein were removed, he flattered himself that the command of the imperial troops would of course devolve on himself: but when the resentment of Austria, and the caution of Spain raised an insuperable barrier to his wishes, he conducted his plan with such consummate address that he procured it for Tilly, on whose fidelity he could confidently rely. His

management respecting the election of a king of the Romans was equally skilful. Too wise to embark in a chimerical contest for the imperial sceptre, though repeatedly solicited by France, he confined his ambition to attainable objects. Dreaded alike by Austria and Spain, whose interest he had repeatedly immolated to his own; and respected by the enlightened minister of France, who admired the wisdom which penetrated and defeated his own aspiring projects, Maximilian steered his course with so much dexterity, that he not only preserved the electoral dignity during his life, but even transmitted it to his posterity.*

Charnace's instructions respecting his conduct at Munich were chiefly directed to the following points: to endeavour to inspire the elector with pacific sentiments towards Denmark, and the other members of the protestant union; to prevent him from taking an active part in the Italian war; and lastly, to strive by every expedient to excite his jealousy against Austria. With this view he was instructed to urge the impolicy of his sacrificing his interests to ideas of friendship, which became ridiculous, when they were no longer reciprocal; and if possible to persuade him, that his further elevation was totally inconsistent with that narrow policy which ever influenced the sister cabinets of Madrid and Vienna; both of which would behold with equal suspicion the aggrandisement of a prince, who alone among the members of the

* He is called by Nani, "principe di profondissimi sensi, è che sopra ogn' altro hà saputo cavare dà comuni interessi privati vantaggi, col mercantare il tempo, è maneggiare la fortuna." iv.

Germanic constitution possessed talents and popularity capable of disputing the imperial diadem.*

An intimate alliance with France was artfully suggested as necessary for the attainment of that elevated dignity, and a plan traced to facilitate the execution. The Bavarian ministers however were so blindly devoted to the imperial court, that they received the offer with studied indifference, assuming in their intercourse a distant reserve, more suited to the suspicious character of a spy, than to the accredited agent of a regular government.

By patience and perseverance, however, Char-nace at length obtained an audience of Maximilian. More thoroughly acquainted with his real interests than any of those whom he employed, that sagacious prince seized, with the intuitive glance of a statesman, all the different bearings of the project. He readily admitted that the Duke of Mantua was unjustly persecuted, and promised never to contribute to his overthrow. Evading the question of the imperial crown, he confined himself entirely to general assurances of grateful acknowledgment for the flattering offer; but declined to enter into any unnecessary discussion, respecting peace, as a negotiation was actually pending at Lubec. Disdaining, however, to disguise his intentions in the event of an unfavourable issue, he plainly signified, that he should consider himself inviolably bound to support the emperor, so long as the interests of religion were concerned. Though the result of the interview was by no means so favourable as the mi-

* Le Vassor, viii. 125.

nister of Louis could have desired, yet it was easy to discover, from the general tenor of Maximilian's conversation, that he was by no means satisfied with the behaviour of Ferdinand. Of Spain he spoke in less ambiguous language, complaining, that his projects were constantly thwarted by the intrigues and jealousy of Olivares. But when he mentioned Wallenstein, it was impossible for him to restrain his indignation; but giving way to the natural warmth of his temper, he expatiated upon his rapacity, his arrogance, and his cruelty, in terms of bitter reproach. The elector's discourse was evidently studied; yet, with all his dissimulation, he could not so entirely suppress his feelings, as to conceal from Charnace, that interest and ambition were the reigning passions of his soul, and that to the gratification of these, every other consideration, except that of religion, would be readily sacrificed.*

Convinced that it was impracticable under existing circumstances to shake Maximilian's resolution, Charnace departed for Lubec, determined to try if bribes or promises could prevent the conclusion of peace. The reader is already apprised, that all his endeavours proved abortive. The total indifference hitherto manifested by the Parisian court, for the distress of the German protestants, and the persecution experienced by their brethren in France, were little calculated to excite the confidence of Christian, who plainly discerned, that it was the voice of interest, and not of compassion, that pleaded with Richelieu in his favour.†

* 1629. Le Vassor, viii. 125.

† Ibid. 128.

CHAP. VIII.

Situation of Austria extremely favourable to the establishment of peace.

Presumption of Ferdinand in losing the opportunity. The unsettled state of Europe calculated to excite his aspiring hopes. His despotic treatment of the hereditary states, and particularly of Bohemia. He forms plans for the extirpation of the protestant faith, and for recovering the secularized property. He publishes the edict of restitution.—Jealousy excited by the preponderance of Austria, even among the catholic states.—Views and conduct of the Duke of Bavaria.—Meeting of the catholics at Heidelberg; they demand a diet for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to Germany.—Wallenstein besieges Magdeburg. Gustavus Adolphus undertakes its defence, though engaged in a war with Poland. His domestic improvements, and military discipline.—Remarks upon the general system of war, and the customs and prejudices of the age.

FERDINAND had now, for the second time, an opportunity of restoring tranquillity to Germany, as nothing could have been easier, had he seriously desired it, than to have extended the treaty concluded with Denmark to all protestant powers. By indulging the wishes of a suffering people, almost driven to despair by the licentiousness and rapacity of his soldiers, he might still have recovered their affections, and endeared his name to posterity. Such also was the situation in which victory had placed him, that every concession would have been accepted with gratitude, and placed to the account of benevolence; for so hopeless was the condition to which his enemies were reduced, that nothing could have been imputed to apprehension.

It has been urged by his partisans, that at this momentous crisis, he was constrained to act in di-

rect contradiction to his own inclination by the importunate zeal of the catholics. Their pretensions were unquestionably great; but it is probable they would have been satisfied with the permanent ascendancy obtained in the electoral college, had they been once convinced that he entertained no views of personal aggrandizement to the prejudice of the Germanic constitution, but was actuated solely by a disinterested attachment to the papal religion. The unvarying prosperity, however, which had hitherto crowned all the measures of his reign, and which he presumptuously attributed to his fierce exertions in favour of Rome; the almost implicit obedience attending his edicts; the arrogance of the Jesuits, who aspired to exercise unlimited authority in Saxony; and the intemperate councils of the Spanish court, weak enough to believe that the long expected hour was at length arrived, when the heretical tenets of Luther and Calvin would cease to pollute the orthodox purity of the Christian church; inspired him with an excess of pride and temerity, which led him to think, that no human efforts could any longer resist his gigantic power, or set bounds to the flight of his victorious eagle.*

It is difficult to determine with critical precision the exact extent of his ambitious designs, because no specific documents exist to substantiate them; but it may fairly be inferred from the conversation of those most intimately acquainted with his plans, as well as from the general tenor of his own actions, that he seriously intended by the aid of the ca-

* 1629. Puffendorf, ii. 56. Schiller, ii. Coxe, i. 813.

tholics to extirpate the protestant faith, and afterwards to render his own authority superior to all legal restrictions.*

Supposing this to have been really the object in view, the moment for undertaking it was judiciously selected, because all the powers, whose policy might have imposed an effective barrier to his wishes, were either engaged in foreign hostilities, or convulsed by domestic dissensions. France, the most formidable of all his enemies, was not only involved in a contest with Spain respecting the Mantuan succession, and in a maritime war with England, but had much to fear from the resentment and jealousy of the Hugonots. Charles I. by repeated acts of duplicity, and an open invasion of the British constitution, had already awakened the suspicions of a people, who alone among the nations of the modern world understood the value of freedom. Engaged in a struggle against his subjects for the extension of the royal prerogative, and in hostilities with France and Spain, he had little leisure to attend to the affairs of Germany. The protection of their liberties against the secret machinations of Austria and Spain engrossed the attention of the Dutch; while the internal commotions, which gradually ruined the Ottoman power, secured Vienna against the restless ambition of her most formidable adversary. Bethlem Gabor was no longer capable of inspiring terror. The period assigned by Providence to his turbulent career was rapidly approaching, and all that he coveted was to be allowed to pass the scanty

* Puffendorf, ii. 56. Schiller, ii. Coxe, i. 813.

remnant in repose. The presumption of Denmark had been covered with disgrace; and the valour of Gustavus Adolphus, as yet confined to a distant theatre, when the resources of Sweden were fairly estimated, had little to alarm the mighty monarch of Austria.*

Persuaded that the disjointed system of Europe was peculiarly adapted for the completion of his favourite project, Ferdinand resolved no longer to delay the destruction of a religion which he hated with all the inveterate rancour of a Jesuit. Could he accomplish an undertaking, to the attainment of which the gigantic power of Charles V. had proved inadequate, he doubted not that his name would hereafter figure with those of Dominic and Ignatius in the Roman calendar. The event of the experiment in the hereditary states was calculated to invite his intemperance to proceed. Hungary alone had been exempted from the general proscription, not through clemency, or reverence for the sacred obligation of an oath, but from fear of Gabor, and the Ottoman cohorts.

Equally indifferent to the claims of justice, and the feelings of humanity, he forcibly abolished the reformed religion in Austria, though legally established by an edict of Maximilian, and sanctioned by his own approbation. Proceeding with the unbridled ardour of a fanatic in the career of tyranny, he prohibited the use of all Lutheran books under the severest penalties; annulled the religious ceremonies of marriage and baptism, unless performed by a catholic priest; and commanded all persons of

* Coxæ, i. 814. Nani, vii.

every description either to abandon his dominions, or to conform to the pontifical ritual.*

Bohemia was treated with still greater severity; for, as he no longer dreaded the spirit of a people broken down by oppression, he gave unbounded scope to his national violence, revenging with relentless cruelty the insult formerly offered to his authority, under pretence of vindicating the honour of the Almighty. Though three-fourths of the inhabitants were sincerely attached to the Lutheran tenets, he published an edict forbidding the public profession of any form of worship except that of the Vatican; ejecting the Protestants from the schools and universities, and replacing them by mendicant friars, indiscriminately chosen for that important office, not on account of their learning, but of their religious opinions. No persons, except those of orthodox tenets, were permitted to exercise any trade or manufactory; heavy fines were imposed on all who presumed, even in domestic retirement, to address their Creator in the language of the heart; marriages were declared invalid, unless they had been solemnized according to the pompous ceremonial of Rome; even the wills of protestants were no longer binding in the tribunals of Austria. With a barbarity, characteristic of bigotry alone, he deprived sickness and age of those asylums which charity had erected for their solace, unless admission was purchased by apostacy. From the towns and cities the burghers were expelled, unless they renounced the worship of their fathers. Even the remotest hamlets were not exempt from persecution, but were

* 1629. Puffendorf, i. 57. Harte, i. 102.

exposed to the visits of itinerant friars, commissioned to scrutinize the opinions of the inhabitants with inquisitorial severity; and if they found them polluted with the smallest stain, the offence was expiated by capital punishment. A military force, sufficient to impress the most courageous with awe, attended this bloody tribunal, whose natural ferocity receiving an additional stimulus from the savage zeal of their coadjutors, exposed the wretched peasantry to every calamity that fanaticism or licentiousness could inflict. Some were murdered in their houses with deliberate cruelty, after beholding the violation of their wives and daughters; others, pursued into the woods and mountains, like beasts of prey, were compelled to receive the mystic symbol of charity and faith under a form abhorrent to their souls, amid the insults and mockery of their persecutors.* To sum up his vengeance in one sweeping act of proscription, a period was fixed, at the expiration of which all persons, who refused to return within the pale of the church, were banished for ever from Bohemia. By this decree, no less remarkable for its impolicy than its injustice, thirty thousand families were driven into exile; and, as in this number many were included conspicuous for the acquirements of knowledge, the talents of industry, and the gifts of fortune, a wound was inflicted on that devoted kingdom, from which it never recovered.†

The picture drawn by a Catholic historian,‡ of the wretched situation to which his native country

* Coxe, i. 814.

† Pebrel, 739.

‡ Pebrel wrote at a time when all party-feelings were extinguished.

was reduced by the intolerance of Ferdinand, is highly deserving of attention, since he can hardly be suspected of exaggerating the defects of the most strenuous champion of the church. "The pages of history," observes that candid writer, "scarcely furnish an instance of a change so rapid in the prosperity of a nation, as that which Bohemia underwent during the reign of Ferdinand II. At that monarch's accession, with the exception of a few of the principal nobility, and an inconsiderable number of friars, the whole of the population was protestant; at his death, it was all, at least in appearance, catholic. Previously to the fatal battle of Prague, the states enjoyed privileges no less ample than those of the English parliament, imposing taxes, enacting laws, confirming or rejecting treaties, and even electing a successor to the vacant throne. But these valuable rights all perished together in one general wreck; and with them vanished the warlike character of the Bohemians. Till that disastrous era they were universally celebrated for military talents, an ardour for glory bordering upon enthusiasm, and for a contempt of death, when life was incompatible with honour. But the spirit of enterprise is for ever extinguished; kindled by national pride, it expired with the last spark of freedom. Individuals indeed were still conspicuous for personal prowess, and sometimes even attained to high military commands; but as the waters of the Moldau, when united with the Elbe, no longer retain their original name, so they were lost and forgotten amid the triumphs of Austria. The national language, like the national character, sunk into contempt, and was replaced by the German in the pulpit, the forum, and even

in the common intercourse of society. Persons of rank, and even the industrious class of mechanics, grew ashamed of their mother tongue, which was no longer employed except by the peasantry in unfrequented districts—a mark of vulgar obscurity. The arts and sciences, which embellished and enriched the capital in the days of Rodolph, fell also into decay; so that for many years not a single man appeared in Bohemia eminent in any branch of literature. Placed under the direction of the Jesuits, the universities afforded no inducements for application, nor propounded any questions for public discussion except on theological subtleties; and, by an express injunction from Rome, no academical honours were any longer conferred, however great the merit of the student.”

“Of all the monastic orders, the Jesuits were undoubtedly the best informed, but they were, also, the most artful and intolerant. Convinced, from experience, that an enlightened people will never long continue subservient to the caprice of a tyrant, they resolved to extinguish every spark of science, that they might trample with impunity on unresisting idiots.* With this view they deputed a certain number of their fraternity to make domiciliary visits in every town and village, for the purpose of inspecting books, and with positive directions to destroy or carry away every work that might nourish

* This fact alone would serve to ascertain that Ferdinand was a tyrant by theory. He had deeply studied the code of despotism, and knew that nothing is so dangerous to absolute power as instruction. Lotichius vainly endeavours (i. 620) to defend him, under pretence that the Bohemians had behaved with equal violence toward the catholics. “In templá, exercitia, officiaque catholicorum *Procerum* injecerunt manus, etiamque *patres societatis* (a heinous offence) sub indicto æterno exilio, e regno ac provinciis amoverunt.”

the Lutheran faith or cherish the flame of liberty. Under this denomination of course were included all the precious treasures of antiquity, because they breathed a spirit too pure to be trusted in the hands of men destined to slavery. Not an author was left, which in an age of refinement would be ever referred to by a man of taste, or be even found in a well-chosen library. Even the ancient annals of the nation were sedulously concealed from the descendants of those who had illumined their country by their courage or their genius. So complete was the exclusion, and so rigid the punishment inflicted on the smallest transgression, that the writings of the learned and patriotic Balbinus on Bohemian literature, could not be published with safety, till after the suppression of the order.*

A prince, mad enough to sacrifice the prosperity of his own subjects at the shrine of superstition, wanted not inducements to pursue the same destructive system, when it could be attempted at the expense of others. Hence little doubt was entertained that the moment he thought it could be undertaken with safety, he would annihilate the remnant of Germanic independence, which was still permitted to exist. Yet possessing a capacity to appreciate the feelings of indignant patriotism, he was aware of the obstacles which were likely to arise, should he venture by one bold act of authority to overturn the ancient constitution. He therefore determined to proceed with caution, gradually undermining the venerable edifice, till the moment should arrive when the spirit of the catholics being completely

* Pebrel, 288.

subdued, the decisive blow might be given. Acting by the advice and with the assistance of the Jesuits, those systematical foes to every liberal sentiment, he conducted his measures with such address and perseverance, that the extinction of freedom seemed inevitable.

The reader may recollect, that during the diet at Mulhausen a proposal was made for compelling the restitution of all such ecclesiastical property secularized since the treaty of Passau. The equity of this claim having been admitted by the majority, the question was suffered to rest, because the difficulty of the undertaking at that time appeared to be insuperable. Not a prince had abandoned the religion of Rome, who was not personally interested to oppose it, as they all derived a considerable accession both of power and wealth, from the plunder of the episcopal and abbacial revenues.

It cannot be denied that by the "religious peace" many points of the highest importance were left undecided, on account of the impediments which arose in adjusting them. But uninterrupted possession for more than half a century, the silent acquiescence of successive emperors from the time of Charles V. and lastly the permission formally accorded to all the princes of the empire, to establish within their respective states whatever communion they might prefer (a concession which of course would have been rendered nugatory without the privilege of appropriating the benefices of the church), seemed to confer a right, which could not be infringed without the most flagrant violation of justice. Neither was the immediate loss of revenue and consequence the only misfortune to be apprehended; on the contrary, their weight as a political

body must be greatly impaired by the prodigious accession of strength which their opponents would derive from the votes attached to the bishoprics and abbeys about to revert to the catholic prelates. Aware of the obstacles against which he must contend, should his projects at once be disclosed, Ferdinand resolved to proceed with the utmost caution, and prudently to withhold the fatal blow, till he was morally certain not to strike ineffectually. The execution of the scheme was however unexpectedly hastened by the presumption of victory, the ardour of the Jesuits, and the assurance of support from the Catholic League, in case of resistance to the decree.*

Respecting the expediency of the measure there seems to have existed no variety of opinion in the Austrian cabinet, though there was much with regard to the manner of its execution. By some of the members it was proposed to begin with the greatest circumspection, confining the attack to the weaker states, as the venality of the electors was calculated to inspire a well-founded expectation, that if they were left for the present in the uninterrupted enjoyment of their usurpations, they would behold with indifference the ruin of their inferiors. Others recommended the adoption of judicial forms, by allowing the sufferers to present their complaints before the different tribunals of the empire. This mode of proceeding appeared most consonant to the principles established in all

* Sarrasin, 82. Puffendorf, i. 57. Schmidt, iv. 28.—Lotichius as usual defends the emperor, and attributes his conduct to any motive rather than to inclination. But in a country where ministers are not accountable to the nation for the advice they give, the responsibility must of course attach to the sovereign.

forensic disputes, and subject of course to fewer inconveniencies. By the gradual operation of this artful system, the ecclesiastical property would in a few years be recovered without exciting any violent emotion, and an opportunity afforded to the emperor, by suspending the suit, or retarding the decision, to favour those whom interest might prompt him to conciliate.*

The zeal of the bigots however could not be satisfied with any measure short of unqualified proscription; and the pride of Ferdinand being in unison with their wishes, the fatal edict appeared.† Previously to its publication it had been sanctioned by their approbation. In a long and studied preamble, Ferdinand, in virtue of the imperial authority, assumed the privilege of expounding all the controverted articles of the religious peace, thus constituting himself the sole judge and arbitrator between the contending parties. This prerogative, according to the opinion of the courtly civilians, was derived from the practice of former times, and various precedents were produced to establish it.‡

Nothing certainly could be more preposterous than such a pretension, which if once acknowledged, would invest the emperor with the power of deciding a cause, in which he was too deeply interested to act impartially. But his zeal or rapacity could no longer be restrained by the dictates of prudence.§ Impelled by the natural impetuosity

* Puffendorf, i. 57. Le Vassor, viii. 133. † 1629. Lotichius, i. 623.

‡ I wonder whether any measure, however repugnant to sense or justice, could be instituted by a sovereign in any country, for which the ingenuity of a minister would be capable to produce a precedent.

§ The following passage from Caraffa will serve to shew the opinion entertained by the court of Rome respecting the edict. "Quare sua majes-

of his temper, and the intemperate counsels of Spain, he issued a decree, declaring "every confiscation of ecclesiastical property, made subsequently to the treaty of Passau, to be contrary to the spirit of that convention, and consequently destitute of all legal validity." The secular occupants were commanded to restore the domains which they had seized with impious profanation; and commissioners were appointed to carry the edict into immediate execution. By an additional article, all catholic princes, or great landed proprietors, were authorized to banish their subjects or vassals, unless they embraced the papal religion. It was further enacted, that the privileges accorded by the peace of Passau, extended only to the adherents to the confession of Augsburg; by which artful interpretation the Calvinists were exposed to the penalties of heresy.*

According to this iniquitous decision, every illegal possessor of an ecclesiastical benefice, and consequently every secular occupant was called upon to surrender it into the hands of the Austrian commissary, under pain of the imperial ban. So severe an injunction could not fail to create universal consternation throughout all the protestant states, as they plainly foresaw, that this fatal blow

tas ipsos electores imperii consulere voluit, an ea, quæ meritò exigebantur, nunc tandem defunctis tot bellis, deberent restitui. Neque enim de causæ justitia quæstio erat, sed de executione, quam sua majestas absque electorum judicio, ac voto, solus noluit, contra plurimorum mentem aggredi illo tempore." 311. Little doubt can be entertained that the legate spoke the fashionable language of the Vatican.

* "Il ne faut pas douter (says pere Bougeant, i. 145) "que le zele de la religion n'eut part a ce dessein." This is evidently the observation of a bigot, who views the actions of statesmen through an inverted glass. Such folly would be hardly excusable in a monk; but what could be alleged in defence of a minister who should act on similar principles?

to freedom of conscience, was intended as a prelude to the total subversion of the Germanic constitution. Neither was the immediate loss an object of indifference, since it comprehended no less than two archiepiscopal and twelve episcopal sees, besides many abbeys and monasteries.*

To an ordonance enforced by the army of Wallenstein what hope of resistance remained? The Elector of Saxony too late discovered the fatal error which avarice had tempted him to commit. Exposed to the reproaches of the friends whom he had betrayed, he had nothing to offer in his excuse, but felt with all the bitterness of conscious shame the sting of merited reproof. Proud and presumptuous in the exercise of injustice, and resolutely determined that nothing should be wanting to aggravate the humiliation of those he despoiled, Ferdinand selected Augsburg for the commencement of the prosecution, because it was the cradle of protestantism. The reformed religion was prohibited in the city, where it first assumed a political form; the bishop being reinstated in all his prerogatives.† In Lower Saxony the house of Brunswick was deprived of the episcopal revenues of Hildersheim; at Magdeburg and Halberstadt the protestant priests were constrained to relinquish their prebends; and the archbishopric of Bremen by a pontifical decree was added to the enormous list of preferment already lavished upon the Austrian family. The same iniquitous system was pursued

* The archbishoprics of Bremen and Magdeburg, and the bishoprics of Minden, Halberstadt, Osnaburg, Verden, Lubec, Ratzburg, Meissen, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, and Camin.—Bougeant, i. 146.

† Ut insultatio foret manifestior ab Augustane urbe initium fit.—Puffendorf, i. 58.

in Franconia, Westphalia, and Suabia, where the protestants were ejected from every benefice.*

This forcible resumption of ecclesiastical property was universally regarded as a preparatory step to the total suppression of the reformed religion. But at the moment when the tempest appeared ready to burst over the devoted heads of the protestants, their ruin was averted by the jealousy of those at whose instigation the edict had been issued. The enormous power and pretensions of the imperial court at length excited the apprehensions of the catholics, who anticipated the loss of their own independance, should Ferdinand be allowed to proceed with impunity in his ambitious career. The authority which he exercised exceeded that to which the most despotic of his predecessors had aspired. The deposition of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and the investiture of Wallenstein, by the simple operation of an imperial rescript, though at first overlooked by the violence of party, appeared on cooler reflection to establish a precedent, calculated to degrade all the members of the empire to the most abject condition of vassalage. Another instance of rapacity, scarce less alarming, had been displayed in the treatment of Bogislaus, Duke of Pomerania, whose dominions had been seized without any pretext, except that of their probable re-vertibility to the chief of the empire in quality of an imperial fief.† All the emperor's proceedings tended equally to indicate the boundless extent of

* 1629. Schmidt, iv. 28.

† A most melancholy picture is drawn by Galetti of the misery of that unfortunate people ; " das kriegsvolk di unterthanen mit schlagen behandeln, in ganze land alles verbrenne, die kirchen beraube, des gottesdienst kindere, weiber & jungfrauen bis auf den tod nochzuchtige, und hernach die leichname den hunden zur speise vorwerfe," i. 130.

his ambition. The subjugation of Holstein, at which he evidently aimed, though circumstances had induced him to defer the execution, by rendering him master of the shores of the Baltic from Kiel to Colberg, would enable him to form a navy capable of dictating laws to northern Europe. Assisted by the Polish fleet, with whose sovereign he was connected both by interest and blood, he anticipated the destruction of the lucrative commerce carried on by the Dutch in those stormy seas, and justly regarded by that enlightened nation as a nursery for their marine. The conquest of Denmark no longer presented insuperable obstacles, and even Sweden itself might be unable to resist. Having reduced the north under his absolute control, the subjection of Germany would follow of course; for what resistance could be opposed by her disunited chiefs to a system so artfully combined?*

Though the objects embraced by the avidity of Ferdinand were too manifest to be any longer mistaken, the plan was prepared with so much sagacity that it was not easy to impede its execution. An Austrian army had already penetrated into Italy, and threatened the independence of Mantua; while another was destined for the recovery of Poland, whose timid monarch, at the head of numerous forces, was discomfited by a handful of Swedes.†

It was scarcely possible to contemplate with an unbiassed judgment the alarming posture of public affairs, and not to tremble for the liberties of Germany. Conscious of having contributed, through

* 1629. Pfeffel, ii. 304.

† Ibid. ii. 310.

mistaken policy, to the creation of a power grown truly formidable to themselves, it is probable that the members of the Catholic League would have sunk under the conviction of their own inferiority, had they not been roused by the active genius of Maximilian, the foe and rival of Wallenstein. Disgusted at the ascendancy of a man, whom he equally hated and feared, the Duke of Bavaria examined all the operations of the Austrian cabinet with a jaundiced eye, and so atrocious was the system which it had long pursued, that no eloquence was required to kindle indignation in every bosom capable of appreciating the blessing of independence. The recompence conferred by imperial favour was regarded as much beneath his merit, and cancelled by recent neglect. At his instigation the catholic princes assembled at Heidelberg, and drew up a petition, requesting the emperor to convene a diet for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to Germany, and correcting the disorderly behaviour of his armies. In reply to a requisition from Ferdinand, to disband the troops which were no longer necessary for the protection of their dominions, they boldly declared, "that till security should be given for their complete indemnification for all the expenses incurred in defence of the common cause, they would neither reduce a single regiment, nor relinquish a foot of territory.*

This unexpected display of patriotic firmness disconcerted the emperor's projects, and tempted him to consent to their request without sufficiently attending to the serious inconveniencies likely to

* 1629. Schmidt, iv. 28. Lotichius, i. 651. Pfeffel, i. 310.

arise from a general assembly in the unsettled posture of affairs. But before we enter upon the proceedings of the diet of Ratisbonne, the exertions of which prescribed an insuperable barrier to the ambition of Austria, it is necessary to advert to other transactions, scarce less important in their results.

While the genius of Wallenstein exalted the power of Ferdinand, his arrogance and rapacity, by alienating the affection of the catholics, undermined the foundations of the colossal fabric, before it arrived at maturity. The slightest hesitation in obeying his orders was invariably punished by that vindictive chieftain, as a proof of rooted disaffection. The citizens of Magdeburg had attracted his resentment, by detaining some vessels laden with corn, for the supply of the imperial army. Whether this was the effect of mistake, or of intention, it is unnecessary now to inquire: but whatever may have been the real motive, the magistrates were seized with a sudden panic, and offered ample atonement.* No explanations, however, were sufficient to mollify his inflexible soul; no excuses, however humble, were admitted. In expiation of perhaps an unpremeditated offence, they were commanded to equip a regiment for the imperial service, and to maintain it at the expense of the city. The plea of poverty having been in-

* Lotichius exculpates the inhabitants. "Ita instructus audacia, sublimitate, ferocia, copüs, viribuspue, Friedlandus fortunam amplius haud metuebat; cum eam virtute suam fecisse sibi fingeret. His igitur subsidiis fultus nihil non facile contempsit. Ut super Magdeburgo, præcipue, intra imperium posito, facilem sibi promitteret triumphum." 1, 654.

effectually urged, Wallenstein at once put an end to the negotiation by investing the city. Justly alarmed for the safety of an ally, the Hanseatic confederacy sent deputies to the camp, to deprecate his anger by intreaties. Considering supplication to be a confession of weakness, the haughty chieftain replied, that if the burghers were really desirous of averting his wrath, they must submit to the following conditions. The grain which had been detained must be immediately restored; the delinquents must be brought before him in chains, to be punished at his discretion; and lastly, an Austrian garrison must be admitted into the town as a security against all future misconduct.

These demands, if granted, would have virtually extinguished every spark of freedom, and enabled the emperor to execute the edict of restitution with respect to Magdeburg, whenever he chose to enforce it. They accordingly refused, with commendable prudence, to admit a foreign garrison; but tempered the answer by the most exaggerated assurances of respect and attachment, imploring permission to send an embassy to Vienna, to explain, more fully, the motives by which they were actuated. This request was rejected with sullen disdain, and five days only allowed for their final decision, after the expiration of which, all intercourse was prohibited, and every avenue shut to reconciliation.*

Convinced that nothing was to be expected from the mercy of the foe, the citizens prepared for active resistance. During a protracted siege of

* 1629. Harte, 1, 107.

twenty-eight weeks, they withstood all the efforts of Wallenstein, who finding it impossible to subdue their constancy, and being anxious to conceal his disappointment under the ostentatious display of generosity, summoned a deputation of the magistrates to his camp, and after expatiating upon his clemency in a studied harangue, dismissed them with the assurance that their magnanimity having disarmed his resentment, hostilities should in consequence be suspended.*

The succours afforded by Gustavus Adolphus to the inhabitants of Stralsund had so deeply offended the Austrian pride, that an opportunity was sought after for revenge. It was, therefore, with more than hostile activity that an expedition was prepared for the assistance of Sigismund in Poland.†

In order to understand the cause of the quarrel, we must refer to the annals of Sweden, where we find, that after a glorious reign of thirty-two years, Gustavus Vasa, the deliverer of his country, left three sons. Eric, the eldest, after vainly aspiring to the hand of Elizabeth, Queen of England, gratified a romantic passion for a plebeian beauty. But being equally indulgent to all his other propensities, he was deposed by his subjects, in whose eyes his vices and effeminacy had rendered him contemptible. After governing Sweden during four and twenty years, his brother John was succeeded

* Lotichius, i. 665. Galletti, i. 121.

† The arrogance of Wallenstein is fully displayed in his orders to Arnheim; "Take," said the haughty warrior, "ten thousand men, and drive Gustavus out of Poland; but in case you should prove unable to accomplish it, tell him Wallenstein will effect it in person."—Swedish Intelligencer, part i. 43.

by Sigismund, his eldest son, by Catharine, daughter of Sigismund II. King of Poland. That prince however having imprudently listened to the suggestions of a bigoted mother, and abandoned the protestant faith, the sceptre was not only transferred to Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the youngest of Vasa's sons, by the unanimous voice of the nation, but rendered hereditary in his family. To sanction an act so repugnant to the established rules of descent, a decree was passed by the states, declaring popery a political disqualification, and rendering the exactment a fundamental law of the constitution.*

Though the national welfare ought undoubtedly to precede every other consideration, yet doctrines like these are too frequently expunged from the statute-books of kings, who are sometimes apt to consider the public inheritance, like a private fortune, entrusted to them, not for the benefit of others, but for their own use and enjoyment. Sigismund, like many of his royal compeers, being deeply infected with these tenets, was far from admitting the national right to limit, or alter the succession. On the contrary, he exerted all the arts of intrigue to undermine the authority of Gustavus, who mounted the throne after the death of his father.† In these clandestine attempts he was secretly abetted by the court of Vienna, and the

* Upon the deposition of Sigismund in 1599, his son Ladislaus (then an infant) was chosen in his place, but on condition that within the space of six months, he should be sent to Stockholm, to be educated in the Lutheran tenets. This clause, which was probably inserted as a salvo for delicate consciences, not being complied with, his title was forfeited of course.—*Swedish Intelligencer*, i. 40.

† In 1612. *Swedish Intelligencer*, 41.

active casuistry of the Jesuits. Hence arose that enmity which eventually led Gustavus to the defence of Germanic freedom, and gave so violent a shock to the Austrian power, that it tottered to its very foundation. Sigismund, when seated on the throne of Poland, endeavoured by arms to vindicate his title to Sweden. Hostilities however were of short duration; and after the conclusion of a truce, Gustavus had leisure to direct his attention to the internal regulations of his kingdom, by ameliorating the laws, augmenting the marine, and establishing an enlightened system of economy in every department of government. But what particularly occupied his active mind was the perfecting of the military discipline, or rather the creating it anew, since he regulated all the operations of an army on principles hitherto unknown, no less with respect to its internal arrangement, than to the laborious duties of a campaign. The management of the artillery was simplified, the muskets were lightened;* the pikes shortened,† and manufactories of arms established in various parts of his own dominions; by which the exportation of money was judiciously obviated, as those articles had been formerly procured, at an enormous expense, from the fabrics of Spain and Italy.‡

Having thus secured to his people internal prosperity, he directed his attention to foreign alliances, as the surest means of preserving it; and Denmark

* The muskets made use of in the Swedish army before the reign of Gustavus were extremely cumbersome and unwieldy, and when fired were supported upon a rest; by lightening the former, the latter being no longer necessary, was suppressed.—Grimoard, i. 435.

† The pikes were reduced from eighteen feet to eleven. *ibid.*

‡ Harte, i. 36.

being the power, whose political interests were most likely to clash with his own, he requested a personal interview with Christian, convinced that by an amicable disclosure of their mutual pretensions, more might be effected in a few hours conversation, than in weeks, or even months, pompously wasted in the ceremonious discussions of diplomacy.*

A good understanding being thus established with Denmark, Gustavus resolved to visit Germany. But being anxious to avoid the irksome honours of a royal reception, he assumed a fictitious name, and under the modest appellation of Monsieur GARS,† examined the strength and resources of that powerful empire with the penetration of a statesman. This however appears not to have been the only object of his travels; for justly regarding the marriage state as decisive of the happiness, or the misery of life, he was unwilling to trust for the beauty and temper of his destined bride, to the flattering pencil of a pensioned artist, or the fallacious praises of a courtier.‡

The insidious conduct of Sigismund, whose machinations were conducted with greater facility under the cover of amity, than amid the perils and precautions of war, determined Gustavus to recommence hostilities with redoubled activity. Entering Livonia without any formal notice, at the head of a numerous army, he opened the campaign with

* Harte, i. 36.

† A word composed of the initials of Gustavus, Adolphus Rex Sueciæ.

‡ From Sir Dudley Carlton's Letters we find, that in the summer of 1620, Gustavus, after passing through Germany under a borrowed name, ended his journey at Berlin, in order to see the young princess of Brandenburg whom he intended to marry, 481.

the siege of Riga. Anxious to reduce it, before succours could arrive, he conducted his operations with so much ardour, that in a few days it was completely invested. Convinced that activity is the soul of war, he worked in the trenches with a mattock and spade, while his example was followed by Oxenstern, Horn, and Banier, and a train of heroes, destined to support a conspicuous part in the future pages of history. Alarmed for the safety of a rich commercial city, the Polish monarch dispatched Prince Razivil to attempt its relief with an army of fourteen thousand men. Finding upon his arrival that the Swedish lines were too strongly fortified to be assailed with the smallest prospect of success, he submitted to the humiliation of watching the rapid progress of the besiegers from the opposite bank of the Dwina, and was forced to retire after vainly attempting to reinforce the garrison. Though reduced to distress for want of provision, and destitute of every hope of assistance, the besieged refused to capitulate till the mines of the enemy were ready to explode. Upon the signal being given, the citizens would have been buried under the ruins of their habitations, had not the humanity of Gustavus, his admiration of bravery even when displayed by a foe, pleaded powerfully in their favour, and tempted him to indulge the generosity of his disposition, by granting honourable terms to the garrison.*

* The following anecdote, related by Harte on the authority of a gentleman for whose veracity he professes the highest respect, is so descriptive of the feelings of the Swedish hero, that I cannot withstand the temptation of inserting it. Seaton, a Scotch officer, in the service of Gustavus, who was severely wounded during the siege of Riga, stood high in his sovereign's favour, which he attracted in a manner no less

Every successive campaign proved equally glorious to the Swedish arms, and equally disgraceful to Sigismund. Yet no considerations being sufficient to reconcile the latter to the loss of a crown, of which he thought himself unjustly deprived, the flame of war was never extinguished, while materials could be found to foment it. The constitution of Poland however was so little calculated for military exertions, that it was frequently necessary to impede the progress of the victor by a display of moderation to which the heart of Sigismund was a stranger. Hence occasional truces intervened, but which were observed no longer by the Polish monarch than was rendered indispensable by the

honourable than singular. A little time previous to the Polish war, the king, offended with Seaton for some inadvertence at a public review, gave him a blow in presence of the army. The business of the day was no sooner concluded than the indignant Scot demanded his dismissal, which was signed by Gustavus in the heat of passion, and accepted by Seaton in sullen silence. Reflection, however, having suggested to the former the cruelty of his behaviour, his first occupation on the following day was to inquire after the man whom he had so grievously affronted. Being informed that he had departed at an early hour, and taken the road to Denmark, Gustavus immediately ordered his horses; and, attended only by a confidential friend, and two menial servants, quitted Stockholm, regulating his motions with so much exactness, that he always slept where Seaton had dined. When arrived at the confines of Sweden, he left his attendants; and, riding forward with augmented speed, soon overtook the fugitive. "Dismount, sir," cried the magnanimous monarch as he approached him, "you have been severely injured, and I am come to afford you the only satisfaction that can compensate so unjustifiable an offence. I am no longer in my own dominions, and we are therefore equal now. Both of us have swords and pistols, and the affair of course will be soon decided." Seaton no sooner recovered from the astonishment occasioned by this exalted act of generosity, than falling on his knees he expressed his gratitude for that striking mark of condescension, and requested permission to live and die in the service of a prince who so nobly atoned for his errors. Raising him from the ground with great emotion, the king embraced him, and ever after honoured him with his friendship. i. 46.

penury of his finances, the weakness of his army, or the intractable obstinacy of a factious diet.*

These intervals of repose were employed by Sigismund in endeavours to bias the venal suffrage of a corrupt aristocracy, and devoted by his rival to domestic improvements. Conscious that he had nothing to conceal from the world, Gustavus beheld the degradation of Swedish literature with deep regret, and, by additional endowments to the university of Upsal, by the foundation of colleges at Dorpat and Abo, and the establishment of schools in all the principal towns, he introduced a taste for science and letters, which would have been alone sufficient to render him immortal.†

While the Swedish monarch was securing the affections of a grateful people by acts of public utility, Sigismund was sinking, with no less rapidity, in the national esteem, by the weakness and rapacity of his government. In direct violation of a constitutional law, the richest benefices of the church were conferred on his sons, though they were utterly disqualified by their tender years from discharging the functions of religion. Large estates were also purchased, in the name of the queen, though by an ancient statute the reigning family was declared incapable of acquiring landed property; and, lastly, the coin was debased and adulterated, to the unspeakable detriment of commerce.‡ These grievances, though loudly calling for animadversion, were still further aggravated by the clamour of party, till the name of Sigismund

* Harte, i. 52.

† Grotius was one of his favourite authors, whose excellent treatise, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was almost constantly in his hands. Ibid.

‡ Piaseccii chronica in ann. 624.

became so unpopular, that when the truce expired, in 1625, he found the utmost difficulty in procuring supplies for another campaign. Yet, as nothing could induce him to sheath the sword, hostilities were renewed with so much vigour on the side of Gustavus, that Livonia was reduced in the course of a single summer. Proceeding forward in the career of victory, he crossed the Dwina on a bridge of boats, took Posvolia, Birzen, and Mittau, and defeated the Poles, in a sanguinary battle, in the extensive plains of Semigallia. The strength of the enemy consisted chiefly in a numerous cavalry, mounted on fleet and active coursers, and accoutred with a magnificence approaching to Asiatic profusion. In a country affording sufficient space for all the pompous variety of evolutions, which constitute the pride and terror of an eastern army, the rapid movements of these desultory squadrons were believed to be irresistible, when opposed by infantry alone. But notwithstanding the use of the bayonet was then unknown, Gustavus had invented an admirable substitute in the shortened pike, which, by judicious management, rendered his battalions impervious.

The victories of Gustavus, during the Polish war, however, are not sufficiently connected with the present history to require a circumstantial elucidation. Suffice it to remark, that he was invariably successful in all his operations, and that his triumphs were owing less to the bravery of his troops, or to the capacity of his generals, than to his own matchless superiority in tactics. Yet, notwithstanding the brilliant results of his enterprizes, he was never averse to a negotiation; for, as he loved his people with parental affection, he could not endure

the thought of augmenting their burthens, when no adequate returns of aggrandizement or glory were likely to compensate the sacrifice. These considerations induced him to listen with perhaps imprudent eagerness to every overture for peace; and it was always with reluctance that he found himself contrained, by the duplicity of his adversary, to recommence hostilities.

The capture of Elbingen supplied him with funds for continuing the war, as well as with abundant magazines;* while that of Marienburg, the capital of the Teutonic order, by rendering him master of the banks of the Vistula, secured the possession of Polish Prussia, in spite of the united efforts of Cospoliski and Sapieha, the ablest generals of Sigismund.†

Never inattentive to the minutest occurrence which tended to promote the prosperity of his people, or to protect the protestant faith, he published an edict in 1627, offering to all the members of the reformed church, who were driven out of Germany, on account of their religious tenets, an asylum in Sweden; and, as a farther inducement, he promised them an exemption from all taxes during a stated period.‡

* In 1626. Harte, i. 71.

† Ibid. 77.

‡ This edict is preserved by Lotichius, i. 546. "Gustavus, &c. codicillis, hisce, omnibus quorum interest notum facimus, nobis exploratum esse, quo pacto magna pars vicinorum per Germaniam nostrorum ab adversariis eo adigantur, ut interveniente persecutione, relictis domiciliis, agris, et fortunis fere omnibus emigrare peregrinasque sedes quærere cogantur. E quibus multos esse innotuit qui in Sueciam nostram confugere velint, modo consensus ante nostri certiores esse possint. Siquidem igitur nos erga omnes in universum, ea necessitate præventos, more ingenii christiani commiseratione tangimur, tum vero nostri muneris esse putamus, ut vicinis nostris tantum non hac sub afflictione occurramus, sed omnibus confessioni nostræ addictis solatio simus. Hanc ob rem be-

The only reverse experienced by the Swedish troops, during the Polish war, was in the spring of 1627, while Gustavus was employed in domestic improvements at Stockholm. Teufel and Strief, both officers of acknowledged valour and experience, were entrusted with the command of eight thousand men at a season of the year, when the severity of the weather seemed to preclude offensive operations. Depending too confidently upon physical obstacles, and relaxing in necessary precautions, they were surprised by Conospoliski, whom they believed reposing in winter quarters at a considerable distance from their encampment. Both the commanders were detained in captivity, but the common men were dismissed upon honourable conditions. Gustavus was so little accustomed to the frowns of fortune, that he might have been expected to punish the negligence of the prisoners with the greatest severity; he, however, bore his misfortunes with the equanimity of a philosopher,

nevolentium et sympathiam nostram ad omnium notitiam divulgare placuit. Venirent igitur omnes in Sueciam nostram, quicunque et auxilio et protectione opus habent, scirentque nobis hoc volupè, illisque quicunque sunt concessum, licitumque esse.

“Primum ergo illis potestatem facimus amplissimam, ut absque ullo onere atque impendio, hanc in Sueciam nostram educere, ac nostra sub protectione vivere, possint, usque dum Deo meliora tempora reddere visum fuerit. Alterum est illos omnes sub nostro hoc regno securè, absque ulla recognitione, onere, sive tributo, futuros esse liberrimos, quoad fortunis facultatibusque utentes suis, civilibus commerciis abstinebunt. Interim si quis forte civium negotiationes exercere cupiant, illi eodem loco essent, quo cives ipsimet. Denique quibuscunque temporibus in meliùs emendatis, ad lares patrios reverti allubescat, illis hoc quovis tempore concessum, integerrimumque foret. Neque anset esset quispiam ab illis sub discessum, vel tenuncium exigere!” What a model is this for imitation !

and seems to have regarded those unfortunate men as sufficiently humbled by disgrace.*

In an action fought at Dirschau, Gustavus received a wound in the arm, while reconnoitring the enemy's position. This circumstance would hardly have merited our attention, did it not serve to shew the attachment of the troops, and the pious confidence of the monarch. Alarmed for the safety of their heroic leader, the commanding officers, with Oxenstiern at their head, repaired to the royal pavilion; and, with the tenderness of affectionate children, entreated their sovereign to be more careful of a life on which the happiness of thousands depended. This proof of regard, so grateful to his feelings, drew tears from the eyes of Gustavus; who replied, with unassuming dignity, "that their affection led them to over-rate his merit, since he could not believe himself so important to the world, as they were induced by their partiality to suppose. Should the Supreme Being," continued he, "think fit to terminate my short career, he will undoubtedly raise some abler champion to protect the throne of Sweden: but, while its defence shall be entrusted to me, it is my duty to perform the allotted task without ever attending to the event; and, should it be my destiny to fall at the head of my troops, to perish in the defence of his people's rights is the most glorious death to which a sovereign can attain."†

* Harte, 80.

† Ibid. i. 83. Oxenstiern having remonstrated with his master upon another occasion, respecting the rashness with which he exposed his person, the king told him, with a smile, "that he was of too cold a temper."—"Possibly," replied the chancellor; "but if my ice did not sometimes

The rapid progress of Gustavus at length excited a serious alarm both at Vienna and Madrid; because the conduct pursued by both these courts, during the Polish war, exposed them almost equally to his resentment. Anticipating, that in the event of a successful termination of the contest with Sigismund, he might direct his victorious arms against Germany, they endeavoured by the most unbounded promises to prevent that disheartened monarch from listening to the pacific overtures of Sweden. Auxiliary troops, a powerful fleet, and liberal subsidies were successively offered, in order to induce him to persevere; though it was evident to the world, that by protracting the struggle, his kingdom must be exposed to ruin and disgrace. Sigismund, however, had no sooner rejected the proposals made by the generous victor, than he too late discovered, that his friends were no less remiss in fulfilling their engagements than they had been forward in contracting them. No ships appeared, no money was remitted; and, when Sigismund complained of this treacherous conduct, his remonstrances were treated with so much neglect, that he could no longer doubt the perfidy of his allies.*

Persuaded that adversity could alone overcome the obstinate resentment of the Polish monarch, and extremely anxious to terminate a war which obstructed the execution of more important pro-

cool your fire, your majesty might have been consumed before this."—*Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, par Monsieur D. M. 119, quarto, anno 1764.—The author professes to have been assisted by MS. notes by M. Arkinholtz. I shall hereafter quote it under the title of *Histoire de Gust. Adol.*

* Harte, 88.

jects, Gustavus prepared to carry on his operations in 1629 with so much activity, that he might reduce his rival to unconditional submission. The continued series of misfortunes which had hitherto attended the Polish arms, having increased the unpopularity of the contest, the cry of the nation was unanimously pacific, yet the exhortations of the Pope, and the arrival of Arnheim with an Austrian army, revived the drooping courage of Sigismund, and determined him in spite of fatal experience to hazard another campaign.

Gustavus, being informed that the emperor had sent a reinforcement to Sigismund, dispatched an officer to Wallenstein, to remonstrate on a measure directly tending to interrupt the harmony which so happily subsisted between the courts of Vienna and Stockholm, and which it had been his constant study to preserve. With his accustomed duplicity the haughty duke assured him, that no blame could attach to the imperial court, as neither the emperor nor himself had the smallest concern in the transaction, the nature of which had been totally misunderstood. The mistake he supposed had arisen from the following circumstance: "that a part of the imperial army having been disbanded, some companies had enlisted in the Polish service; but, as this had been done without his knowledge or approbation, he was not only entirely unacquainted with the amount of their numbers, but considered himself as exempt from all kind of responsibility.*

After the junction of Arnheim with the Polish army, Gustavus was unable to keep the field, till

* Grimoard, i. 400.

reinforced by fresh levies from Sweden. The position of Marienberg affording every advantage for defensive operations, he resolved to concentrate his forces under the walls, till it should be in his power to adopt a system more suitable to his enterprising spirit. This plan, however, though wisely conceived, was by no means easy in its execution: a retreat was to be effected over extensive plains, in sight of an army abounding in cavalry, and elated with temporary success. Yet, in spite of every obstacle that the enemy could oppose, Gustavus, having repelled them in various attacks, arrived at Marienberg with little loss, though not without considerable risk, as he was once actually surrounded by a party of horse, but was rescued by the valour of his followers.*

The soul of Gustavus was never designed by nature to endure with patience even the shadow of disgrace. Having received reinforcements, he resolved to recover his former ascendancy, and prepared for a general action. Without designing to attend to the enormous disparity of force, he replied to an officer, whom he had sent to reconnoitre, and who appeared alarmed at the strength of the enemy, "In proportion to their numbers our fire must prove destructive." The anticipations of the king were completely verified, as the allies were defeated in various encounters, in which they engaged with more courage than discretion.

In an army composed of different nations ill fortune invariably produces dissension. Accustomed to pillage, and the unrestrained gratification of

* Grimoard i. 403.

every licentious passion, the imperial troops affected to treat the Polish peasants with the same brutality which they had exercised in Saxony and Westphalia; and, when punished for their rapacity, appeared astonished to find that any excesses were prohibited by the military code of Poland. The impossibility of maintaining regular discipline among men made ferocious by indulgence, excited a suspicion that Sigismund seriously entertained the design of rendering himself absolute, by the assistance of Ferdinand; and this unfounded opinion contributed to increase the general discontent and disaffection. To complete this scene of misery and disorder a pestilential disease broke out in the camp, which was rapidly augmented by the total defect of wholesome sustenance, because the dread of infection prevented the peasants from furnishing provisions. The coolness which existed between Conospoliski and Arnheim was so much embittered by distress, that they actually accused each other of treachery. Satisfied that it was impossible for men so justly exasperated by unmerited reproaches ever again sincerely to co-operate, Sigismund applied to the imperial court for the recall of Arnheim, who, being removed in consequence, was succeeded by the Duke of Saxe-Lauenberg.*

The change of commanders, however, producing no alteration in the fortune of the war, Sigismund began seriously to feel the necessity of averting destruction by a negociation. Richelieu, who was no less attentive to the interests of the northern nations than to those of Italy and France, was no sooner

* Grimoard, i. 405. Harte, i. 117.

informed of the wishes of the Polish monarch than he instructed Charnace to repair to Poland, and offer the mediation of Louis. In this attempt he was warmly seconded by Sir Thomas Roe, the English minister; and, as neither Gustavus nor Sigismund were averse to a treaty, no material impediments intervened. The prejudices of the latter, however, were less easily subdued than the resentments of the former. The Swede, perhaps, anticipated triumphs more brilliant than the destruction of a Polish army; but Sigismund, though completely disgusted with the dissensions of his generals, and the indiscipline of his soldiers, could hardly bring himself to renounce an antiquated claim, though it was no longer possible for the most sanguine temper to cherish the hope of establishing it. The splendid promises of Ferdinand, though always fallacious, had made so strong an impression on the Polish monarch, that it required some address to persuade him, that they were merely illusory, and intended only to occupy the Swedes in distant enterprizes, without ever considering, that the security of Austria must be purchased by the ruin of Poland. Aware that the object nearest to the heart of Sigismund was to transmit the crown to his descendants, Charnace artfully insinuated that an alliance with Sweden was the only certain means of effecting it, since it could hardly be doubted, that he would otherwise find a dangerous competitor in the ambition of Ferdinand, who already destined the throne of Poland as an appanage for one of his children.

This latter argument having proved conclusive, conferences were held in tents erected at equal distances from the hostile camps; and, after a negocia-

tion of thirty-nine days, conducted to a six years' truce, which was afterwards extended to a longer period.*

Though by a specific article Sigismund acknowledged the title of Gustavus to the Swedish sceptre, he stipulated in secret for the reservation of a claim, now destitute of all solid foundation. This, however, can be regarded in no other light than as an innocent sacrifice to pride, as the question was never likely to be revived, and Gustavus had too much sense and magnanimity to deprive his country of a real blessing, when it could be procured at the expense of a shadow.†

Having thus terminated a contest that promised no adequate compensation of glory, Gustavus prepared for the execution of an enterprize, which, if crowned with success, could not fail to allot him a distinguished station in history, and which, though replete with difficulties apparently insuperable, it was no trifling honour to have encountered.

Gustavus had long meditated in secret the humiliation of Austria as the inveterate enemy of protestantism. Too prudent, however, to hazard an undertaking of such magnitude, till all his preparations were complete, he examined with attention the strength and resources of that formidable power, which he boldly aspired to overthrow; and, having deliberately calculated the obstacles which he possessed for overcoming them, he courageously embraced the magnanimous resolution of prescrib-

* At its expiration in 1635 it was protracted for one and twenty years. Harte, i. 120. Grimoard, i. 409.

† This treaty may be found in Dumont, v. p. 2, 594.

ing bounds to the despotism of Ferdinand, or falling heroically in the attempt.

But before we follow him in an undertaking the most arduous, perhaps, ever conceived by the genius of man, let us direct our attention to the internal situation of Sweden, that we may be able to form a more correct opinion of the astonishing effects which wisdom, activity, and courage can produce.

No prince was ever more deservedly popular with every class of his subjects than Gustavus Adolphus, yet it was not by a relaxation of the reins of government, or an indiscreet compliance with every demand, that he secured the affection of the people, but by a vigorous attention to the administration of justice; by denying to others those pernicious indulgences which he constantly refused to himself, and by tempering the effusions of his natural liberality by prudential maxims of economy. By his soldiers he was revered with filial affection, but their adoration was tempered with respect.* The strictest discipline was observed in every department of the army;† so that

* “ Et vulgus militum non ut regem, sed quasi numen venerabatur.” Burgus de bello Suecico, 29. In another place he says, speaking of Gustavus, “ miles strenuus, invictus, prudens, cui nihil objici fere aliud posset (si alieni regni occupationem *more nostrorum temporum* excuses) quam quod alioquin præclarum ingenium, in hoc incautum, deceptoris Lutheri nugis subdiderat.”—It is to be hoped that Burgus is a better historian than a divine!

† Ce serait oublier un des beaux traits de l'histoire militaire de Gustave, si je ne disais pas que la discipline qu'il établit dans ses armées, fut la première cause de ses grands succès. La plus sévère subordination animait ce grand corps, et Gustave en dirigeait tous les mouvements au but qu'il se proposait, n'ayant jamais à craindre de se voir arrêté par le brigandage du soldat, ou l'inconduite des chefs. Ce grand corps ne savait qu'obéir, et marchait avec confiance partout où son roi le conduisait. Le

his camp was rendered a school for decency, regularity, and religion; and, being temperate, or rather abstemious, himself, he never allowed his officers to live luxuriously. By this judicious attention to the behaviour of his soldiers, he introduced habits of moderation, highly conducive to the success of his future plans; for, such were the patience and frugality of the Swedes, that they could subsist during three months upon the same quantity of provisions which would have been consumed in one, by an equal number of Austrians.* Accustomed from their cradles to a life of fatigue, they endured, without a murmur, the rudest blasts of a northern winter, or the meridian ardour of a southern sun; indifferent alike to every feeling, except that of having contributed by their personal exertions to the glory of a sovereign, whom they equally loved and admired.†

The views and expectations of a Swedish soldier were bounded exclusively to his profession. In the course of the thirty years war numbers arrived at the age of maturity, who were born and educated in the “tented field.” Without the strictest regard to the rules of morality, such a mode of existence must have engendered habits of savage ferocity and dissolute licentiousness, as was the

plus grand avantage pour les Suedois fut sans doute de combattre sous les yeux d'un maitre chez qui les recompenses comme les chatimens etaient toujours en proportion du merite, et qui avait pour principe d'aller au-devant de la mort, pensant qu'elle n'est dangereuse que pour ceux qui la craignent.—Francheville, Tableaux Militaire, 328.

* The numbers of foreigners progressively enrolled in the Swedish armies, as they advanced into the interior provinces of Germany, proved highly injurious to their discipline.—Schmidt, v. 2.

† Harte. Essay on the Military State of Europe, prefixed to the Life of Gustavus Adolphus, 4.

case with the imperialists, who, both in their dress and demeanour, affected the terrific fierceness of barbarians. In the Swedish camp schools, were daily opened with as much regularity as amid the tranquil occupations of domestic pursuits.*

Unremitting in his attention to field exercises, Gustavus was more inclined to overlook an inadvertence in a private soldier than to forgive a similar fault when committed by an officer, because the former was likely to be attended with less serious consequences. It was, besides, a paramount principle in his military code scarcely ever to inflict corporeal chastisement, however great the offence; as in his estimation a sentence of death was less repugnant to those exalted feelings of honour, which it was his constant endeavour to excite, than the disgrace inflicted by a blow. Though averse to punish he was ever ready to reward; and so minutely attentive to the characters and actions of every individual, that there was scarcely a man in the whole army distinguished by courage or regularity, with whose name he was unacquainted. The smallest inadvertence in executing a manœuvre never escaped his notice; but, instead of loading the offender with curses or with stripes, he would dismount from his horse, and correct the defect with the persevering kindness of friendship.†

* This Spartan discipline, according to Harte, converted the very children into heroes, and rendered them insensible to dangers, which might have appalled the courage of men. "One day," as he informs us, "a caanon-shot pierced the tent where the boys were studying, and killed two or three of them, while occupied with their books. But no sensation whatever was produced; as not a single youth started from his seat, or even dropped his pen.—Essay 5. Education, I am persuaded, may do much, but this appears to exceed its powers.

† Simplicity in the construction of every military evolution, and rapidity

The system pursued, with respect to promotion, was admirably calculated for the encouragement of merit, as the claims of seniority were never suffered to operate to the prejudice of superior talents. Hence every loss was immediately replaced by an officer perfected by experience in a subordinate station, or destined by the splendour of precocious genius, to shine in an elevated situation.* The pretensions of birth were totally disregarded, neither was money accepted as an equivalent for service.

No less careful of the morals, than of the health of his soldiers, Gustavus allotted two chaplains to every regiment, men judiciously chosen to impress, by the weight of their own example, the doctrines which they were bound to inculcate. Neither vagrants, nor gamesters, nor thieves, nor prostitutes, were suffered to contaminate the virtue of men, whose lives were devoted to the noblest purposes—the defence of their country and their religion.†

By attending to the minutest articles of expenditure, and preventing all jobs and fraudulent contracts, Gustavus was enabled to maintain numerous armies, without oppressing his subjects by immoderate taxes, or even impoverishing the subjugated provinces, by levying enormous contributions. Yet,

in its execution, were justly considered by this consummate warrior as constituting the most important principles of tactics. From him the modern conquerors of the continent have borrowed many lessons of value. Grimoard, i. 434.—See *Essai sur le Systeme Militaire de Bonaparte*.

* Formed under the eye of a sovereign capable of appreciating every species of merit, no officer was ever entrusted with a command, who was not perfectly competent to the undertaking.—Grimoard, i. 434.

† Harte's Essay, 7.

notwithstanding the contracted state of his finances, it does not appear that his troops were reduced to greater hardships, that must naturally attend an invading army, in a country exhausted by predatory incursions. Neither is there any instance on record, of a mutiny having been excited on account of the deficiency of pay or of provisions.*

Intimately acquainted with the tactics of Greece and Rome, the King of Sweden availed himself of their discoveries, whenever they could be employed with advantage, adopting them to the modern practice of war by ingenious devices of his own.† By reducing the unwieldy squadrons of cavalry,‡ he

* The subsidies received from foreign powers were comparatively small. France contributed no more than twelve hundred thousand livres a year (about fifty thousand pounds sterling) towards the conquest of Germany. Compare this with the sums which England has lavished on fruitless expeditions, and the inference will be truly alarming.

† “Distinguons la tactique, du genie de la guerre. Manuel de ce qui s'est pratiqué, la tactique n'a du merite, que jusqu'au jour ou quelque élève hardi, s'avise de refaire le leçon. Les regles restent, elles son simples, le vulgaire les connaît; l'application seule varie; temeraire, heureuse, elle appartient au genie. C'est un jeune inventeur qui, poussé par un sentiment de necessité, au lieu de s'engager dans le labyrinthe d'une antique machine, prefere courir les hazards de quelque moteur nouveau. Dans son impatience il a ignoré, negligé, ou sacrifié même des ressources utiles; ses rivaux sont plus savans que lui, et plus methodiques; mais il emporte sur eux par le vif élan d'une penetration, qui sait se passer du savoir, et se jouer de l'habitude.”—*Memoire sur les effets de la Religion de Mohammed*, par M. Oelsner. There is much truth in the above remark.

‡ The strength of a regiment of cavalry, and even the number of troops of which it was composed, varied according to circumstances. The troop, however, usually comprising one hundred and forty men, was commanded by a captain, a lieutenant, and a cornet. The heavy dragoon wore an iron cap and cuirass, both musket-proof, and was armed with a carbine, two pistols, and a long sword. The arms used by the light cavalry were nearly similar, but their offensive weapons were less heavy, and their sabres crooked instead of straight.—*Grimoard*, i. 437. The imperial horse were in general cased in iron, and thus rendered inactive by the weight of their armour.—*Tableau Milit.* 266.

rendered them more proper for active service ; and by stationing infantry between the bodies of horse, he enabled them to resist the ponderous shock of the Austrian cuirassiers, which till then had proved irresistible.* Instead of being condensed in enormous squares, according to the practice of contemporary generals, the Swedish army was usually drawn up in two lines, supported by a body of reserve.† Four surgeons were allotted to every regiment, a precaution no less recommended by the suggestions of policy than by the common dictates of humanity, yet probably neglected by the callous pride of Austria ; as it appears that Tilly,‡ after the battle of Leipsic, was obliged to recur to a practitioner of Halle to dress his wounds, which would hardly have happened, had not the imperial army been defective in medical assistance, or the medical men been sadly defective in talent.||

To particularize every improvement introduced by Gustavus, would require proficiency in the science of war, to which I have little pretence. I shall, therefore, forbear to enter into minute details, contenting myself with simply enumerating the ob-

* Francheville, *Tableau Militaire*, 289.

† The comparative advantages of the Swedish and Imperial orders of battle are scientifically discussed by Francheville, 289. 304.

‡ Francheville states the strength of the imperial squadron at 150 men ; but he says, (259) *les regiments Suedois etaient moins forts que les imperiaux. Un escadron, etait composé de 66 cavaliers ; les compagnies d'infanterie etaient de 144.*

|| Harte, *Essay* 11. Grimoard supposes one medical assistant to have been attached to every regiment of three thousand men ; but, as he never condescends to mention his authority, it is impossible to ascertain the degree of credit which his assertion may deserve. Francheville corrects the assertion of Mr. Harte, by telling us, that the surgeons were with the baggage.—*Tab. Mil.* 258.

jects to which his attention appears to have been directed with the most striking advantages. To him is attributed the discovery of the brigade or column* of firing in platoons,† and of leathern portable artillery.‡ In his knowledge of military architecture, the construction of bridges and batteries, and in every thing relating to the higher departments of an engineer, he certainly

* An anonymous historian, quoted by Harte, gives the following account of the column:

Dicebat se novam et pucherrimam in ipsius exercitu formam aciei observasse, quam hoc loes describere nimis prolixum foret. Summa huc redit, eam munitioni similem, quæ ab omni parte, qua hosti accessus patet, eum destinatis ictibus petere queat; neque tantum machinas commode posse displodi, sed etiam quemque sclopetarium viritim jaculari, et hostem ferire: quod in magno agmine quadrato fieri nequeat, ubi duobus aut tribus ordinibus sclopetata displodentibus reliqui ictus sint inanes, adeo ut agmen illud ab irruente equitatu facile dissolvi possit: quod in acie Succica fieri nequeat; nam priusquam hostilis equitatus se loco movere aut impetum facere possit, sclopetarios sub præsidis non tantum hastatorum, sed etiam equitum, tanquam duorum propugnaculorum, quæ ad latera habeant, tutos esse; ad hæc multos gradus inter sclopetarios esse ad receptum, ut priusquam hostilis equitatus ad ultimum agmen pervenire et illud disturbare possit, eum dissipari necesse sit. Cum igitur coherentia totius aciei, equitatus et peditatus, tormentorum majorum ac minorum, nec non et sclopetariorum maximi sit momenti; se non videre, quomodo hujusmodi acies, nisi Deo ita volente, aut si priusquam instructa sit, hostis eam ex improvviso invadat, fundi fugarique possèt; in eam autem victoriam vertè, ut audines serventur, nec acies rumpatur.—Harte, ii. 363.

† Le maniement du mousquet chès les Suedois etait beaucoup moins composé; que chez les imperieux—par le retranchement de la fourchette es mousquetaires Suedois gagnaient plusieurs tems, et etaient aussi plus estes dans les marches.—Tab. Milit. 276.

‡ According to Grimoard, who appears particularly conversant with all military details, these cannon were constructed upon principles entirely new, and consisted of a thin tube of copper, strengthened by four iron hoops, and entirely enveloped with cord. Over these was drawn a case of boiled leather, fitted to the tube with great exactness. The principal advantage derived from this species of artillery, was the facility with which it was brought into action, being light enough to be drawn by two men; and the difficulty with which the cannon were heated, which ren-

excelled all preceding generals; and probably equalled the most accomplished commanders of our times, so far at least as genius could attain, unassisted by more modern discoveries in mechanics, and the astonishing progress which Europe has made in all the higher branches of mathematics; after his death, it seems gradually to have declined, till the days of* Frederic II.†

Gustavus is said to have repeatedly declared, that he never desired to command an army exceeding forty thousand men; but this probably proceeded solely from the difficulties which would have arisen in providing supplies for a more numerous body.†

dered them capable of being fired much oftener than ordinary guns, without exposing the artillerymen to the smallest risk. i. 438. Galetti, ii. 295. On croit que le Baron Melchior de Wurmbbrand est l'inventeur des canons de cuir, on en fit usage pour la premiere fois au siege de Wormdit. Tab. Mil. 317. The French used them till 1756, under the appellation of *pièces suédoises*. The cannon weighed 625 pounds, and was four feet in length; they were all four-pounders, and the charge of powder required was equal to a third part of the weight of the ball. Ibid. 318.

* In a rapid sketch like the present, I may be allowed to speak in general terms, and in that light the assertion is correct. Marlborough and Monteculi, Condé and Turenne, Eugene and Luxemburg, were splendid exceptions; but, in spite of the practical lessons which they gave to the world, the cumbersome system of German tactics became the fashionable standard for imitation. Instead of vying with each other in celerity of motion, commanders prided themselves solely upon manœuvring scientifically through a theatrical campaign; and, if they proved fortunate enough to gain a few leagues of country, or to capture a fortified town, they retired contentedly into winter quarters to repose on the laurels so cheaply acquired; while processions and *Te Deums* imposed upon the nation, and made them submit to the heaviest burthens with patience, if not with alacrity.

† *Friedrich der einzige*, as he is called by the Prussians.

† The achievements of France against the powerful coalitions opposed to her usurpations, and which have been full as much owing to the numerous population, over which she exercises a paramount control, as to the genius of her commanders, or to the superiority of her tactics, has fatally illustrated the present question, and proved to

The reader will probably be surprised to learn that the pay in those days was comparatively much higher than at present. A colonel of infantry in the Swedish service received yearly three hundred and eighty pounds sterling; a lieutenant-colonel half as much; and a captain one hundred and twenty-eight. The stipend of a common soldier amounted to nearly sixpence a day.* In the imperial army the emoluments of the officers were considerably greater;† but, on account of the defalcations and retardments to which they were subject, their situation appears, on the whole, to have been much less comfortable. This remark applies exclusively to the period, when the complaints of Germany, and the rapid progress of the Swedes, compelled Ferdinand to prescribe bounds to the rapacity of his commanders; as, during the splendid tyranny of Wallenstein, officers were restrained by no ties except those of discretion, being suffered to live with Asiatic profusion on the fruits of extortion and cruelty.‡

the satisfaction of all impartial observers, that *ceteris paribus*, superiority of numbers is almost certain to prevail.

* The bounty money given to recruits was also prodigiously great, and was said, toward the conclusion of the thirty years war, to have amounted to the sum of 56 florins for a foot-soldier, and 100 ducats for a horseman: the amazing difference which existed between the two services was owing to the latter being expected to provide himself with a horse.—Galetti, ii. 293.

† Tab. Milit. 263.

‡ The system of war almost universally adopted before the time of Gustavus was a system of robbery. The preparations necessary for opening a campaign required little previous foresight, when armies were supported without magazines, at the expense of the country they occupied. Accustomed to procure all their resources from pillage, they no sooner exhausted one province than they removed to another, where the means of subsistence were more abundant.—Grimoard, i. 444.

No regular cartel being established for the exchange of prisoners, it frequently happened that they were detained for years in captivity,* or were constrained to pay enormous ransoms for their release.†

It is no trifling glory to the Swedish monarch, that he contributed essentially to mitigate the horrors of war by his generosity toward those whom fortune subjected to his power. The situation of a province, desolated by the inroads of an invading enemy, appeared to him sufficiently wretched, without wantonly adding to its misery; he accordingly checked the ferocity of his victorious cohorts by salutary regulations, punishing inhumanity with unremitting severity, as the most disgraceful stain that can tarnish the character of a soldier.

The number of generals employed in an army was far inferior to that which modern practice has introduced; neither in the hour of battle was the same attention paid to seniority. Hence it frequently happened, that the command of a battalion was entrusted to a colonel, though a more ancient officer was present. Even the direction of a separate army did not necessarily confer the rank of general. Holk entered Misnia with eight thousand men, and Arnheim conducted a still larger body to the assistance of Sigismund, yet neither of them

* This was actually the case with respect to Gustavus Horn, and Jean de Wert, who did not recover their liberty till after the peace of Munster.—Harte, Essay 24.

† That of a colonel frequently amounted to a thousand pounds, and so on in proportion to the prisoner's rank. Ferdinand paid the enormous sum of four thousand pounds to Verdugo, to purchase the liberty of the young prince of Anhalt.—Essay 36.

was invested with a higher title than that of colonel.*

Another singularity, universally prevalent in the habits of war, was the facility with which officers were allowed to abandon the service of one sovereign and to enter into that of his enemy. Custom having sanctioned this dangerous practice, it was no longer attended either with danger or disgrace. The slightest offence was sufficient to tempt them to withdraw in disgust, even without signifying the intention to their commander. Such behaviour would now be punished as desertion; but the manners of the age so completely palliated the turpitude of the action, that it would be difficult to produce more than a single instance, in which it was punished as criminal.†

The reputation acquired by Gustavus in the cabinet was little inferior to his glory in the field;‡ and, as a statesman, he may dispute the palm with Oxensteirn, one of the most enlightened ministers of any age or country.

The generosity of commanders, in rewarding merit, almost exceeded the bounds of prudence; for though these opposite qualities are rarely allied in private life, they ought never to be separated in public stations. Notwithstanding the contracted state of his finances, Gustavus rarely promoted a common soldier without adding a munificent pre-

* Galetti, ii. 28.

† Ibid, 29.

‡ Mr. Harte appears to have regarded this as an honour exclusively applicable to the warriors of this splendid era, though it has in fact been the characteristic of genius, in every period of the world, to unite the talents of a statesman with those of a soldier. Without recurring to the annals of antiquity, where Pericles and Epaminondas, Hannibal and Julius Cæsar, and many others of almost equal celebrity, would fur-

sent. This system of remuneration, like all the other qualities of that extraordinary man, was carried by Wallenstein to excess, who scarcely ever rewarded an officer of rank with less than five hundred pounds. Tilly received from the emperor such extensive estates in Lower Saxony, as enabled him at his death to bequeath a legacy of ten thousand pounds to the Walloons, besides providing amply for his family.* Ferdinand's liberality toward the Duke of Friedland surpassed belief, and was almost great enough to satisfy the pretensions of a man whose vanity and ambition were unbounded.

Till the arrival of the Swedish monarch in Germany, contributions had been levied with an unrelenting rapacity;† for which history was then unable to furnish a precedent. The portion allotted to remunerate the soldiers was divided by the colonels according to the muster-roll, by which ingenious device the shares of the non-effective men were appropriated to themselves. The art of supporting armies, without any expense to their sovereign, constituted the principal secret of the mili-

nish illustrations no less splendid than striking, it will be sufficient to select, from modern times, a Marlborough, a Frederic, and a Wellington. Without transcendent talents, a general may acquire such a mechanical knowledge of his profession, as will enable him to trace the plan of a campaign, or to direct the operations of a siege; but the endowments requisite to form a hero are imparted by nature to few, and it is probably true, that no man ever attained to the highest excellence in the military art, whose talents were exclusively military.

* Harte, Essay 36.

† Some idea may be formed of the rapacity of the soldiers from the following passage: "*Usus militaris est in Grmaniae hyemali, et eo, quo in stativis militares morantur, tempore, ut singuli, vel bini, aut terni unam habeant incolarum domum, cujus dominus victus militi, et equo, si equum miles habet, dare tenetur. Pagus quoque, ceu civitas, ubi stativa sunt, contributiones porrigit secundum muletam, quæ deinceps in singulos milites pro rata parte distribuuntur. Præter hæc unusquisque*"

tary art, as practised by the imperial generals.* The regiments of Papenheim and St. Julien are reported to have drawn sixty thousand pounds from the Middle Marche; and Wallenstein is said to have extorted the enormous sum of two millions sterling (though it is probable that the amount has been greatly exaggerated by the resentment of a suffering people) from the Electorate of Brandenburg alone.†

Many of the most eminent commanders rose entirely by personal merit, having neither birth nor fortune to recommend them. Aldringer and Merci were of humble extraction; Jean de Wert was the son of an illiterate peasant; Beck originally a shepherd, and Stalhaus a menial servant.

The military dress presented a singular mixture of ferocity and foppery. Ruffs were almost universally worn, frilled and frittered into the most fantastical fashions. Tilly's accoutrements were highly grotesque, and calculated to render his diminutive figure an object of general ridicule.‡ Wigs were

aliquid semper ab hero domus extorquet, donativi nomine, quod incolæ, etiam si inviti, dant tamen, ne in suam familiam, facultatemque milites desaviant."—Burgus, i. 48. The author was himself a soldier.

* This important secret has since been employed with increasing success by the revolutionary generals of France, and in particular by Buonaparte.

† Harte, Essay 39.

‡ His person and manners are thus described by the author of the *Life of Gustavus*.

"Le Comte Tilly etait d'une taille au dessous de la mediocre, maigre et sec, le bas du visage pointu, de grandes moustaches, des cheveux courts, gris, tout plats et fort negligés, un nez fort long, des joues creuses, le front large et ride, une phisionomie seche et rude, la barbe courte et mediocreement fournie. Ce grande capitaine etait toujours vetu d'une maniere bisarre. Le Marechal de Grammont raconte que, l'etant allé voir par curiosité, il le rencontra a la tete de son armée, qui etait en

seldom made use of, except by the French; but the hair was variously arranged, according as taste or temper directed. The Austrians, who affected a terrific air, would not suffer it to cover their foreheads, but by the opposite party it was usually dressed in the manner adopted by Vandyck, in most of his juvenile portraits. Whiskers, however, were universally regarded as essential requisites for a soldier, and were twisted and curled most fantastically.* The vanity of rank was particularly displayed in the beauty and magnificence of the golden chain, which decorated the neck of an officer. The colour of the scarf, as well as its materials, depended entirely upon the choice of the wearers, whose taste was displayed in the richness and variety of the embroidery. The swords were large and cumbersome, but seldom overcharged with ornament, as they were intended for defence rather than deco-

marche. Il etait monte sur un petit cheval gris, vetu d'un pourpoint de satin verd avec des manches a bandes comme un Espagnol, et des hauts de chausse de la meme etoffe; un petit chapeau retroussè, surmontè d'une plume d'autruche rouge, qui lui descendait jusqu'a sur le dos; un baudrier de deux pouces de large par dessus sa veste, auquel pendait son epee de bataille, et un seul pistolet a l'arçon. Lorsque le marechal approcha pour lui faire la reverence, Tilly, croyant remarquer qu'il s'eton- nait de le voir dans eet equipage, lui dit, Monsieur, vous trouvez peut- etre mon habillement extraordinaire. J'avoue qu'il n'est pas toute-a-fait conforme a la mode de France; mais il est a mon gre, et cela me suffit. Je pense aussi que ma haqueneè, et ce pistolet tout seul vous surpren- nent, pour le moins autant que mon accoutrement. Pour que vous n'ayies pas mauvaise opinion du Comte de Tilly, a qui vous faites l'honneur de rendre une visite de curiosité, je vous dirai que j'ai gagnè sept batailles decisives, sans avoir etè obligè de tirer une seule fois le pistolet que vous voyes la; et mon petit cheval ne m'a jamais abandonè, et n'a jamais bal- lancè a faire son devoir."—Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 142.

* Mr. Harte observes, that he never saw a picture of any general of that age without them, except that of Christian, Duke of Brunswick. Essay 43.

ration. Instead of being fashioned after the model of the leg, the boots were rather calculated to protect it, being made of materials strong enough to resist a pistol bullet. Spurs were of brass, with a curved neck, and had a large box (which served as a pivot for the rowels) filled with small metal balls, as if their only use was to jingle.* Armour† was frequently studded with gold and silver. Many, however, objecting to the weight, contented themselves with casing their breasts and backs in steel, and covering the rest of their bodies with a dress of leather, so stiffened as not to be easily perforated.‡ Gustavus never made use of any defensive garment except an elf-skin waistcoat; but he was no less conspicuous for contempt of danger, than for the unrivalled powers of his mind.§

In an age, when the long duration of hostilities may be supposed to have blunted the finest feelings of the heart, it might be expected that private quarrels

* Mr. Harte informs us, that he once saw a spur of this description, which had been found near Prague, on the spot where the famous battle was fought which decided the fate of Bohemia. Amid the incongruous productions of fashion and folly, it is hardly credible that any thing so intrinsically defective should have become an object for modern imitation.

† I have seen a magnificent suit, richly inlaid, which belonged to Duke Bernard, and is preserved as a memorial of his ancestor's prowess by the reigning Duke of Saxe Weimar.

‡ Harte, Essay 45. It is impossible to say too much in commendation of this author's accuracy and indefatigable diligence, which form a striking contrast with his style.

I am very sorry to tell you, that Harte's *Gustavus* does not take at all, consequently sells very little: it is certainly informing, and full of good matter; but, it is as certain too, that the style is execrable: where the devil he picked it up, I cannot conceive, for it is a bad style of a new and singular kind; it is full of Latinisms, Galicisms, Germanisms, and all *isms* but Anglicisms; in some places pompous, in others vulgar and low.—Lord Chesterfield's Letters, iii. 177.

§ Ibid. Francheville, 265.

would not only have happened more frequently, but that they would have also been attended with more fatal consequences than amid the pleasures and refinements of domestic society.* Yet during the course of the thirty years war, very few instances occur in which the contentions of individuals were decided by duels; neither did any stigma attach to the reputation of those who declined accepting a challenge.† By the code of Gustavus, disputes between officers were submitted to a military tribunal; but if a captain or lieutenant permitted privates to fight, he was rendered responsible for the mischief that might ensue, deprived of his commission, and frequently compelled to serve in the capacity of a common soldier. The honour of a warrior, in the judgment of that enlightened prince, might be displayed in actions more character-

* By an edict of Gustavus, every person engaged in a duel was to be punished with death. Soon after its publication a quarrel took place between two officers of rank, who knowing that the steady temper of their sovereign would not pardon a transgression of the law, applied to him for permission to decide their difference by single combat. Though justly offended at their presumption, the king smothered his anger, acceded to the request, and signified his intention of being himself a spectator of their prowess. The hour was appointed, and the king arrived, attended by a body of infantry, whom he formed into a circle around the combatants. "Now, gentlemen," said he, addressing them as they were preparing to engage, "you are at liberty to fight till one of you falls." They drew their swords, when Gustavus, beckoning to the provost martial of the army, added with a stern dignity, "The moment one is killed behead the other." Confounded at this unexpected display of firmness, the officers fell instantly on their knees, imploring forgiveness for their temerity, which they at length obtained upon condition of their solemnly promising to be reconciled.—Harte, i. 90.

† Cratz in a transport of fury challenged Wallenstein; yet this insult offered to the authority of his general was attended with no serious consequences. Merode was killed by Jean de Wert, but the combat was not premeditated. A few other examples might be produced, but they are insufficient to controvert the general principle.—Harte, Essay 46.

istic of valour than the murder of his brethren in arms.

Science is indisputably the offspring of tranquillity: hence the Muses are represented with great propriety as delighting in solitude and retirement. It cannot therefore be supposed, that at a period when Germany was desolated by conflicting armies, her progress in literature would be conspicuous. The human mind, however, has constant need of nourishment; and, if not supplied with wholesome sustenance, will fatten on offals. Hence judicial astrology became the fashionable study of the age; so that no measure of importance was ever undertaken without consulting the planets. Grebner, Braunborn, and Battista Seni were beheld with an adoration approaching to idolatry, as men possessing supernatural powers, and capable of deciphering the mysterious volume of futurity. Even the splendid genius of Tycho Brahé would scarcely have risen to celebrity, had it not been degraded by the paltry tricks of divination. Each religion had its soothsayers, who interpreted the constellations as the interests of their party designated.* Ferdinand is reported to have entertained the highest reverence for these literary impostors, and to have regulated the most momentous transactions of his reign in consequence of their presumptuous admonition. The credulity of Wallenstein exceeded belief: not a plan was embraced, nor an enterprize attempted, without the advice or sanction

* In the north Gustavus was the *Arctic Lion*, the *vis viva* of the Reformation, while in the south he was called the *modern Attila*, and the *Scourge of God*.—Harte, Essay 46.

of Seni.* Chemnitz, an author of acknowledged merit, appears implicitly to have given credit to the prodiges which he has transmitted to posterity. According to him, and his rivals in credulity, the industrious Lotichius, a thousand miracles, totally reversing the established order of nature, announced the calamities, which awaited Germany, to a blind and obstinate people.† The fall of a column was adduced by the Austrian ministers as a powerful argument to prevail on Ferdinand to consent to the the deposition of Wallenstein. The hearts of the bravest officers in the imperial army are said to have experienced a sudden depression upon discovering that they were holding a council of war, in the house of a grave-digger at Lepsic, the walls of which were besmeared with allegorical figures.‡

Nothing was too absurd to meet with credit, and stories even became popular in proportion to their absurdity. Distinguished personages were persuaded that their armour, and even their bodies, might be rendered impenetrable by enchantment, like those of Achilles and Orlando.§ The preva-

* There were some that sayd, that even by the skill of some in the starres (wherein besides others he made use of Kepler, a great master), and by the Chaldeans art was foresignified his times and fates to be come.—Swedish Intelligencer, i. 12.

† According to Gallobellgieus the fate of Magdeburg was announced by the following miracle. “A city captaine’s wife dying in child-bed desired to be ript; the child was found a boy, almost as bigge as one of three yeares old. Hee had a head-piecc, and an iron brest-plate upon him; great bootes of the French fashion, and a bag by his side, with two like musket bullets in it.”—Ibid. 119.—Blind indeed must be the people who can behold with indifference such prodigies as these!

‡ Mr. Harte enters into many details to shew the prevalency of superstition, from which I have borrowed the foregoing anecdotes.

§ Not the Achilles of the Iliad, as Homer expressly tells us of his being

lency of this opinion may be inferred by consulting the military code of Gustavus; the first article of which, under the strictest penalties, prohibits the use of enchanted arms, or the recurring to magical incantations.† Could this extraordinary clause proceed from a belief in the powers of sorcery, or was it only a sacrifice to the credulity of his contemporaries?"†

wounded in the arm; but the ideal hero of the tragic poets, and of the Alexandrian school.

* *Memorant eo momento, excitata magicis Succorum carminibus procella, magnam grandinis vim cœlo demissam, quam obvius ventus in obsessorum faciem impellebat.*—Burgus, 38.—It is rather surprising, that an orthodox catholic should attribute so much influence in heaven to heretics.

† Lotichius, however, may keep in countenance the last mentioned author, as the following story will prove. "Wiblenger, a shoemaker, who commanded the insurgents in Upper Austria, was possessed of a secret to render himself invulnerable. In the engagement with Pappenheim a cannon shot struck his side; but instead of doing him the smallest injury, it recoiled like a tennis ball from a racket." Having established this fact upon uncontrovertible testimony, the author informs us in the following page that this extraordinary personage, in spite of his incantations, was killed by a pistol. Circumstances so contradictory could hardly have been recorded by the same writer, had he not supposed that some part of the cobbler's body was exempt from the charm, like the heel of Achilles.—Lotichius, i, 464.—Such however was the miserable taste of the age, that three dissertations were published by the learned Wallin, a professor at Upsal, respecting the magical qualities of Gustavus's sword, where, if the reader has either leisure or inclination for such researches, he may find a matchless waste of erudition.—Wallin de gladio Gustavi Adolphi.

CHAP. IX.

Diet at Ratisbonne.—The public opinion favourable to peace.—Views of the different parties.—Reasons which induced the Emperor to convene a diet. His imprudence in doing so. He opens the assembly in a studied speech, and demands supplies for continuing the War.—Unpopularity of Wallenstein; the German princes insist upon his removal, and positively refuse to proceed to the election of a King of the Romans till their complaints are attended to. Ferdinand attempts to allay the ferment by partial concessions.—Conduct of France. She sends an embassy to Ratisbonne.—Character of Father Joseph.—Plans of Richelieu.—Difficulties attending the deposition of Wallenstein; his behaviour.—Peace concluded with France. Reasons which influenced Richelieu. He disavows the ambassador, and obliges the emperor to consent to a revival of the treaty.—Gustavus Adolphus addresses a manifesto to the German princes. They return an answer.—Wallenstein's behaviour during his retirement.

THOUGH every attempt hitherto made for the restoration of tranquillity had proved abortive, yet so ardent was the desire for peace, that men, suffering their inclinations to outstrip their judgment, looked forward to the proceedings of the approaching diet with sanguine hopes of success; yet, when they impartially examined the views and resources of the contending parties, it was difficult to suppose, that amid the cavils and jealousies of popular discussion, so many jarring interests could be amalgamated. Exhausted by the exactions of the imperial commanders, the protestants were anxious for the termination of hostilities; but still they required some satisfactory pledge for their future security. Their endeavours indeed were confined to objects more attainable than those of their opponents; and it is highly probable, that they would have been

completely satisfied with the unmolested enjoyment of the secularized property, and the free exercise of their religion. No less offended with the arrogance and rapacity of Wallenstein, than alarmed at the aggrandisement of Austria, the catholics were scarcely less eager for peace; but in the pride of conquest they disdained to treat upon equal terms, presumptuously demanding, as the price of conciliation, the immediate restitution of all ecclesiastical benefices from the church, with an adequate compensation for the losses occasioned by the unconquerable obstinacy of their opponents. Neither was Ferdinand averse from a pacification, provided his edict was admitted as a preliminary.*

The emperor's facility in assembling a diet created universal astonishment, as a spirit of opposition was widely diffused, and complaints and murmurs were every where heard, too loud and violent to be treated with contempt. The apprehensions even of those who on all former occasions had manifested unshaken allegiance toward the imperial throne were at length awakened, for they no longer doubted that the ruin of the protestants would pave the way for their own subjugation.†

The popular manners of the Duke of Bavaria, when contrasted with the sullen haughtiness of Ferdinand, produced a comparison too mortifying for vanity to endure with patience. The ties of interest which had so long united their discordant spirits had gradually relaxed; so that it was generally expected that the jealousy excited by the favour of Wallenstein, and recently aggravated by the in-

* 1630. Schmidt, iv. 29.

† Puffendorf, i. 58.

trigues of France, would kindle into a flame, when they were mutually irritated by collision. Though the Electorate of Bavaria had hitherto escaped the calamities of war, it was impossible for the aspiring soul of its sovereign calmly to endure the superiority of a man, whose rapid elevation prematurely frustrated his splendid visions, and robbed him of the glory which he fully anticipated as the reward of victory. The preference given to the brilliant talents of Friedland had totally extinguished every spark of gratitude in Maximilian's bosom, and even prepared him for joining the enemies of Austria, when a favourable opportunity should occur.*

These considerations, however, were either entirely overlooked by imperial pride, or yielded to others which appeared more important. Without the assistance of the diet it was impracticable for Ferdinand to provide for the expenses of the Mantuan expedition, or even successfully to oppose the King of Sweden, who was actually preparing for the invasion of Pomerania; because it was dangerous any longer to persevere in a system, which had so completely alienated the affections of the nation, that every individual might be expected to join the hostile standard, when displayed in the cause of freedom. But his principal aim in convening a diet was to secure the reversion of the imperial dignity to his eldest son; and this he was persuaded could never be effected, unless the wishes of the electors were gratified.

Resolutely determined to sacrifice every thing to the attainment of that paramount object, he repaired

• 1630. Puffendorf, i. 58. Schmidt, iv. 29.

to Ratisbonne, with extraordinary pomp, toward the end of June, 1630, accompanied by the empress, and his eldest son, already King of Bohemia and Hungary. The Duke of Bavaria and the ecclesiastical electors were previously assembled to receive him, accompanied by numerous and splendid retinues, and decorated with Asiatic ostentation. The electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, however, declined attending, alleging, in their excuse, that their dominions, exhausted by the calamities of war, were utterly incapable of providing funds for so expensive a journey.* This, probably, was an exaggerated statement, but they were happy to avail themselves of a popular pretext to avoid an altercation with Ferdinand, being both predetermined to refuse their consent to the election of a King of the Romans. Neither were they entirely exempt from apprehension respecting their personal security; as in case their correspondence with Gustavus should be discovered, they had every thing to dread from the resentment of an offended despot.†

The imperial commanders appeared at the diet in a style of magnificence, which plainly shewed how great part of the plunder had been applied. But the equipages and attendants of Wallenstein eclipsed even the splendour of Maximilian and Ferdinand. Six hundred gentlemen marched in his train, whose costly attire, while it excited admiration, contrasted too strongly with the general misery to be viewed without silent imprecations.

* Unde non omnino falsa ipsorum excusatio poterat videri, ni paulo post colligendo contra Cæsarem militi thesauros fere erogassent. Burgus, 41.

† Harte, i. 165. Puffendorf, i. 58.

The situation in which the emperor had imprudently placed himself was little calculated to increase his popularity, or to ensure his tranquillity in future ; since he had not only to combat the inveteracy of his avowed opponents, but to contend against the jealousy of his apparent partisans. The former, however, he beheld with disdain, convinced that nothing could render them formidable, while he possessed the support of the catholics. And of that he appears never to have entertained the slightest suspicion ; but seriously to have flattered himself that he had completely satisfied their most romantic expectations by the “ edict of restitution,” and eternally bound their ambitious leader by raising him to the electoral dignity.* Desirous of concealing his lofty designs under the specious veil of moderation, he addressed the assembly in a studied harangue, in which he boldly asserted, that neither the origin of the war, nor its long duration, could justly be imputed to him, since he had never neglected a single opportunity which could lead to the termination of hostilities. If all attempts toward negotiation had proved abortive, the failure arose from the implacability of his opponents. The obstinacy of Frederic, in refusing to accept the conditions proposed at Mulhausen, was notorious to every member of the Germanic constitution, by the majority of whom they were approved. Instead of endeavouring to obliterate the stain of rebellion, by humbly acknowledging his fault, he actually carried on a traitorous correspondence with the external enemies of the empire ; in consequence of

* Schiller, ii.

which he exhorted the electors seriously to consider, whether he had not justly forfeited every claim to forgiveness.*

The attention of the members being diverted to objects of far greater moment, the consideration of the claims of the unfortunate Palatine was consequently suspended, though the question was revived in a subsequent session, at the instigation of the English ambassador. Anxious to obtain the reinstatement of his unhappy brother-in-law, Charles I. deputed Sir Robert Anstruther to the diet, on purpose to intercede in his behalf. Had this petition been delivered with that dignified firmness which announces resolution, and the lofty feeling of national honour, it could hardly have failed of meeting with attention; but the hereditary prejudice of the house of Stuart, in favour of prerogative, combining with the dissensions which prevailed at home, prevented the king from employing the only language to which the emperor was likely to attend. Desirous, however, of palliating the harshness of a refusal by every external token of respect, Ferdinand endeavoured to gratify the vanity of Charles by conferring upon his representative the most flattering marks of distinction.

The friends of Wallenstein, who had still a numerous party at the imperial court, contended, that nothing could be more impolitic than to drive the Palatine to despair, since it was by no means improbable that circumstances might arise, when it might be highly expedient to restore his dominions, as a necessary counterpoise to the inordinate

* Schmidt, iv. 29. Lotichius, 734.

ambition of Bavaria. But the ascendant of Maximilian again prevailed, and what he owed to gratitude he secured by fear. Ferdinand no longer dared by an equivocal declaration to leave his intentions dubious; but when pressed by Anstruther for a final answer, he, without hesitation, replied, "That in consideration of his respect for the kings of England and Spain, he would consent to recall the sentence of proscription, provided Frederic accepted the conditions already offered, and gave proofs of repentance by his submission. That indispensable ceremony being duly performed, he promised to restore that part of his dominions which was actually in the hands of the infanta Isabella."* An offer like this, however qualified, ought to have been regarded in no other light than that of adding insult to injury, and should have animated the exertions of an indignant sovereign in defence of his own and the national honour.

The political situation of Europe engrossed much of the attention of the diet, as Ferdinand endeavoured, by various arguments, to enforce the necessity of providing supplies for the prosecution of hostilities, in case his earnest endeavours for the restoration of peace should terminate unsuccessfully. "The position of Germany," he said, "was highly critical, as a coalition was forming, whose hostile designs threatened to extend the flame of war more widely than ever, unless the machinations of their enemies were rendered abortive by the vi-

* Le Vassor, ix. 446. Barre, ix. 594. Saunderson's Charles I. 143. Lotichius, i. 756. Burnet's Mem. of Hamilton. Rushworth's Hist. Collect.

† Schmidt, iv. 29. Lotichius, 734.

gorous exertions of those who adhered to the orthodox faith with pious constancy. The projects of Sweden, no longer concealed under the veil of mystery, could not escape the observation of the most shallow politician. Notwithstanding the truce concluded with Poland had given peace and security to his realm, Gustavus Adolphus continued to augment his armies with as much activity as if his dominions were threatened with an invasion. His boundless ambition, disdaining the narrow limits prescribed by nature, would never repose till it had enveloped Europe in a general conflagration." Proceeding to examine the motives which might be supposed to influence that monarch's conduct, he triumphantly asked, "of what injuries the King of Sweden had to complain? what insults had he received from the Germanic empire? on what pretence could he interfere with her internal regulations? The dispute occasioned by the occupation of Stralsund might be speedily brought to an amicable adjustment, provided Gustavus would consent to accept the mediation of Denmark. But should he perversely reject so fair an offer, it was equally for the interest and for the honour of the German nation, to prepare for the invader so warm a reception, as would make him long repent his temerity."^{*}

The Mantuan war coming next under consideration, Ferdinand attempted, with his usual duplicity, to prove that it had been a war of necessity, and that he had been compelled by the restless ambition of France to take up arms in defence of the rights and dignity of the imperial diadem. In this

* Schmidt, iv. 738.

unavoidable contest, involving the dearest interests of all the German states, full as much as it regarded his own, he could not doubt their alacrity to furnish supplies.*

Subsidiary demands to an enormous amount appearing to require some palliative, Ferdinand concluded his address in a tone of benevolence by no means natural to his feelings. After lamenting the hardships to which every part of the empire had been unfortunately exposed by the long duration of hostilities, he conjured the assembly to take into consideration the calamitous state to which their country was reduced, and to endeavour by wise and salutary regulations to provide an adequate remedy. "To alleviate the burthens of a suffering people," he said, "was the dearest wish of his heart, and was no less recommended by the dictates of prudence than enforced by the voice of humanity, since nothing could tend so effectually as their internal dissensions to promote the designs of their enemies."†

By this artful attempt to disguise rancour and ambition under the specious veil of compassion, Ferdinand expected to elude all complaint respecting the tyrannical proceedings of Wallenstein: but the indignation excited by the insolence and rapacity of that haughty chieftain was too inveterate for words to appease. Instead of simply replying to the imperial address, in the official language of flattery, they resolved to avail themselves of the only opportunity that might ever occur for obtaining effectual relief. The miseries occasioned by the

* Lotichius, 734.

† Barre, ix. 591.

licentious excesses of the imperial troops were detailed in all their enormity; compensations were demanded for the injuries sustained, and security required against their future recurrence. Of the inefficacy of remonstrances they had already experienced such inveterate proofs, that it would have been the height of credulity to have depended upon promises, without possessing the means of compelling their fulfilment. For so predominant was the influence of Friedland, that every complaint preferred against him was artfully attributed, by the Austrian ministers, to envy, excited by his pre-eminent talents, or to secret disaffection toward the head of the empire, whose legitimate prerogatives none dared to dispute, while defended by the genius of Wallenstein. These arguments, however, though indisputably supported by uncontested facts, were no longer calculated to produce their wonted effect, because they could not be acted upon with security. Even those members of the diet who had supported Ferdinand, in his most extravagant schemes, now warmly espousing the popular cause, insisted upon the removal of the only general capable of opposing Gustavus.* Imploring the emperor, in pathetic terms, to have compassion upon the sufferings of a hitherto patient people, whose silent endurance of the most galling tyranny entitled them to pity,† they intimated that a conti-

* Quem (meaning Wallenstein) odium ac nauseam humani generis vocitabant.—Puffendorf, i. 58. Galletti, i. 131.

† If Burgus be correct, and, as he was an officer in Wallenstein's army, he had every means of ascertaining the truth, the people had cause enough to complain. "Conquesti præter omnia sunt de Vollenstaino summo armorum Caesaris præfecto, illum oblique perstringentes, quod superbus homo, ambitione elatus, ad militum benevolentiam captandam, tantam exercitui concessisset licenciam, ut nihil tam facinerosum esset,

nuance of the same oppressive system might impel them to listen to the dictates of despair, and to seek that redress under the banners of Sweden, which they had ineffectually solicited from the justice and humanity of their legitimate sovereign.

The losses sustained by the different states were described in terms of merited indignation. By Brandenburg they were estimated at twenty millions of dollars, by Pomerania at ten, by Hesse Cassel at seven, and by the other members of the Germanic constitution according to the same exaggerated scale of calculation.*

Ferdinand would have willingly postponed the discussion of every other affair till he had secured the election of his son ; because, while that important question remained in suspense, he was compelled to subject his impetuous temper to many irksome restraints, as the smallest inadvertence might at once have destroyed his visionary plans of ambition. But intrigues and duplicity proved equally fruitless ; no promises could satisfy the expectations of the nation, no artifices could elude its

quod milites contra miserrimos populos non auderent ; sævire in homines, virginibus vim inferre, combusere domos, civitates devastare, depopulare provincias, pium putarent ; militaribus præceptis contineri piaculum ducerent, esse has non conservandi, sed perdendi imperii artes ; non instruendi milites, sed corrumpendi ; irritari militum petulantia populos, inde rebelliones, et bella civilia oriri."—Burgus, i. 45.

* Schmidt, iv. 29. Lotichius, i. 738, &c. Ferdinandus enim per prædatorium, et sine ordinum consensu conscriptum militem suum, solos evangelicos ordines, belli hujus curriculo, immensa auri vi emunxit, quanta, præteritis aliquot seculis, etiam extrema necessitate ingruente, a toto imperio exacta et contributa non est. *Dissertatio de Ratione Status in imperio Romano Germanico, Authore Hippolitho a Lapide.* 457.—This satirical work, which is attributed to Chemnitz, is extremely scarce, as it was suppressed by order of the Austrian government soon after its publication. (Friestadii, 1647). I am indebted to Mr. Coxe for its perusal.

discernment. Encouraged by the flattering promises of France, and confident of being supported by the whole German confederacy, the Duke of Bavaria protested against the validity of an election, which, considering the circumstances under which it must be conducted, would necessarily be deficient in a most essential point—unbiassed freedom of suffrage. In a city surrounded by the imperial troops, the decision of the electors could not fail to be treated as the effect of compulsion, and of course as illegal. “What necessity,” said Maximilian, in a tone of defiance, “exists any longer for maintaining such numerous armies, except to render the Duke of Friedland as much an object of terror to the German princes, as he is an object of detestation to the people?”*

Ferdinand, though represented by many historians as not naturally cruel and vindictive, was assuredly more sensible to the voice of interest than to the calls of humanity. The sympathy of a despot is rarely awakened by the distresses of those whom Providence has subjected to his fury; but if not totally insensible to the suggestion of prudence, he will sometimes assume the garb of mercy, when necessary, to appease the murmurs of an indignant people, rendered formidable by despair. Perceiving therefore that nothing would satisfy the diet but a partial acquiescence with their demands,

* Barre, ix. 591. Ferdinandus, ut in aliis omnibus, ita etiam in hoc passu, fidei a se datæ, uno impetu perupit, ac pro lubitu suo, generalem exercituum ducem in imperio, Wallenstemum, sopitis jam fere publicis turbis, et discrimine omni submoto, creavit. De Rut. Stat. 464. Licet imperatori nomen istud, quod caput imperii, tam in militaribus, quam in civilibus, cit, tribuatur; jus tamen creandi supremum belli ducem, imperium sibi reservavit. Ibid. 506.

he judged it expedient to comply, rather than to hazard his authority in a precarious contest. He accordingly consented* to disband eighteen thousand of his bravest troops, flattering himself, by this act of condescension, to silence the jealousy of the electors, and to render them more tractable in future.

It is but fair to acknowledge, that Ferdinand was placed in a most critical situation, and that it would have required extraordinary talents to extricate him with credit from a maze of difficulties which became gradually more intricate as he advanced. Temerity, perhaps, would have been the resort of wisdom, because to desperate diseases none but desperate remedies should be applied. Ferdinand, however, was desirous of reconciling so many discordant interests, that it was out of his power to act with decision, or to meet the danger with a resolution adequate to its urgency. The scruples of religion (for though frequently misguided by intemperate zeal, religion undoubtedly formed the master-spring of all his actions,) could hardly fail to interfere with the bold suggestions of ambition; neither was it easy to reconcile the timid counsels of friars, who aimed at accomplishing their insidious designs by the tortuous paths of intrigue, with the lofty projects of Wallenstein, whose ardent courage panted to overturn by force of arms every intervening obstacle, that obstructed his passage to uncontrolled authority. The former, regarding the enforcement of the edict of restitution as the principal object to be effected, when policy suggested the necessity of its suspension during a

* *Pio sed pernicioso consilio.*—Burgus, 47. Pfeffel, ii. 312.

limited period, as the surest expedient for preventing the protestants from uniting with Sweden, they positively denied, that the imperial prerogative extended to such profanation. "Ecclesiastical property," they presumptuously contended, "was independent of all human control: to protect it was the noblest duty of royalty, but to alienate it exceeded its utmost prerogatives." Addressing themselves to the weakness of the pious monarch, they further asserted, "that, by permitting the church to be robbed of her possessions, he became no less criminal in the judgment of Heaven than if he had appropriated the spoil to the profanest uses. For what purpose," they asked, "had Providence crowned his arms with uninterrupted success, except that he might employ his victorious cohorts in defence of the orthodox faith?" They further insisted, that "he was irresistibly called upon to display his gratitude by some immediate act of beneficence toward those, whose unwearied supplications had drawn blessings on all his undertakings, instead of deferring the execution to a distant period, when it might possibly never be accomplished."* Wallenstein, on the contrary, whose sagacity foresaw the gathering storm, expatiated upon the imprudence of reducing the army at the decisive moment when he was about to gather the long expected harvest of all his fatigues. "The spirit of opposition, which had so unexpectedly shewn itself in the diet, arose entirely," he strenuously contended, "from the indecision of the emperor, and the secret promises of Sweden. To reduce the factious to silence, and to complete the

* Pfeffel, ii. 312.

subjugation of Germany, required nothing except a little perseverance in the same salutary system, which had hitherto been pursued with so much advantage and glory. The menaces of Gustavus he affected to treat with a levity bordering on contempt, arrogantly boasting, that if the hardy Goth should be rash enough to hazard his reputation on German ground, he would drive him back again with a rod.*

Though the wisdom of this advice could not be easily controverted, Ferdinand wanted resolution to pursue it; imprudently resorting to a middle system equally distant from the opposite extremes, by which he hoped to appease the violence of party without exposing the empire to a general convulsion.† Maximilian, being perfectly acquainted with the emperor's prejudice in favour of the priesthood, and wishing to protract the decision, combatted the opinions of the Jesuits, by artfully suggesting, that no stain had attached to his immediate predecessors on the imperial throne, for having sacrificed the pretended interests of the church to the peace of the empire. He readily admitted (for had he ventured to reduce the clergy to a level with the laity, his arguments would have lost all their weight), that it was the paramount duty of a Christian sovereign to shield the ministers of religion from every insult; but, he contended, that a monarch had other obligations no less urgent to perform; and that it would be highly criminal to risk

* Barre, ix. 593. Nani, viii.

† The *mezzo termine*, so highly extolled by the politicians of Italy, is perhaps the most dangerous course that a statesman can pursue in a difficult crisis, yet it is usually that to which most men resort, who value themselves on that questionable quality, called prudence.

the tranquillity of a mighty nation, in pursuit of an object which he was by no means certain to accomplish. The resources of the protestants were, in his estimation, far more considerable than their adversaries were disposed to admit, and if united with those of a foreign foe they might bid defiance to the power of Austria.*

These insinuations were admirably calculated to produce the effect which Maximilian wished, as they tended to reconcile the jarring counsels of pride and prudence. Ferdinand, however, was unable to conquer his religious scruples, and preferred to expose himself to any extremities rather than incur ecclesiastical censures. By deferring the decision to some future period, he hoped to assuage the fears of the protestants, without offending the pious delicacy of those whom he venerated with an adoration approaching to idolatry.†

In justice to Ferdinand, we are bound to acknowledge, that almost every thing conduced to thwart his projects, or to mislead his judgment. The policy of terminating hostilities with France was either felt, or pretended, by all the princes of Germany, as a necessary preliminary to a rupture with Sweden. This opinion coinciding with the projects of Richelieu, an embassy was appointed to Ratisbonne. But that sagacious minister having objects in contemplation, far more interesting to the glory and prosperity of France than the most favourable conclusion of the Mantuan war, it was essential to employ in this important mission the talents of an able negociator; and those talents were found under the humble garb of a mendicant

* Schmidt, iv. 18.

† Ibid.

friar. Francis Tremblai, so justly celebrated in the annals of diplomacy, by the title of Father Joseph, the name he assumed upon taking the habit of St. Francis, possessed, in an eminent degree, every quality requisite to deceive. Under the mask of austere piety, and an affected indifference for all worldly concerns, lurked the aspiring soul of a statesman, and a genius commensurate with the most arduous undertakings.* By a minister less discerning than Richelieu, this extraordinary man might have been suffered to waste his transcendent faculties in indolently begging from door to door, some scanty pittance for the convent, or in cultivating a garden with his fellow-drones; while his aspiring soul spurned at an occupation in which unlettered piety was more likely to succeed, than the splendid endowments of a Leo X. or a Julius II.

* I find the following anecdotes in Harte, which he professes to have taken from a Latin MS. written by a Carmelite friar. According to this account, Father Joseph was descended from the ancient family of Le Clerc, and born 1579. His youth was passed in scientific pursuits, in manly exercises, and in the practice of arms; at Padua he perfected himself in mathematics and jurisprudence; at Rome he studied men and politics. He next visited Germany and England, made himself acquainted with the constitutions of both countries; and, though he travelled with little expense, frequented none except persons of eminence. At the age of twenty-three, he assumed the habit of St. Francis, in direct contradiction to the advice of his friends, who thought him better qualified for a military life. By his interest with the great he procured considerable benefactions to the order, and undertook the department of superintending the missionaries sent to preach the gospel in the East Indies. He talked most of the modern languages fluently, and was particularly distinguished for his acuteness in conducting a theological dispute. The pious biographer proceeds to inform us, that his hero refused a cardinal's hat; but, as he produces no authority to confirm the assertion, I feel as little inclined to give credit to it, as I do the miracles of his protecting saint. Richelieu, who outlived his confidant, was too well acquainted with the talents and ambition of that extraordinary man, to have exalted him to a situation in which they might have proved dangerous even to himself.—Harte, i. 183.

The latent spark, which required only the fostering breath of power to kindle into a resplendent flame, when cherished by the kindred mind of Richelieu became a refulgent luminary in the political hemisphere. The address manifested by Father Joseph, in the management of a secret negociation at Rome, attracted the cardinal's notice, who discovered a spirit analogous to his own in the man, whom monastic ignorance disdained as a weak and visionary enthusiast. He perceived that the ostentatious piety of the monk proceeded from policy, and not from conviction; and, as he valued accomplishments far more than sanctity, he called the hypocrite from his cell to act a distinguished part on the splendid theatre of the world. Disdaining mediocrity in any station, the aspiring monk, from the very moment he abjured the pleasures of life, aimed at celebrity by the only methods which poverty offered. Severe in penance, fervent in prayer, and exemplary in the performance of all the minor duties of a monastic vocation, he perhaps looked forward with mortified ambition to the honours of canonization, when they were the only honours within his grasp. But no sooner did the career of earthly glory expand to his dazzled sight, than he embraced it with all the ardour of a man, who, after a long and tedious banishment, finds himself restored to the society of those, whose feelings and language correspond with his own; while by his subsequent actions he plainly shewed, that in assuming the penitential habit of St. Francis, he mistook his vocation, and that if he ever obtained a place in the Roman calendar, it would not be acquired by the virtues of a martyr.*

* Le Vassor, ix. 425. Leon Brulart, his colleague in the embassy,

The partiality of Ferdinand toward the monastic habit pointed out the cupuchin as the fittest instrument that duplicity could employ to overreach him: for, while the austerity of his manners inspired veneration, it was hardly possible for the pious emperor to suspect, that the man he admired was more deeply versed in the writings of Macchiavel than in those of St. Jerome. But as it would neither have been consistent with the humility of his profession, nor decorous in the eyes of the German people, to invest a votary of St. Francis with the pomp inseparable from the representative of an illustrious monarch, the cardinal cast his eyes upon Leon de Brulart, at that time ambassador in Switzerland, as likely to be satisfied with the external shew, without presuming to dive into the mysteries of the mission.*

The expectations of Richelieu were completely justified by the event, as the monastic diplomatist was treated by the emperor with as much respect as would have been paid to an angel from heaven.†

drew the following portrait of him, in a private letter: "Ce capucin n'a rien d'un chretien, que le nom, ni d'un religieux que son froc, et sa corde. Jamais on ne vit une dissimulation plus profonde, ni une plus trompeuse duplicité. Imbu des maximes de la politique la plus rafinée, il s'est uniquement appliqué a surprendre les princes d'Allemagne, a mepriser toutes les regles de la bienséance, et de l'honnêteté, et ne s'est jamais proposé d'autre but, que ce qui serait plus utile, et plus propre a lui assurer les bonnes graces du Cardinal de Richelieu."

* Grimoard, ii. 35.

† The author of the *Speculum Theopoliticum*, supposed to be Ferdinand's confessor, thus describes his veneration for the clergy. "Mortallium neminem in terris æque reveritus est, atque sacerdotes, in quibus omnibus divinum numen venerabatur, atque honorabat. Auditus est non sine admiratione dicere, occurrentibus sibi eodem loco, ac tempore, angelo et sacerdote, se primum sacerdoti, deinde angelo honoris officium persolvaturum." Caput, ix.

In vain did the ministers of Spain and Savoy explain the secret projects of the Parisian court, insisting that the real object of the embassy was to create disunion in the electoral college, and impede the election of a King of the Romans. A single word from the friar produced a stronger effect upon the pious emperor than the most elaborate discourse from the unhallowed mouth of a mundane counsellor.

The arrival of a pompous legation from France, by giving a novel direction to the public opinion, suspended for a moment the fall of Wallenstein: for, singular as it may appear, the intervention of Louis was regarded alike by the catholics and protestants as a subject of universal gratulation. It gratified the former, because it displayed an interest in the politics of Germany, which could only be attributed to jealousy of Austria, whose power they were anxious to reduce. Scarcely less sanguine in their expectations, the latter persuaded themselves, that whatever might be the motive which actuated the son of Henry, whether he intended openly to favour the enterprizes of Sweden, or merely to counterbalance the influence of Spain, it must prove ultimately beneficial to themselves, since it was hardly possible for the imagination to figure to itself a political revolution, from which no eventual good should accrue.

It is probable that Richelieu, in proposing a negotiation, never seriously intended to pursue it, but regarded the sanctity of a diplomatic character to be the safest covering for intrigue. At least it is certain, that the termination of the dispute respecting the succession of Mantua, being at best a secondary consideration, was left to the capacity or the

incapacity of Brulart, as the crafty friar had business to transact of a more urgent nature, which entirely engrossed his attention. The main object of his instructions being to procure the deposition of Wallenstein, it was to the accomplishment of that important point that all his artifices were directed. To remove from the command of the Austrian armies a general, who had led them from victory to victory, at the moment when the greatest warrior of the age was preparing to penetrate into the heart of Germany, was an enterprize worthy of the genius of Richelieu.*

The singularity of the attempt, combining with the period at which it was made, has induced many writers to assert, that the abasement of Austria was previously planned between the minister of France and the chiefs of the catholic party; but this opinion appears to have been hastily taken up in consequence of the event, and to be unsupported by any authority. To form a rational judgment of the whole transaction, we should indentify the feelings and the prejudices of the German princes at this momentous crisis, their exalted notions of their own military skill, and the contempt with which they viewed the troops and tactics of all other nations. Under these circumstances we shall no longer be induced to tax them with pride and presumption for believing, that after the reduction of the imperial army, and the removal of its haughty commander, neither generals nor men would be wanting to chastise the temerity of Sweden.† Was it consistent

* 1630. Schmidt, iv. 29. Schiller, ii.

† Independently of the Italian army, the Austrian forces amounted to forty thousand men, and those of the League to thirty thousand.—Schmidt, iv. 29.

with reason, much less with vanity, to believe that the barbarous sovereign of a half-civilized people, that the King of Finland and Lapland, whose name had never reached the genial regions of southern Germany, should be destined to change the destinies of Europe? The dominions of the Goth were too poor, too remote, and too defective in population, to inspire the smallest apprehension. By those confident statesmen the wars and politics of Sweden had been contemplated with the same haughty indifference with which they viewed the savage incursions of undisciplined Tartars, or of the wandering robbers of Arabia.*

The intrigues of the diet for the humiliation of Wallenstein were resumed with greater ardour than ever, when his enemies were assured of the co-operation of Richelieu. Even the Spanish ambassador was impolitic enough to unite in the prevailing cry, and to solicit the dismissal of the only general capable of supporting the fortunes of Austria. Still however their united efforts might have proved ineffectual, had not the irresolution of the emperor been at length overcome by the artful insinuations of Father Joseph. Concealing his attack under the appearance of zeal for the welfare and glory of Ferdinand, he dexterously suggested, that it would be acting conformably to the dictates of prudence to remove a man whose arrogance had justly rendered him unpopular,† because little

* Schmidt, v. 1.

† Piacsius, 410, thus describes the oppression of Wallenstein: "*Et simul insolens militis alendi introducta ratio, invitis provinciarum populis, eo onere contra præscriptum antiquarum sanctionum imperialium gravatis, idque nulla æquabili moderatione servata, sed licentiæ militaris arbitrio, ut civitates et oppida quasi in prædam datæ, a receptis hospitio,*

doubt could be entertained that in return for this concession, the diet would immediately gratify his wishes, by proceeding to the election of a King of the Romans. The loss sustained by the absence of that victorious commander could not be attended with serious consequences, since the moment the emperor had accomplished the mighty object upon which parental affection was so meritoriously bent, he might replace the Duke of Friedland at the head of his armies, and by conferring upon him additional titles and estates, obliterate the mortification of a temporary disgrace.

An opinion, delivered with prophetic emphasis by so persuasive an advocate, dissipated all the scruples of Ferdinand; yet it is possible that jealousy might not be without its share in deciding the question: for though he exercised an authority over the whole of Germany more absolute than any of his predecessors, it was an humiliating reflection for Austrian pride, to feel that he was indebted for this unprecedented splendour to the genius of a man, who a few years before was confounded among the crowd of Bohemian nobles. Neither was it easy for him to believe, that the hand which had raised the tremendous fabric was deficient in strength to overturn it.* In proportion, however, to the extent of Wallenstein's power, the difficulty of re-

seu præsidiî imperatorii titulo militibus, stipendiorum nomine diriperentur, conniventibus ad omnia eorum præfectis. Isti enim non aliud responsum dabant ea de re conquerentibus, nisi quod imperator mallet suos subditos habere pauperes, quam rebelles."

* Ferdinand's heart was not very accessible to gratitude. "Cum acerrimè Fridlandi abdicationem urgerent electores, inter alias hac quoque usi ratione, quod Meelenburgica ditio facilius *inermi* quam *armato*, avelli possit."—Puffendorf, i. 58.—How far this suggestion operated, subsequent events prevented posterity from ascertaining.

moving him augmented ; and should he refuse obedience to the imperial mandate, as his enemies artfully suggested, it was impossible to foresee to what dangerous lengths he might be hurried by passion and resentment.* From an army entirely of his own creation, and implicitly devoted to his commands by the united impulse of interest, fear, and admiration, what a formidable opposition might arise. The immensity of his wealth, the fruit of extortion, afforded funds for supporting the partners of his triumphs, should he bid defiance to the imperial authority, while his unbounded vanity would feel the indignity with the keenest sensibility. His behaviour, however, upon this trying occasion was widely different from that which was anticipated by the fears of his friends, or foretold by the malice of his adversaries. Perceiving that the influence of the Bavarian faction was about to prevail, he retired to Memminghen, a town in Suabia, to await the event in apparent indifference, but more probably with the design of shaping his future course as the stars and Seni might admonish. Fearful of irritating a spirit so alive to glory, and so impetuous in all its decisions, the emperor resolved to proceed with the utmost circumspection, and he accordingly selected two of Wallenstein's friends to convey the tidings of his disgrace,† with directions to soften the unwelcome message by the most flattering assurances of esteem.

* Certe maximum est, et prodigio proximum, quod et Cæsar electoribus, et Walsteinius Cæsari obsecutus est. De Comitibus Ratisbonæ celebratis epist.—Theod. Berenici Norici.

† Questenberg and Werdenberg, both men of rank, and filling distinguished offices.—Lotichius, i. 755. Schmidt, iv. 29. Swedish Intelligencer, i. 11.

Wallenstein was previously acquainted with the purport of their visit, before the messengers of Ferdinand arrived; and though his bosom was convulsed by conflicting passions, the serenity of his countenance was far from indicating the tempest that raged within. "The emperor is betrayed," said the Duke of Friedland, producing an astronomical calculation, "the ascendant of Bavaria prevails; but as the conduct of Ferdinand is the result of necessity rather than of inclination, I feel disposed to pity and to forgive him. The result of his determination is no secret to me; on the contrary, I clearly foresee that he is destined to repent the imprudent sacrifice which he has been tempted to make; I will not, however, resist his orders."

This unexpected composure no less astonished than delighted his friends, who were prepared for a very different reception; and whom he now dismissed with magnificent presents, and a letter to the emperor, imploring him to continue his protection and favour, in the submissive language of respect.*

That the haughtiest of human beings should have bowed submissively to a decree which seemed at once to level his proudest hopes, was a subject of universal astonishment. But it would have been inconsistent with the character of that extraordinary man to have acted a natural part; and as he was firmly persuaded that his meridian splendour was obscured only by a transient cloud, he looked forward with confidence to the happy moment when it should burst forth more refulgent than

* Schiller, ii. Barre, ix. 593. Galetti, i. 133.

ever. Such at least was the opinion of those, who viewed his actions in a favourable light;* others indeed pretended, that having deliberately weighed in the scale of prudence the probable consequences of resistance, he discovered that by prematurely throwing off the mask, he might forfeit the pleasure of revenge. As yet his preparations were incomplete. His estates, though immense, were scattered in different provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, and might be easily seized by the activity of his enemies, before he could arrive to defend them. With these the nerve of his power would be lost; and he was inclined to think too ill of mankind to believe that human fortitude could resist the bait, should they be held out as a temptation to treachery. To time alone he trusted for redress, resolved not to impair his future prospects by his own temerity.† That his career of glory was not finally closed, the astrologer Seni, in whose predictions he confided with the credulity of a child, had plainly discovered from the planets; yet it was unnecessary to recur to supernatural sources to illustrate a fact, which a volume more accessible to human infirmity might have clearly unfolded. The approach of an enemy like Gustavus Adolphus could hardly fail to summon from his inglorious retreat the greatest general that Austria possessed.

Want of firmness in one essential point usually leads to imprudent concessions in others. After sacrificing Wallenstein to the intrigues and jealousy

* Among these was Nani, who expresses his admiration in the following words: "restando dubbio, sè apparisce maggiore nel esercitare il commando, ò ne'l lasciarlo, viii.

† Schiller, ii.

of Maximilian, it was in vain for Ferdinand to contend against the impetuous current of popular opinion, in a question still more important to prerogative. It had long been a subject of serious complaint, that the Mantuan war had been undertaken without obtaining the concurrence of, and even without consulting the diet, who affected to construe this contemptuous neglect into a flagrant breach of their constitutional privileges, and not without an appearance of reason; because the troops which had been ordered to cross the Alps formed part of the army of the empire. Ferdinand ineffectually endeavoured to elude the attack by expatiating upon the necessity of an unanimous effort to oppose the common enemy of the papal religion; flattering himself, that if he should succeed in exciting their apprehensions for the safety of the church, he might depend upon their cordial concurrence. Contrary, however, to his expectations, the proposal was received with an indifference more demonstrative of courage than of foresight. Every consideration relative to personal security was absorbed in the idea of prescribing bounds to the exorbitant power of Austria. Encouraged by the facility with which they had hitherto carried all controverted points, they proceeded with ardour in the work of humiliation, requiring from the emperor a positive assurance that he would never more engage in a foreign war without the consent of the diet. They further required, that he should immediately establish so rigid a discipline, that no member of the empire might have any thing to fear from the licentious conduct of his army.*

* 1630. Swedish Intelligencer, i. 12.

Mortifying as these concessions must have appeared to the unbending spirit of Ferdinand, it was impossible for him to withhold his assent without risking an open rupture; and having thus sacrificed the fruit of many painful years of fatigue and dissimulation, he felt secure of meeting with a grateful return. But no sooner did he urge the election of his son than he plainly discovered his error. Various causes for delay were successively started. The unquiet state of the empire was alleged by some as a satisfactory reason for deferring the discussion; by others it was argued, that the forms of the constitution expressly required that the ceremony should take place at Francfort, and not at Ratisbonne; while the two protestant electors, deriving courage from the general confusion, boldly declared, that they would never consent to continue the imperial crown in the Austrian family, till the edict of restitution should be revoked.* The eyes of Ferdinand were at length opened to the danger that surrounded him; when too late to retract he repented his concessions, and plainly discovered that he had been made the dupe of an unprincipled friar.†

The prospect of an immediate rupture with Sweden making it necessary to appoint a successor to Wallenstein, the ambition of Maximilian, secure of the support of the Catholic League, aspired openly to that important command. The difficulty of the times, so argued his numerous partisans, required that the most cordial harmony should

* Grimoard, ii. 64.

† The hypocrisy of Father Joseph made so deep an impression on the mind of Ferdinand, that he was often heard publicly to say, "that a capuchin friar had disarmed an emperor with his rosary, and covered six electoral bonnets with his cowl.—Schiller, ii.

subsist between the army of Austria and that of the League; and the surest means of preventing dissensions, would be to place them both under the orders of the same commander. The valour and skill displayed by the Duke of Bavaria in the Bohemian war, his prudence, power, and popularity, seemed to point him out as the only general to whom this important commission could be securely entrusted. In the estimation of Ferdinand, however, these were insuperable obstacles. When placed at the head of the united forces of Austria and the League, what might not his ambition attempt! The imperial crown might be for ever wrested from the House of Hapsburg; neither was this improbable, since the secret emissaries of the emperor pretended to have discovered, that a project was actually formed, with the knowledge and approbation of the Electors of Mayence, Cologne, and Saxony, for transferring the sceptre to Bavaria, after the death of its present possessor.*

The bare suspicion of a design, so decidedly hostile to the aspiring projects of Austria, was sufficient to awaken the ancient jealousies, which had long subsisted between the ancestors of Maximilian and those of Ferdinand.† Though secretly resolved to elude the demand, the emperor was sensible, that the strength and popularity of the new elector would make it dangerous to offend him by an open and unqualified refusal; he therefore had

* Et dubiò procul Cæsar elegisset heroem, agnatum, fortem, splendidum, fortunatum, circumspectum, nisi secretò aliud insusurrasset communis illa principum noverca, ratio status nuncupata.—Lotichius, i. 760. *Memoires de Louise Juliane*, 294.

† Eam esse electoris Bavari eminentiam, ut jurisdictionem illam militarem non nisi absolutam sit admissurus. Ut plus etiam illi, quam Friedlando, debeatur. *Ibid.*

recourse to the arts of intrigue, and, without formally resisting the wishes of the catholics, annexed to the exalted dignity of generalissimo a thousand irksome conditions, at which the pride of Maximilian was sure to revolt. This necessarily led to a protracted negotiation, and ended in a compromise, by which the command was conferred upon Tilly, the friend and client of Maximilian.*

Nothing now remained to occupy the assembly except to terminate hostilities with Louis; and as it became requisite to recal the troops from Italy, in order to oppose the progress of the Swedes, the emperor embraced the resolution of concluding a peace, though it necessarily involved some unavoidable sacrifices of pride and prerogative. But, admitting that it was evidently for the interest of Austria to put an end to the Mantuan war, it should naturally follow, that to have protracted the contest would have been equally advantageous to France; because it served to divide the attention of Ferdinand, instead of permitting him to concentrate the whole of his force in the north of Germany, when threatened by the valour of Gustavus. It would be unjustly depreciating the sagacity of Richelieu, to suppose him blind to so obvious a truth; yet, though he clearly distinguished the line of conduct which it would have been most advisable for him to pursue, he was no longer at liberty to adopt it. The constitution of Louis, naturally delicate, was ill calculated to struggle against the violence of a malady, which his physicians pronounced to be mortal. In the event of his death, the crown devolved to the Duke of Orleans, a weak

* 1630. Lotichius, i. 760. Barre, ix. 544. Schmidt, iv. 29.

and volatile prince, alternately governed by his mother and his favourites. His hatred of the cardinal, whose interests had long been at variance with his own, must unavoidably have exposed that haughty minister to the full weight of royal resentment. Richelieu had therefore no alternative left, except to brave the storm with unshaken fortitude; or to endeavour to avert it, by the powerful protection of his ancient mistress; and by gratifying her inclination in an important point, he hoped to obliterate the remembrance of past ingratitude. To have embraced the former, required a degree of magnanimity which conscious integrity could alone inspire, but to which the cardinal's heart was a stranger; for, however bold he might appear, when dispensing the favours and exerting all the authority of the crown, he bent beneath the blast of adversity with more than female timidity. The partiality of Mary toward the Spanish court, had rendered her, from its commencement, averse to the war; and this dislike was considerably increased by the apprehension of the danger to which France might be exposed by losing its sovereign at that critical period. These considerations appeared to the cardinal too weighty to be despised, and he accordingly dispatched a courier to Father Joseph, with positive directions to terminate hostilities upon any conditions.*

Aware of the embarrassment in which he might be involved, should Louis recover, and Richelieu disavow his instructions, the artful monk declined affixing his name to the instrument, under pretext

* Le Vassor, ix. 449.

that it would be totally inconsistent with the rules of propriety for him to subscribe it, as he was not invested with any public character. The imperial ministers, however, were not so easily deceived. They knew that he alone possessed the confidence, and was entrusted with all the secrets of the cardinal, and positively refused to be bound by any conditions which he objected to sanction. The disciple of St. Francis being now compelled to submit, the following treaty was concluded :

“ That in consideration of the harmony which should in future prevail between the courts of Vienna and Paris, their sovereigns engaged neither openly to attack each others dominions, nor to afford assistance to any foreign power, with whom they might be engaged in hostilities.

“ That the Duke of Guastalla, in consequence of a pension to be regularly paid out of the revenues of the duchy of Mantua, should cede all his claims to the Duke of Nevers.

“ That upon the latter soliciting, in respectful language, the investiture of the duchy, and acknowledging its dependence upon the imperial throne, the emperor would immediately confer it, and within a stated period withdraw his troops from the fortresses which they actually occupied.

“ That the Spaniards should likewise evacuate Piedmont, upon condition that the French should repass the Alps.”*

A compensation was allotted to the Duke of Savoye, for the loss of Susa, Pignerol, and some other towns of inferior value, retained by Louis.

* This treaty may be found at length in Dumont's valuable collection, v. partie ii. 615.

The republic of Venice and the Duke of Lorraine were expressly comprehended in the negotiation, upon conditions highly favourable to their interests.

The general sentiment excited by the foregoing convention, was very far from conforming to the expectations of those, by whom it had been negotiated. All parties, on the contrary, appeared equally dissatisfied. When Ferdinand reflected upon the numerous sacrifices to which he had been tempted by the fallacious promises of Father Joseph, he grew enraged at his folly, for having suffered piety to get the better of prudence; yet felt himself entangled among so many difficulties, that it was too late to think of retracting. The Duke of Mantua complained that his territories were dismembered, even without the empty ceremony of asking his consent; more sensible to the trifling losses he sustained, than to the permanent tenure which they ensured. The pride of the Venetians, though certainly treated with greater attention, was offended at the indifference of Louis, forgetting that they had lost all political consequence with the invaluable commerce of Asia. It would have been a proper compliment, they thought, to the dignity of the senate, to have deferred the signature till the arrival of their ambassador, who was actually on his journey to Ratisbonne. The Spaniards were still more severely mortified at the neglect they experienced: accustomed to take the lead in every negotiation, they could not endure the humiliation of being obliged to abide by the arbitration of others, in a question so interesting to themselves.*

* Le Vassor, ix. 451. Barre, ix. 596.

The recovery of Louis having released the cardinal from all his apprehensions, he attempted, by a flagrant violation of truth, to correct the imprudence which timidity had induced him to commit. Determined that nothing should engage him to ratify the article which *precluded France from assisting her allies, should they become the enemies of Austria*, he endeavoured to preserve the honour of his master, by accusing the negociators with having acted in contradiction to their positive instructions; without deigning to reflect, that in return for an engagement so important to Ferdinand at that perilous crisis, he had acceded to the proposals of the French plenipotentiaries respecting the evacuation of Mantua. Brulart was not only reprimanded for disobedience of orders, but received an absolute injunction to follow the emperor to Vienna, to declare that his master was resolved to withhold his ratification till the objectionable clause should be expunged; and, in order to give a more serious air to this ridiculous farce, the monk, upon his arrival at Paris, was refused access to his former patron, and commanded to retire into a cloister. This disgrace, however, was of short duration; and, after a few weeks passed in monastic seclusion, he appeared at court a greater favourite than ever.*

It was during the sitting of the diet that a manifesto was received from the King of Sweden, explanatory of his motives for taking up arms. They were exposed in a long and elaborate memorial,† from which it will be sufficient for our present purpose to extract a few of the leading articles. He began by complaining, “that in the year 1625,

* La Vassor, ix. 451. Barre, ix. 596.

† Lotichius, i. 782.

while engaged in hostilities with Poland, Ferdinand had caused a Swedish courier to be intercepted, charged with dispatches of infinite importance, the contents of which had been published with the grossest misrepresentations, and the messenger treated with gratuitous cruelty. Not satisfied with offering this unpardonable insult to an independent sovereign, he had assisted Sigismund with troops and money, had encouraged him by promises to continue the war, and even issued a proclamation forbidding the Swedes to recruit in Germany, a privilege common to all the nations of Europe: that, in direct contradiction to the established principles of justice, and in violation of the forms of the Germanic constitution, he had deprived the Dukes of Mecklenberg of their dominions, both of whom were allied to Gustavus by the strictest ties of friendship; that he had occupied several towns on the shores of the Baltic, and equipped a navy, with a view to usurp the sovereignty of that sea, though universally acknowledged by the law of nations to be subject to the jurisdiction of Sweden; that he had seized and confiscated her trading vessels, and interrupted her commerce with the Hanseatic cities; that he had laid siege to Stralsund, though avowedly placed under the protection of Gustavus, and had even excluded his ambassadors from the congress at Lubec, when they appeared to prefer their just complaints.* That he had presumed to declare the King of Sweden by a public document an

* Legati ipsius modò non cum contemptu rejecti sunt, sed etiam minis in illos sævitum est; nisi a Lubecca, immo Germaniæ finibus, excedant, fore ut omnia expectant ultima.—Lotichius, 784.

enemy to the Germanic empire, and had sanctioned by his approbation certain scurrilous writings, in which the character of Gustavus was falsely traduced, and his power derided.”*

Instead of openly resenting these acts of injustice, the king affirmed, “that he preferred to seek satisfaction by pacific attempts. Remonstrances had been presented to the electoral college, but had been treated with silent contempt. Not satisfied with neglecting his just demands, the catholic members had purposely omitted to give him the title of king.” Having thus stated his griefs with becoming dignity, he concluded by regretting, in pathetic language, that all his endeavours to prevent the effusion of human blood had hitherto been rendered abortive. “Humanity,” he said, “had induced him to stifle his resentment, but should the emperor continue to reject his complaints, as the sovereign and protector of an independent nation, he must stand acquitted before God and his fellow-creatures, should he resort to those means with which Providence had entrusted him, for asserting the unquestionable prerogatives of his crown, and the rights and interests of his people.”†

Depending for justification upon the integrity of his motives, and anxious to avoid a sinister interpretation, Gustavus directed Oxenstiern, his confidential minister, to repair to Dantzic, for the pur-

* Galetti, i. 148.

† Εἰσην μὲν γὰρ μετὰ μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ, καὶ πρῖνοντος, καλλίσον ἐστὶ κτήμα καὶ λυσιτελεσάτον· μετὰ δὲ κακίας καὶ δουλείας ἰπποειδίου, πάντων αἰσχύσον καὶ βλαβερωτάτον. Polyb. ii. 31. T. 2. p. 79. ed. Schweigh.

Dumont, v. ii. 609. Harte, i. 144. Barre, ix. 591. Swedish Intelligence, i. 43.—In justification of his own conduct he says, “tametsi omnium singulatum exactissimè deponderare velim, non inuenio, quo jure, quoque titulo, proesentis belli causa mihi sit imputanda.—Lotichius, i. 798.

pose of communicating with the Count of Dohna, the Austrian ambassador. But it soon became apparent, that it was far from the intention of the imperial cabinet to remove the obstructions to peace : on the contrary, it was evident, that their only object was to ascertain to what the preparations of Sweden amounted, and if possible to embroil her with the senate of Dantzic, in order to deprive her of the facilities afforded for recruiting. The partisans of Austria having totally misrepresented the objects of Sweden, the chancellor of Gustavus was publicly insulted in the streets ; and deeming it unbecoming his sacred character again to expose himself to a similar outrage, he proposed to Dohna to adjourn the conferences to Elbing, or to any other city which combined convenience and security in an equal degree. Convinced by the Austrian's reply that his professions were insincere, Oxenstiern thought it expedient to bring the negotiation to a speedy issue by producing the outline of a treaty, the counterpart of that intended to have been submitted to the congress at Lubec, had an opportunity been allowed for presenting it, which he delivered as the ultimatum of Sweden.

“ The imperial troops were required to evacuate the circles of Upper and Lower Saxony, to demolish the forts erected on the shores of the Baltic, and to allow to all its maritime cities uninterrupted freedom of commerce. The court of Vienna was further called upon to suspend her naval armaments ; to re-establish Bogislaus, and all the other princes of the protestant persuasion in the full possession of their legal prerogatives ; to reinstate the Dukes of Mecklenburg, who if really criminal might be brought to trial before a competent tribunal, and subjected in

consequence to whatever penalties an impartial judgment might award. Some compensation was also required for the injuries sustained by the inhabitants of Stralsund, from the unjustifiable aggression of Wallenstein."

To these proposals the Austrian plenipotentiary hastily replied, that terms so degrading could be dictated only at the head of a victorious army. All farther communication accordingly ceased, and the king prepared to assert his rights at the head of his warlike battalions.*

Gustavus's threats do not seem to have produced any great sensation at Ratisbonne; but as it would have been inconsistent with the electoral dignity to have allowed the imputations to pass unnoticed, the following answer was returned:—That the injuries complained of did not appear sufficient to justify an appeal to the sword, because the court of Vienna had not been accused of any overt act of hostility. With regard to the omission at which he was offended, they solemnly protested, that it did not arise from want of respect, but was strictly conformable to ancient precedents; it having never been customary for the German princes to address an elective sovereign by the regal title. Disclaiming all interference concerning the duchies of Mecklenberg, they declared the decision of that important question to be an unalienable branch of the imperial prerogative; "it belonged," they asserted, "to the emperor alone to dispossess a rebellious member, and Ferdinand had therefore exercised a legitimate right in punishing an undutiful vassal." Proceeding in the same submissive style they at-

* 1630. Burgus, i. 34.

tempted to vindicate the behaviour of their chief during the Polish war, pretending that it would have been utterly inconsistent with the united characters of a brother, and an ally, to have refused his assistance to Sigismund; but as the states of the empire took no part in the contest, they were surprised to hear that the preparations of Gustavus were directed against some of its members. Still however it was in his power to terminate the contest by an amicable discussion, and should he be disposed to act with moderation, they declared themselves ready to concur in any measures calculated to preserve the tranquillity of Europe.

This letter was accompanied by another from Ferdinand, in which he expressed his astonishment that a Swedish army should have entered Pomerania without any previous declaration, and defended his conduct as strictly agreeable to the forms of the Germanic constitution. He finished by conjuring Gustavus seriously to reflect on the dangers which awaited him, before he ventured to provoke the resentment of a monarch, whose victorious armies had so often chastised the temerity of those who disturbed the public repose.*

Before we advert more particularly to the exploits of Gustavus, let us follow Wallenstein into his retirement, that we may see the effects which disgrace produced on that eccentric character. With a mixed sensation of indignation and sorrow, the imperial army learned the degradation of their triumphant commander, whose generosity, indul-

* *Historia delle guerre di Ferdinando*, ii. è Ferdinando, iii. del Conte Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato. i. 10.—Though these letters were written after the landing of Gustavus, for the sake of connexion I have inserted them here.

gence, and splendid talents, equally attracted their love and admiration. Many officers of distinction immediately threw up their commissions, and solicited permission to share his fortunes. Those whose merits or attachment had raised them highest in his favour, received the honourable distinction of a household employment; while to others, whose zeal was less conspicuous, or on whose fidelity he could not rely with equal confidence, pensions were assigned sufficient to procure all the comforts of life, and to attach them for ever to his interest: for though he had resigned his employments with the magnanimity of a sage, it was not with the intention of burying his talents in obscurity, but in order to prepare for his return to power with more extensive and more permanent authority. Disdaining to gratify the malice of his opponents, by the most trifling indication of mental depression, he lived at Prague in a style of magnificence, more suitable to the sovereign of a wealthy people than to the degraded people of Austria. Six spacious gates conducted to a palace, erected in the midst of the capital of Bohemia, on a commanding spot, where a hundred houses had been cleared away to make room for the stately edifice. Profusion and taste were equally displayed in the Corinthian columns which adorned the portico, and in the painted ceilings and costly tapestries which decorated the long suite of apartments, and which presented to the inquisitive eye of the philosopher the singular phenomenon of a retired officer surpassing monarchs in affluence. His household, established after the expensive model of a royal court, comprehended all those idle appendages of pomp and ostentation, who are accustomed to waste an useless

existence in the flimsy ceremonies of etiquette. Gentlemen of illustrious families accepted with pride the key of chamberlain; many even are said to have resigned the offices which they held about the person of Ferdinand, for the more flattering distinction of being permitted to wait in the antichamber of Wallenstein. Sixty pages, instructed by the ablest masters in all the sciences and accomplishments which enrich the understanding, or give grace and agility to the body, attended him when he appeared in public. A guard of fifty soldiers, in costly uniform, was stationed in an outward hall, to preserve their master against the plots of his enemies, or the too great importunity of his friends. Four chamberlains were placed at the door of his apartment, whose business it was minutely to investigate the name, the quality, and the business of every one who demanded access, that none might intrude through motives of curiosity on the leisure of a man, whose moments were too precious to be consumed in colloquial intercourse, or complimentary salutations. His table, consisting regularly of a hundred covers, was daily spread with the most delicate viands; and it is remarked by some contemporary writers, as an instance of uncommon refinement, that clean napkins were furnished at every repast; it would be difficult to produce a more striking proof of the semi-barbarity of the times. The richness of his liveries, the splendour of his retinue, and the magnificence of his furniture, are represented as almost surpassing belief; yet, in an age and country where unsoiled linen was regarded as a luxury, we may readily conceive that every thing approaching to common comfort must have excited the greatest admiration. When he removed from Prague to

Gedsen or Sagan, a hundred waggons transported his plate and wardrobe, and sixty carriages conveyed his attendants, while the cavalcade was closed by fifty grooms, each leading a noble courser, richly caparasoned.* Six barons, and as many knights, attended daily to receive and communicate his orders, while a party of soldiers constantly patrolled the adjacent streets, to prevent his meditations from being interrupted by the bustle of commerce, or the shouts of festivity. No carriages were permitted to approach the palace; no sounds of active industry were heard, but sad and solemn silence prevailed, as in the gloomy precincts of a Carthusian monastery. An enemy to frivolity of every kind, he never wasted a minute in those trifling amusements, which frequently constitute the most serious occupation of courtiers. Grave and reserved in his deportment, as if he regarded taciturnity to be the criterion of wisdom, he was far more liberal of his money than of his conversation; and even when he deigned to impart his ideas, he did it reluctantly, and with repulsive condescension. Disliking mirth, and even innocent recreation, he was scarcely ever known to relax the severity of his features; and the coldness of his constitution enabled him to resist the seductions of the senses with stoic apathy.

* The wonders related respecting his stables, the racks and mangers of polished steel, the stalls divided by columns of marble, and the portraits of the horses painted by the most excellent artists of Italy, approach too nearly to the fictions of eastern poetry, to be allowed a place in the serious pages of history. But if we may judge from a palace which still exists in the vicinity of Teplitz, inhabited by one of his descendants, and which is deservedly called by the Prince de Ligne, "the Chantilly of Bohemia," Wallenstein's taste for magnificence was unbounded. Much may be subtracted from the exaggerations of Sarrasin and De Prade, and still much remain to admire.

Though engaged in a correspondence with persons of eminence in every European nation, he seldom had recourse to the assistance of a secretary, so little confidence did he repose in the discretion or the fidelity of others. *

In this stately obscurity Wallenstein awaited with a steady, though not with a tranquil mind, the happy hour when fortune, more just to his perfections, might render him once more an object of terror to the enemies of his country and his own. The victories of Gustavus announced that moment to be rapidly approaching, and he looked forward to it with all the ardour of a mind inflamed alike by ambition and revenge. Absolved by ingratitude from every obligation which imperial bounty had formerly imposed, his aspiring genius no longer hesitated to embrace the boldest designs which pride or resentment inspired. Whatever conduced to the humiliation of those by whom he had been offended, he regarded as lawful; whatever promoted his own elevation, he hailed as just and meritorious. †

* Schiller ii. Harte ii. 105. Carve Itinerarium i, 90.—The former is always ingenious, lively, and entertaining; the second accurate, laborious, and useful; the third was chaplain to Devoroux, one of Wallenstein's murderers, and was himself an eye witness of his prosperity. His political attachments would naturally lead him to view the Duke of Friedland's actions with a prejudiced eye; so that when he speaks of his power he may safely be credited.

† Wallenstein had few personal graces to boast of. Tall, thin, of a sallow complexion, his hair short and red, his eyes small, but beaming intelligence and fire, his figure was better calculated to inspire terror than to create respect.

THE
CIVIL AND MILITARY
HISTORY OF GERMANY,

FROM THE
LANDING OF GUSTAVUS

TO THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA.

BY THE LATE
FRANCIS HARE NAYLOR, ESQ.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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HISTORY OF GERMANY.

CHAP. X.

Gustavus's motives for invading Germany. His preparations for that important enterprise. He submits his plan to the consideration of the Swedish nation. Richelieu offers him a subsidy, which is rejected with disdain.—Gustavus negotiates with the Protestant powers.—Congress at Lubec.—Gustavus takes leave of his people in a farewell speech. Embarks at Elssnaben, and lands in Pomerania; occupies Stetin, and concludes a treaty with Bogislaus.—Consequences produced by the arrival of the Swedes. Their rapid progress, no less owing to the coincidence of favourable circumstances than to the transcendent talents of their sovereign.—Gustavus enters Mecklenberg.—Magdeburg declares in his favour. Impolitic conduct of Ferdinand.—Fruitless attempt of Saxony.—Colberg and Griffenhagen taken.

AFTER the unavailing efforts of the Danish monarch to prescribe bounds to the tyranny of the imperial court had failed through that monarch's incapacity, Gustavus Adolphus was the only sovereign to whom the protestants of Germany could reasonably look for protection. Various causes, derived from the most active principles that can rouse all the energies of the human heart, combined to render him the inveterate enemy of Ferdinand. An unshaken attachment to the opinions of Luther, to which he owed the possession of the Swedish crown, an enthusiasm for liberty, that characteristic passion of exalted souls, resentment excited by personal injuries, and the ardent desire of military renown, stimulated his ambition to the arduous undertaking of reducing that power which had gradually become the bane and terror of Europe. It was an

achievement worthy of heroic courage, and, if crowned with success, might eventually civilize the semi-barbarous people which he governed. By taking a leading part in the politics of Germany the rude virtues of the Swedes would be brought in contact with the habits of a nation, among whom the arts and comforts of polished society had made no contemptible progress. The admiration of manners more refined than their own, was calculated to awaken a spirit of emulation, which might civilize the rude inhabitants of Dalecarlia. Thus policy, keeping pace with ambition, impelled him to the execution of that arduous enterprise which had been long the favourite object of his meditations; for little doubt can be entertained, that even at a very early period of life, he anticipated the glory of becoming the champion of protestantism.*

Previously to the commencement of the troubles in Bohemia, at a time when the members of the reformed church were not only living in perfect security, but were daily acquiring such additional strength as might render them formidable to the partisans of Rome,† he wrote to the leaders of the protestant party, expressing his zeal and attachment for their favourite tenets, and assuring them that in every emergency they might rely securely on his assistance.‡ In 1620 he renewed the offer, but still with no better success; as either the hero's character was too little known to inspire confidence, or pride, or economy, or some other motive, equally contemptible, opposed an insuperable obstacle to his wishes.§

* Puffendorf, ii. 1.

† The letter bears date the 2d of March, 1615.—Schmidt, v. 1.

‡ Puffendorf, *ibid.* Sattler geschichte von Würtemberg, vi. 28.

§ Puffendorf, ii. 2.

These repeated repulses, however disheartening, were far from cooling his ardour. Whatever were the occupations in which he was engaged, his thoughts were fixed with steady attention on the transactions of Germany, as the only theatre where his transcendent talents could be displayed with appropriate lustre. The humiliation of Austria was alike the subject of his sleeping and of his waking dreams; it accompanied him to his pillow at night, and returned again with the dawning day, refreshed and invigorated by repose.

The reader is acquainted with the event of the negociation carried on in 1625, between Gustavus Adolphus and the English cabinet, and with the folly of the allies in giving a mercantile preference to the cheaper talents of Christian. The sagacity of the Swede anticipated the danger to which the treachery of his confederates, or the uncertain issue of a campaign, might expose him, unless put in possession of Wismar or Dantzic, or some other port, which secured a communication with his hereditary dominions: but, unfortunately for the world, he had to do with men, some of whom either wanted penetration to discover, or honesty to acknowledge, the propriety of the demand; while others would have preferred the loss of independence to that of a single commercial vessel, and might possibly have felt less repugnance at returning under the pontifical yoke, than in opening a new and unfrequented channel to the natural productions of Sweden.

No sooner, however, was the contest with Sigismund concluded, through the mediation of France, than Gustavus directed his undivided attention toward accomplishing his favourite project; and,

luckily for Europe, the convention with Poland was signed at a moment when the distress of the protestants had silenced every scruple that distrust or vanity had formerly inspired, and induced them to implore the protection of Sweden as their last and only resource.”*

Notwithstanding the justice and necessity of the struggle in which he was about to engage (for necessary and just in reality it was, provided any war can merit that appellation, not expressly undertaken to repel an invader), the prospect which opened before the Swedish monarch was far from alluring. The gigantic strength of Austria, the valour of her troops, and the skill of her commanders, appeared to raise around her a formidable rampart, which it would be the height of temerity to assail; and so universal was the terror which accompanied her arms, that a genius less enterprising than that of Gustavus, would have shrunk from the conflict, overwhelmed by the sentiment of conscious inferiority. But, instead of suffering himself to be intimidated by the difficulty of the undertaking, his courage kept pace with the danger, while his penetrating discernment discovered some weak and vulnerable parts, which might have escaped a less accurate observer. Circumstantially informed of the minutest occurrence which took place in every German court, he knew that the emperor was no less detested than feared, and that the indignation of the

* Schmidt, v. 1.—En effet, il est probable que c'eut été fait du parti protestant; et peutêtre de la religion Lutherienne en Allemagne, si la fortune lasse de servir les vastes desseins de Ferdinand; ou plutôt si la *Providence par un jugement secret dont il faut adorer la profondeur*, n'avait alors suscité le plus redoutable ennemi que l'empire eut jamais eu dans la personne de Gustave Adolphe roi de Suede.—Bougeant, i. 150. A curious confession for a Jesuit!

protestants, compressed by tyranny, was ready to explode; he was sensible that victory would confirm the wavering minds of the timid, and by augmenting the number of his adherents, open fresh resources for the prosecution of the contest; while every league of country, rescued from the oppressive dominion of Ferdinand, would cripple his resources, and circumscribe the sphere of extortions.

An accurate examination of those resources tended materially to diminish the dread which they inspired. When calculated according to the military returns, the force of her armies appeared tremendous; but it was not by the fallacy of official reports that the courage of Gustavus could be appalled. The wealth collected by plunder had rendered many of the imperial generals proud, dissolute, and inattentive to duty; while the troops were consumed by various maladies, the fruit of libertinism, and of unwholesome nourishment. Differing no less from each other in language and manners than in the fashion of their accoutrements and the use of their arms, they were neither animated by the spirit of national glory, nor by the more potent charm of religion.*

The troops of the League were unquestionably maintained upon a better footing. More regularly paid, more warmly clothed, and supplied more abundantly with all the necessaries of life, they felt that attachment for their native land, which nothing can extirpate out of the human heart, except wanton

* *Exercitus est ei omnium gentium colluvie mixtus, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis; alius habitus, alia arma, alia sacra, alii prope dii sunt.*—Forstner, i. 295.

oppression, excessive taxation, or the infernal precepts of modern philosophy. The intrigues of Richelieu had, however, greatly diminished the peril which might have resulted from the cordial co-operation of all the catholic states; hopes even were entertained that they might be induced to preserve the strictest neutrality, provided no attempt should be made to alter the national worship.*

The discontent, which till then had fermented in secret, was no longer concealed from public notice. With the interests which originally gave birth to the contest, the spirit of hostility had subsided; and many, even among those who had formerly shewn themselves the most inveterate enemies of the Palatine, were become strenuous advocates for a general pacification. A due regard to personal safety conduced also to render the Duke of Bavaria more jealous than ever of Austria; for he knew that Ferdinand attributed entirely to his opposition his recent disappointment at the diet of Ratisbonne; and that his resentment was kindled to such a degree, that he would probably attempt to punish his ingratitude, were he not deterred by the dread of Gustavus.†

Neither were the catholic princes in a situation to maintain their numerous armies, without the aid of fresh contributions. Determined to adopt a different system, and, by a vigorous discipline, to restrain the licentiousness too natural to a victorious army, Gustavus felt secure, if successful, of being universally hailed by the enthusiastic acclamations of gratitude and admiration as a tutelary deity.

* Schmidt, i. 295.

† Ibid.

It was not, however, to the resources of his own comprehensive genius, unbounded as they were, nor to those which he foresaw must inevitably arise at every step, that he trusted entirely for a prosperous issue: prudence pointed out the necessity of foreign alliances; he endeavoured to secure the co-operation of every state, which jealousy or fear rendered hostile to Austria; though he looked to their exertions with the diffidence of a man who had traced, in the eventful pages of history, the imbecility, the selfishness, and the duplicity of courtiers: but while he guarded against the fatal effects of credulity, he was aware that dangers no less destructive may arise from the opposite extreme. A judgment less penetrating might have led him to question the sincerity of France, from the inability to conceive that the persecutor of the protestants in Languedoc might become their strenuous champion in Saxony: but the King of Sweden was aware, that in the estimation of Richelieu, though decorated with the splendour of the Roman purple, the prosperity of the church was a secondary consideration, and that the ambitious cardinal would prefer the reputation of an enlightened minister to the remoter honours of the calendar.

Supposing even that the event should prove less propitious than the sanguine monarch expected, the sea would afford him a secure retreat, and the rocks and shoals, by which his dominions were surrounded, presented insuperable obstacles to an invader.

Convinced, however, that it was scarcely possible for any war to succeed, that should be waged in contradiction to the national feeling, the king post-

poned his final decision till he had collected the sentiments of his people. Disdaining the paltry arts of intrigues, so efficacious in influencing popular debates, and unwilling to meet with a public affront in the senate, he privately convened his ablest statesmen and most experienced generals, to consult with them respecting the practicability and policy of the undertaking, before he ventured to submit it to the national suffrage. The counselors being assembled, Gustavus complained, in an artful speech, of the injuries he had sustained from the emperor, but which it is unnecessary to enumerate on the present occasion, because they have been fully detailed in his memorial to the diet. The subsidiary offers from France and England were next explained, with the assurance that he wished to avail himself of his confidential friends before he entered into any specific agreements. The necessity of asserting the dignity of his crown he considered to be no longer a doubtful question, but to have been decided by the arrogance of Austria. He conjured them, however, seriously to deliberate on the plan to be pursued in conducting the contest; whether it would be most conducive to the interest of Sweden to confine themselves entirely to a defensive system, or boldly to penetrate into the heart of the empire, and endeavour to strike a decisive blow, before the enemy was aware of the peril.*

The impossibility of continuing an amicable intercourse with a prince so ambitious as Ferdinand, was admitted without the smallest hesitation; but

* 1630. Puffendorf, ii. 4. Gualdo, i. 5.

the same unanimity did not prevail respecting the mode of conducting hostilities. In the estimation of some, and among their number we find the distinguished name of Oxenstiern, the resources of Sweden were deemed inadequate to the undertaking. The united armies of Ferdinand and the League were calculated at upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand men; a force three times more numerous than what the king's utmost exertions could bring into the field, though he should drain his dominions of men and money. They accordingly suggested, that the wisest policy would be to concentrate his troops in Polish Prussia, a country abounding in strong military position, and easily defended against superior numbers. For the internal security of the kingdom there was nothing, they thought, to apprehend, because the want of a navy must prevent the emperor from extending his conquests beyond the shores of the Baltic. Another argument adduced in support of this opinion, was the impoverished condition of the northern provinces of Germany, so completely exhausted by the rapacity of the imperialists, as to be totally unable to furnish supplies for the Swedish army.*

Whether these arguments were the result of serious meditation, or offered merely with the view of affording an opportunity for displaying the superior sagacity of Gustavus, it is immaterial now to inquire. Far from being intimidated at the alarming picture presented by the advocates of defensive operations, the king asserted, that his

* Puffendorf, ii. 4.

only motive for wishing to avoid the impending conflict was derived from the impulse of humanity. "The power of Austria," he said, "did not alarm him: but when he contemplated the miseries occasioned by war, his bosom panted for peace. To have diminished the burthens so long endured by his faithful people, with exemplary patience, would have afforded to his heart more exquisite satisfaction than the proudest triumphs could bestow. But once admitting the necessity of commencing hostilities, he was decidedly of opinion, that they ought to be prosecuted with the utmost vigour in Germany." The danger, he contended, was more than compensated by the advantages. A defeat would be attended with more disastrous consequences, if sustained in defending their land, than in invading that of the enemy. In one case, it would expose their wives and daughters to the brutality of undisciplined barbarians; in the other, the loss, however severe, might be shortly and easily repaired. It ought also to be considered, that notwithstanding his solemn professions of amity, the King of Poland would be ready to break the truce, whenever he could do it with safety; he would, of course, be ready to avail himself of the first reverse of fortune to unite with the enemies of Sweden. The impolicy of maintaining an army in Prussia was clearly illustrated; because the famine, which actually afflicted that unhappy country, must necessarily prevent it from becoming the theatre of hostilities. "The event of the contest," he said, "must depend upon the energy with which it was commenced; it would be far better never to unsheath the sword, unless they resolved at once to penetrate into Pomerania, and

pushing forward with unabating activity, to endeavour at once to transport the seat of war into the hereditary dominions of Austria. The possession of Stralsund would not only secure the sovereignty of the Baltic, and keep the coasts of Germany in continual alarm, but would preserve a safe and easy communication with Sweden.”*

Arguments like these, when enforced by the charms of royal eloquence, were calculated to produce the most enthusiastic effects on minds not insensible to the seductions of glory, and attached to a young and heroic sovereign by the united impulse of love and admiration.† Having thus convinced the understandings of the leading members the king no longer hesitated to submit his plans to the consideration of the senate. In a numerous assembly, many of which were of course unconnected with the court, some difference of sentiment might be expected, and we accordingly find that a considerable number expressed a decided preference for a negotiation. It was urged in support of a pacific system, that the national revenues were so completely exhausted by the Polish war, as to be utterly incapable of affording supplies for a foreign expedition. Adverting to the arguments which they expected to hear from the partisans of energetic measures, they observed that economy held a prominent station among the most sacred duties of a sovereign. “In a country like Sweden, where the comforts and refinements of civilized life had never penetrated, it was not they said by the lustre of military renown that a monarch ought to aim at

* Harte, i. 124.

† Puffendorf, *Selecti ad mentum regis censebant*, ii. 4.

immortality ; the path which conducted to the temple of fame was far more straight and accessible : let him aspire to glory by directing his attention to the establishment of manufactures, the improvements of agriculture, the extension of commerce, and the encouragement of the arts and sciences."

The idea of hazarding the happiness and prosperity of the nation in a contest in which the honour of the king, or the safety of the states were not immediately implicated, was treated as chivalrous and romantic. "The preservation and extension of the protestant faith depended," they said, "upon the will of the Almighty. He had hitherto nursed it with paternal solicitude, and would never suffer it to perish by human perversity." Admitting that the Dukes of Mecklenburg had been unjustly deposed, and that it was highly desirable to rescue their dominions from the rapacity of Austria, they strenuously contended that this might be effected with greater facility by an amicable discussion, than with the sword, or the firelock. The idea of an invasion was treated with merited contempt, as they would never admit that a country virtually enjoying the blessing of insular security, could have any thing to dread from the threats of an enemy, completely destitute of maritime resources.*

It cannot be denied that this mode of reasoning was both plausible and popular ; the arguments adduced were upon a level with the meanest understanding, and accorded with the practice of ordinary statesmen in common times. But there sometimes occurs in political affairs an alarming crisis, which baffles all precedent. In such situa-

* Puffendorf, ii. 16. Burgus, 26.

tions, transcendent genius, disdaining the trammels of pedantry, explores new paths of action, encountering the difficulties with which it is surrounded, not with official documents, or logical deductions, but with a spirit and capacity commensurate with the danger. Such was now the case with Gustavus; and the energy which he had communicated to men capable of appreciating the wisdom of his projects, was displayed in the arguments with which they supported his measures. "It was difficult," they said, "impartially to examine the emperor's proceedings, and still to retain the smallest doubt respecting the nature and extent of his designs. The subjugation of Germany, so nearly completed, must unavoidably lead to the total depression of protestantism; because, with the prosperity and independence of the northern nations, its destiny was indissolubly connected. They must flourish or fall together. Wherever the imperial armies had penetrated, every vestige of freedom was abolished. The hereditary states of Austria were already despoiled of all their privileges; those of the empire were gradually undermined. The ambitious schemes, entertained by the cabinet of Vienna, were no longer concealed under the veil of mystery, but blazoned forth with presumptuous arrogance. A plan was in agitation for the maintenance of four separate armies for the purpose of awing the surrounding nations, and preventing them from interfering in favour of any people, whom Austria wished to enslave. The first stationed in Hungary, was intended to guard the eastern frontiers against the Ottoman cohorts; the second was destined to intimidate the Venetians, and repress the levity of all the Italian po-

tentates; the third was to occupy the banks of the Rhine, and the fourth to be encamped on the shores of the Baltic. The objects contemplated required no farther illustration, nor could they be counteracted, except by a general confederacy of all the protestant powers."

So much stress had been laid by the opposite party on the internal security of Sweden, that it became requisite to canvass that important question, under all its various bearings. According to the opinion of the advocates for peace, nature had erected so formidable a barrier in the surrounding rocks, that all fears of invasion were nugatory, provided a warlike people would condescend to sculk in inglorious safety behind that insurmountable rampart. "But is this," they asked, "an attitude becoming a martial nation? Is it even consistent with their interest to assume it? we may possibly escape the sword of the enemy, but it will be by abandoning every thing that gives value to existence. Our commerce will be annihilated, our character impeached, and we shall be no longer regarded as occupying a place among the independent nations of Europe."

"It has been urged," continued they, "by the opposite party, that Austria has lately assumed a tone less presumptuously offensive. The fact is admitted, but the inference which our opponents have attempted to draw is completely erroneous. It is a change of language, but not of principle. It is the effect of hypocrisy, and not of moderation; for while the tide of victory swept all before it, the arrogance of her commanders was insupportable. Various causes have combined to excite her fears, and the apprehension of danger renders her anx-

ious to weaken the general abhorrence, which the insolence of despotism has created. The strength of Stralsund has hitherto baffled her efforts; the treasures of America, captured by the Dutch on their passage to Europe, have crippled the exertions of Spain; and the fall of Rochelle has enabled France exclusively to dedicate her immense resources to the Mantuan war. These are circumstances which have given a different aspect to affairs; these were the motives to which Denmark was indebted for the recovery of Holstein, and which now prescribe the necessity of a temporary compromise with Sweden. Let us not be deceived by professions contradicted by uniform practice. With peace in her mouth, she not only continues to fortify her ports on the Baltic, but is busily occupied in creating a navy. In the empire her proceedings are equally arbitrary; state after state is subjected to her dominion, so that every vestige of independence will be shortly effaced."

After minutely dwelling upon every incident which could tend to elucidate the tyranny of Ferdinand, they proceeded to examine the interests, the resources, and the political connexions of the other European powers. The views and principles of the Spanish government coinciding exactly with those of Austria, Spain must ever be regarded as the decided enemy of freedom. Discord and timidity, the fruit of corruption, combined to render the fertile provinces of Italy no less weak than contemptible. Three powers, they insisted, and only three, possessed the strength and courage requisite to resist the overwhelming torrent, France, Holland, and Sweden. Of the danger resulting from such a confederacy, the cabinet

of Vienna was perfectly aware, and was exerting every artifice to impede their union, from the conviction that such an alliance could alone uphold the liberties of Europe. Could Sweden and Holland be lulled into security, Austria might employ her undivided force for the humiliation of France. This would pave the way for the subjugation of Holland; and that accomplished, the fall of Sweden could not long be retarded: for what could she expect, except to be abandoned by all the world, if she forsook her friends in their distress?

Having once undertaken the protection of Stralsund it would be disgraceful to leave it to the mercy of an indignant conqueror. The possession of Wismar, and of the Isle of Rugen was sufficiently important to justify temerity; because, if they were once in the occupation of Sweden, the imperialists must be compelled to abandon their positions on the coasts of the Baltic. In valour and discipline, and the patient endurance of every fatigue, the Swedes were exceeded by no nation in Europe; and these were virtues which in great measure compensated for numerical inferiority. But it was not alone to the national resources that they might confidently look for success. Let our victorious monarch once set his foot in Germany, and his standard will be joined by those veteran bands, who have lately been dismissed from the Austrian service; and as the army proceeds, it will be rapidly augmented by the hatred of those whom the tyranny of Ferdinand has driven to despair.*

The ardour of the nation being now in unison with the wishes of the king, preparations were

* 1630. Puffendorf, ii. 16. Loccenij Hist. Suec. 563.

carried on with unabating activity in all the ports and arsenals of Sweden ; though through a tender regard for the weakness of those who supported a contrary opinion, a declaration was made on the part of Gustavus, that notwithstanding the warlike attitude which it was thought expedient to assume, he would never reject an offer of peace on fair and honourable conditions.* This however being an event which the most sanguine dared not expect, every exertion was made to recruit the army, both at home and abroad. A fleet was equipped, military stores were collected, and transports procured, in hopes of being ready to take the field before the emperor could unite his scattered forces.†

This unusual activity, unquestionably proclaiming the object in contemplation, Charnace was directed to renew his offers, as Richelieu was persuaded, that the difficulties with which he was surrounded, would induce Gustavus to subscribe with alacrity to any condition which Louis might deign to accord. But the tone of superiority, or rather of protection, which, with the characteristic arrogance of his nation, the French plenipotentiary affected to assume, proving highly offensive to the Swedish monarch, and the proposals made being totally inadequate to his expectations, he disdained to barter unfettered freedom for a miserable stipend.‡

The spirit with which Gustavus in every situation asserted the dignity of an independent crown,

* Puffendorf, ii. 17.

† Ibid. Gualdo, i. 5.

‡ It appears from the best authorities, that in return for a subsidy of 1,200,000 livres (about £50,000) the King of Sweden was required to maintain in Germany an army of six and thirty thousand men, and positively to engage to continue the war during six years.—Harte, i. 126.

was no less consistent with the dictates of prudence than with the most romantic notions of honour. Had he condescended at the commencement of this glorious career to become the pensioner of France, and bound himself to reject all pacific overtures during a limited period, he would not only have been degraded in his own estimation, but must have excited similar sentiments in the minds of those whose friendship he most studied to conciliate. Yet though he declined for the present any specific engagements, he had sufficiently penetrated the intentions of Richelieu, to be secure of the future co-operation of France whenever he chose to accept it: and, being anxious to cultivate a good understanding with the most powerful monarch in Europe, he sent a confidential minister to Paris,* with instructions to obliterate any unfavourable impression which the departure of Charnace might have occasioned; and to insinuate to the cardinal, if an opportunity should occur, that notwithstanding his refusal of the former proposals, his master would not object to enter into a subsidiary treaty, provided the conditions were neither inconsistent with his personal honour, nor injurious to the interests of his people. It does not appear that any conversation was actually signed by Nicholai, during his residence in the capital of France; but if we give credit to Locenius, a contemporary historian, there is reason to believe, that an agreement was entered into between the two nations, respecting the amount of the subsidy to be granted by Louis, and the service to be performed by Gustavus; though some accustomed formalities might pos-

* Nicholai. Harte, i. 126.

sibly have been wanting to give official validity to the treaty.*

It would indeed have been totally inconsistent with the dictates of prudence, for Gustavus to have adventured his army in the heart of Germany, unless he had been assured of the co-operation of Louis. Every transaction of his life at this critical period evinces the earnest desire of ascertaining correctly, how far he might rely upon the assistance of every power apparently interested in the humiliation of Austria; it is therefore highly improbable that he should have neglected that, whose decision was of the greatest importance. Unwilling to deprive himself of a single ally, whose friendship could be secured by negotiation, he dispatched Sadler upon a mission to the Helvetic diet, at that time sitting at Baden, with directions to explain with unreserved frankness the motives of his undertaking, and the extent of his resources; persuaded that the ancient spirit of the Swiss would revive at the prospect of humbling a monarch, whose claims to supremacy had never been formally surrendered. The terror inspired by the depredations of Wallenstein, however, completely silenced

* This conjecture, according to Harte, is confirmed in a letter from Sir Thomas Roe to Lord Dorchester, in which he regrets that no pecuniary aid had been granted by England to Sweden, because, "De Charnace, the French ambassador, had made some offers to that purpose." This appears to be copied from a MS. letter, dated Feb. 26, 1630.—Harte, i. 143.

In another MS. letter to Sir Dudley Carlton, at that time resident in Holland, dated May 17, 1630, he observes, that "De Charnace had offered Gustavus an annual subsidy of £50,000, and that he was empowered to add £17,000 more.—Ibid.—The published correspondence of Carlton extends only to the end of the year 1620. The account given by Locenius, p. 565, corresponds very nearly with the foregoing statement.

every other feeling, so that they preferred the enjoyment of precarious freedom to the perils incidental to a renovated contest.*

Meanwhile Falkenberg had been sent to Holland for the purpose of raising three additional regiments, and in order to concert with the Dutch government a general plan of operations. In his way thither, he was directed to stop at Copenhagen, in order to sound the intentions of Christian, and, if possible, to secure his neutrality. Though envy excited by the transcendent talents of Gustavus was the predominant passion in Christian's breast, he was constrained for the present to stifle his personal feelings, because he plainly foresaw that he could not openly attempt to embarrass his projects, without incurring the indignation of protestant Europe: but, while he dealt in professions of unbounded amity, he secretly resolved, by clandestine intrigues, to frustrate the plans of his rival; and, in order to effect it with greater facility, he offered his mediation to accommodate the differences actually subsisting between the courts of Vienna and Stockholm. This proposal coinciding with the timid policy of the sovereigns of Brandenburg and Pomerania, they joined in recommending a pacific system from motives equally selfish.†

Though resolutely bent upon chastising the temerity of Sweden, when the favourable moment should arrive, Ferdinand was delighted at the idea of postponing the conflict till he should have ter-

* *Mercure Suisse*, 9.—This curious work was published in 1634, without the name of the author; but it has since been attributed, and I believe with justice to Spanheim, to whom the world is indebted for *les Mémoires de Louise Juliane*.

† Bougeant, i. 154. Burgus, 35. Barre, ix. 599.

minated hostilities in Italy. To the pressing solicitations of his treacherous friends it was impossible for Gustavus to object without exposing himself to the censures of an ungenerous world, too prone to attribute to interested motives the most exalted efforts of virtue. However insidious the conduct of the imperial court, or insincere the professions of Christian, one important advantage accrued to Gustavus from the congress at Dantzic, because it manifested his unwillingness to resort to arms, till every hope of accommodation was frustrated. Neither did it escape the penetration of that sagacious monarch, that in the course of the negociation various circumstances must occur to elucidate the secret views of the Austrian cabinet, as well as to ascertain the real intentions of Richelieu. In both these objects he completely succeeded. The duplicity of Ferdinand was demonstrated in colours too clear to be defended, even by the partial sophistry of friendship; while the efforts of Charnace to impede the treaty, effaced every suspicion of insincerity.*

Too prudent to expect any favourable results from a negociation conducted under similar auspices, the King of Sweden had never relaxed in his preparations, fully determined to commence hostilities the moment his forces should be in readiness. During the conferences at Lubec, a clandestine correspondence was opened with the Germanic confederacy, desirous of bursting the galling fetters which the despotism of Austria had imposed. While the selfish policy of the protestant electors tempted

* Puffendorf, i. 19.

them to submit to every indignity rather than resort to the hazard of arms, the Langrave of Hesse, the Dukes of Mecklenberg and Luneberg, and the administrator of Magdeburg, gave positive assurances, that they would openly declare in favour of Sweden, whenever it could be done with impunity. The wealthy merchants of Lubec and Hamburg engaged also to advance a considerable loan, and consented to accept the copper of Dalecarlia for its gradual liquidation.*

Nothing now remained for Gustavus except to provide for the government of the kingdom during his absence: the danger of the contest in which he was about to engage gave peculiar importance to the measure; the states were convened at Stockholm, and never perhaps did any assembly meet under circumstances more awful and impressive.

The executive authority was vested in a council, and the department of the finances entrusted to John Casimir Count Palatine, who had married a Swedish princess; for, notwithstanding his tender affection for the queen, her want of capacity for political affairs afforded a powerful motive for her exclusion.

Having thus regulated the internal administration of government, Gustavus presented to the diet his infant daughter,* as their future sovereign, exacting from them a solemn oath, that in the event of his death, they would preserve their fidelity to Christina. He simultaneously delivered to them a manuscript, supposed to have been written by him-

* Schiller, ii.

† Christina, then only four years old, so conspicuous in the sequel for her follies and vices. This ceremony took place on the 20th of May, 1630.

self, with the advice and assistance of Oxensteirn, containing regulations to be observed by the council of state under every possible emergency. Nothing seems to have been omitted, which a mind anticipating its melancholy destiny was able to provide,* either respecting the happiness of the nation, or the safety of his daughter.

The solemnity of his manner, which clearly indicated that he believed himself addressing them for the last time, drew tears from all the spectators; the feelings of the monarch were in unison with those of his people—his voice faltered, and it was some time before he could conquer his sensations sufficiently to continue: “It is not from thirst after military renown that I am about to plunge my country in a war. I call Heaven to witness, that the contest on my part has not been voluntary. I have been publicly insulted in the person of my ambassador by the Emperor of Germany; he has assisted my enemies, oppressed my friends, persecuted my religion, and even attempted to deprive me of that exalted dignity to which the bounty of Providence has elevated me. Groaning under the yoke of the most grievous tyranny, the protestants in despair implore my succour; and, by the blessing of the Almighty, I will avenge their injuries.

“It is, I confess, an undertaking replete with danger; but, in proportion to the difficulty, the

* Mr. Harte informs us, that he was once in possession of a MS. copy, taken, as he supposes, immediately after the ratification of the senate. “This great work,” says the author whom I have just mentioned, “may be considered as the reduction of contingencies to one uniform system.” The original packet had the following inscription from the hand of the chancellor. *Regiminis Suecici constitutio; quam rex invictissimus Gustavus secundus et magnus ultimæ voluntatis instar, regno populisque suis statione hac mortali functus exhibendum voluit.* l. 145.

glory will increase. I am unconscious of ever having shrunk from my duty, and whatever may be my future destiny, I am prepared to encounter it with fortitude and resignation. The protecting arm of Heaven has hitherto shielded me in the day of battle; and should I be designed to accomplish the mighty work, it will no doubt continue to preserve me. But should I be doomed to fall in defence of the Lutheran faith, I shall have fulfilled my part right nobly. Continue with firmness to perform your duty; be just and honest; be obedient to the laws, and faithful to your sovereign; and should we meet no more in the present world, we shall be certainly united in a better."

After pausing an instant to conceal his tears, he resumed his discourse, directing it successively to the different orders of his subjects. "To you, who are members of the executive government, I earnestly recommend the care of my people. May the grace of God enlighten your understandings, and enable you to execute the arduous task allotted to your charge, with wisdom, equity, and moderation."

Turning next to the nobility, he thus continued, "accept the thanks of your grateful sovereign, illustrious nobles, for all your services: may the admiration of the world, and the delightful feeling of conscious integrity, reward you for them! Be true to my daughter, whom I entrust with confidence to your protection. Be to her, what you have ever shewn yourselves to me; remember, that you are the descendants of those heroic Goths, by whom the Roman eagle was humbled!

"To you, servants of the Most High" (looking stedfastly at the ministers of the Gospel), I recom-

mend candour, unanimity, and forbearance. Be living examples of those exalted virtues which it is your peculiar province to inculcate; but, above all, beware of abusing the influence, which your profession gives you, from the desire of riches, or the love of domination."

"Deputies of the towns and provinces, may the Almighty prosper all your undertakings; crown with prosperity your honest industry; and make you long enjoy the blessings and comforts which are inseparable from morality."

Having thus emphatically exhorted all the different classes steadily to persevere in the peculiar duties of their respective stations, he terminated this short and pathetic harangue with a fervent petition for the happiness of his people, concluding in the following words: "My heart is too full for utterance. My prayers, my blessings will ever attend you. Farewel! perhaps for ever."*

Gustavus having thus fulfilled an obligation nearest his heart as a tender father and an affectionate sovereign, his thoughts were directed with unremitting attention to the final equipment of the armament. The troops were embarked at Elfsnaben, amid the tears and supplications of innumerable spectators, attracted by the novelty and magnificence of the spectacle, or impelled by the tenderest affections of nature. Admiration and wonder, veneration and sympathy, prevailed alternately, as they successively contemplated the magnitude of the preparations, the danger of the enterprise, or the heroic character of its leader, who

* Schiller, ii.—Puffendorf touches only slightly upon the business agitated in this assembly. ii. 23.

appeared in the midst of surrounding warriors, no less conspicuous for the manly beauty of his person, than for the commanding dignity of his station. He was attended by his generals, whom he had trained to the fatigues of a military life; for there was not one among them, with the exception of Oxensteirn, who was not younger than himself.*

Toward the latter end of May, the fleet weighed anchor, but was prevented from sailing by contrary winds, so that it did not reach the coast of Pomerania till the twenty-fourth of June, 1630. The number of the forces, with which Gustavus undertook to humble Austria, was little calculated to excite the fears of his enemies, or to inspire confidence to his partisans; as, according to the most authentic documents, they amounted to no more than twelve thousand five hundred infantry, and two thousand cavalry. To these which accompanied the king must be added the garrison of Stralsund, comprehending nearly six thousand men, and about as many more which served in Prussia, under the command of Oxensteirn.† What an enormous disproportion to the resources of Ferdinand! The forces of the League, consisting of between thirty and forty thousand men, were stationed in Westphalia and Lower Saxony, under the orders of Tilly and Pappenheim. An Austrian army, scarcely less numerous, was employed in Italy, under Gallas, Aldringer, and Colalto; but, the moment peace was concluded with France, it would be ready to enter Germany. Montecuculi and Ossa at the head

* The names of Gustavus Horn, of the Count of Thurn, of Barner, of Teufel of Tott, of Falkenberg, and of Kniphausen, will often occur in the following pages.

† Puffendorf, ii. 24. Grimoard, i. 458.

of ten thousand veteran troops dictated laws to Suabia and Alsace; while the Spaniards, in nearly equal strength, repressed the discontents which the tyranny of the emperor had excited in the Palatinates. Eight thousand in the pay of the ecclesiastical electors, were deemed sufficient for the safety of their own territories: thus an uninterrupted line of defence extended from the Alps to the Baltic. The eastern provinces, though less strongly guarded, were by no means destitute of protection. Three regiments under Baltazar di Marradas, were more than adequate to repress every murmur in Bohemia, where the spirit of the inhabitants was so entirely subdued, that they had abandoned every hope of emancipation; while Tieffenbach, with nearly an equal force, kept Silesia in subjection.

From this sketch it appears, that the only vulnerable point was in the northern frontier, though even there the rapacity of Torquato Conti, seconded by sixteen thousand veterans, had reduced the country to a desert, and the miserable inhabitants to a state of slavery, so abject and hopeless, that they hardly dared to indulge the flattering expectation of finding a deliverer in Gustavus.*

The sun was rapidly sinking beneath the horizon when the Swedish fleet entered the harbour of Pennemond, in the Isle of Usedom. After superintending the preparations, for disembarking his troops in flat-bottomed boats, each capable of containing two hundred men, and two small pieces of artillery, the king leaped on shore, and falling upon his knees, implored the God of Hosts to favour an

* Harte, i. 159.

enterprise,* undertaken in defence of religion and liberty. This pious duty being fulfilled, he seized a pickaxe, and, with the activity of a pioneer, began to throw up an intrenchment. The example of their sovereign kindling the emulation of all his officers, stimulated them to labour with such indefatigable zeal, that, before the dawn of day, a breast-work was completed, affording security against any sudden attack.†

Conscious that in a situation so highly critical, the first impression is frequently decisive, the king issued an order enjoining the strictest discipline, and menacing with the severest punishment whoever should venture to infringe it. This salutary precaution was no less consistent with his natural humanity than with the wisest policy, since it was highly important to his future success to convince the natives, that he came not with an intention to augment their sufferings, but to rescue them from the rapacity of their plunderers.‡

At a period of the world, when the human understanding was not sufficiently illumined by the ray of philosophy to reject the mysteries of divination, it was almost universally regarded by his soldiers as a certain presage of future victory, that the

* Lotichius, 786. Puffendorf, ii. 25. Burgus, 64.

† Ibid. Bougeant's account is curious from its absurdity. *A peine-eut-il mis pied a terre, qu'on vit ce prince par un sentiment de religion qu'on ne saurait s'empêcher de louer même dans ceux que le malheur de leur naissance a engagés dans l'erreur, se prosterner humblement à terre, &c.*

‡ "Nempe deus hominem utili in milites severitate, in incolas comitate, in omnes justitia imbuerat; qui catholicos aliquatenus peccantes castigaret."—Burgus 71. And again, speaking of the Swedes, he says, "miles in adversis constans et patiens; in pugna impiger et strenuus, cum colonis et hospitibus modestus et affabilis." What praise is this from the pen of an enemy!

first intelligence which greeted his arrival was that of a conquest.

The local importance of the Isle of Rugen, separated from Stralsund only by a narrow channel, had not escaped the attention of the imperialists, who, as a necessary precaution, had erected three small fortresses at the most accessible points, which, while they gave them apparent security, enabled them to interrupt the traffic of Stralsund.

With a mercantile people, the most important consideration is usually the facility of commercial intercourse. It therefore appeared highly probable to the Austrians, that an offer of neutrality would be eagerly caught at by this wealthy republic, without considering the disadvantages which must eventually accrue to their generous protector. Fortunately, however, Lesly, who commanded the Swedish garrison, was too alert and too sagacious to be deceived. Not content with rejecting the insidious proposal, he meditated in secret a decisive blow, which proved highly injurious to Austria. Having received information that a plan was in agitation for selling the island, which formed part of the Pomeranian territory, to the King of Denmark, and aware that the treaty, if carried into effect, must either deprive his master of a strong military station, or involve him in hostilities with Christian, he resolved to stop the negotiation by a vigorous attack. A select body of veterans, being secretly embarked, before the imperialists had the smallest intimation of their design, the enemy was driven with little difficulty from all their posts, and compelled to evacuate the island.*

* Puffendorf, ii. 22. Burgus, 37. Swedish Intelligencer, i. 48.

As it was no longer possible for the Austrians to entertain a doubt, that the first operations of the Swedish army would be directed against Pomerania, Torquato Conti proposed to the duke to undertake the defence of his dominions, provided he would allow him to garrison Stetin. Bogislaus was too prudent to consent, foreseeing that a measure so decidedly hostile could not fail to expose him to the resentment of Gustavus. Timid and irresolute, no less from the weakness of character than from the indecision natural to age, Bogislaus was reduced to a most distressing dilemma, because it was impossible for him to avoid offending one of the belligerent powers, and by no means improbable that he might give umbrage to both. But as the Austrians were already masters of the greater part of the duchy, the danger that was nearest appeared the most alarming; and he accordingly dispatched a confidential agent to the King of Sweden, who was still detained by contrary winds, to endeavour, if possible, to deprecate his resentment. Gustavus received the messenger with his wonted benignity, but positively refused either to suspend his operations, or to admit the neutrality of Bogislaus. This harsh declaration, however, was tempered by the assurance, that in case he should experience no opposition in landing, he would be ready to enter into a treaty with the duke, and to take his dominions under his protection.*

No sooner had Gustavus, by rendering himself master of the mouth of the Oder, secured a communication with Sweden, than crossing the narrow frith, which separates Usedom from the continent,

* Puffendorf, ii. 24.

he invested Cammin, by the capture of which he procured an abundant supply of provisions and ammunition.*

This rapid success, obtained without the loss of a single man, by adding to the lustre of the Swedish arms, encouraged their secret adherents; and, in proportion as it augmented the fame of Gustavus, it contributed to efface the impression of terror which the cruelty of Torquato had inspired. The presumption of Ferdinand, in disdaining to employ the most common precautions against an enemy whom he affected to despise, which, in the event of success, would have been attributed by flattery to wisdom and magnanimity, now exposed him to ridicule and contempt. Aware, when too late, of the fatal mistake which vanity had induced him to commit, and resolving if possible by vigorous measures to repair it, the emperor sent orders to Torquato Conti, who commanded in Pomerania, to endeavour to retard the progress of the invaders, till a more formidable force could be assembled. Tilly at the same time received directions to advance into Misnia, and occupy the country between the Saal and the Elbe, from whence he might watch the motions of the Swedes, and secure by his presence the precarious fidelity of Brandenburg and Saxony, both of whom were ready to shake off their fetters.

Having disarmed the Pomeranians, whose vengeance he dreaded, and called in his scattered detachments, Torquato divided his little army† into two separate bodies; and, having left one in a strong camp near Anclam, he advanced toward Stetin at

* Puffendorf, ii. 25. Gualdo, i. 9.

† Amounting, as had been already stated, to sixteen thousand men.

the head of the other, hoping by his activity to intimidate Bogislaus, whose behaviour had excited his suspicions. Foreseeing, also, that Gustavus would leave nothing unattempted to render himself master of the Oder, he threw a bridge across the river, to preserve a communication between the corps encamped on the opposite banks, and with the view of disputing the passage.* The plan of the Austrians, if their force had been larger, would have confined the Swedes within a narrow tract, where it would have been difficult for them to procure supplies, and would likewise have covered Francfort, an important fortress, and the key of Silesia, while Torquato was at liberty to regulate his operations as circumstances would require.†

The King of Sweden was too well aware of the advantages arising from vigorous exertion, to allow the smallest respite to the enemy, and he resolved in consequence to endeavour to penetrate into the heart of the empire, before the catholics should have recovered from their consternation. This plan, however, could not be effected without previously liberating the navigation of the Oder, and occupying Stetin, the metropolis of Pomerania. The insolent treatment which Bogislaus had received from the court of Vienna, combined with the misery to which his subjects were exposed, from the depredations committed by the imperial troops, left little doubt in the mind of Gustavus, that the hearts of the natives were universally favourable to his enterprise; though the feeble character of their sovereign precluded every hope of

* Lotichius, i. 787.

† Ibid.

his acting with decision, while the event of the contest was doubtful. Gustavus, therefore, resolved no longer to temporize, but to secure the fidelity of Bogislaus, by placing a Swedish garrison in his capital. The possession of that strong and populous city would afford a commodious asylum for his magazines, as well as a place of safety to which he might retire, in case of any sudden reverse. Besides, it would have been highly imprudent to have adventured his army at a distance from the coast, while the fate of Stetin was undecided; because nothing would have been easier, during the absence of the Swedes, than for the Austrians, by blockading Stralsund, to have obstructed their communication with the fleet. Such an event must have immediately compelled the king to suspend his operations, though marching forward in the full career of victory. These considerations having been deemed conclusive, Gustavus embarked his troops at the close of day,* and taking advantage of a favourable breeze, arrived in a few hours before the walls of Stetin. The army was instantly landed, and preparations made for investing the city; when a trumpeter arrived, to inquire the cause of this hostile appearance, and to caution the soldiers not to approach within reach of the batteries. The messenger being conducted to the royal presence, Gustavus demanded by whom he was sent; and being told that he came by order of Damitz, the governor, he commanded him to return, and inform his general, that it had never been customary for the King of Sweden to negotiate with

* 1630. On the 20th of July.

persons of inferior rank, through the intervention of an interpreter.

Terrified at the apprehension of having offended a sovereign who asserted his dignity with so much firmness, Damnitz hastened to the camp, and substituting humility in the place of arrogance, submissively requested that his master might be permitted to continue neuter. He was proceeding to explain the distressed situation to which the Pomeranians were reduced, and their inability to engage in a war, when he was suddenly interrupted by the king—"I treat with none except principals," said Gustavus indignantly, "and will either visit the duke in his palace, or meet him here in the open plain."

The magistrates and citizens, whom curiosity had attracted to the Swedish camp, were delighted with the affability of Gustavus, who addressed his conversation to all who approached him, with freedom, and even familiarity. To the burgomaster he was particularly attentive, assuring him that he entertained no hostile designs against the German nation, and would prove his sincerity by his actions.*

Bogislaus, being made acquainted with the answer of Gustavus, thought it prudent to comply with his inclinations, and immediately set out, with a few attendants, for the royal pavilion. The Swedish monarch hastened to meet him, and addressed the duke with the characteristic frankness of a soldier. "In approaching your capital, good cousin," said the king, as he saluted the sovereign of Pomerania, "I come with the olive branch in

* Harte, i. 189. Lotichius, *ibid.* Puffendorf, ii. 26.

my hand ; for I am an enemy to none, except the enemies of freedom ; of course, we are destined to be friends, and as a convincing proof that I speak the language of truth, I will deliver you from the despotism of Austria. In order, however, to render my alliance essentially serviceable, it is indispensably necessary for me to secure Stetin against the dangers to which it might be exposed, while my troops are engaged in distant conquests. A Swedish garrison shall protect it for the present ; and, upon the word of a king, I promise to restore it when the success of my arms, or the conclusion of peace, shall enable me to do it with prudence."

Bogislaus, confounded at this unexpected demand, or more probably affecting surprise, reiterated the prayer which he had formerly made by the mouth of a delegate, that he might be permitted to abstain from acts of hostility toward either of the belligerent powers. To this Gustavus laconically replied, in the language of scripture, "He that is not for us is against us."*

Observing the palace windows to be crouded with ladies, (for the conference took place just under the walls) and desirous of giving a less serious turn to the conversation, Gustavus said, with a smile, "I think it would be difficult for those fair champions to resist the impetuosity of my Dalecarlian infantry."†

The good humour and gallantry of the king inducing Bogislaus to make another attempt, he

* Swedish Intelligencer. A work no less scarce than estimable for its accuracy, for which I am indebted to Marquis Wellesley.

† Harte, i. 190, upon the authority of Chemnitz, an invaluable history, of which I have never been able to procure a copy.

began to expatiate, with the prolixity of age, upon the danger which awaited him from the implacable resentment of Ferdinand. Gustavus, however, soon dispelled his hopes, by declaring, in a firm and solemn voice, "That he should deem himself unworthy to command the bravest troops which ever faced an enemy, if he suffered himself to be diverted from the path of prudence by any arguments." This declaration was too plain to be misunderstood; and Bogislaus, convinced of his inability to resist; or, what is still more probable, persuaded that he had done enough to secure himself from the imputation of treachery toward the imperial throne, contented himself with adding, in the tone of humility, "Then nothing remains but to submit."

The negociation being concluded, the duke prepared to return to his palace, under pretext of making the necessary arrangements for the reception of his visitors. A guard of honour was ready to escort him, commanded by Lord Rea, who, as he entered the town, secured the gates, in conformity to his secret instructions. The fate of Stetin being thus decided, the garrison, consisting of about twelve hundred men, enrolled themselves under the banners of Sweden.*

The king's principal object being to conciliate the affections of the Germans, by proving to them that their own happiness and security was inseparably connected with his success, he directed both officers and soldiers to pitch their tents upon the ramparts, in order that the citizens might not sus-

* Swedish Intelligencer, i. 53.

tain the smallest inconvenience by lodging them. And as it was his invariable custom to partake the hardships which necessity compelled him to impose, he preferred passing the night on board one of his vessels to a magnificent apartment prepared for his reception in the ducal palace, declaring to the courtiers, who pressed him to accept a more comfortable lodging, that a fur cloak for a general, and a truss of straw for a soldier, made excellent beds, when their king was contented with a hammock.*

The vicinity of the imperialists rendered it necessary to provide against any sudden attack; cannon were accordingly planted on the ramparts, and every precaution was employed which could tend to preserve the city against a nocturnal surprise. On the following day a convention was signed, by which the ancient compact, concluded in 1570, between the predecessor of Bogislaus and the crown of Sweden, was formally renewed, and an alliance concluded for the mutual protection of their respective dominions. In compliment to the weakness of an infirm old man, it was expressly declared, by a separate article, that this treaty implied no hostile designs toward the chief of the empire, or any of its members, but was intended solely to preserve the fundamental principles of the Germanic constitution in all their original pu-

† Harte, i. 192.—The day after his landing, being Sunday, notwithstanding the pressure of important business, he thrice heard divine service, and was each time accompanied by a great number of officers. Hearing some of them complain, that this excessive devotion prevented them from attending to more urgent concerns, he rebuked them for their levity, saying, that “though war might be their amusement, religion was a duty from which nothing could dispense them.”—*Ibid.*

city. This clause, however, was perfectly illusory, as Bogislaus engaged to employ all the resources with which Providence had entrusted him, in order to obtain complete redress for the various insults offered to his authority, in direct violation of the legitimate privileges of an independent sovereign. Gustavus, on the other hand, solemnly covenanted to restore all the towns and fortresses belonging to the duke, which he might eventually occupy; but in case Bogislaus should die without male issue before the conclusion of peace (an event by no means improbable), then his dominions were to remain in the hands of the Swedes, till the Elector of Brandenburg, the presumptive heir, should ratify all the articles of the present treaty, and indemnify Gustavus for every expense incurred in defending Pomerania. No specific term was assigned for the duration of this alliance, but it was expressly stipulated, that it could not be abrogated, except by mutual agreement. By an additional clause, Bogislaus engaged not to enter into any negotiation without the permission of Gustavus.*

The extreme facility with which the duke had consented to every proposal, created a suspicion that there was more of artifice than of sincerity in his opposition. Many even believed, that all the articles of the treaty had been previously settled.†

* Dumont, v. p. 2. 606. Puffendorf, ii. 27. Swed. Intell. i. 55.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.* Barre, ix. 601.—Burgus expresses his opinion in still clearer terms. “Adventum regis Bogislaus et Stetinenses primo ægre se ferre simularunt, clausisque portis *quasi*, se defensuri, ad regem legatos misere, qui ipsum allocuti, retulerunt, cupere illum, ut dux sui copiam faceret, quo coram quid vellet esset expositurus; neque illum adire *palam* dux abnuuit, cum quo jam *clanculum* transegerat,” 73.

Neither was this impression in the least weakened by the subsequent conduct of Bogislaus, who, in a justificatory letter, addressed to Ferdinand, endeavoured to vindicate his behaviour, by shewing that any attempt to resist the Swedes must inevitably have completed the ruin of Pomerania, without retarding the progress of the invaders; because the Austrian general had disarmed the inhabitants, and left the coasts of the Baltic unprotected.* “What then,” he asked, “was the proceeding which prudence would dictate, when his capital was invested by a force too powerful to be withstood? Was it not to endeavour to avert the storm by submission?”

The possession of Stetin appeared to Gustavus so essential to the prosperity of his future designs, that he lost not a moment in repairing the walls, and strengthening them by additional fortifications; and this laborious task was completed in a few days by the diligence and activity of his soldiers.* The king, during the interval, received deputies from many of the adjacent towns, desirous to deprecate the horrors of a siege by early marks of attachment.

It is unavailing to follow the victorious monarch, with circumstantial minuteness, through all his career of glory, or accurately to enumerate all the towns and fortresses, with uncouth names, which were successively subjugated. For, however im-

* Harte, 193.

† Quatuor dierum spatio, quod vix credibile, mira Suecorum alacritate, civitas fossa et lorica circumdata, atque propugnaculis insuper ad justam defensionem munita.—Burgus, 78. The praise of an enemy is never suspicious.

portant the operations of an army may appear to contemporary politicians, the results alone can interest the curiosity of posterity. It is not to the numerical returns of killed and wounded that an enlightened understanding resorts for information, but to the changes produced by the event of a campaign in the relative situation of the belligerents. From the mutilated carcasses which strew the field of battle, humanity turns away in disgust, to inquire how far the carnage may have been favourable to the extension of commerce, to the pursuits of science, and to the general welfare of mankind. These are the most useful lessons that history can impart; and it is only by inculcating the precepts of virtue, encouraging the practice of rational piety, and kindling the flame of enlightened patriotism, that the task of the historian becomes delightful.

Eager to avail himself of the confusion into which his activity had thrown the imperialists, he extended his conquests on the left bank of the Oder, while Marshal Horn, who had lately arrived with reinforcements from Livonia, was occupied in reducing the eastern provinces of Pomerania. Dam, Stargard, Camin, Beerwald,* and Wolgast,

* L'Ingenieur Schildknecht rapporte ce qui lui est arrivé avec Gustave. Il dit, que le monarque Suedois étant au camp de Beerwalde avait projeté de s'emparer d'un défilé pour surprendre les imperiaux dans leur camp. Mais comme il ne se fiait jamais aux cartes gravées, et comme il était impossible d'aller reconnaître le terrain puisque l'ennemi l'occupait, cet ingenieur en fit le plan d'après le rapport des habitans, et le presenta au roi qui dirigea sa marche en consequence. Mais l'armée avant d'arriver au défilé se trouva tout d'un coup vis-a-vis d'un marais qui n'était pas marqué dans le plan de l'ingenieur. Ce marais pouvait être défendu par l'ennemi, et coûter beaucoup de monde aux Suedois. Le roi rebroussa chemin, et traita fort mal le pauvre Schildknecht, qui assura S. M. que le plan avait été fait sur le rapport d'un vieux gentilhomme et d'un ecclésiastique du lieu, " Et bien," dit le roi en plaisantant, " suivés ces braves

fell successively into the hands of the Swedes, though the two former were defended by the eminent talents of Piccolomini.*

The invasion of Germany, however much it might excite the fears, or stimulate the hopes, of those who were placed contiguous to the scene of action, was far from exciting a similar sensation at Vienna. It would have been derogating from the presumptuous arrogance of Austria, not to have treated with contempt the menaces of a sovereign who, from an obscure corner of the north, provoked the resentment of a mighty monarch, whose gigantic power threatened Europe with fetters. Neither were the former exploits of this warlike barbarian (for so the flatterers of Ferdinand denominated Gustavus) less an object of derision, because his military fame was supposed to have arisen, not from the transcendant powers of genius, but from having contended against adversaries more ignorant and weak than himself.* The humiliating picture which Wallenstein drew of the tactics and resources of Sweden, contributed to cherish this fatal delusion: it was natural for pride to contemplate with scorn the pretended achievements of a pigmy hero, whom the presumptuous Friedland confidently boasted he could repel with a scourge. Even his uninterrupted triumphs in Pomerania were unable to open the eyes of Ferdinand. Gustavus was called, in derision, a *king of snow*, whose strength must dissolve in the warmer regions of southern Germany, though it preserved

gens, et faites vous montrer ce marais pour n'en pas tromper d'autres."—Francheville, 306.

* Harte, 195.

† Ibid, i. 227.

its solidity amid the northern forests. This strange infatuation, which blinded the emperor, obscured also the intellects of the electors, who, flattering their chief with the servility of slaves, refused the regal title to the only monarch, whose talents did honour to a sceptre. But while Gustavus was satirized at Vienna and Ratisbonne, he was diligently employed in laying the foundation of his future glory, and had actually made himself master of the greater part of Mecklenberg and Pomerania.*

The imperial generals endeavoured to compensate, by energetic measures, for the supineness of the court; and as rigour and activity are synonymous terms in the despot's vocabulary, they indulged the soldiers in the most wanton excesses of lust and rapacity. Under pretext of distressing the Swedish army, the country was plundered with remorseless barbarity; many towns and villages being reduced to ashes, lest they might afford an asylum to the invaders. These enormities, however, so far from being attended with essential benefit to the Austrians, contributed to render the emperor's name more odious, if possible, than ever, while the Swedish monarch, regularly paid for every article delivered to the commissaries, and never indulged his troops in the smallest excesses. The consequences, arising from the different behaviour of the belligerent armies were such as might naturally be expected; for, while the Swedes were welcomed with grateful acclamations, as men delegated by Heaven to rescue an impoverished country from the tyranny of its oppressors, the imperialists

* 1630. Schiller, ii.

were exposed to the fury of the exasperated peasants, and, when found in parties too weak to resist, were massacred without the smallest compassion.*

Torquato Conti, being unwilling to risk the event of a battle, before all his reinforcements were arrived, intrenched himself in a strong position near Garz, where he completely covered the contiguous provinces, and was ready for an attempt upon the capital of Pomerania, should an opportunity offer to attack it. Bogislaus was fully sensible of the danger which threatened him, during the absence of his gallant defender; and he accordingly implored him not to abandon Stetin, till he had compelled the enemy to retire. The difficulty of an undertaking was never a reason with the Swedish monarch for declining it; but being convinced, that nothing could induce the Austrians to quit their intrenchments, he resolved to endeavour to get possession of Garz, which covered the enemy's flank. The attempt, if successful, would give lustre to his arms, and compel them to change their position; neither could the failure be attended with important results. At the close of day, the Swedish detachment began its march, and arrived, without interruption, in the vicinity of Garz. The dead silence which prevailed inspiring confidence, the scaling ladders were applied to the walls; but no sooner had the men began to ascend, than the enemy, having obtained previous intimation of their design, attacked them with the most resolute

* Lotichius, 791.—*Cæsariani ob perfidiam Stetinensibus irati.*—Burgus, 80. I should be sorry to submit this passage to an Irish commentator.

bravery. Undismayed at the danger, the Swedish commander collected his forces, and having cut a passage through the enemy rejoined the army. Delighted with his success, he presented himself before the king; and, laying at his feet two Austrian standards, as irrefragable proofs of superior prowess, expected to receive his highest reward, a hero's commendation. But how severe was his disappointment when, instead of approving his desperate courage, Gustavus, who suspected that the failure had arisen from his inadvertence, said, with a look of reproach, "Though no man admires a gallant action more than myself, I can never regard it as a satisfactory atonement for want of discretion."*

The same generous spirit which animated the bosom of the Swedish monarch, was far less conspicuous in the behaviour of the Austrians. The old Latin adage† was considered by Torquato as a satisfactory excuse for the greatest atrocities. Treachery and assassination were alternately employed by the crafty Italian; and had they succeeded in delivering his master from an enemy too formidable to be defeated in honourable warfare, he would probably have been extolled both at Vienna and Madrid as the most perfect of heroes.

Quintio Aligheri (or del Ponte, as he is more frequently called), under pretext of having received a signal affront, went over to Gustavus with a determination to destroy him by poison, or assassination, in case he should fail in his infamous plan of de-

* Harte, i. 203.

† Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat.

livering him a prisoner into the hands of Torquato. A mind equally depraved having designated a captain in the Swedish service as a fit accomplice, it was resolved between them that the most probable means of effecting their purpose would be, for Quintio to endeavour to acquire the confidence of his master. Being gifted by nature with a quick understanding, an undaunted courage, and a constitution equal to the severest fatigue, he soon attracted the notice of a monarch, who was never backward to recompense merit; and, being rapidly promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, was consulted by Gustavus upon various occasions. The king being desirous of reconnoitring in person the Austrian lines, selected the Italian as a companion; because he naturally concluded from his former situation that he must be thoroughly acquainted with the adjacent country. Quitting the camp in the evening, with an escort of only seventy horse, he left part of them at the entrance of a defile, in order to secure a retreat. Aligheri, having undertaken to explore the environs, rode full speed to the imperial camp, and informed the general that the fortunate moment was at length arrived; and, that if he would entrust him with the command of five hundred horse, it would be impossible for Gustavus to escape. Unsuspicious of treachery, and attributing to accident the protracted absence of his friend, the king was surrounded on his return. Notwithstanding the immense disparity of numbers, he disdained to yield; so that the perfidious Italian, despairing of being able to take him alive, resolved to effect his hellish purpose by murder. He is said, however, to have confessed in the sequel, that at the moment he pointed his pistol against the

Swedish hero, he was impressed with a kind of supernatural awe, which prevented his drawing the trigger. Falling at length with his wounded horse, the king was seized by the enemy, who were conducting him a prisoner to the imperial camp, when the party which had been left behind arrived unexpectedly to his succour. The officer, who commanded it, alarmed for the safety of a beloved sovereign, advanced to meet him; and hearing the report of fire-arms, hastened to the spot from whence it proceeded. A violent charge overturned the Austrian horse, and gave liberty to the illustrious captive. The intimacy, which had prevailed between Aligheri and the man whom he had chosen for his confederate,* having rendered the latter an object of suspicion, his papers were examined, and proofs being found to substantiate his guilt, he was condemned to the gallows by a military tribunal.†

Not many days elapsed before a monk in disguise was arrested in the Swedish camp; and, being interrogated respecting the motive of his appearing under a fictitious character, he confessed that he had undertaken to assassinate the king. Such were the methods employed by Austria, and such the nefarious policy of the Jesuits.‡

Being equally deficient in money and in men, Torquato resolved that nothing should induce him to hazard a battle till the arrival of Tilly. No sooner however was he assured that Gustavus was advancing into Mecklenberg, by hasty marches,

* He is called Giovanni Battista, but those are both baptismal names, that of his family being no where mentioned.

† Puffendorf, ii, 28. Lotichius, i. 792. Burgus, 93. Swed. Intel. 50.

‡ Harte, 203, upon the authority of Loccenus.

than he made an effort for the recovery of Stetin. But the enemy was too vigilant to be taken by surprize; so that the reception he met with was by no means calculated to make him eager to renew the attempt.*

Allowing all to genius which it is able to accomplish, it is still fair to acknowledge, that every thing combined to favour the operations of Gustavus; and though Torquato is usually accused of incapacity, it might not have proved easy for a more experienced general to have supported his reputation under similar circumstances. Exposed by the neglect or imbecility of the Austrian ministers to extreme pecuniary distress, placed at the head of an army diminishing rapidly by the ravages of disease, and entrusted with the defence of a country so entirely drained by the exactions of his predecessors, and his own insatiable rapacity,† as to be utterly incapable of furnishing additional supplies, he seems to have adopted the only method by which total destruction could have been avoided. Compelled to subsist upon the precarious produce of plunder, the soldiers ceased to respect the orders of their superiors, who no longer dared to punish those, whom they were equally unable either to feed or to pay.‡ Desertion, the natural consequence of distress, contributed no less than sickness and famine to thin the Austrian bat-

* Lotichius, 794. Burgus, 99.

† Puffendorf draws an affecting picture of the atrocities committed by Savelli, who was second in command. "Ejusviri" (meaning Savelli) "foedum sordidæ avariciæ specimen ferebatur, quod eum post abrepta in tributum cætera, equis demum rusticorum manum injecisset, nec qui vel redimerit, vel emeret, strigosa jumenta inveniretur, eadem demum carnifici addixerit, exiguum sibi corû pretium stipulatus, iii. 5.

‡ Lotichius, 791.

talions. In this trying situation, Torquato proposed an armistice as his only resource, under pretext that it was inconsistent with the principles of humanity to keep the field in a season so uncommonly rigid. The offer however was rejected with disdain. "My troops," said Gustavus, "have been accustomed from their cradles to a colder climate, and can subsist without oppressing the natives. The imperialist's are at liberty to retire into winter quarters, but they must not expect to be left in repose."*

A campaign, conducted with such manifest disadvantage on the side of the Austrians, could hardly fail to terminate unsuccessfully. True to his promise, the king perpetually harassed them by desultory attacks; and the greater part of Pomerania being now subjected by his victorious cohorts, he resolved no longer to defer an enterprize, which would manifest to the world his future intentions in language too clear to be misinterpreted. The duchy of Mecklenburg had been treated by Wallenstein with greater lenity than any other province of Germany; and he appears from the commencement of his military career to have regarded it with the partial eye of a parent, as the seat of his future dominion. Various motives therefore combined to influence the Swedish monarch, in directing thither his triumphant career. It was alleged in his manifesto, that he entered Germany for the purpose of reinstating the legitimate sovereigns of Mecklenburg, to whom he was allied by ties of consanguinity, as well as by treaties; nor could he longer postpone the honourable effort,

* Schiller, ii.

without material injury to his reputation. Thus far he was prompted by glory, and interest asserted even a stronger claim, were it possible for interest, in a hero's estimation, to be distinct from glory. In proportion as he advanced, he was secure of finding more abundant supplies; and every progressive step brought him nearer to the dominions of the Landgrave of Hesse Casel, who was ready to join the Swedish army with eight thousand well disciplined troops. To dislodge the imperialists from Wismar and Rostock was likewise an object of infinite moment; because the occupation of those commanding stations enabled them to carry on a piratical war in the Baltic, extremely injurious to the commerce of Sweden. Both Lubec and Hamburg had promised reinforcements, in addition to a pecuniary subsidy, and he was aware that the proximity of a victorious army would operate more effectually for the encouragement of religious zeal, than the most fervent exhortations from the pulpit. He felt also the impolicy of abandoning Magdeburg, which a premature declaration in favour of the Swedes had exposed to the resentment of Austria. But, above all, he hoped by his presence to encourage the Elector of Brandenburg to declare against Ferdinand, whom he equally feared and detested.*

As the troops he expected were not yet arrived from Livonia, he could spare no more than twelve thousand men† for this important expedition; the remainder being requisite for the defence of Pome-

* Gualdo, i. 14.

† Burgus reduces them to six thousand, but I prefer following the accuracy of Harte, i. 206.

rania, a small squadron was directed to cruise on the coast, to second the operations of the land forces, and to supply them, if necessary, with provisions.*

Damgarten and Ribnitz being taken by storm, the garrison of the former was put to the sword in retaliation for the atrocities committed by the imperialists, after the capture of Passewalk ;† that of the latter, being for the most part composed of mercenaries, wanted little inducement to enrol.‡

Gustavus having thus by his rapid conquests secured the keys of Mecklenburg, addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, assuring them, that his only object in invading the duchy was to restore the authority of their legitimate sovereigns,§ unjustly deposed by a tyrannical decree. All faithful subjects were in consequence exhorted to assist in expelling the partisans of the usurper, for so the Duke of Friedland was called. To the zeal of the well affected an adequate recompense was promised, while against those who should adhere to the adverse party, the severest punishment was denounced.||

This was of course the proper moment for the Dukes of Mecklenburg to declare themselves, because the only chance that remained of recovering

* Puffendorf, ii. 32.

† Excusebant Succī hanc scœvitiam exemplo sibi a Cæsarianis Pasbaldicæ dato, ubi Suecorum nemo in captivitate servatus fuerat.—Burgus, 101. The Swedish Intelligencer gives a horrid narrative of this shocking transaction, i. 59.

‡ Puffendorf, ii. 33.

§ Adolphus Frederic, and John Albert.

|| Sic ut omnes et singulos Fridlandi ministros, tanquam dei et religionis hostes, patriæque et libertatis persecutores, cædatis, ejiciatisque. Lotichius, i. 793.

their dominions was by the assistance of Sweden. To the generosity of the emperor they had ineffectually resorted, after having repeatedly appealed to his equity. They had likewise tried the effects of submission, had employed the mediation of powerful friends, and even secretly offered to prove unfaithful to Gustavus. But the resentment of Ferdinand was implacable; he had resolved to reduce every member of the empire to the most abject state of dependance, and hoped by the severity with which he punished his opponents more effectually to accomplish his purpose.

The general detestation in which the Austrians were held, leaving little doubt that the natives would return with alacrity under the more lenient government of their ancient sovereigns, Savelli was sent to oppose the invaders: but as little hope could be entertained of a prosperous campaign, without the possession of Rostock, and as the inhabitants were supposed to be warmly attached to the ducal party, he endeavoured to get possession of it by the following stratagem:—Having obtained permission from the magistrates for an Austrian detachment to traverse the town, they seized the gates, disarmed the guard, planted cannon on the walls, and prepared for a regular defence.*

This treacherous action, which the imperial general attempted to justify upon the plea of expediency, impeded for a while the operations of Gustavus, and obliged him to advance with greater caution. Determined, however, that nothing should be left to the caprice of fortune, he strengthened

* 1630. Burgos, 102, Puffendorf, ii. 33. Lotichius, i. 793.

Ribnitz and Dambgarten by additional fortifications; for, notwithstanding he had been joined by large bodies of deserters from the Austrian armies, he was still too feeble to undertake the subjugation of Mecklenberg, and at the same time to leave a sufficient force to secure his conquests in Pomerania against the attempts of Torquato.

The only prince, who had openly declared in his favour, was Christian William, administrator of Magdeburg, who had been forcibly deprived of that lucrative see by the injustice of Ferdinand. No sooner was he apprised of the preparations making for the invasion of Germany, than he indulged the hope of recovering his bishopric. Resolved to identify his fortune with that of Gustavus, he visited Stockholm in secret; and, giving way to the chimeras of a sanguine imagination, he offered, with the assistance of his numerous adherents, to surprise and disarm the Austrian garrison; and should the undertaking, as he anticipated, be crowned with success, he proposed to levy a considerable force in Lower Saxony, and by desultory enterprizes entirely to occupy the attention of the imperialists. In return, he required a sum of money for completing his military preparations, together with the promise of being reinstated in his former dignity, whenever circumstances should favour his pretensions. This proposal was far too agreeable to Gustavus to be treated with indifference; but as the zeal of the administrator frequently tempted him to contemplate events through a delusive medium, and might consequently lead him, by a premature declaration, to frustrate a project, which, if conducted with sagacity, could hardly fail to produce essential benefit, the king exhorted

his enterprising friend not to hazard success by temerity; but for the present to confine himself to a clandestine negociation with the disaffected citizens, preparing them by degrees for a general insurrection, when circumstances might justify the attempt. The plan of operations being thus arranged, Christian William returned into Germany, in order to carry it into execution; and that he might more effectually elude the vigilance of his enemies, he immediately entered into a negociation with Ferdinand, offering to resign all pretensions to the episcopal revenues, in consideration of an adequate pension.*

The long expected moment being at length arrived, the king sent Stralman, an officer, on whose prudence and fidelity he could perfectly rely, to attend the administrator, under the character of envoy, but in fact to restrain the impetuosity of his temper by cautious counsels. Delighted at the prospect of entering upon a more active career, and having gained admission into Magdeburg in disguise, Christian prepared his adherents for the decisive scene, and then repaired in triumph to the town-house, where the principal burghers were assembled.† In a studied oration, he expatiated on the misery produced by the tyranny of Austria; explained, in language well calculated to inflame his auditors, the ambitious projects of the imperial court, whom he accused of having formed a deliberate scheme for the total extirpation of the protestant religion, and the destruction of the Germanic constitution. As the only means of escaping

* Puffendorf, ii. 31.

† Lotichius, i. 807.

the impending danger, he recommended an alliance with the King of Sweden, the champion of freedom and religious toleration.* Perceiving that his exhortations were likely to produce the desired effect, he presented Stralman to the assembly, as the confidential minister of Gustavus, and empowered by him to conclude a treaty, upon terms of mutual convenience. Seduced by the prospect of recovering their independence, and the free enjoyment of the Lutheran worship, the citizens and clergy renewed with alacrity the oath of fidelity to Christian, and signed a convention with the representative of Gustavus, by which he obtained the disposal of all their military resources, together with permission for his troops to traverse the city, whenever occasion might require. In return for these advantages, the Swedish monarch solemnly engaged to succour the town, in case it should be besieged by the imperialists, and farther promised never to terminate hostilities with the common enemy, without stipulating for the independence of Magdeburg.†

Notwithstanding the confidence reposed by Gustavus in the bravery and attachment of his soldiers, he could not but foresee that, without the co-operation of the protestant states, no durable impression could be made upon a country so populous, and every where abounding in strongly-fortified cities. No man was more capable of justly estimating the resources of the nation with which he contended; he knew it to be invincible, if firmly united; and was perfectly aware that he ought not to cherish the faintest hope of ultimate success, unless he should

* Gualdo, i. 18. † Lotichius, i. 607. Bougeant, i. 157. Puffendorf, ii. 31.

be fortunate enough to arm the discontented members against their tyrannical chief, and thus conquer Germany with the assistance of Germans. Appreciating the feelings of other men by those of his own, he seems scarcely to have entertained the smallest doubt that the enthusiasm of liberty would operate more forcibly than the timid suggestions of fear; and that, in the arduous struggle for religion and independence, every meaner passion would subside. But he quickly discovered that he had calculated entirely upon erroneous principles, in attributing to others those elevated sentiments, which rendered glory the idol of his own adoration. Restrained by the apprehension of inevitable ruin, the unavoidable consequence of a defeat, many of the protestant princes confined themselves entirely to barren vows for the prosperity of an enterprize, in which they were too cautious to engage. The vacillating timidity of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, encouraged by the weakness or the venality of their ministers, prevented them from acting with decision or vigour. Yet so violent was the resentment excited by Austrian despotism, in the bosoms of both, that they were equally incapable of acting with the circumspection necessary to elude suspicion, though fear deterred them from openly declaring in favour of Gustavus. Convinced that nothing could be expected from their voluntary exertions, while the event of the contest remained uncertain, that sagacious monarch embraced the design of overcoming their scruples by coercion, and compelling them to become, like the timid Bogislaus, the unwilling instruments of their own emancipation.

It cannot however be denied, that some occur-

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rences had taken place to sanction the indecision of these wavering statesmen, under the specious title of prudence. No sooner had the degraded sovereigns of Mecklenberg embraced the resolution of appealing gallantly to the sword, than they appointed the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg commander of the troops, which he might be able to levy for their service. At a period when commerce and agriculture were equally straitened by the devastations of war, an army was easily collected. The duke had scarcely erected his standard, when he found himself at the head of a force sufficiently formidable to embarrass the operations of Pappenheim. That active general, one of the ablest who figured in the sanguinary contest, was aware of the difficulties which must attend the blockade of Magdeburg, should Lauenburg be suffered to retain possession of several towns, which he had recently occupied in the vicinity of the Elbe, and in particular of Ratzburg, the ancient residence of his family. Feeling that his own reputation must necessarily suffer, unless he put a speedy stop to the incursions of the foe, Pappenheim resolved by one decisive blow to annihilate the resources of his antagonist. Advancing with rapidity, his cannon were planted against the walls of Ratzburg before the Saxon was apprised of his approach. Convinced of the impossibility of defending a town, the inhabitants of which were decidedly hostile, Francis Charles immediately proposed to capitulate; but was told that it was necessary to surrender at discretion, and allowed only a quarter of an hour to decide. Terrified at the idea of being exposed to the resentment of Ferdinand, he resolved to encounter every possible danger, rather than voluntarily subscribe

to such degrading conditions. Embarking on the lake, which separates Ratzburg from Lubec, he sailed from the harbour with the well-founded expectation of being able to reach the latter city in security.

The Austrians, however, being apprised of his intention, fired at the vessel, and killed the pilot; when the murmurs of the crew compelling their leader to regain the shore, he surrendered to Pappenheim; upon receiving a promise that his life should be spared. This condition clearly shews the barbarity of the age, and the little respect then paid by the rulers of civilized nations to the common laws of humanity. Thus terminated an expedition, which notwithstanding its failure, was not wholly destitute of advantage to the Swedish cause, because it prevented the Austrians from drawing reinforcements from Lower Saxony for the defence of Pomerania, but which was calculated nevertheless to afford to timidity a plausible plea for declining the contest.*

Gustavus foreseeing that the moment was approaching when he must be compelled to meet the united forces of Ferdinand and the League, unless their junction could be prevented, preferred, by dividing his own army, to encounter the danger in different quarters, rather than suffer the enemy to consolidate their immense resources for one gigantic effort. For this purpose it became necessary for him to occupy the vast extent of country, which stretches from the confines of Polish Prussia to the frontiers of Holland; by which he not only secured the navigation of the principal rivers which intersect

* Burgus, 104. Lotichius, i. 810. Harte, i. 213.

the northern provinces of Germany, but would oblige the enemy to remove the theatre of hostilities to a distance from the shores of the Baltic. In order to facilitate the execution of this important project, it became requisite to maintain in the field five separate armies. The first, consisting of at least thirty thousand men, and under his own direction, was destined to drive the imperialists out of Mecklenberg; the second, under the command of the gallant Horn, but amounting to little more than half that number, was entrusted with the defence of Pomerania. General Teuffel* with a corps ten thousand strong, was directed to watch the motions of the Austrians on the banks of the Vistula; while the administrator of Magdeburg, reinforced by Falkenberg and six thousand Dutch, guarded the country between the Elbe and the Weser. A fifth army, composed of six thousand Swedes, and of the English auxiliaries which the Marquis of Hamilton was expected to bring, was to extend its operations from the left bank of that river over the whole of the bishopric of Munster.

A plan combined with such consummate skill could hardly fail of producing the most beneficial results; but the difficulty of finding resources commensurate with the magnitude of the undertaking appeared to present insuperable obstacles to its execution, as the expenses of the war, even upon the contracted scale to which it had been hitherto confined, far exceeded the revenues of Sweden. The king was therefore compelled to leave much

* Among the most distinguished officers in the Swedish army were the Colonels Teuffel and Tod, whose names gave rise to the following humorous observation, "das Gustav sey mit Tod und Teufel (Death and the Devil) in Deutschland gekommen."—Struvius, Corp. Hist. Germ. 1267.

to the decision of fortune, convinced by the experience of preceding ages that she in general has been partial to those, who by their genius and activity were best entitled to her favours. In proportion as he advanced, he was almost morally certain of procuring new allies, contributions might be raised in the ecclesiastical states, and the subjugated provinces would supply his army with fresh recruits.

Though the rapid progress of the Swedes was far from creating an alarm at Vienna, in any degree commensurate with the extraordinary effects which their conquests were destined to produce; yet it began to excite universal attention in every other part of the empire, awakening the fears and expectations of the different political factions, according as their wishes or their interests suggested. The hopes of the protestants again revived; assemblies were convened, alliances contracted, and armaments levied. No longer confining their timid hopes to the humble enjoyment of personal security, they began to contemplate the recovery of independence as no improbable contingency, and even ventured to talk of retaliation. On the side of the catholics the impression produced was perhaps fainter, because fear is usually less active than hope. But in the estimation of most men, who suffered themselves neither to be warped by the too confident suggestions of pride, nor to be biased by the delusions of party, it became a subject of serious doubt, whether at the commencement of a war it was not highly imprudent in the emperor to disband his veteran regiments, and the only general, in whose capacity the army confided.*

* 1630. Schmidt, v. 2.

Though the cabinet of Vienna still affected to treat the operations of the Swedes with haughty indifference, yet it was easy to infer from the activity which prevailed in the military department, that they were not totally insensible to the danger. Relying too confidently upon the immense resources which the house of Austria could command, they however neglected many precautions to which under similar circumstances more enlightened ministers would have resorted; and thus by their presumption increased the irritation of the public mind, instead of endeavouring by wise and conciliatory expedients to eradicate the seeds of disaffection. Flattering himself that his remonstrances might now be attended with salutary effects, the Elector of Saxony determined to make another effort in favour of the protestants. In a letter to Ferdinand, he strenuously exhorted him, as he valued the peace and prosperity of Germany, to revoke the edict of restitution; because, while that fatal measure, like an impending tempest,¹ was ready to burst over their heads, it was futile to talk of permanent tranquillity. Inflated with the recollection of his former triumphs, and stimulated by the infatuated zeal of the Jesuits, anxious to appropriate the benefices piously rescued from the pollution of heresy, to the use of an order instituted expressly to preserve the purity of the catholic worship, the emperor assured him, in a tone of defiance, that he strangely underrated the ability of Austria, if he supposed it deficient in strength to enforce the edict, and to chastise the temerity of Gustavus. It would, however, he said, conduce essentially to the security of the empire, were the contingents furnished by the different members to

be increased: and he accordingly exhorted both Saxony and Brandenburg to meet the necessity of the times with augmented contributions. Indignant at experiencing insult and disregard, when he looked for praise and attention, John George renewed his exhortations in more energetic language, accusing Ferdinand of beholding with insensibility the many calamities, which his improvidence had occasioned, imputing to him the nefarious design of subverting the liberties of Germany, and upbraiding him with requiting his former services with the blackest ingratitude. As the only means of appeasing the ferment, he proposed the convention of a general assembly, for the termination of all religious disputes, and for securing to the members of the reformed church, the full enjoyment of every privilege to which they were legally entitled.

It is among the greatest misfortunes which have befallen mankind, that according to the present constitution of society, various classes of men derive emolument from the sufferings of their fellow creatures. In the days of Ferdinand superstition and avarice were no less vociferous in their clamours for war, than commercial speculation is at present. And so great was their influence, that this second remonstrance was received at Vienna with no less indifference than the former.*

The affairs of the emperor daily assuming a more unfavourable aspect in the north of Germany, he determined to oppose another commander to the victorious Swede, as his ministers insisted that the conduct of the war, and not the system prescribed,

* 1630. Lotichius, i, 747.

was defective. Torquato Conti was in consequence recalled, and replaced by Schomberg, a brave and experienced officer, who had risen by merit from the lowest rank, and wanted nothing, except genius, to become a great commander.* The miserable situation however, in which he found the army, precluding the possibility of offensive operations, the utmost to which he aspired was to be allowed to pass the approaching winter in inert security; but the activity of Gustavus, and the patient courage of his soldiers, braved the inclemency of a climate, mild in comparison with their native forests; conscious that in proportion to the severity of the season their chance of conquest must augment. Colberg, the depository of Austrian plunder, was accordingly invested by General Kniphausen, with an army twelve thousand strong, but defended itself till the following year;† and, in the month of December, Gustavus in person laid siege to Griffenhagen. Though Schomberg was encamped in the vicinity, he was too weak to attempt its relief; the garrison therefore, after a desperate resistance, and the loss of their chief, were obliged to evacuate the city. Elate with victory the king appeared before Gartz, in the hope of tempting Schomberg to

* Gualdo. i. 19.

† The following anecdote does so much credit to the bravery of the Scotch that I shall not apologize for inserting it. Colonel Monro being entrusted with the defence of Scheifelbein, a small fortress near Colberg, but deemed incapable of sustaining a regular siege, received orders from Kniphausen, not to surrender, while a single man remained. The imperialists appeared before it, and Montecucoli, who commanded them, sent a summons to Monro, with offers to treat for a capitulation. Undismayed by the immense disproportion of numbers, the gallant Scot returned for answer, "that the word *treaty* was omitted in his instructions, but that he had powder and balls at his service."--Harte, i. 217. Swed. Intell. 70.

quit his intrenchments; but that wary commander, too prudent to hazard his well-earned reputation in an unequal contest, and apprehensive that Gustavus might assail his camp, retreated to Francfort upon the Oder.*

Too prudent to allow the smallest respite to a flying foe, the Swedish cavalry pursued the imperialists with so much activity, that they threw their rear into confusion, and put a regiment of Croats to the sword, in retaliation for the atrocities which they had committed.†

Large bodies of the imperialists having taken refuge in the march of Brandenburg, that unfortunate country, though subject to a prince who had never offended the emperor, was exposed to plunder and devastation. It is, however, a tribute due to the memory of the gallant Schomberg, distinctly to state, that no exertions on his part were left untried to curb the licentiousness of the soldiery; and, finding that hunger had rendered them deaf to the voice of authority, he offered to resign the command. Too weak to oppose the overwhelming torrent, trembling for the safety of his capital, the elector removed his plate and jewels to Spandau. Courier after courier was dispatched to Vienna to solicit redress, but it was the policy of Ferdinand to exhaust the resources of those whose power he beheld with jealousy, and the sufferings of heretics he always contemplated with the pious insensibility of an inquisitor. Convinced that nothing could be expected either from the justice or the compassion of the imperial court, the elector in despair issued a

* Ferdinand di Capua.

† Puffendorf, ii. 38. Gualdo, i. 20.

proclamation, authorizing his subjects to take up arms against the violators of their domestic repose, and to employ those means which nature furnishes to all her children, to repress the rapacity of the imperialists. For so deplorable was the condition to which he found himself reduced, that the only expedient which presented itself to his distracted imagination, was to sanction by the sacred authority of law the vengeance of an exasperated people.*

* Schiller, ii. Lotichius, i. 805,

CHAP. XI.

Situation of the Swedes; the imperial minister alarmed at their rapid success; feeling and conduct of Ferdinand.—Character of Arnheim; he exerts his influence over the Elector of Saxony in order to detach him from Austria.—John George aspires to place himself at the head of the Protestant party; communicates his designs to the Elector of Brandenburg, and obtains his concurrence; convenes the States at Torgau, and with their approbation invites all the Protestant princes to an assembly at Leipsic.—Gustavus Adolphus concludes an alliance with France; negotiations for that purpose; his dignified conduct; Articles of the treaty, and the effects produced by them in the opinion of the world.—Tilly marches with the design of giving battle to the Swedes.—Danin taken.—Cruelty of Tilly at New Brandenburg.—Frankfort upon the Oder carried by assault; generosity of the King of Sweden.—Diet meets at Leipsic; opened by a speech from the Elector of Saxony; a memorial presented to Ferdinand; his reply.—Gustavus proposes a general confederacy for protecting the liberties of Germany.—Timid policy of John George; he rejects the offers of Sweden, but prevails upon the Diet to levy an army for their mutual defence. Some of the members enter into a clandestine correspondence with the King of Sweden. The Emperor issues an edict to annul the proceedings at Leipsic, which are justified by the framers in a spirited reply.—Tilly besieges Magdeburg; efforts of Gustavus to relieve it frustrated by the pusillanimity of Saxony and Brandenburg; fall and destruction of Magdeburg.

THE unvarying success, which had hitherto attended all the operations of Gustavus, began at length to alarm the presumptuous indifference of the imperial court; who beheld with amazement an army which they thought too insignificant to disturb the repose of a monarch, who wielded the colossal sceptre of Austria, so soon augmented to four times its original numbers.* A body of re-

* From 13,000 to more than 50,000 men; viz. 39,400 infantry, and 11,800 cavalry.

serve was also known to be training in Sweden, sufficient to augment the German army to seventy thousand combatants; while exertions were making in every part by additional emoluments to provide against the ravages incidental to war.*

Astonished to see a romantic adventurer (for by that contemptuous appellation the Austrian ministers presumed to designate the greatest warrior that modern Europe has produced,) creating resources by the magic wand of genius, and extending his conquests over the north of Germany, Ferdinand now seriously regretted his folly in having consented to reduce his military establishment, and to deprive himself of the services of the only general, whose talents were calculated to inspire confidence. This fatal error operated to his disadvantage in a two-fold ratio; because age, having been assumed as the fairest criterion, none had been disbanded except veteran soldiers, who, being totally unacquainted with all mechanical professions, were compelled to provide for their future subsistence by enlisting under the banners of Sweden.†

Perseverance and obstinacy are distinguished from each other by such tender shades, that it is not surprising to find them so often confounded in the apprehensions of men, unacquainted with the subtlety of metaphysical distinctions. This mental confusion had so entirely clouded the judgment of Ferdinand, that he would have regarded himself as surrendering the most valuable jewel in the imperial crown, had he consented to annul the unpopular edict which had created such general alarm.

* 1631. Harte, i. 226.

† Ibid. 227.

By a partial compliance with the wishes of those, whose union with Sweden was most to be apprehended, the humiliation of Austria might have been prevented; but such condescension was no less inconsistent with Ferdinand's ideas of royal prerogative, than it was repugnant to his religious prejudices. He accordingly continued with unremitting severity to enforce the edict: the love of power had originally induced him to resort to that improvident act, and both pride and inclination now prompted him to persevere. From the embarrassment excited by arbitrary measures, he attempted to extricate himself by others no less arbitrary and impolitic. Religion and vanity were equally implicated in the result; nor could he retrace his steps, as he absurdly believed, without exposing his authority to universal derision, and failing in duty toward his Creator.*

With no less surprise than indignation the protestant princes beheld the venerable fabric of the Germanic constitution progressively undermined; but as the terror occasioned by the despotism of Ferdinand had in some degree abated, they resolved to avail themselves of the only opportunity that might ever occur, for attempting to recover their independence. The unexampled severity with which the imperial tribunals persecuted the adherents of the Elector Palatine, had greatly irritated a numerous party. According to the established principles of jurisprudence, the confiscated property, so far from reverting to the imperial crown, belonged exclusively to the sovereigns in whose dominions the sequestrated fiefs were situated. Yet, in

* Grimoard, ii. 182.

spite of the representations of the different states, Ferdinand not only refused to revoke the powers granted to the commissioners, but even to subject their proceedings to revision.*

Though the Elector of Saxony had viewed with indifference this tyrannical conduct, while his personal interests were untouched; yet, when he discovered, that by the desertion of his ancient allies he had diminished his strength, without establishing a claim to more liberal treatment, disappointment embittered resentment; and, in the excess of his anger, he secretly resolved to assert his dignity by some signal act of revenge.

It is, however, far from improbable, that the natural indolence of a character, degraded by vicious indulgence, † might have prevented him from acting with the necessary vigour, had not his passion been continually fomented by Arnheim, who had recently quitted the Austrian service for that of the elector. Arnheim ‡ had been educated in the school of Wallenstein, to whom he was devotedly attached by the double tie of gratitude and interest. Exasperated at the neglect with which his patron had been treated, he determined to employ the unbounded influence which he had obtained over his weak and irresolute master, in order to detach him

* Grimoard, ii. 182.

† This prince is thus painted by Feuquieres. “Le Duc de Saxe est fier, orgueilleux, grand yvrogne, avare, haï et méprisé de ses sujets . . . amoureux du repos et du plaisir, incapable des grandes affaires.” Beer is said to have been his favourite liquor, with which he intoxicated himself in preference to the most exquisite wines.

‡ Cardinal Richelieu, who hated duplicity in all characters except his own, said in the presence of Grotius, that Arnheim, by devoting himself to the profession of arms, had deprived the see of Rome of one of its most artful intriguers.—Harte, i. 263.

from the Austrian party ; that by his assistance he might avenge his own personal wrongs, and those of his ancient benefactor. The invasion of Germany by the Swedes affording an opportunity too favourable to be overlooked, he accordingly seized it with avidity.

Though addicted from habit to the most degrading vices, John George was not totally destitute of ambition. His pride revolted at the idea of having been rendered the dupe of Austrian cunning, and beholding, in return for squandered honour, his son deprived of the archbishopric of Magdeburg, and the city of Augsburg stripped of all its privileges, in defiance of his repeated remonstrances.

It did not escape the penetration of Arnheim, that the arms of Gustavus must be rendered invincible, if firmly supported by all the protestant states ; but as the ascendancy of Sweden would have defeated his schemes for the exaltation of Wallenstein, he persuaded the elector to embrace a plan of intricate policy, which, if wisely conducted, might have raised his fame and authority to the highest pitch of elevation, while it tended equally to frustrate the ambitious designs of Sweden and Austria. With this view he represented to John George, that he held in his hand the important balance destined to determine on which side the belligerents should preponderate. That nothing could be expected from the generosity of Ferdinand, had been sufficiently manifested by his recent ingratitude ; it was, therefore, to his fears that he must in future apply, and from them he had every thing to expect. For this purpose it became necessary to alarm him with the apprehension, that the protestants would unite their interests with

those of Sweden; and, in order to give probability to the report, it was expedient to court the alliance of Gustavus by every external demonstration of amity; but studiously to avoid for the present, at least, to contract any specific obligation that might prevent his ultimately adhering to that party which presented the greatest advantages.*

This project was exactly conformable to the wishes of the elector, though he wanted steadiness and ability to carry it into execution. However anxious he might be to revenge himself on the emperor, still his pride recoiled at the idea of rendering himself dependant upon the bounty of a prince, whom he treated as a semi-barbarian. Though totally destitute of talents to become the head of a great political confederacy, his vanity aspired to pre-eminence; and he accordingly resolved to amuse the Swedes with illusory hopes, in order to awaken the fears of Ferdinand, but cautiously to adhere to the illiberal system which his unworthy favourite recommended.†

The plan of operations being finally settled, was communicated to the Elector of Brandenburg, whose political opinions were in unison with his own, and whose co-operation he considered as essential to the success of this deep-laid scheme of deception. During an interview at Annaberg these princes agreed to avail themselves of the opportunity presented by fortune, for setting bounds to the tyranny of the emperor.‡

These preliminaries being arranged, John George,

* *Histoire de Gustavus Adolphe*, 280.

† *Ibid*, 281.

‡ 1631. *Lotichius*, 810.

in an assembly of the Saxon states, convened at at Torgau, secured the support of the different orders, whose concurrence was requisite to give strength and legality to his intended proceedings. With their approbation he addressed circular letters to all the protestant princes, inviting them to be present at a general convention to be held at Leipsic, in the month of February, for the purpose of taking into serious consideration the degraded state of their religion, and providing a remedy adequate to the danger which threatened the Germanic constitution."*

While John George was thus unintentionally forwarding the views of Gustavus, that sagacious monarch laid the foundation of his future glory, by contracting an alliance with France. The reader is already acquainted with the overtures made the preceding year by the accredited agent of Richelieu; for, in treating of the reign of Louis XIII. it is not to the pusillanimous son of Mary of Medici, but to his enlightened minister, that every transaction ought to be ascribed.

After persuading his master publicly to disavow the proceedings of his minister at Ratisbonne, it became the primary object of the cardinal's policy to conclude a subsidiary treaty with Sweden. The first proposals for that purpose having been conveyed in a tone of protection, the noble soul of Gustavus spurned at the idea of rendering himself tributary to any power, however alluring the advantages presented. He accordingly replied to the French plenipotentiary with cautious reserve,

* Lotichius, 810.

though without positively rejecting his offer. This prudent behaviour contributed essentially to exalt the character of Gustavus in the cardinal's estimation, and proportionably augmented his anxiety to conduct the negociation to a prosperous issue. Convinced of the impossibility of overreaching a monarch no less conspicuous for judgment than for courage, he directed Charnace to seize the first opportunity to conclude the projected alliance, though he cautioned him to beware of compromising the dignity of the Gallic crown by any unnecessary condescensions.

It would have been equally inconsistent with the prejudices of Louis and the sacerdotal functions of his minister, to have entered into a league with a heretic for the extirpation of the catholic faith; for, whatever may have been the indifference of Richelieu with regard to spiritual affairs, he was too politic to offend the delicate scruples of the clergy by an open avowal of his sentiments. Charnace was accordingly instructed to introduce a clause in favour of the catholics; by which it was stipulated, that in the provinces occupied by the Swedish troops, no innovation should take place in the established worship. Gustavus at first took fire at the proposal, declaring that retaliation was absolutely necessary, in order to compel the imperial commanders to act toward the members of his own communion with greater humanity. To induce him to relax on this important point required consummate address; Charnace however at length succeeded: for, when he found it impossible to convince his understanding, he decided the question by appealing to his magnanimity. "Even supposing Louis less warmly attached to

the papal see," such were the arguments adduced by the plenipotentiary, "it would be impossible for him to have acted otherwise, without injuring his reputation in the estimation of those, whose good opinion it was essential to conciliate. By preserving to the catholics the free exercise of their religion he fulfilled the duties of a faithful son of the church, and must therefore stand acquitted in the eyes of mankind. In a political point of view," he likewise contended, "that the conduct recommended was equally eligible; because, when it should appear to the world that the only object in contemplation was to rescue from oppression the German people, and to renovate their enfeebled constitution, it might not be difficult to detach the moderate catholics from the Austrian party. Besides," added Charnace with delicate flattery, "terror and persecution are the resort of bigotry; but to become the champion and protector of a mighty nation, groaning under the yoke of the most intolerable tyranny, is the noblest exertion of heroism."*

This mode of reasoning was too congenial with the feelings of Gustavus to fail of producing the desired effect: but scarcely had Charnace overcome one obstacle, when he created another by his inadvertence. In drawing up the articles for the intended treaty, he proposed, with the characteristic vanity of a Frenchman, that the clause relative to the subsidy should be worded in terms highly offensive to the dignity of an independent sovereign; as he wished it to be understood, that it was not merely the friendship, but the *protection*

* Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 284. Le Vassor, ix. 599.

of France that Gustavus was ambitious to obtain. Incensed at an attempt so derogatory to the glory of their master, the Swedish plenipotentiaries,* though on the point of signing, threw down their pens, indignantly exclaiming, "The King of Sweden disdains to ask protection of any except the Almighty. By the favour of Heaven he has hitherto supported himself through every difficulty, and doubts not of being enabled to perform his allotted task without applying to man for protection."

Though foiled in the endeavour to degrade a monarch, as far superior to the degenerate son of Henry IV. as genius and courage are to timidity and superstition, Charnace started fresh difficulties respecting the titles to be given to the only potentate in Europe, whose virtues did honour to a sceptre. "The appellation of *Majesty*," he said, "was never accorded by the court of France to an elective monarch, and as such he affected to consider Gustavus, because the national diet had never formally renounced the right of suffrage.† The French negociator adhering pertinaciously to this ridiculous pretension, the dispute was referred to the king, who instantly declared, "that he disdained to purchase the alliance of France by an act of baseness; and that he had a thousand times rather forego the advantages which her co-operation might afford, than sacrifice the dignity of a crown which he had hitherto worn with unsullied lustre."‡ Besides, a precedent assisted precisely

* Horn and the two Baniers, the one secretary of state, the other a general.—Harte, i. 230. Galetti, 171.

† Hist. de Gust. Adolphe, 284.

‡ Puffendorf, iii. 2.—The author of the History of Gustavus Adolphus inserts the following letter, written by the King of Sweden to Louis:

applicable to the point in question. Gustavus Vasa, the grandfather of Adolphus, had concluded a treaty with Francis I. in which the right of precedence had alternately varied according to the usual forms of diplomacy. This species of argument appeared too conclusive even for official artifice to controvert; and Charnace being now reduced to silence, the convention was signed on the twenty-third of January, 1631, at Beerwald, in Brandenburg.*

This alliance, which was limited to the space of five years, unless peace should be previously restored to Europe, comprehended the following

“ L’ambassade que votre majesté nous a envoyée au mois de juin dernier, nous a été d’autant plus agréable, qu’elle nous était un témoignage de son amitié et bienveillance envers nous, ainsi que de son affection louable et constante pour le bien public. Certes il ne pouvait rien nous arriver, que nous desiderassions avec plus d’ardeur que de voir renouveler cette union, qui a régné pendant tant d’années, entre les rois de l’un et l’autre royaume nos prédécesseurs; de la voir même plus étendue pour la liberté et la sûreté des peuples de nos deux royaumes dans un tems, où l’Europe est dans un état de trouble et d’agitation. C’est à quoi nous sommes portés avec toute sorte d’empressement, comme il auroit été aisé à voire M. de reconnoître. Cependant le Baron de Charnacé n’ayant pas voulu, pour des considérations que nous avons de la peine à comprendre, consentir que nous missions nos titres et nom à l’inscription des patentes de notre traité d’alliance, ainsi qu’ont accoutumé de faire tous les autres rois, nous avons trouvé fort étrange qu’on s’arrêtât à une chose de si peu d’importance, qui n’aceroit, ni ne diminue en rien l’honneur de l’une, ni de l’autre majesté. Toutefois nous avons cru qu’il était du devoir d’un roi, de ne rien négliger de ce qui concerne sa dignité royale. Nous eussions plutôt souffert la rupture du traité, que de relâcher aucune chose appartenante à cette dignité, que nous avons reçu de dieu, et de nos ancêtres. Nous ne saurions nous persuader que la conduite du dit ambassadeur, en cette occasion, ait été fondée sur la volonté et commandement de V. M. ayant toujours reçu de bons témoignages de son amitié,.....

“ Que si V. M. juge à propos que cette négociation soit reprise, il sera nécessaire que nos ambassadeurs soient munis à l’avenir de pouvoirs suffisans, afinque le traité ne soit pas retardé par la nécessité d’en demander d’autres.” Hist. de Gust. Ad. 285.

* Le Vassor, ix. 600. Puffendorf, iii. 3. Hist. de Gust. Adolphe, 286.

clauses: "That in consideration of the sum of four hundred thousand crowns,* to be annually furnished in two separate payments, either at Paris or Amsterdam, according to the option of the King of Sweden, that monarch should maintain in Germany an army, consisting of thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry." The objects to which this imposing force was to be particularly directed, were distinctly specified: "To protect the allies of the contracting parties against all illegal attacks; to reinstate in their ancient and legitimate prerogatives, those princes who had been dispossessed, either by force of arms or by arbitrary and illegal edicts; to restore the constitution of the German empire to its original purity; to re-establish freedom of commerce in the northern seas; and to procure the demolition of every fortress erected in contradiction to the rights of nations, either upon the shores of the Baltic, or among the mountains of the Valtaline; in a word, to recover the balance of Europe, alarmingly deranged by the overweening ambition of Austria."—"Each of the contracting parties was to enjoy ample permission to recruit in the dominions, or to frequent the ports, of his ally; while vessels belonging to any hostile state were to be rigorously excluded from their harbours. It was farther agreed, that no innovation should be attempted in the national worship, but that it should be left entirely in the same situation under which it existed prior to the commencement of hostilities." By an additional article, protection was offered to the Duke of Bavaria, as well as to the other members of the Catholic League,

* About £50,000.

provided they should abstain from all acts of hostility.”*

An effort was made, on the part of France, to prevail upon Gustavus to keep the treaty a secret for the present, lest delicate consciences should take umbrage at an alliance contracted by the advice of a cardinal and the agency of a monk, with the avowed champion of a religion, against which every zealous adherent to the interests of the Vatican professed eternal hostility. The publicity of the transaction, however, was too essential to his reputation for Gustavus to agree to the proposal.† Notwithstanding the outcry of bigotry, whose pious scruples were offended at the encouragement thus openly given to heresy, this alliance unquestionably forms one of the most brilliant features in the administration of Richelieu. Neither did it prove less beneficial to the King of Sweden, who was no longer regarded as a daring adventurer, setting fame and fortune on every cast, and whose chimerical projects a single reverse might overthrow. The opinions of mankind underwent a sudden and decisive revolution; so that the timid prudence of those who adopted prosperity as the criterion of friendship, no longer hesitated to declare in favour of a cause, which they had hitherto trembled to embrace: even the fears of the papists in some measure subsided, when they were convinced that their religion had found a protector powerful enough to check the animosity of the victorious Goth, should

* This treaty may be perused at length in the Appendix to Harte, and in Dumont's valuable collection.

† Le Vassor, ix. 601.

he venture, in the intoxication of zeal and conquest, to transgress the bounds of moderation.*

Though Gustavus allowed his troops a few days repose, in order to recruit their exhausted strength, he was far less indulgent to himself. His active genius was never known to slumber; and, while he considered the proposals of Charnace, he inspected the fortifications of Gartz, and caused a fort to be erected on the right bank of the Oder, in order to render the possession of Custrin less advantageous to the enemy. Already he entertained the most sanguine expectations of compelling them to evacuate Pomerania, by which Lusatia and Saxony would be open to his incursions, where he was sure of procuring abundant supplies, and from whence he might turn his victorious arms as circumstances should require, either against the members of the Catholic League, or the hereditary dominions of Austria. The approach of Tilly, however, suddenly constrained him to suspend the execution of this bold design, and to assume a defensive attitude. Alarmed for the safety of Francfort and Landsberg, the general of Ferdinand having entrusted Pappenheim with the blockade of Magdeburg, proceeded at the head of twenty-two thousand veterans to the defence of those important fortresses. Pursuing his way by hasty marches, in spite of the inclement season, he appeared before Francfort; and being satisfied, from the movements of the Swedish army, that it was in no immediate danger, he increased his strength by draughts from the garrison, and marched away, with the decided resolution of bring-

* Puffendorf, iii. 3. Schmidt, v. 3.

ing the war to a speedy issue, by giving battle immediately to Gustavus. But, in proportion as it appeared advantageous for the Austrian commander to hazard an engagement, it was for the interest of his opponent to decline it. Deeming it highly perilous, in the face of an enemy superior in numbers, to make any attempt upon the adjacent fortresses, the king recrossed the Oder, hoping, by the apparent uncertainty of his plans, to embarrass Tilly. He also foresaw the possibility of inducing him, by a feint, to hurry back for the protection of the blockading army; in the event of which, he proposed to commence the siege of Francfort, so much weakened by the reinforcements afforded to the generalissimo, that he did not absolutely despair of carrying it by assault. At all events, these movements would harass the imperialists, who were obliged to proceed by a circuitous route, while the possession of most of the contiguous towns enabled the Swedes to confine their operations within a narrower circle.*

Tilly no sooner heard that the Swedes had crossed the Oder, than he trembled for the safety of Pappenheim; but, however anxious he might feel to afford him relief, the want of provisions obliged him to continue for several days in the position he occupied, till stores could be collected for the army. Concluding that the efforts of the enemy would be directed against Damin, in order to open a passage to Magdeburg, he sent orders to Savelli to defend the town to the last extremity, promising within the space of three weeks to extricate him from every difficulty.

* 1631. Gualdo, i. 21. Puffendorf, iii. 8.

The apprehensions of Tilly were shortly verified. The Swedes invested Damin with an impetuosity which surprised and confounded the timid Italian, accustomed only to the inert regularity of Austrian tactics. It is but fair to acknowledge, that the strength of the town was greatly impaired by the intenseness of the frost, which rendered pervious the morasses by which it was surrounded, and enabled the assailants to render themselves masters of a fort, which, in a milder season, would have been impregnable. This appears to have been accomplished in a single day; and, on the following morning, while the king was examining the fortifications, the ice gave way, and he fell into the water up to the shoulders. Terrified at his situation, as he was actually within reach of a musket-ball, his aid-de-camps ran to his assistance; but, with unruffled serenity, he forbade them to approach, and being left entirely to his own exertions, soon extricated himself from every peril. The temerity with which he risked his life, having induced the generals in a body to represent to him the loss which the protestant religion would sustain, if deprived of its only defender, the king calmly replied, "that all human events were under the control of a Being who wisely regulated them for the general benefit of mankind. Confiding implicitly in his unerring wisdom, he should continue, as long as he was permitted to live, to perform the task allotted by Providence. Besides," added he with a smile, "I have the vanity to believe, that no observations are taken with so much accuracy, as those which I make myself."*

* Harte, i. 236.

A lodgment having been effected on one of the principal bastions, Savelli took fright, and offered to capitulate. This dastardly resolution was universally attributed to avarice, as the duke was supposed to be far more anxious for the preservation of his ill-gotten wealth, than for that of his military character. Tempted by the importance of the conquest, the king readily permitted the garrison to retire with the honours of war; but the cowardice of the commander was so repugnant to his feelings, that he was utterly unable to conceal his contempt. When Savelli saluted him, he could not refrain from saying, with sarcastic severity, "that he was happy he had abandoned the pleasures of Rome for the laborious profession of arms; but that he would advise him, in future, to renounce an occupation, less suited to his talents than the splendour of a drawing-room." Then, turning to his officers, he added, indignantly, in his native tongue, "Had that coward so dishonoured the Swedish name, he should instantly lose his head; from his present master, however, he has nothing to apprehend; for, unless I totally mistake the emperor's character, he will easily make his peace at Vienna."*

The capture of Damin supplied the Swedes with immense magazines, and a numerous train of artillery. Among the baggage belonging to the imperial officers were the valuable effects of Aligheri, who formerly attempted to destroy Gustavus, as the reader has been already informed, and who had been rewarded for the perfidious act by the rank of colonel in Savelli's regiment. Delighted at the prospect of punishing a traitor, the Swedish com-

* Puffendorf, iii. 5. Harte, i. 237. Gualdo, i. 23.

manders represented to the king that the property of an assassin ought not to be sacred. "My word is pledged," said the heroic monarch; "and I had rather suffer twenty such villains to escape with impunity, than expose my veracity to the possibility of a reproach."*

Meanwhile Tilly directed his course through the Electorate of Brandenburg, the only route that remained, without exposing the troops to a thousand hardships, from want of provisions, in an exhausted country, all the fortresses of which were occupied by a vigilant enemy. During the march he was joined by Savelli, who first communicated the intelligence of his now irreparable disgrace. Justly exasperated at an action so truly inglorious to the imperial arms, the indignant veteran loaded him with reproaches, and ordered him immediately to repair to Vienna, to answer for his conduct before a military tribunal. The tribunal assembled, and the complaints of Tilly were fully substantiated; yet, in spite of proofs the most unquestionable of peculation and cowardice, Gustavus's prophecy was completely fulfilled; the illustrious poltroon being not only permitted to escape, but soon afterwards entrusted with an important mission in Italy.*

No sooner was Gustavus assured that the imperial general had fallen into the snare, than he resolved, by the reduction of Francfort, to open a passage into Silesia. Leaving Banner to repair the fortifications of Damin, and watch the imperialists, he hastened to Stettin, to superintend the preparations necessary for the execution of that important

* Harte, i. 237. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 279.

† Puffendorf, iii. 5. Gualdo, i. 23. Harte, i. 236.

design. Meanwhile Colberg surrendered, after a vigorous defence, by which the whole of Pomerania, excepting Grypswald, ineffectually assaulted by the enterprising valour of Banner, was rescued from the oppression of Austria.*

These repeated disasters exasperated Tilly almost to madness, because they not only deranged his future projects, but sullied the glory which that veteran had acquired by long and meritorious services. Uncertain on which side to direct his attention, he at one moment proposed to dispel the cloud by the capture of Magdeburg, and the next determined to meet the youthful hero, whose rising constellation obscured the lustre of his setting sun, and trust the fate of the empire and his own renown to a general engagement. All the movements of the enemy, however, displayed such striking proofs of sagacity, that he could scarcely indulge a rational hope of compelling him to fight to disadvantage. He therefore, at length, resolved to satiate the resentment which rankled in his bosom, by some memorable act of revenge. The castle of Feldsberg being carried by storm, he inhumanly ordered the unresisting soldiers to be put to the sword. Proceeding forward in his sanguinary career, he invested New Brandenburg, defended by Kniphausen, a consummate warrior, at the head of a veteran garrison. The loss of a courier, unfortunately intercepted by the Austrian cavalry, leaving the governor ignorant of his master's intentions that he should evacuate the town if attacked, he resolved to defend it to the last extremity. Baffled in repeated attempts to carry it by assault, Tilly

was preparing to abandon the enterprise, when a party of Walloons, impatient for plunder, mounted a breach, which was deemed impracticable by the ablest engineers, and rushing into the streets, put every thing that opposed them to the sword. Except the gallant commander, and the wives and daughters of some of the principal citizens, not a soul escaped; the wretched inhabitants having incurred the resentment of the victors, by submitting to the Swedish dominion, with a facility bordering upon disaffection.*

Incensed at these acts of savage barbarity, the king proclaimed his resolution of behaving in future to the imperial troops exactly as the Swedes should be treated, till he should have taught his adversary to respect the rights of humanity, as practised by civilized nations.

The mystery which enveloped all the schemes of Gustavus continued to puzzle his antagonist. Too proud to tolerate the ascendancy of a warrior, whom he still presumed to treat as a stripling, and panting after an opportunity of ascertaining more minutely the extent of his military talents, Tilly sent Colorado to reconnoitre the position of the Swedes, resolved, if his report should justify the desperate undertaking, to attack them in their intrenchments at Schwedt. The result, however, being in no respect encouraging, the enterprise was abandoned as impracticable.†

The indecision observable in all the operations of the Austrian army, convincing the king that Tilly

* Harte, i. 240. Puffendorf, iii. 8. Lotichius, i. 856. Swed. Intelligencer, i. 87. Burgus, 141.

† Hist. de Gust. Adol. 290.

had been unable to penetrate his designs, he determined no longer to delay his plan for the reduction of Franckfort. Having called in his detachments under Horn and Banner, and embarked his heavy artillery upon the Oder, he appeared unexpectedly before the walls of Francfort. Upon receiving intimation of the enemy's approach, Tieffenbach, an officer of great reputation, threw himself into the city. With a garrison exceeding eight thousand men, according to the opinion of the ablest tacticians, Tieffenbach ought to have taken post on an eminence, which commanded the Oder, from whence it would have been practicable for him to have embarrassed the operations of the enemy, till Tilly could march to his relief. Tieffenbach, however, was of a different opinion, and retired behind the walls, after causing the houses in the Faux-bourgs to be levelled with the ground; by which he allowed the Swedes to continue their works without molestation. Activity is perhaps the most distinguishing feature in the character of Gustavus, and is the most essential quality a general can possess. He never wasted a moment which could be employed advantageously; and never entrusted to others what he was able personally to perform.

To storm a city, surrounded by well-constructed fortifications, defended by a numerous garrison, was an enterprize no less difficult than dangerous; yet it was hardly possible for Gustavus to cherish a hope of success, if he allowed time for Tilly to arrive.

A tremendous fire having been kept up for several days, a breach was effected, which, after personal inspection, the king resolved to assault. The preparations requisite for this desperate attempt

having occasioned the besiegers to slacken their efforts, the garrison, concluding that Tilly was approaching to effect their delivery, insulted the foe with taunts and reproaches.

*Incensed at becoming an object of derision, when he flattered himself to inspire a different sentiment, a Saxon lieutenant, whose name was Auer, proposed to his comrades to avenge the insult in the blood of the offenders. Perceiving that the suggestion was received with applause, he leaped into the ditch, and placing a scaling ladder against the wall, in utter defiance of a shower of balls, mounted it at the head of his gallant followers. The temerity of the attempt having luckily attracted the attention of Gustavus, he ordered the assailants to be supported by continual reinforcements, till the Austrians, after almost incredible exertions, were compelled to retreat. This success, however brilliant, might have proved only momentary, had not the imperial commanders been culpably remiss in the discharge of their duty; for, while the Swedes were employed in storming the works, they were engaged in the pleasures of the table; and, though alarmed at the tumult, not one of them chose to leave his dinner, that he might ascertain from whence it proceeded. Intelligence, however, at length arriving, that the enemy was actually in possession of the principal streets, Tieffenbach and Montecuculi mounted their horses; and, attending solely to their personal safety, fled precipitately toward Glogau, in Silesia. The gallant Schomberg, on the contrary, forgetting the unmerited treatment which he had received, to remember only the duties of a soldier,

* April 14, 1631.

exposed his life with the temerity of a volunteer. His attention, however, was soon attracted to another quarter, where Lumsdel* and Hepburn, two gallant Scots, after bursting a gate, were pushing forward with resistless impetuosity.† Convinced that no efforts of courage could any longer avail, Schomberg abandoned the city in despair; upon which the soldiers immediately threw down their weapons, imploring quarter. The conquerors, however, proved totally insensible to their intreaties; and, hewing them down with remorseless fury, ex-

* The king was so delighted with the gallantry of Lumsdel, that, on the following day, he told him to ask whatever he pleased, as a reward.—Harte i. 245.

† When the Swedes entered Francfort, Butler (a relation of the Ormond family) was almost the only officer of distinction at his post; but, after a gallant defence, he was grievously wounded and taken prisoner. The imperial generals, however, endeavoured to conceal their own dastardly behaviour, by throwing the blame upon Butler, and, had it not been for the following circumstance, he might have been degraded and dishonoured, as a reward for his meritorious services. All the Swedish generals being invited that night to sup with the king, he declared that he would not taste a morsel till he had seen the brave Irishman who fought so courageously; “and yet,” added he, “I have something to say, that may not be agreeable for him to hear.”

Butler being unable to walk, on account of his wound, was brought in a chair. Gustavus, after viewing him sternly, inquired, in a tone little calculated to inspire confidence, “whether he was the elder or the younger Butler?” Upon his replying, “the latter,” the king exclaimed, in a transport of joy, “I thank God that you are so; for, had you been the elder, I must have passed my sword through your body immediately. But now you shall be attended by my own physician, and want nothing that can possibly contribute to your comfort.”—Harte, i. 248.

This anecdote clearly proves, that the elder Butler must have been guilty of some atrocious action, though history is silent respecting the particulars; because nothing less than a crime of the blackest die could have extorted such a threat from the mouth of a prince, no less conspicuous for clemency than for courage; and, as the man who had excited the indignation of Gustavus was a principal agent in the assassination of Wallenstein, we may safely infer, that there is no atrocity in the dire catalogue of human offences, at which his head, or his heart, would have recoiled.

claimed in derision, "Such quarter shall you have, as you gave at New Brandenburg." In a conflict conducted with such savage barbarity the carnage of course must have been immense; more than three thousand were slain in the streets, besides a considerable number who perished in attempting to swim across the river, when they found the bridge obstructed by baggage. All the efforts of the king to preserve the town from pillage were for a long time ineffectual, and he was even obliged at last to cause several soldiers to be shot, before order and discipline could be restored.* He had, however, the satisfaction to learn, that notwithstanding the excesses in which the victors had indulged, not a woman had been violated, and only one citizen killed, who had provoked his fate by his own imprudence. Being informed that the inhabitants were in want of provisions, he ordered corn and wine to be distributed among them from the imperial magazines, thus subjugating by his generosity those whom his valour had so lately subdued.† This

* Burgus, 157, accuses Gustavus of having connived at their excesses; "Gustavus vero iratum se fingens ob eadem a suis ad novum Brandenburgum acceptam, exercitui eam prædam concedere voluit, ut promptiorem ad reliqua haberet."

† Puffendorf, iii. 11. Lotichius, i. 858. Gualdo, i. 26. *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 292. The following anecdote, taken from Khevenhiller, merits attention, on account of its singularity. The first civil officer in the Swedish army, possessing the rank of general, had fallen accidentally into the hands of the Austrians, a few days previously to the capture of Francfort, and had been entrusted by Schomberg to the care of his steward, with directions to treat him with the utmost attention. But no sooner had the imperial generals fled, than the steward prepared to follow his master on horseback; his prisoner, who accompanied him, being compelled to walk, though entitled, from his age as well as his station, to every indulgence. During the march he was exposed to continual insults, from the bigotry of his companion, who frequently pointed his pistol at his

brilliant exploit, achieved with a facility which

head, with this comfortable salutation, "Heretical dog, I have a great fancy to shoot you!"

The pious sacrifice was, however, not consummated; probably, because some of the fugitive soldiers prevented its execution from the sordid calculations of interest, or from the hope, if overtaken by the Swedish cavalry, that the prisoner from gratitude might intercede in their favour. At length, after a painful journey of sixteen hours, they reached the confines of Silesia; when the captive, being presented to Schomberg, reproached him publicly in the presence of his officers, for having suffered a person of rank, bending under the pressure of age and infirmity, to be exposed to the danger of perishing from want of those common attentions which humanity never refuses. "But if you are deaf," said the old man, with honest indignation, "to the voice of compassion, it is astonishing to find you equally blind to the suggestions of interest, and that you should forget that the king my master is able to retaliate with tenfold severity, on thousands actually in his power."

The justness of this reproof was acknowledged by the silence, if not by the confession, of Schomberg. A carriage conducted the prisoner to the castle of Wartemberg, where he met with every accommodation requisite to alleviate his sufferings, if any thing could compensate the loss of liberty. Being rigidly guarded, and lodged in an apartment at the top of the fortress, every attempt to recover it seemed impracticable: besides, all the villages to the east of the Oder were filled with Austrians; and to traverse a wide and rapid stream, presented to a man, between sixty and seventy, obstacles sufficient to have daunted the enterprising courage of youth. The more he reflected upon the difficulty of the undertaking, the less probability he saw of effecting his escape. In this situation he received a visit from an inhabitant of the adjacent town, who came to offer every assistance which it might be in his power to afford. The candour which reigned in the tradesman's countenance reviving the prisoner's hopes, he imparted to him his design, promising him a considerable recompence if, on the following night, he would wait for him under the walls of the castle, and conduct him in safety to the banks of the Oder. The honest burgher pledged his word and retired. At the appointed hour the Swede, by the help of his sheets, dropped from the window, and before break of day arrived at the river. At sight of the perils which now awaited him, his spirits drooped. It was more than thirty years since he had attempted to swim, and he felt that he wanted both strength and activity to struggle against the impetuous current. The love of freedom, however, at length prevailed: he took off his clothes; and, fastening a shirt upon his back, committed himself boldly to the protection of Providence. After contending long and manfully against the rapidity of the stream, his powers were so nearly exhausted, that he looked forward to death as inevitable, when to his inexpressible joy his foot struck against

astonished the world,* opened a passage into Silesia and Bohemia, in case the king should incline to turn his victorious arms against the hereditary dominions of Austria. And so favourable was the moment for some decisive attempt, that it would have been impossible for Tilly to have defended Vienna, without abandoning the empire to the resentment of the protestants, who began to arm in every direction; and, in case he confined his operations to the Rhine and the Elbe, there was nothing to prevent the triumphant Goth from extending his conquests to the Danube.

Such was the dilemma in which Tilly was placed, when he heard that Francfort was invested. By following Gustavus, he could hardly fail to impede the execution of his designs, and might even find an opportunity of attacking him to advantage; but by stedfastly persevering in the siege of Magdeburg, there was reason to hope that the king might be induced to relinquish his operations upon the Oder, in order to hasten to the relief of a city so essential to his future prosperity; the loss of which might determine the fluctuating politics of Saxony and Brandenburg, and give a decided superiority to the Austrian arms in the northern province of Germany.

Such were probably the considerations which presented themselves to the imperial general, before he resolved upon succouring Francfort; but

the bottom. His courage revived, and after incredible efforts he reached the opposite shore, naked and desolate, with nothing but a shirt to cover him, and uncertain whither to direct his steps. At length, however, after suffering severely from cold and hunger, he reached a Swedish outpost, nearly exhausted with fatigue.—*Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 297.

* Including killed and wounded, the whole loss of the Swedes did not exceed four hundred men.—*Harte*, i. 245.

as he was proceeding thither by rapid marches, he was met by a courier with the melancholy tidings that the moment for exertion was irrecoverably lost.* Overwhelmed with consternation at the assurance of an event so contrary to all his calculations, that it almost tempted him to attribute the ascendancy of genius to supernatural agency, he immediately altered his plan; and, meditating in gloomy silence a memorable revenge, decreed the destruction of Magdeburg.†

But before we follow this barbarous veteran to the consummation of an enterprise, destined ever to render the name of Tilly an object of execration to all who sympathize in the sufferings of their fellow creatures, it is necessary to advert to the trans-

* In a letter addressed to the Elector of Bavaria, Pappenheim describes the distress of the army. “Je voudrais pouvoir depeindre a votre serenité l’etat de notre armée, comme je l’ai devant les yeux. Le roi de Suede est renforcé des troupes venues de Stralsund et de Prusse, il nous est superieur, et actuellement il assiége Francfort. Les protestans assemblés à Leipsic ont formé la resolution d’armer, et auront bientôt une forte armée sur pied. Les Anglais sont prêts a s’embarquer pour se joindre aux Suedois, et les etats de la Hollande ne resteront pas les bras croisés; enfin tout le pays n’attend que d’être appuyé pour se soulever. Il est bien a craindre que le secours pour Francfort n’arrive trop tard. Engager l’armée entre l’Elbe et l’Oder c’est donner aux protestans le loisir de faire des leveés, et de venir au secours de Magdeburg, de couper aux imperiaux la communication avec l’Elbe, et pres qu’avec toute l’Allemagne.

“D’un autre côté laisser prendre Francfort c’est tomber dans un autre inconvenient non moins facheux. . . . de sorte qu’au moins de quelque incident heureux, que l’esprit humain ne saurait prévoir, les affaires sont dans une plus grande crise que jamais.”

He adds in a postscript, “J’apprends dans ce moment que Francfort vient d’être emporté l’épée a la main, et que tout y a été massacré. Nous y avons perdu l’élite des troupes de l’empereur, et je ne sais s’il sera possible de continuer le siège de Magdeburg, n’ayant pas de forces suffisantes, pour fournir a l’investissement de la ville, et pour faire face a l’armée du roi, qui après la prise de Landsberg ne manquera pas de marcher au secours de Magdeburg. . . .”—Hist. de Gust. Adolphe. 300.

† Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 299.

actions at Leipsic, where, in consequence of the resolutions embraced at Torgau, a protestant diet was assembled.*

In conformity to the wishes of the Elector of Saxony, as well as to the prevailing opinion of the times, that the fortunate moment was at length arrived for prescribing bounds to the tyranny of Austria, the meeting was calculated, both from the number and resources of those who attended it, to excite the apprehensions of Ferdinand. In addition to all the members of the Saxon family, it comprehended the head of the house of Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, the Margraves of Bareuth and of Baden Dourlach, and the Prince of Anhalt. Many also of the friends of the Reformation having been prevented from attending, either by personal or worldly prudence, sent their representatives; viz. the Archbishop of Bremen, the Margrave of Anspach, the Dukes of Brunswick, Luneburg, and Mecklenberg, and the administrator of the Duchy of Wirtemberg, the sovereign of which was still a minor. Deputies likewise appeared from the circles of Swabia and Franconia, as well as from many of the imperial cities.†

The members being assembled, every precaution was used to guard against treachery, which extended so far, that no stranger was permitted to remain in the city, whose business was not clearly ascertained; and the more effectually to prevent this rigorous order from being eluded, the keys of

* 1631. Speaking of the conduct of John George at this important crisis, Puffendorf says, "Eum Cæsari hactenus plus satis addictum, apertè jam erumpentes ipsius artes, et proditæ causæ communis exprobratio, tandem ad fortia consilia excitaverunt." iii. 12.

† Swedish Intelligencer, i. 22. Lotichius, i. 818. Harte, i. 260.

the city were deposited every night in the elector's chamber.* Threats, promises, and caresses were however successively employed by the court of Vienna, to suppress an assembly, which in the intoxication of power it deemed unconstitutional, because convened without the authority of the emperor. The victories of Gustavus, however, had infused vigour and animation into the breasts of the most timid; so that many who lately trembled at the name of Ferdinand, now ventured openly to brave his authority.

Though the ostensible motive for summoning the convention was to counteract the schemes attributed to the catholics, for the total suppression of the reformed religion, and which they were expected to bring forward at the approaching diet, John George secretly flattered himself, to be able to establish an independent party, unconnected alike with Sweden and Austria, and thus hold the balance between them. But as it seemed essential to success, that ambition should be disguised under the mask of patriotism, he opened the assembly in a studied oration, proposing the following objects for its deliberation: The first consideration to which he directed its attention was the calamitous state to which Germany was reduced by the desolation occasioned by the hostile armies. "It could hardly fail to occur," he said, "to all impartial observers, that under this pressure of misery, the princes of the empire could not long support their independence, unless some remedy could be devised commensurate with the magnitude of the evil;" and he

* Swedish Intelligencer, 23.

accordingly conjured his hearers "to unite in restoring the violated laws to their ancient purity, and in endeavouring to promote a general peace, which could never be accomplished without previously establishing a good understanding between the rival religions of Rome and Luther, more exasperated against each other than ever, by the fatal edict of restitution. Nothing," he protested, "could be farther from his intention than to attack the legitimate prerogatives of the imperial crown; but while he was ready to acknowledge its legal authority, he deemed it essential to the happiness and security of the nation, that it should be confined within constitutional limits."

He next adverted to the intolerable taxes, by which their revenues had been exhausted. This oppressive system, he said, had been carried to so great an excess, that many sovereigns were compelled to reduce their expenditure, and forego various comforts which habit had rendered essential; the renunciation of which could not fail, in a little time, to deprive them of that powerful source of authority which rests on public opinion. Among the most prominent evils, to which they were exposed, was the arbitrary conduct of the imperial generals, who levied contributions with insatiate avidity, subjecting the dominions, even of their firmest friends, to all the rigour of military execution. "This treatment," he added, "was rendered still more intolerable, by comparing it with the mild and parental behaviour of Ferdinand towards his hereditary subjects, who were not only exempted from the burthens of war, but were never called upon to furnish the smallest subsidy, till it had undergone a full and impartial discussion in an assembly of national

delegates. By this unequal distribution, the taxes imposed upon the other provinces were necessarily augmented far beyond their proper proportion." At his recommendation, a memorial was transmitted to Vienna, recapitulating in firm, but temperate language, all the grievances of which they complained, and imploring the emperor to terminate them speedily by a total change in the whole military system, a revocation of the edict, and a due attention to the fundamental laws of the empire. It concluded by stating in respectful terms, that if contrary to their expectations, this humble petition should be treated with neglect, they should feel themselves bound by that paramount duty, which they owed to those whom they were appointed to govern, to vindicate their rights by every means with which God and nature had armed them.*

Though every allegation reposed on facts, which it was impossible to controvert, this address could not have been presented at a more inconvenient season, both for the emperor and the League; because the abandonment of the principle of arbitrary imposition and free quarters, would inevitably have destroyed the main sinews of the war. It was in vain for either of them to look to its internal resources for funds sufficient for aggressive hostilities, and to concentrate their armies within their own territories would be the means of exposing them to certain invasion. Besides, by evacuating the protestant states, they afforded an opportunity to that restless sect to assert those principles of universal

* Swed. Intell. i. 26. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 282. Lotichius, i. 821.

toleration, which were the fruits of their dangerous theories.

Prudence, however, having deliberately weighed the detriment likely to result from treating the remonstrance with silent neglect, against the disgrace attending compliance, Ferdinand judged it expedient to return an answer, which, though it differed little in substance from that delivered at Ratisbonne, was couched in language far less reprehensible for its insolence and asperity. Too zealously attached to the interest of the church to cancel the unpopular edict, he boldly contended that, in issuing that fatal decree, his conduct was not only sanctioned by the divine authority, but, according to the opinion of the profoundest civilians, was perfectly conformable to the practice of his predecessors, as well as to the spirit of the Germanic constitution. With respect to the misery occasioned by the prolongation of hostilities, he endeavoured to shield ambition under the convenient plea of necessity, insisting that on his part it had been solely a war of defence, and that he had been compelled by the unprovoked aggression of the enemies of social order, to vindicate the purity of the catholic religion, and the just prerogatives of the imperial diadem. "No man," he affirmed, with affected humanity, "could lament more sincerely the degradation of agriculture, and the ruin of commerce; but such were the inevitable consequences of war, and to ascribe them to the errors of his administration, would be no less unjust than to attribute earthquakes and storms, and the disorders observable in the moral world, to an inherent defect in the general organization of the universe. The crisis in which they were placed called imperiously for energetic measures, and the

noble fabric erected by the wisdom and virtue of their illustrious ancestors must fall to decay, unless supported by strenuous exertions, and even occasional deviations from the rigid line of constitutional rectitude, to which in happier times it would have been his pride and study religiously to have conformed. Having thus attempted to palliate his despotic proceedings, he faithfully promised that directions should be immediately sent to the different commanders, enjoining them to establish a severer discipline, and to punish every excess, of which the soldiers might be guilty, with exemplary severity.*

After replying thus minutely to every inculpation, he concluded with a declaration highly honourable to his feelings, had it flowed from conscious integrity. "A thousand times rather," exclaimed the crafty tyrant with characteristic hypocrisy, "would I bow my neck to the axe of the executioner, than afford room for posterity to reproach my memory with having suffered the lustre of the Germanic empire, which has existed for ages the admiration and terror of surrounding nations, to be sullied by my inadvertence."

This answer was to the full as mild and moderate as the petitioners had a right to expect; and probably more so than they anticipated; because, the moment selected to prefer their complaints, was calculated to excite a strong suspicion that they acted in concert with Gustavus. This, however, in fact, was an unfounded conjecture; for though they had artfully taken advantage of the panic created by his victorious career, to extort

* 1631. Lotichius, i. 838. Schmidt, iv. 3.

from the apprehensions of Ferdinand those concessions, for the acquisition of which they had in vain appealed to his generosity, the majority of the assembly wanted courage or honesty to behave with consistency. That sagacious monarch, who never neglected an opportunity of promoting the welfare of the protestant church, dispatched a confidential agent to Leipsic, with directions to communicate to the assembled princes the treaty recently concluded with France. He was further instructed to propose their uniting with the crown of Sweden; and to employ those arguments, which reason and interest so imperiously dictated, in order to convince them, that the fortunate moment was at last arrived, when it would be easy to establish the liberties of Germany upon a basis too solid for despotism or superstition to overturn. But as he anticipated the difficulty of persuading an assembly, composed of persons whose views and attachments were so widely different, to act with unanimity and vigour, and was apprehensive that a pedantic adherence to ancient forms might inspire a veneration for their constitutional chief, which neither insults nor injuries could obliterate, the Swedish envoy was instructed to urge the necessity, at all events, of raising an army to oppose the encroachments of the common enemy, in case he should invade their dominions; but this latter proposal was not to be made, unless he should discover that the former plan was too bold and decisive for such timid politicians to embrace. Under these circumstances he was ordered to demand supplies in men and money, with the permission of retiring to any fortress in Saxony, where he might be obliged to take refuge by a sudden reverse. As it was far from impos-

sible, however, that this second measure might encounter opposition, he was in the last place to admonish them, in the strongest terms, respecting the policy of entering into a general confederacy for their mutual protection, which might be studiously concealed, till impending destruction should impose the necessity of more active exertions.*

Hoping that his recent triumphs might tend more efficaciously, than all his remonstrances, to obviate the objections which folly or presumption had alternately started, he imparted to the meeting the capture of Francfort. Yet, notwithstanding his proposal was strenuously seconded by the influence of France, he had the mortification to discover, that no cordial co-operation could ever take place, unless inspired by the dictates of despair; because their views were too opposite, and their connecting link too feeble to give unity of action, and that persevering courage which participates in the expenses of a protracted contest, unbiassed by the intrigues of short-sighted jealousy, or the baneful speculations of avarice; ever prone to sacrifice a distant advantage, however important, to the attainments of an immediate, though comparatively inconsiderable benefit.

Notwithstanding many of the members were secretly inclined towards an alliance with Gustavus, no progress was made in the negotiation, because the Elector of Saxony damped the rising flame by his cautious or crooked policy; admonishing his allies that, by a premature declaration, they must necessarily expose themselves to inevitable ruin, in case

* Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 298.

the imperial arms should recover their ascendancy.* His motives, however, were more fully explained in a confidential conversation with Charnace, to whom he fairly confessed that his fears of Gustavus were greater than those which he entertained of Ferdinand; because he was confident, that the latter would be always ready to receive him into favour, should he feel disposed to solicit a reconciliation; whereas the former, when he should have realized his ambitious projects, by the assistance of the protestants, might abandon them to the indignation of the emperor, without even deigning to intercede in their favour.†

After this clear exposal of his private opinions, it was in vain to hope for vigorous exertion on the part of the elector, till insult and oppression, carried to excess, should compel him to adopt a more liberal system of policy. Gustavus, however, had the satisfaction to find, that his admonitions were not thrown away, since, by a vote of the diet, an army was ordered to be immediately levied, consisting of forty thousand effective men, for the express purpose of maintaining "the Confession of Augsburg," in all its purity; of opposing the passage of the imperial troops, should they continue to violate the rights of neutrals; and, finally, to resist, a most important point, the execution of the "Edict of Restitution."

These preliminaries being settled, a committee was appointed, consisting of some of the most active members, for the purpose of superintending such business as might require immediate dispatch.

* Puffendorf, iii. 12. Harte, i. 264. Le Vassor, ix. 605.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.* Hist. de Gust. Adol. 298.

Invitations were also sent to the King of Denmark, the Duke of Holstein, and the Hanseatic League, soliciting them to join the confederacy, which was publicly announced, with diplomatic solemnity, at every European court inclined towards the doctrines of the reformers.* Secret assurances were likewise transmitted to Gustavus, by several of the princes, and in particular by those of Hesse-Cassel and Luneburg, declaring their readiness to hazard their lives and fortunes, in defence of the cause which he had so generously undertaken to defend.†

No sooner were the resolutions of the diet officially communicated to the protestant sovereigns, than Ferdinand indignantly threw aside the mask, and, in a thundering monitory, annulled their proceedings, commanding the members immediately to suspend their preparations, under pain of incurring his just displeasure, and forbidding their subjects to pay any taxes imposed for military purposes. The severest penalties were denounced against all, who, after the promulgation of this decree, should adhere to the Union; while all foreigners, found in the protestant ranks, were to be instantly conducted to the gallows. This violent denunciation of imperial wrath commenced, as is usual in similar cases, with the warmest expressions of paternal affection; the artful monarch professing to be animated with the sincerest regard for the prosperity of a people whom he piously wished to exterminate; and to entertain a veneration, bordering upon idolatry, for the Germanic constitution, which it was his earnest desire to overturn; while he solemnly declared, in face of the world, that his only object

* Harte, i. 265. † Puffendorf, iii. 12. Hist. de Gustave Adol. 299.

was to reclaim the former from those dangerous errors, which tended to the ruin of their souls, and to restore the latter to its original beauty, which had been gradually impaired by the impious audacity of fanaticism, and the licentious freedom of philosophy.*

To these protestations the confederates replied, in language equally insincere, disclaiming the imputation of fanning the flame so rapidly spreading over their desolated country; or of attempting to strip the imperial crown of any of its legitimate prerogatives. The sole inducement, they protested, which tempted them to coalesce, was to secure their dominions from insult and depredation; a precaution indispensable to their personal safety, as well as to the prosperity of their dominions, and which could not be repugnant to the principles of any well-regulated government, because it was sanctioned by an authority anterior and paramount to every civil institution—the law of nature and of God.†

While the protestants were striving, by warlike preparations, to render their opposition more formidable, the imperial commander was no less active in prosecuting the siege of Magdeburg. In the success of this important enterprise, the heart of Tilly was deeply interested; since he flattered himself, by its capture, to recover the lustre of the imperial arms, and to reward his soldiers for all their fatigues, at the expense of men, whose wicked apostacy from the papal see had justly exempted them from the rights of humanity.

Upon the return of the generalissimo from his fruitless attempt for the relief of Francfort, Falken-

* 1631. Lotichius, i. 842.

† Schiller, ii.

stein proposed, in a council of war, to destroy the bridge and the suburbs; and this project, being received with universal approbation, was instantly carried into execution. The strength of the garrison being thus concentrated within a narrower compass, the besiegers were suffered to prosecute their labours with little interruption; for that able commander was unwilling to lavish the lives of his soldiers in fruitless sallies. Indeed his weakness prescribed a system of caution, as the greater part of his little garrison consisted of raw recruits, indifferently accoutred, and paid with little regularity; because the vigilance of the enemy prevented Gustavus from fulfilling his promise of sending pecuniary supplies.

Another difficulty arose from the mercantile spirit which almost universally prevailed among the higher classes, making them contemplate with horror the contingent misery of a protracted defence, and inducing them to listen with disloyal facility to the secret overtures of Tilly; while some even regarded the wages of treachery in the light of a profitable speculation.* Hence neglect, or perfidy, having omitted to replenish the exhausted magazines, the only rational hope which presented itself to the governor, was in the courage and humanity of Gustavus.

In order to supply the deficiency of regular

* That a treacherous correspondence was actually carried on appears clearly from the confession of Pappenheim, who, in a conversation with the administrator, after he was taken prisoner, candidly asked him, how he could be foolish enough to hazard his life in defence of men, who were actually in the pay of the Austrians, to whom they regularly communicated the order of the day, with all other circumstances of local information, which could tend to facilitate their designs: and he farther assured him, that the plan of attack was regulated in consequence of such information.—Harte, i. 273.

troops, the burghers were formed into military corps, and instructed in the management of artillery; a desperate expedient, and calculcated to produce irreparable mischief, when men cease to be animated by the generous spirit of patriotism, which prefers to perish under the ruins of expiring freedom, rather than submit to the yoke of an invader. Accustomed to the profits and the comforts of trade, few of the inhabitants manifested either the zeal or the intelligence of soldiers. Instead of uniting hand and heart in the common cause, they divided into factions, opposing the wisest and most salutary schemes, if they originated with the contrary party. The poorer classes complained that, by an unfair distribution of labour, they who had least to lose were compelled to make the greatest exertions, forgetting that their superiors were permitted to remain inactive, only because they paid liberally for substitutes. Fomented clandestinely by the factious and disaffected, this dangerous spirit gradually pervaded all ranks of society, frequently shewing itself in mutinous tumults. Yet notwithstanding every symptom of culpable indifference, religious enthusiasm, that infallible characteristic of a rising sect, fomented by the zeal of popular preachers; a strong attachment to liberty, though valued by the greater number only on account of its abuses; a rooted detestation of Austrian tyranny, inspired by recent oppression; and the expectation of seeing the Swedish hero arrive to their succour, animated the majority with the firm resolution of defending their ramparts to the last extremity.*

* Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 312.

The confidence reposed in the valour and generosity of the Swedish monarch was not destitute of solid foundation. The fall of Francfort, and the confederation of Leipsic were known at Magdeburg; and, being justly regarded by the citizens as highly favourable to their future prospects, they expected every moment to behold the besiegers fly before the victorious legions of Gustavus. Tilly also was too well acquainted with the magnanimity of that illustrious monarch, to doubt his employing every possible expedient for the protection of a city which had declared so early in his favour. This conviction might have averted the impending calamity, had the inhabitants been guided by the dictates of reason, instead of presumptuously rejecting her warning voice; which taught them to listen to the offers of Tilly, who exhorted them to avoid the ruin which impended by a speedy surrender.* Too cautious to incur the heavy responsibility of a refusal, Falkenberg requested permission from the Austrian commander, for an officer to pass with dispatches for the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, whom he wished to consult as heads of the Leipsic confederacy. Tilly at first seemed disposed to accede to the proposal, but an intercepted letter having fallen into his hands, containing an assurance from the King of Sweden that he would march to their assistance the moment his preparations were completed, he regarded external communication as highly inexpedient, and returned a positive refusal.†

The spirited resistance which he continued to ex-

* Burgus, 193.

† Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 313. Schmidt, v. 4.

perience, together with the intelligence received of Gustavus's arrival at Potsdam, tempted the imperial general to renew his offers ; but increasing moderation, by confirming the expectation of approaching relief, rendered the citizens more obstinate than ever. Neither was the hero, on whose exertions they so firmly relied, inattentive to the danger which awaited them. No sooner had Lansberg surrendered,* than putting himself at the head of all his cavalry he began his march towards Magdeburg, leaving the infantry to follow with the utmost expedition. It was however an invariable principle in his military system, never to advance without securing his rear; and this precaution became more necessary than ever, at a time, when he was preparing to traverse a country, where he was equally exposed to the treachery of inconstant allies and the attacks of an enterprising foe, and where one imprudent step might blast the fruits of so many victories. Neither was the conduct of his brother-in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, calculated to dispel these apprehensions, whose timid policy had opened the gates of Custrin to the Austrians, when flying before the victorious Swedes, while he refused admittance to the latter. No confidence could be placed in a temper so unsteady, because, in case of a reverse, the venality of his ministers would not fail to take advantage of their master's timidity, to induce him to declare for the stronger party, and to place all his fortresses at the disposition of Tilly ; an event utterly subversive of all Gustavus's plans, as it would have cut off the com-

* 1613. April 16th.

munication between the Swedish army and their magazines in Pomerania.

The possession of Custrin and Spandau could alone enable him to advance with security, and Marshal Horn was in consequence dispatched to Berlin, to require that both should be placed under the protection of a Swedish garrison, till Magdeburg should be rescued from destruction ; after the delivery of which he solemnly engaged to restore them with their stores and artillery. Unwilling to offend the delicacy of the elector by openly questioning his integrity, Horn was instructed to declare, that it was not from the suspicion of George William's veracity that his master's apprehensions arose, but because he was unwilling to endanger the stability of the protestant cause, which might be utterly ruined, should the venal commanders of Prussia refuse him a passage, as they had ungenerously done during the preceding winter. The king farther solicited a month's pay and provisions for the forces employed against Tilly, solemnly promising, that they should observe the strictest discipline during their march through the electoral territory.*

Whatever might be the opinion entertained at the court of Berlin respecting the pretensions of Gustavus, it is impossible to deny that, if not rigidly conformable to the principles of justice, they were authorized by the practice of all belligerent powers, and enforced by motives so transcendently cogent, that hesitation might have past for a proof of incapacity. The important services rendered to the

* Hist. de Gust. Adol. 302.

Prussians, in liberating them from the extortions of the imperialists, justly entitled Gustavus to the gratitude and confidence of the elector. That irresolute prince, however, was unfortunately guided by the perfidious counsels of Schwartzenberg, a man of noble extraction, but devoted to Austria with venal servility. Convinced that, in order to carry his point, he had only to alarm the fears of his master, he artfully insinuated that, by ceding his fortresses, he would virtually surrender every claim to independence, and become in fact the vassal of Sweden. By a measure so decisive of political attachment, his fortune in future must be inseparably united with the precarious destiny of a sovereign, whose temerity indeed astonished mankind, but whom a single reverse might overwhelm with irretrievable ruin. Together with Gustavus therefore he must fall or triumph; since, after deserting the emperor at this momentous crisis, he could never flatter himself to escape with impunity, in case the adventurous Goth should ultimately meet the disastrous fate to which his rashness had so often exposed him. This mode of arguing, however contrary to the suggestions of rational policy, accorded so exactly with the fears of George William, that he embraced it as the voice of inspiration. Unmoved by the destruction of a rich and commercial city, one of the strongest bulwarks of the reformers, and callous to the cry of freedom and humanity, he attended to nothing but personal security, though he attempted to palliate his dastardly behaviour by the most pitiful and ridiculous excuses.

Gustavus, being now completely satisfied that no impression could be made on the generosity of the elector, resolved to appeal to a stronger

passion, his timidity. Accompanied only by an inconsiderable escort,* he set out for Berlin, determined to negotiate this important business in a personal interview. The elector was no sooner informed of the king's approach than he prepared to receive him with reluctant urbanity. Attended by his ministers and principal officers he met his illustrious guest at the distance of half a league from the capital, flattering himself to atone for his past misconduct by external marks of respect. It was not long however before he discovered that the heart of Gustavus was no less insensible to adulation than it was incapable of disguise. Unable to reply to a hero, whose natural eloquence rose to sublimity, when animated in the cause of humanity, George William replied in the ambiguous language of duplicity, requesting time to consult with his confidential advisers before a definitive answer was returned. This demand being acceded to without producing any thing but additional proofs of equivocation, the indignant monarch thus expressed his contempt for a degenerate relative. "The interest which I feel for the distressed inhabitants of Magdeburg is inspired by compassion, and a sincere attachment to the protestant religion: but, if I am unsupported by those who have far greater reason than myself to be alarmed at the triumphs of Austria, that unfortunate city must fall, and personal safety shall henceforth become the only object of my consideration. This instant I will commence my retreat, and open a treaty with the emperor,

* Five hundred horse, a thousand foot, and four field pieces were sufficient to frighten the court of Berlin, which in the course of little more than half a century became one of the greatest military powers in Europe.

who will be happy to accede to any proposals which the interest of my kingdom may require. But when one of the strongest bulwarks of protestantism shall be overturned, and the Swedes shall no longer shelter you against the resentment of Ferdinand, what expectations can you form from his clemency?" The humiliating conviction of internal debility flashed at once upon the mind of the elector, and combining with the approach of the Swedish army hastening rapidly to the seat of negotiation, and sufficiently powerful to effect by coercion what their sovereign solicited as a pledge of fraternal amity, soon terminated the discussion, and put Gustavus in possession of Spandau.*

Desirous of dividing the attention of the enemy, and securing the frontiers of Pomerania against the incursions of the troops assembling in Bohemia, that prudent monarch left Horn to repel their desultory inroads; directing him to incorporate into the ancient regiments the recruits which progressively arrived from Stockholm.

Two different roads conducted to Magdeburg; one through the sandy plains of Brandenburg, the other by Dessau and Wittenberg. The former however presented so many local impediments, that it could not be undertaken with safety. Besides the dearth of provisions, which every where marked the desolating career of the Austrians, it would have been absolutely necessary to pass the Elbe in sight of a superior army. By crossing that river at Dessau, or Wittenberg, all these difficulties would greatly diminish. The commanding situation of the latter pointed it out as the most proper

* Gualdo, i. 27. Puffendorf, iii. 13. Le Vassor, x. 30.

receptacle for provisions and military stores, which might be abundantly supplied from the fertile plains of Saxony. But in order to render this project feasible, the consent of the elector was indispensable, and Gustavus accordingly addressed himself to John George, requesting that directions might be issued for his hospitable reception; a reasonable demand, because the service to be performed was equally important to all the friends of the reformation. Being intimately acquainted with the character of the man from whom he was compelled to solicit a favour, he cautiously forebore to urge the expediency of being allowed to garrison Wittemberg, though he did not hesitate to declare, that as a trifling compensation for all his exertions, he hoped that the elector would provide for the subsistence of his troops during their passage through his dominions. These demands were urged as undoubted claims; but he farther insinuated, that a due regard for his personal glory, as well as for the stability of the confederacy over which he presided, ought to awaken in the breast of John George a spirit of bolder enterprize, and prompt him to partake in the glory of delivering a city, the loss of which must endanger the solidity of the fabric, which it had been the study of his ancestors to erect.*

To these salutary admonitions the degenerate descendant of the illustrious Maurice proved totally insensible: for his narrow understanding was unable to comprehend that souls might exist so different from his own, as to be capable of beholding with virtuous disdain all the paltry interests of the world, when religion and glory were concerned.

* Puffendorf, iii. 14. Harte, i. 266. Burgus, 173.

Meanwhile the king's anxiety augmented hourly, and with it his contempt for the despicable policy of the Saxon. Yet while he viewed his supineness with ineffable scorn, compassion for the devoted inhabitants of Magdeburg still induced him to make one effort more, to rouse the leader of the protestant party from the disgraceful torpor into which he was sunk by constitutional indolence, brutal sensuality, and the shameless venality of his ministers. In a second address he accordingly cautioned him against listening to the treacherous suggestions of men, who from interested motives magnified the resources of Austria, and impressed his mind with exaggerated respect for the exalted dignity of the emperor. "His veneration toward the chief of the Germanic body had been fully manifested," he said, "by long and passive submission, but he was now called upon to fulfil a more imperious duty—the duty of a sovereign toward his faithful subjects, and of a creature toward his almighty Creator."

The urgency of the occasion not allowing time for the forms of protracted negotiation, he proposed a personal interview, most probably with the intention of recurring, if necessary, to those resistless arguments which had proved so efficacious at Berlin. This offer, however, being immediately declined with evasive duplicity, so incensed Gustavus, that he indignantly exclaimed, "since nothing can rouse these timid politicians, it is time to abandon them to their destiny. I will retire to Pomerania, and wait there till impending destruction shall force them to implore my protection."*

So many days had been wasted in ineffectual

* *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 306. *Burgus*, 175.

communications, that before the king could embrace a definitive resolution, the fatal intelligence arrived, that the once wealthy Magdeburg was no longer numbered among the cities of the earth. The dread of being interrupted by the activity of his opponent gave additional energy to the operations of Tilly. By the end of April, Pappenheim, having pushed the trenches to the foot of the ramparts, proposed to the generalissimo to attempt an assault, though no practicable breach was effected. Tilly, however, unwilling to expose his troops in so desperate an undertaking, and thinking it probable that the dreadful prospect before them might induce the citizens to listen to reasonable terms, despatched another messenger with proposals less rigorous than the former.* But so embarrassed was Falkenstein in all his proceedings, by the presumption and folly of his colleagues, that two whole days were spent in fruitless deliberations, without leading to any decisive result. Expecting hourly to behold the besiegers retire, the magistrates scarcely deigned to lend a patient ear to the suggestions of prudence; and this fatal delusion progressively extending to the lower orders, the municipal bands grew every day more remiss in their military duty.

This dreadful infatuation was greatly augmented, when they found the enemy's fire gradually slacken, and finally cease altogether. No longer doubting that their deliverer was at hand, they could hardly be prevented from abandoning their stations. This unfounded confidence was probably the sentiment which Tilly meant to inspire; for, during the fol-

* May 8th,

lowing night, he summoned the generals to a council, in which, after explaining the impossibility of continuing the siege, and at the same time detaching a force sufficient to oppose the Swedes, he submitted to their consideration the following alternative: whether to break up the camp, and march directly to give up battle to Gustavus, or immediately to endeavour, by one desperate effort, to make themselves masters of the city. The difficulties attending the latter proposal appearing insuperable to most of the commanders, their sentiments were delivered with that cautious hesitation, which frequently attempts to conceal timidity under the specious covering of prudence; so that the enterprise would probably have been relinquished as impracticable, had not Pappenheim, with the impetuosity natural to his character, expatiated upon the ignominy of abandoning the siege, when about to be rewarded for every toil with an abundant harvest of laurels.

The opinion of a man, whose intrepidity rendered him both the idol and oracle of the army, and who was no less conspicuous for those elevated qualities which are necessary to constitute a consummate commander, gave a sudden turn to the debate. At the dawn of day, when the two confederate burghers might be expected to repose from the fatigues of service, it was resolved to begin the assault, and the intervening moments were sedulously employed in transporting the scaling ladders to their destined stations, and in marshalling the troops for the attack.*

* Khevenhillier, xi. 1791. Harte, i. 271. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 319.

The appointed hour arrived, yet Tilly is represented as being still uncertain what course he ought to pursue; because, in the event of a failure, he plainly saw that the flower of the army must perish; and, that with a diminished strength, and sullied reputation, he must fly before a novice in the art of war, for as such he still treated Gustavus. But while his spirits fluctuated between hope and apprehension, intelligence was sent by pensioned traitors, that every post was negligently guarded. This information at once decided his conduct; the signal was given for an immediate attack.*

Upon approaching the walls, the death-like stillness which prevailed within excited the most favourable expectations. After passing the night upon the ramparts, in order to watch the motions of the besiegers, Falkenberg had just quitted his post to attend a council, summoned by the administrator for the purpose of returning a decided negative to Tilly's proposal. Various attacks were simultaneously directed against different quarters, but the resistless valour of Pappenheim first effected a lodgment, and compelled the municipal bands, at that time entrusted with the defence of the outworks, to save themselves by a precipitate retreat. Not a moment was wasted. The scaling ladders were applied, and the soldiers mounted, after experiencing a weak, ill-directed fire from a few straggling sentinels, whom their flying comrades had roused from their slumbers. The cannon being now in the hands of the assailants, were employed for the destruction of those sumptuous edifices, which they were intended to protect.

* May 10th. 1631. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 319.

Alarmed by the sudden discharge of artillery, and the universal tumult which prevailed, Falkenberg quitted the senate-house, and flew towards the quarter where the fire was loudest. In his passage thither he met a column of Austrians, driving before them a body of soldiers and citizens. Encouraging the fugitives by his exhortations and example, he prevailed upon them again to face the assailants, who in their turn were compelled to retreat. No permanent benefit was however derived from this solitary instance of courage. The overwhelming torrent, continually augmented by a flood of warriors pouring impetuously from different avenues, swept every thing before it; and while the gallant Falkenberg contended valiantly against its resistless impulse, he died the death of a hero.* The loss of a brave and experienced commander, at such a tremendous crisis, was not to be replaced by the desultory efforts of despair, notwithstanding the citizens, awakened by cries and shouts, rushed from their dwellings, armed with pikes or swords, or whatever weapons terror or accident, the zeal of a domestic, or the parting legacy of a dying friend, administered to their exasperated passions; while in the unequal conflict they displayed a contempt of danger,

* Lotichius pays a deserved tribute to the memory of this gallant officer in the following laconic remark: "Quo pereunte jam perierat Magdeburgum."

Namque ubi lethali trajectus pectore plumbo
 Occubuit, raptas secum spes abstulit urbis;
 Defecere animi, nec jam sua brachia movit
 Miles, et obscuris se turba recessibus abdit
 Civica.

Ant. Garissolii Adolph. lib. v. vers. 632.
 Montalban; Qu. 1644.

which, if properly regulated by enlightened prudence, might have averted their calamitous destiny.* But the head, accustomed to provide an adequate remedy, was no longer capable of rational combination. Neither were there the exertions of systematic defence, but the frantic struggles of men rendered desperate by the conviction of unavoidable misery. Great and universal was the consternation that prevailed. From more than twenty steeples the pealing bells sounded an alarm; the drums beat to arms, while the artillery thundered in every direction. Roused from their pillows by the terrific tumult, though as yet unconscious of the extent of their calamity, the women with tears conjured the partners of their affection, whom instinctive bravery, or the dreadful anticipation of impending destruction, hurried from their embraces, not to abandon them in the hour of distress. Twinning round the neck of a beloved son, the disconsolate mother intreated him not to hazard a life so precious to her, and so necessary for the protection of his sister's honour. With bleeding hearts, and silent tongues, they tore themselves away, for how could they reply? what consolation could they offer? when the groans of the wounded, and the shrieks of females flying from the brutality of unfeeling croats, too plainly indicated the extent of their misfortune.†

* *Jamque cæsarei ab ingruente civium turba repellebantur, ni interfecto plumbea glande Falkenbergis, cives exterriti cessissent.*—Burgus, 297.

† *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 320. “*Apertis portis equitatus et Croatæ introducti sunt, qui per civitatem discurrentes miserandam stragem ededere. Sævitur in viros, feminasque promiscue,*” &c.—Burgus, a professed admirer of Tilly and Ferdinand, 198.

No sooner had Pappenheim established himself upon the ramparts, than he sent detachments to the principal gates; two of which being carried with little opposition, were immediately opened to Tilly. That ruthless chieftain now entered at the head of his infantry; and, having planted cannon to command the principal streets, issued orders for the citizens to retire to their houses, and await their doom in silence.

Content with the glory of having subjugated a city, which had so presumptuously braved his resentment, a less sanguinary victor would have been satisfied with imposing heavy contributions, and abolishing factious independence. But, to appease the anger and bigotry of the inexorable Tilly, a libation of blood was required; and the licentious fury of every savage tribe, which Austria disciplined to pillage and massacre, was accordingly indulged in the fullest gratification of all those hateful passions, which degrade and brutalize the character of man, when inflamed by lust, stimulated by avarice, or rendered insensible to the dictates of humanity, by the violence of religious animosity.

It might have proved difficult, perhaps, to have restrained the ferocity of similar savages; but the attempt, even if unsuccessful, would have done honour to the feelings of the conqueror; whereas the name of Tilly is indelibly inscribed in characters of blood, an object of everlasting abhorrence. Abandoned to the guidance of every brutal propensity, the soldiers gave unbounded scope to their inordinate appetites. No tie was respected; no asylum secure. Invading the sanctuaries of domestic retirement, the Walloons violated numbers

of women in presence of their distracted husbands, and of virgins before the eyes of their mothers. No rank, however elevated, was exempt from insult; no place, however venerable, afforded security. Neither the innocence of childhood, nor the decrepitude of age,* found mercy in the sight of those barbarians, who, when fatigued with sensual gratification, are said to have amused themselves with the hellish diversion of murdering infants at the breasts of their mothers, or throwing them, with deliberate cruelty, into the flames which their insatiable fury had kindled.†

Touched at length by the miseries of which their duty had compelled them to remain involuntary spectators, some officers belonging to the army of the League repaired in a body to the inexorable commander, who presided over the work of desolation, intreating him to put a stop to the carnage, while any victims yet remained for compassion to rescue. With cold, phlegmatic, calculating ferocity, Tilly weighed the cannibal recreations of rape and assassination against the crimes of rebellion and heresy; and although almost every edifice was involved in flames, and torrents of blood flowed through every street, he was nevertheless of opinion, that something still was wanting to balance the tremendous account, and forbade the petitioners to interfere. "Return in an hour," was the

* Non anni juvere senes, non fœmina sexu
Tuta fuit, salvasque dedit sua forma puellas;
Bis pereunt, raptusque fero pudor anteit ense.

The subject is not inferior to that of Virgil.—Garissel, lib. v. vers. 708.

† Khevenhillier, xi. 1810. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, ibid.

barbarian's reply ; " it will be time enough then to consider what ought to be done ; for, after all their sufferings, the soldiers* are entitled to some indulgence."

Many of the catholic historians have endeavoured to rescue the reputation of Tilly from the indelible stain of inhumanity.† But no satisfactory proofs have ever been adduced to shew that he would have spared the inhabitants, had he been able ; on the contrary, his behaviour, upon various occasions, particularly at New Brandenburg, was calculated to inspire a firm belief, that he was far from beholding with an unwilling eye the atrocities committed at Magdeburg.‡ It is by no means my intention, however, to accuse him of having deliberately sanctioned, by his authority, the dreadful conflagration which ensued, and which appears to have proceeded from accident, though the partisans of Ferdinand have attempted to prove that it was kindled by the frantic fury of the inhabitants, who, when deprived of every hope of escaping, embraced the

* Puffendorf, iii. 15. Gualdo, i. 30. Harte, i. 270. Galetti, i. 178. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 324.

† None have contended more strenuously than Khevenhiller, who pretends that Tilly was affected even to tears, when he found himself unable to repress the licentious fury of an undisciplined soldiery. But, had this been the case, he would have hardly boasted, in his dispatch to the emperor, that no similar victory had been recorded in history since the destruction of Troy and Jerusalem.

‡ Even the pious Lotichius is unable to conceal, or even to palliate, the atrocities of the conquerors. "*Gallo-Belgæ tamen, sub Pappenheim merentes, nulli facile perpercerunt. Etiam ipsis barbaris crudeliores. U passim in matronas gravidas, parvulos, hominesque ecclesiasticos, nulli sexus, ætatis, conditionis, ac dignitatis, ratione habita, intemperantissime sævirent. Usque eò, ut vel commilitionibus cæteris stomachum moverent, essentque abominandi*, i. 876. The subsequent passage is too horrid to be inserted.

desperate resolution of perishing memorably, like the self-devoted citizens of Saguntum.* But, what-

* The learned editor of the *Theatrum Europæum* does not hesitate to attribute this inhuman action to the rage of the conquerors. According to him, it was occasioned by their setting fire to some buildings where the miserable inhabitants had retired, ii. 168. With this, however, it is but fair to compare an opposite testimony, though the former has been adopted by most historians. "Quæ celeberrima urbs paucarum horarum spatio, incertum hostilè, an fortuito incendio (utrius intestino, quam cives, quatenus urbem hosti non possent, triumphum prædamque eriperent,) in cineres subsedit, multis millibus mortalium ferro, flammæque haustis," I give this on the authority of the accurate Schmidt, v. 4, who professes to copy it from a work entitled "Epitome Rerum Germanicarum." If we consult Wassemberg, an author of considerable weight, the latter opinion will acquire additional confirmation. "Erat itaque non jam pugna, sed cædes. Cum nihil ergo prosicere cives viderent a se, et Falkenbergio præperatis per urbem cuniculis, versa in rabiem pertinacia, ignem injiciunt, qui victos simul et victores, rapuit."—Florus Germanicus, 186. Adelzreiter says, "Certè constat non Tillium modo, sed et militem passim restinguendis flammis sedulam fortemque operam dedisse, sed inutilem." To these assertions, decisive as they may appear, we shall oppose another, of at least equal validity. Among the notes to the German translation of Wassemberg, we find the following passage, attributed by some to the Prince of Furstenberg, a general of reputation in the Austrian service, and by others to Fugger, who fought with distinction in the army of the League. "It is not true," says the author, "that the citizens set fire to the town; on the contrary, I have been told by Pappenheim, that he was himself the author of the conflagration; and he farther assured me, that it was occasioned in the following manner: Upon entering Magdeburg, he was greatly annoyed by the enemy, who fired upon him from some houses, of which they had taken possession; and not being able to dislodge them, he applied combustibles to the buildings," 202. It is, however, possible to reconcile these contradictory statements, as the fire appears to have broken out simultaneously in different quarters, and even in those where the plunderers had not penetrated. But had I previously entertained any doubt upon the subject, it would have been dissipated by the confession of Lotichius, that indefatigable champion of the papists. "Supposuerant forte Cæsariani, primum in urbem irrupentes, tædas picæ ac sulphure infectas. Hoc facto ut cives ob urbis defensione ad larium vindicias averterent. Sed propositum flamma etiam superavit," i. 176. The following extract will shew what ideas that author entertained of humanity. Speaking of the miserable wretches who had taken refuge in the cathedral, he says, "His omnibus veniam dedit Thillius, neque solum vitæ concessit usum, sed tridua inedia coniectis etiam diaria, unde vivere possent distribuit."

ever may have been the cause of the calamity, the flames spread with so much rapidity, that, before night, out of four thousand houses, only one hundred and seventy were left standing; and so intense was the heat, that the Austrians were unable to remain in the city. No sooner, however, had the fire abated, from want of materials, than they returned to pillage with such thoughtless rapacity, that numbers were suffocated in searching after treasures amid the smoking ruins. On the 13th of May, Tilly entered in triumph, exultingly contemplating a scene of desolation, which no human eye had ever witnessed since the destruction of Jerusalem.*

Being informed that a considerable number of persons, of both sexes, who had taken refuge in the cathedral, had remained three days without nourishment, he ordered them to be supplied with a scanty allowance of bread, assured them that their lives were no longer in danger, and having shut up the men in a place of confinement, he sent the women and children to the camp.† These, together with

* As he proceeded to the cathedral, to return thanks to a divinity who delights in mercy, for having delivered so many innocent victims to his avenging sword, he is said to have repeated, with peculiar delight, the following passage from Virgil:

Venit summa dies et ineluctabile fatum
 ——— fuit Ilium at ingens
 Gloria *Parthenopes*.——Harte, i. 276.

That a general, educated by the Jesuits, should have possessed literature sufficient to furnish the quotation, or even to vary the passage as occasion required, is by no means an extraordinary circumstance; but that any sentiments, except those of contrition and pity, should have presented themselves to his imagination, when trampling thousands of mangled carcasses beneath his horse's hoofs, must naturally excite our astonishment, and would be utterly incredible, did we not previously know that he had been schooled in the seminaries of St. Ignatius.

† The following verses, extracted from a Latin elegy, by no means des-

a small remnant of the garrison, who had defended themselves with obstinate bravery till allowed to capitulate; and a few of the higher order, whose wealth averted destruction, were all that escaped from the carnage. Every officer was put to the sword, except a colonel and major, whose names are unrecorded in the pages of history, as well as the means by which they were preserved. The administrator was wounded in opposing Pappenheim, and surrendered upon a promise of being treated with proper respect; yet no sooner had he delivered up his sword, than he was stripped almost naked, and cruelly insulted by the Walloons, who deemed it meritorious to persecute heresy, and who were actually preparing to put an end to his existence, when he was rescued by the humanity of Pappenheim. Too noble to insult a prostrate foe, that gallant commander conveyed him in a litter to Wolmerstadt, where he was attended by his own chaplain and domestics. But there were others on whom his melancholy situation made no impression; the Dukes of Holstein and Saxe-Lauenberg had the baseness to treat him with studied indignity. Such was the general want of civilization, and such the virulence of religious hostility.

After contemplating the desolation which he had occasioned, with apathy, if not with exultation, Tilly gave directions for repairing the fortifications,

titute of poetical merit, written by Joachim Rusdorfuis, and preserved by Lotichius, are applicable to this horrid transaction.

Auri sacra fames, rapiendi dira libido,
In te nequaquam seivit habere modum.
Ludus erat portas vi, vi perfringere vœctes,
Ludus et imposito rumpere faste seras.
Omnes ignavo vastasti milite terras,
Ista fuit belli gloria summa tui.

and erecting huts sufficient to contain three regiments. From that hour the pillage ceased ; but, on the following day, a fire broke out in that quarter of the camp where the spoils of Magdeburg had been deposited, of which, by the just retribution of Providence, the greater part was consumed. During the confusion, many of the prisoners recovered their liberty, and among others Stralman, the Swedish envoy ; who having traversed the Elbe without being discovered, joined his master at Spandau.

It would be a waste of time to endeavour to specify with minute precision the number of slaughtered citizens, as it is a question concerning which historians differ materially. From the most authentic documents, however, it appears that upwards of thirty thousand perished;* of which more are supposed to have been destroyed by fire than by the sword of the conquerors: for scarce a cellar was opened which did not contain the bodies of several women and children, supposed to have been suffocated by the intensity of the vapour. Between six and seven thousand were almost immediately thrown into the river ; but this circumstance affords no ground whatever for accurate calculation, because several months elapsed before the ruins were completely cleared away, and the extent of the calamity ascertained. Neither would it prove less derogatory to the dignity of history to enumerate the prodigies, by which, according to the opinion of the pious Lotichius, the ruin of Magdeburg was predicted.† Among this description of facts

* Schmidt, v. 4. Puffendorf, iii. 15. Lotichius, 863. Galetti, i. 188. Harte magnifies the loss to 40,000." i. 188. Burgus, 200.

† The poet, Lotichius, the father of the historian, is supposed by many to have predicted the fall of Magdeburg, in his beautiful elegy addressed

we may venture to include the extraordinary relations of female heroism, recorded by the credulity of contemporary writers, and copied by those who succeeded.* We may readily admit that an

to Joach.—Camerarius, ii. 4. Burman, in his edition of that elegant author, has collected and compared the opinions of the learned upon this subject; and, after amply discussing the prophetic nature of the poet's dreams, concludes with this pertinent observation: "Nos in medio hæc relinquimus nec in ulterius somnio explicando, somniare ipsi volumus." Those who are acquainted with his Comments on Propertius, the Anthologia, &c. will best know how to appreciate the justness of this remark. See Dict. de Bayle Art. Lotich.

* I cannot dismiss this melancholy subject without abridging a narrative, written by Theodanus, a protestant divine, and minister of the church of St. Catharine, who is said to have lived to a very advanced age, and to have died in 1720, and with whom, according to the author of the History of Gustavus Adolphus, many persons alive in 1764 had conversed. "As I was quitting my church, after morning prayers, I was told by some people, whom I met in the streets, that the enemy had actually entered the city. This intelligence appeared to me so extraordinary, that I hardly gave credit to it; but, alas! I too soon discovered that it was no false alarm. My presence of mind now forsook me, and as my wife and maid servant were with me, we ran to the house of my colleague, which we found crowded with people, who had fled thither as to a place of security. We comforted each other as far as our fears would permit. But I had not remained there long, when I was summoned to attend a colonel, who was dangerously wounded. Resolved to fulfil my duty to the last, I sent the maid for my gown; but, before I separated from my wife and neighbours, I told them that, in my opinion, our fate was irrevocably decided, and that we should meet no more in the present world. Upon hearing this, my wife exclaimed, in a flood of tears, '*Will you then leave me to perish alone? If you do, you must answer for it before God!*' I endeavoured to comfort her, by expatiating upon the sacred nature of my function, and the importance of the duties which I was called upon to perform.

"As I crossed the great street, a multitude of women gathered round me, beseeching me, in all the agonies of distress, to advise them in what manner to act. I exhorted them to recommend themselves to the mercy of Providence, and to prepare for death. Upon entering the colonel's lodgings, I found him lying on the floor, in a very feeble state. I gave him all the consolation that religion affords; he heard me attentively, and, when I had finished my prayer, offered me a trifling present, which I left upon the table.

"Meanwhile, the enemy had poured in by thousands at the Hamburg-gate, and fired upon the inhabitants like beasts of prey. My wife and

elevated sentiment of unsullied chastity may have tempted a lady of rank and education to prefer

servant unexpectedly joined me, conjuring me to fly, because they said it would be in vain to sue for mercy, should we be discovered in the room of an officer. We ran into the court, and placed ourselves under an arch; but in a moment the gate was burst open, with a violence which it is impossible to describe. '*Priest, deliver thy money,*' cried one of the soldiers eagerly. I gave him a small box, containing some silver coin, which he immediately opened, and, having examined the contents, demanded gold, in a peremptory tone. I represented to him that, being at a distance from my own habitation, it was impossible for me to comply; apparently satisfied with this excuse, they left me to plunder the house.

"Scarce had they quitted me, when a second party rushed into the yard, crying, '*Money! money!*' They, however, contented themselves with a few shillings, and two silver spoons, which my maid had concealed in her pocket. But these were hardly out of sight, when another soldier appeared, with the most terrific countenance I ever beheld. Each cheek was puffed with a bullet, and on each shoulder he carried a musket. The moment he saw me, he cried, in a voice of thunder, '*Thy money, priest, or thou art dead!*' Having nothing left to give, I excused myself in the manner best calculated to move his pity. He made no reply, but leveling his firelock, would certainly have killed me, had not my wife struck it with her hand, and caused the ball to pass over my head. Convinced at last that we had no money, he asked for plate, and upon receiving a few trinkets from my wife, departed. Others followed, who did not molest us, but contented themselves with saying, '*Wicked priest, what dost thou here?*'

"We now resolved to shelter ourselves in the upper story, and entering a chamber where there were several beds, passed some time in the most horrid suspense; as we distinctly heard the reports of muskets below, and the groans of persons expiring of their wounds. At length, however, our retreat was discovered. A number of armed men poured in together, one of whom was preparing to cleave my skull with a hatchet, when he was stopped by his comrade, who compassionately exclaimed, '*What are you about? Don't you perceive that he is a clergyman?*'

"To another fellow, who came alone, my wife gave a gauze handkerchief, which she wore round her neck; upon which he retired without offering us any insult. His follower, however, was less humane; for, upon entering the room, he struck me upon the head with his sword, crying, '*Money! money!*' The violence of the blow stunned me for a moment, and the blood gushed plentifully from the wound. The wretch now aimed a blow at my wife, who was motionless with terror, but the weapon fortunately glancing upon her gown, which was lined with fur, she escaped unhurt. Astonished at the composure with which we resigned ourselves to the will of the Almighty, he gazed at us with wonder. I

death to the embraces of a barbarian; and that another may have deliberately plunged into a

availed myself of the pause, to represent to him my inability to satisfy his demand, from being in the house of a stranger; telling him, at the same time, that if he would spare our lives, and conduct us home, he should have every thing we possessed. *'Agreed,'* exclaimed he eagerly, *'put me in possession of thy wealth, and I will save thy family. The watch-word is Jesu Maria; pronounce that, and no one will molest thee.'*

"Too happy to have found a protector, we descended into the street, which was now covered with the bodies of the dead and the dying, while the air resounded with the shrieks and groans, sufficient to have pierced the heart of the most obdurate savage. We walked upon human carcases, till we reached the church of St. Catherine, where we met an officer of distinction on horseback. Seeing me covered with blood, he said to my conductor in an angry voice, *'Take care how you behave to those persons!'* Then turning to my wife, he added mildly, *'Madam, is yonder house yours?'* Upon answering in the affirmative, he bade her *'take hold of his stirrup, and fear nothing.'* Addressing himself to me, he said, *'Gentleman of Magdeburg, you are yourselves the authors of your destruction; you might have averted it by acting more prudently.'*

"Upon entering our habitation, we found it filled with plunderers, whom our protector (a colonel) ordered instantly to withdraw. He told us, that he would take up his lodgings with us, placed a guard at the door for our protection, and quitted us with a promise shortly to return. We gave our centinels a comfortable breakfast; who complimented us upon our good fortune in falling into the hands of so compassionate an officer, and beseeching us to make them some compensation for the loss they must sustain from remaining inactive, while their comrades were enriching themselves with a valuable booty. A small gratuity satisfied them, and even induced them to offer to go in search of any of our friends, for whose safety we might be particularly anxious. Delighted at the proposal, I promised to reward them liberally, if they could find the means of saving a friend, whom I supposed to have taken refuge in the cathedral. One of them undertook the office; and, accompanied by my maid, set out immediately; but all their endeavours proved ineffectual, and from that moment I never heard of him again.

"When the colonel returned, he inquired humanely if any body had insulted us during his absence; and being assured that we had been treated with the greatest attention, he hastened away to assist in extinguishing the fire. But scarcely had he quitted the house, when he came running back, exclaiming, with great emotion, *'Shew me the nearest way out of the town: for if we remain here any longer, we shall inevitably perish in the flames.'* Upon this we threw our most valuable effects into the cellar, and having covered the trap-door with earth, made our escape precipitately. My wife took nothing with her, except my gown; and my ser-

well, to escape the brutality of a Croat; but that twelve hundred virgins (as the author of the Me-

vant, seeing a neighbour's child crying piteously at its father's door, led it away. The flames now raged with so much violence, that it was no longer practicable to pass the gates; and the heat was so intense, as almost to deprive us of respiration. After several fruitless attempts to gain the fields, we determined to make our escape by the river. In our way thither we were repeatedly attacked by the Walloons and Croats, who would have certainly massacred us, had it not been for our generous protector. Having at length reached the bastion on the banks of the Elbe, we descended by a scaling ladder, and arrived in safety in the Austrian camp, no less fatigued than terrified with our adventures.

"The colonel presented us with some refreshments as soon as we were seated in his tent, and when we had recovered our strength a little, he asked me rather abruptly, 'what return I intended to make him for the kindness with which we had been treated?' I replied, 'that at present I had nothing to offer, but that I would willingly bestow upon him all the plate and money, which was buried in the cellar, and which formed the whole of our earthly possessions.' The entrance of several officers interrupted the conversation; but, on the following day, he sent his domestics, accompanied by my maid, in search of the treasure, but the fire still raging, they were unable to reach the deposit. Meanwhile we were treated by the colonel with the greatest civility, and invited as guests to his table.

"At length I ventured to request permission to depart; to this he made no objection, provided our ransom should be paid. I accordingly dispatched my servant to the cellar, who returned in a few hours with all our property, which being delivered to our preserver, with the warmest expressions of gratitude for all his kindness, he ordered a passport to be prepared, with permission for us to retire wheresoever we wished, generously presenting us with a crown, to defray the expenses of our journey." *Hist. de Gustave-Adolfe*, 326. *Harte*, i. 278.

This simple story, which bears all the characteristics of the strictest veracity, not only merits attention on account of the precision with which it details the horrors of a successful assault, but is highly interesting from presenting a lively picture of the extreme barbarity of that uncivilized age. At a period when manners less savage prevailed, we should feel inclined to suspect that the praises bestowed, by the benevolent pastor, on Don Joseph Ainsa, (for so the Spanish colonel was called) were wholly ironical; since it is difficult to reconcile, with our ideas of generosity, the behaviour of a man, who considers himself entitled to the praise of humanity, because he does not wantonly embroe his sword in the blood of a peaceful minister of the gospel, or gratuitously murder two innocent females, but suffer them to depart without any injury to their persons, after robbing them of all they possessed.

moirs of the House of Brandenburg is pleased to assert) should have assembled together on the banks of the Elbe, and, after embracing each other, have sought the protection of their honour in a watery grave, exceeds the bounds of credibility, and may fairly be classed with the fable of Daphne, and the legend of St. Ursula,

CHAP. XII.

Different sensations produced by the destruction of Magdeburg.—Gustavus blamed by the protestants for inactivity, but without cause.—Ferdinand, elated with success, grows more presumptuous than ever. The Swedes, having evacuated Spandau, force the Elector of Brandenburg to declare in their favour.—George William justifies his proceedings in a spirited memorial.—Gustavus also publishes a manifesto explaining his motives for not relieving Magdeburg.—Tilly marches towards Cassel, occupies Erfurt, Weimar, and Gotha.—Magnanimous behaviour of the Landgrave.—Gustavus forms an alliance with Russia, takes Gripswald, and reinstates the Dukes of Mecklenberg with great solemnity.—Ferdinand issues an edict commanding the protestants to suspend their levies, and to unite with him in expelling the Swedes, and orders his generals to enforce it in the southern provinces of Germany.—The King of Sweden appears before Magdeburg, and compels Pappenheim to retire; takes Werben and Havelberg; surprises the Austrian outposts, and repulses Tilly.—The Marquis of Hamilton arrives with reinforcements from England. His treaty with Gustavus; ill success of his measures.—The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel concludes an alliance with Sweden.—The emperor resolves to take possession of Saxony.—Tilly, by his insolence, compels the elector to throw himself into the arms of Sweden. He invades the electorate; takes several towns, but is totally defeated in the vicinity of Leipsic.

FEW events could have occurred more distressing to the feelings, or more repugnant to the interest of Gustavus Adolphus, than the destruction of Magdeburg; because it not only afforded to his enemies the proudest triumph, but furnished to the timidity of his vacillating allies a plausible pretext for desertion. Astounded at a calamity no less dreadful than unexpected, most of the protestant princes contemplated the conduct of the Swedish monarch with surprise, if not with suspicion. On the contrary, the expectations of Ferdinand and of the catholics were raised much higher than ever, and

in the excess of presumption they now looked forward with confidence to the happy moment, when every chimerical project should be realized. The courage of Gustavus however remained unshaken. Conscious that the misfortune which appalled his friends, could not justly be imputed to his neglect, and convinced that he must expose himself to constant disappointments if he trusted any longer to the fidelity of a nation, whose attachments were fluctuating as the tide of fortune, he determined in future to adopt a different system, and to extort from the apprehensions of the protestant electors that steady support, which it was in vain to expect from a more elevated motive.

Though the difficulty of his situation might have justified an action of doubtful morality in the estimation of those who vindicate oppression upon the plea of expediency, yet his lofty spirit disdained to purchase the most solid advantages at the expense of justice. He accordingly resolved to evacuate Spandau, when summoned by the Elector of Brandenburg to fulfil his engagement, though by consenting to do so, he unquestionably subjected himself to many inconveniencies, which a less scrupulous politician would have avoided. Without the possession of a fortress, to which he might retire, when pressed by a superior army, it would have been madness to have advanced, because his magazines must have been exposed to the incursions of the imperialists, collecting in force in Silesia. Neither could he return to Pomerania without abandoning Mecklenberg and the Electorate of Saxony to the resentment of Tilly.* Persuaded also, that in case

* Puffendorf, iii. 17. Galetti, i. 189.

of any sudden reverse, his timid brother-in-law would be induced by a perfidious minister to declare in favour of the victorious party, he prudently determined by vigorous measures to secure his fidelity in future. Having settled his plan, he sent directions to the Swedish commander to evacuate Spandau, and signified to the elector, that on the following day he intended to visit him at Berlin, where unless he was received with the hospitality of a friend, he should be constrained to have recourse to coercion. The bearer of this unwelcome message was almost immediately followed by Thurn, charged with dispatches which confirmed the resolutions of the Swedish monarch, in terms calculated to alarm a stronger mind than that of the pusillanimous Prussian. Disgusted at the weakness and duplicity of his relative, Gustavus formally notified to him, that as the geographical position of his dominions no longer admitted of his remaining neuter, he would allow him only three days to decide, whether he was in future to be regarded by the Swedish army in the light of an ally, or of an adversary. In case he should prefer the friendship of Sweden to that of Austria, he engaged to protect him against the resentment of Ferdinand, while he had a soldier left for his defence. If on the contrary he chose to place himself under the shelter of the imperial eagle, he must expect him in future to regulate his behaviour as the necessity of his affairs might require, and must not be surprised to see his fortresses occupied by the Swedish troops, and his country subjected to heavy contributions.*

* 1631. Harte, i. 286. *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 336.

This summary mode of proceeding by no means accorded with the views of the elector, and was calculated to produce a powerful effect; because the imperial army having directed its march toward the forest of Hartz, the terror which its presence had so lately inspired had in great measure subsided. Neither were the apprehensions of the citizens less vivid than those of their unwarlike sovereign, when they beheld the fierce and gigantic Dalecarlians surround the metropolis of Prussia.

General Arnheim, after abandoning the imperial service in consequence of the Duke of Friedland's disgrace, had been promoted to the command of the Saxon army; and having been sent to Berlin, in order to counteract the designs of Gustavus, was easily persuaded by the terrified elector to assume the office of mediator. But, though he was unquestionably gifted with splendid talents, and accustomed to diplomatic affairs, he shortly discovered that no impression could be made upon the Swedish monarch by the usual arts of intrigue. Two days having been consumed in fruitless negotiations, the patience of the king was exhausted, and he ordered his cannon to be pointed against the city. Confiding in the humanity of an ancient ally, George William protested that he had rather bury himself beneath the ruins of his dismantled palace, than submit to the humiliation of beholding his capital occupied by foreigners. But while the Saxon plenipotentiary was expatiating upon the indignity of such a proceeding, he was suddenly interrupted by Gustavus. "Has he not," said the indignant monarch impatiently, "received the imperialists into every town in the electorate? Have they not garrisoned his castles, consumed

the produce of his territories, and impoverished his subjects by their rapacity? And does he imagine that I will endure to be treated with less indulgence? My honour and interest equally forbid it; and I cannot but consider the proposal which you are commissioned to make me, in the light of an additional insult. Know, then, that I will no longer be made the dupe of duplicity. On the contrary, I expect that the elector should put me in possession of some satisfactory pledge for his future sincerity. In addition to this, let him furnish a subsidy toward the prosecution of a war, far more important to Brandenburg than to Sweden; let him supply my troops with provisions while they remain in his dominions, and I will undertake to defend him upon the word of a king; but let him decide without farther hesitation; for if I do not instantly receive an unambiguous answer, the signal shall be given for the bombardment to commence.^{77*}

This spirited declaration having destroyed every hope of averting the storm by negotiation, a deputation, consisting of Prussian ladies, at the head of which the mother of the unfortunate Palatine appeared like a second Veturia, deprecated the wrath of the exasperated Swede, who desirous of manifesting to the world his admiration for the virtues of that illustrious princess, consented at length to moderate his demands. Delivered from the apprehension of impending destruction, George William ventured to visit the camp, where a treaty was concluded upon conditions far less burthensome than his pusillanimity gave him any right to expect; the

* Puffendorf, iii. 17. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 336. Galetti, i. 190. Le Vassor, x. 33. Siri Memorie Recondite, vii. 347.

king, however, would not consent to relinquish those points, which he considered as essential to his future security, though he contented himself with the occupation of Spandau, together with the permission of entering Custrin whenever he might require it, and even reduced his subsidiary demand to a monthly contribution of thirty thousand dollars. Every thing being thus adjusted in an amicable manner, the elector was greeted with a military salute; but the artillery men having forgotten to unload the cannon, several houses were damaged by the shot, though fortunately no lives were destroyed.*

This rigorous treatment of a sovereign, so nearly connected with the Swedish crown, exposed Gustavus to unmerited obloquy, and was represented by his adversaries as totally inconsistent with those elevated sentiments of moderation and equity, which he blazoned to the world as the leading principles of his actions. But this accusation, when impartially examined, appears totally destitute of foundation. Not only his personal glory, and the welfare of thousands whom he led to battle, but the future stability of the protestant religion depended upon the result of the negociation. Situated as he was, and contending in a cause which eventually embraced the happiness of the remotest posterity, it would have been the excess of imprudence to have allowed the noblest projects, ever conceived by the magnanimity of mortal, to have been frustrated by the weak and fluctuating councils of a prince, equally deficient in courage and sagacity, and sur-

* Puffendorf, ii. 17. Lotich. i. 887. Harte, i. 287.

rounded by ministers, whose unblushing venality was corrupted by the treasures of Austria.

No sooner was this convention concluded, which identified the fortune of George William with that of Gustavus, than the former deemed it expedient in a studied apology to justify his conduct towards Ferdinand; and, as he naturally expected to be laden with reproaches, he prudently resolved to be the first to complain. He accordingly began by expatiating upon the evils to which he had been exposed by the disorderly conduct of the Austrians, who, after stripping his territories of every thing necessary for human sustenance, had abandoned them to the discretion of the Swedes, whose rigid adherence to the dictates of justice would have induced them to respect the neutrality of Brandenburg, had it not been previously violated by their enemies. Too feeble to vindicate his rights by the sword, he had been constrained by the resistless law of necessity to attend only to self-preservation.

Unable to controvert a statement supported by clear and undeniable facts, and equally unwilling to compromise his authority by a weak and unfounded justification, Ferdinand, in his answer, confined himself to general topics, without condescending to enter into particulars. The rapid success of the Swedish arms he imputed to the disunion which unhappily prevailed among the different members of the empire, and which had been plainly manifested in the unconstitutional proceedings at Leipsic. With respect to the licentious behaviour of his troops, he simply remarked, that the elector would be fortunate to be treated by the Swedes with equal humanity, because it was

impossible for a country to become the theatre of war, without being subject to a thousand inconveniences.*

Gustavus being delivered from all anxiety by the treaty of Berlin, and feeling anxious to obliterate every unfavourable impression, which his apparent indifference for the fate of Magdeburg might have excited, addressed a manifesto to the German nation, in which he explained his reasons without the smallest disguise. Of the parsimony of the senate he particularly complained, which prevented them from raising a force sufficient to man their extensive fortifications, which, if properly guarded, might have securely derided the impotent vengeance of the assailants. He farther contended, that this ill-judged economy did not proceed from pecuniary embarrassments, because he had himself advanced considerable sums, which had been unpardonably diverted to other purposes, by perfidy or speculation. The negligence of the magistrates, in every other department, had contributed likewise to accelerate their ruin, as it had induced them to connive at the treachery of their fellow citizens, though repeatedly warned of the danger. This fatal indifference to their dearest interests, had afforded so much facility for the venal and disaffected to maintain a clandestine correspondence with the enemy, that Tilly not only obtained the minutest information respecting the strength and disposition of the garrison, but was regularly apprised even of the most secret deliberations of the senate.

Adverting to his own situation, he boldly asserted, that nothing on his part had been left unat-

* Lotichius, i. 889.

tempted, to prevent the dreadful calamity; but, before he could venture to face the Austrian army, it was necessary for him to secure his flank, by the possession of Francfort and Lansberg. Disdaining concealment, as abhorrent to his nature, he readily admitted, that he had repeatedly promised to march to the succour of the besieged; but, at the same time, insisted that a similar engagement could not imply the attempting impossibilities. Those important fortresses, however, had no sooner fallen, than he began his march without the smallest delay, and should have inevitably attempted to raise the siege, had he not been prevented by unexpected occurrences, which no human prescience could foresee: for how could he suppose that the Elector of Brandenburg, his friend and ally, would not only have declined the honour of participating in an enterprise, no less essential to the stability of the protestant church than to the safety of his own dominions, should even refuse to grant him the temporary occupation of Spandau, so indispensable to the success of the undertaking. Neither was it easier to have believed, that the political head of the Evangelical Union would have carried his complaisance toward the imperial court so far, as to refuse him a passage over the Elbe.*

While, by wisdom and activity, the Swedish monarch was laying the foundation of his future glory, Tilly was no less busily employed in making preparations for humbling the Leipsic confederacy. Having taken possession of the see of Magdeburg, in the name of the Archduke Leopold, second son of the emperor, and appointed Mansfeldt governor

* Lotichius, i. 883. Hist. de Gustave Adol. 332.

of that desolated spot, which bore a far greater resemblance to a fortified camp than to one of the richest emporia of northern commerce, but which was still highly important, on account of its commanding situation upon the banks of the Elbe, he left Pappenheim with a force sufficient to repel any desultory attack, and advanced himself at the head of the main army, with the intention of cutting off all communication between Cassel and Dresden.* Though never opposed by a regular force, this expedition was attended with considerable loss; because the hardy inhabitants of the forest of Hartz retaliated upon the stragglers the dreadful enormities perpetrated by the unbridled ferocity of their companions.† For many miles the country was covered with the bodies of those who had fallen victims to the fury of the peasants, whom despair had armed with invincible courage; so that when Tilly arrived at Erfurt, his defalcation in numbers was scarcely inferior to what a sanguinary battle might have occasioned. That city, though calculated from its situation to retard the progress of the Austrians, had been left destitute of provisions, ammunition, and artillery; yet so anxious was the imperial general to reduce it, that he suffered the magistrates to remain in office, upon paying a moderate contribution. Weimar, Eisenach, and Gotha, being successively occupied, the natives were

* Puffendorf, iii. 21. Gualdo, i. 33. Galetti, i. 192.

† So great was their brutality, that, disdaining to employ the smallest delicacy, even toward women of elevated rank, they stripped the Countess of Gleichen, in her own castle, of all she possessed, and even of her personal ornaments.—Galetti, *ibid*.

treated with indecent rapacity, though subject to princes of the Saxon family.*

Undismayed by the tempest which threatened to overwhelm him, the Landgrave of Hesse collected his forces in the vicinity of Cassel, prepared to encounter the impending danger with heroic fortitude. Formidable alike from the extent of his resources, and the elevated qualities of his mind, that prince had been long an object of terror to many of his neighbours,† whose collective strength, even if prudently consolidated for the reduction of Cassel, might have been foiled in the arduous attempt. Unless aided by the co-operation of an Austrian army, they looked forward with anxiety, if not with dismay, to the possibility of a renewal of those melancholy scenes which they had experienced from Mansfeldt and Brunswick: with the most pressing solicitations, they accordingly supplicated the protection of Tilly, who flattered himself, that the consternation, universally excited by the downfall of Magdeburg, might enable him to reduce the Landgrave to unconditional submission before Gustavus could arrive to his succour. Anticipating the dissolution of the Leipsic confederacy, as a necessary consequence of his victory, and looking forward with confidence to the glory reserved for his declining years, when he should triumphantly close his military career, by driving the Swedes out of Germany.

The event, however, was so far from correspond-

* Puffendorf, iii. 21.

† The Electors of Mentz and Cologne, the Bishops of Munster and Paderborn, and the Abbot of Fulde.

ing with these exaggerated expectations, that, even in the outset, insuperable difficulties arose. A haughty message from Tilly summoned the Landgrave immediately to declare, whether he wished to be considered as the friend or the enemy of Ferdinand ; and, if he decided for the former, he was required to receive an Austrian garrison, both at Cassel and Ziegenheim ; he was likewise commanded to disband the troops, which he had trained and disciplined with indefatigable industry ; to desist from all future enrolments, and even to furnish the imperial army with money, provisions, and ammunition." *

Under similar circumstances the generality of princes would have yielded submissively to the impetuous torrent, too happy to purchase a momentary exemption from the horrors of war by the sacrifice of honour and independence. But the friend of Gustavus was cast by nature in a different mould ; his idol was glory, and he nobly preferred a warrior's death to ignominious vassalage. Under-rifed by the immense disparity of force, and incapable of averting the gathering tempest by deceit or prevarication, he replied, with laconic dignity, that, " without abandoning every principle of self-preservation, he could not surrender his fortresses ; that he wanted his troops for his own protection, and had neither money nor provisions to spare ; but that if the Austrian general was in distress for either, he would advise him to apply to the Duke of Bavaria, who was abundantly provided with both, and who was so deeply interested in the suc-

* 1631. Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 344.

cess of his enterprize, that he would contribute with pleasure towards it."^{*}

Highly exasperated at being treated with irony, when he expected the most servile respect, Tilly resolved, by the severity of military execution, to make both sovereign and subjects repent; and, from his general character, we may fairly infer, that he would not have proved remiss, in carrying this menace into execution, had he been allowed time by Gustavus to fulfil it.

After securing the co-operation of the Prussians, the king departed for Stettin, having entrusted Banner with the temporary command of the forces collected in the vicinity of Berlin. Immediately after his arrival in the capital of Pomerania, he gave audience to a Russian ambassador, commissioned by the chief of those inhospitable regions, to felicitate him upon his rapid success, and to offer to assist in the glorious undertaking with hordes of auxiliary savages. To this amicable assurance a most flattering answer was returned, and a treaty was signed, by which the Czar engaged to inundate Germany with his barbarous hosts, whenever his aid should be required. Though nothing short of the most urgent necessity could have tempted Gustavus to have accepted the assistance of such allies; yet he felt delighted at an event, which secured him in future against the machinations of Poland, whose sovereign, as we have seen in the preceding pages, was blindly devoted to Austria.†

After dismissing the Muscovite plenipotentiaries,

* Gualdo, i. 34. Puffendorf, iii. 21. Galetti, i. 193.

† Ibid.

laden with caresses and presents, Gustavus hastened to Gripswald, the only Pomeranian fortress still occupied by the imperialists, but closely blockaded by Todt, an able and enterprising officer. The strength of the fortifications might have long defied the efforts of the assailants, had not its reduction been accelerated by the intemperate courage of the commander. Though proof against the threats or the temptations of the Swedes, Perusi could not behold the prospect of glory with equal indifference. Finding themselves unable to make any impression, the besiegers endeavoured, by taunts and insults, to make the governor abandon his asylum. The stratagem succeeded; Perusi having pursued a small detachment, with the hope of being able to cut it off, was surrounded and slain, after a gallant resistance. His successor, less romantic in his ideas of honour, was easily induced to capitulate, upon condition that the garrison should be allowed to retire to Rostock, escorted by a Swedish detachment; which, proving too feeble to enforce compliance, was disarmed and ill-treated by the prisoners. No sooner was Todt made acquainted with the enemy's perfidy, than he ordered his cavalry to pursue them; and the commission was executed with so much celerity, that they were soon overtaken, and either cut to pieces, or compelled to enrol under the banners of Sweden.*

The capture of Gripswald was almost immediately followed by the reinstatement of the Dukes of Mecklenburg; which ceremony was performed with all the pomp and solemnity which could give additional lustre to their inauguration.† No time,

* Puffendorf, ii. 18. Harte, ii. 293.

* Ibid. 22. Galetti, i. 147. Harte, i. 295. Khevenhiller, xi. 1857.

however, was lost; during the festivities, Gustavus gave directions for investing Wismar and Rostock, and dispatched a confidential minister to Lyons, to give the ultimate arrangements to the treaty of Beerwaldt, and to provide for the regular payment of the subsidy.

While the Swede was thus exerting his utmost endeavours in order to augment the number of his partisans by wisdom, justice, and moderation, Ferdinand was following a different course, and by his tyrannical proceedings, not only alienating the affections of his natural allies, but converting into open and irreconcilable enemies many, whom indolence or timidity might have tempted to persevere in a disgraceful system of neutrality. By an intemperate edict he hastily annulled all the acts of the assembly of Leipsic, enjoining the members, under pain of incurring his utmost displeasure, cordially to unite with him in the meritorious undertaking of expelling the Swedes from the empire. In order to facilitate that important enterprize, no less essential to the internal tranquillity of Germany than requisite for the preservation of its military renown, they were summoned to provide the imperial armies with money, forage, and ammunition, and to allow them at all times an uninterrupted passage through their dominions. Adverting to the complaints so repeatedly urged against the rapacity of the soldiers, he affected to treat them as originating chiefly in that spirit of disaffection, which was rapidly spreading for the destruction of religion, and the utter subversion of all legitimate authority.* This haughty mandate was succeeded by another, addressed to the members of the

* Lotichius, i. 142.

Germanic constitution, as well as to all magistrates and generals, forbidding them to issue any fresh commissions for the recruiting service, and requiring them to exert their influence in order to prevent the new levies from joining their standards ; and lest the conventions subscribing with Sweden might be alleged in excuse of disobedience, it concluded by absolving the German nation from every obligation inadvertently contracted with the invader, as if he seriously believed, that the privileges of dispensing with the most solemn engagements was a prerogative annexed to the imperial sceptre.*

But monitories and menaces were no longer in season. The eyes of the protestants were at length opened to the danger by which they were surrounded ; the inhumanity of Tilly had closed every bosom against the illusions of hope ; and, as the consternation excited by the destruction of Magdeburg began gradually to abate, the timid counsels of indecision were rejected with disdain ; and even where the necessary resolution was wanting, it found a powerful substitute in despair. Instead of disbanding their troops the recruiting service was carried on with increasing activity in Misnia, Franconia, and Swabia, particularly in the great commercial cities where the love of independence, the necessary consequence of a republican constitution, gave additional ardour to religious enthusiasm.

Highly incensed at the contempt with which his authority was treated, the emperor embraced the hasty resolution of enforcing obedience by coercion ;

* Harte, i. 296.

and, for this purpose, he sent instructions to his generals, as they returned from Italy, to suspend their march towards the Elbe and the Weser, till they should have extinguished disaffection in the south. These orders were executed with a vigorous punctuality which did little credit to the feelings of the commanders. The imperial cities of Ulm, Kempton, and Memmingen were compelled by the cruelty of Furstemberg and Aldringer, not only to renounce the confederacy, and to purchase an exemption from military rapacity by a heavy contribution, but even to submit to the "edict of restitution." Terms no less oppressive were successively imposed upon all the Swabian states, and among the rest upon the Duchy of Wirtemberg, at that time subject to a feeble government, the natural consequence of a minority. All the regiments equipped in conformity to the resolutions embraced at Leipsic were compelled to enter into the Austrian service; a circumstance which afforded a formidable addition to the force destined for the annihilation of protestantism.* But as this resolution in the political horizon was solely the effect of compulsion, its duration was coeval with the ascendancy of the power by whose tyranny it was promoted. Hence the obligations contracted with the satellites of despotism were virtually abrogated by the triumphs of Gustavus in Saxony.

Having established his power in Mecklenberg and Pomerania, on the solid basis of universal esteem, and fixed the fluctuating attachment of Prussia, the King of Sweden conceived that the moment was arrived, when he might adventure

* Puffendorf, iii. 20. Schmidt, v. 3. Harte, i. 296.

southwards with security. With this view he assembled the different corps encamped in the vicinity of Spandau, and directed his march toward the Elbe; but as it was an invariable maxim with him never to entrust to others any important commission, which it was possible for him personally to perform, he explored the country at the head of his cavalry, till he arrived within sight of the sumptuous monastery of Jerichou, when, being satisfied that the enemy entertained no thoughts of molesting him, he pushed boldly forward to the gates of Magdeburg, where Pappenheim had retired for shelter.* Convinced that activity is the soul of war, he forded the Elbe at a spot where till then it had been deemed impassable, and carried Tangermund by assault; an important acquisition, as it enabled him to extend his quarters in a country plentifully stocked with cattle, and abounding in the richest productions of husbandry. It is said that at one time he had conceived the design of retaking Magdeburg, but, after deliberately weighing the difficulty of the undertaking against the splendour incidental to success, he resolved to sacrifice the brilliant chimeras of ambition to more permanent objects of glory.†

In order to facilitate the execution of his future projects, the king deemed it expedient to render himself master of Havelburg and Werben; the latter, valuable from the strength of its situation, being built on an eminence near the confluence of the Havel and the Elbe. Banner in consequence received directions to storm Havelberg, which he executed with his usual intelligence, while Werben

* Puffendorf, iii. 19.

† Harte, ii. 99.

was subjected to the dominion of Sweden by the enterprising valour of Bauditzen.*

The rapid progress of Gustavus rendering Pappenheim's position no longer secure, he retired to Halberstadt, from whence he dispatched courier after courier, intreating Tilly not to waste a single moment in distant enterprises, which even if attended with the complete success, would ill compensate the loss of an army.

Notwithstanding he was occupied in the delightful employment of gratifying his pride and resentment, by subjecting the langrairate of Hesse to military execution, that veteran general suspended his schemes to a more convenient opportunity, not totally displeased perhaps at being furnished with an excuse for abandoning a country, where he met with a more obstinate resistance than he expected, and which was completely exhausted by the insatiable rapacity of the invaders. Having mustered his forces under the walls of Mulhausen, he proceeded to Wolmerstadt, and being joined by Pappenheim, continued his march toward the Elbe, declaring publicly that it was his fixed resolution to give battle immediately to Gustavus.†

No sooner was the king apprised of his intention than he quitted Tangermund for the stronger position of Werben,‡ secretly determined not to hazard an engagement, till he should have obtained the co-operation of Saxony.

* Puffendorf, iii. 19. Gualdo, i. 36.

† 1631. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 345.

‡ Werben is supposed to be situated near the spot, where the Emperor Henry I. gained a decisive victory over the Vandals, in commemoration of which he built Sigburg, or *the castle of victory*, ibid. 347.

Meanwhile Tilly advanced by hasty marches, anticipating the laurels which he was about to acquire at the expense of a prince whose courage he esteemed, but whom he was still tempted to regard in the light of a daring adventurer. Impressed with the fatal conviction of the unrivalled excellence of Austrian tactics, and the ascendancy of veteran genius, he haughtily disdained those common precautions which are rarely neglected with impunity. Persuaded that the terror of his name would overwhelm the Swedes with dismay, he appears entirely to have excluded from his thoughts even the remotest contingency of a reverse, and to this destructive impression the succeeding disasters ought in a great measure to be ascribed. Gustavus was informed that a detachment of Austrian cavalry, encamped every night at a considerable distance from the army with less attention to security than to convenience, not supposing themselves in danger from the attempts of an adversary, whom they arrogantly believed to be diligently occupied in throwing up breast-works and digging intrenchments, instead of meditating plans of aggression. This intelligence having been verified by an official report, the king determined to chastise the presumption of Tilly, and concerted his measures with so much address, that the enemy were attacked in different quarters before they had time to prepare for their defence. The result of a combat conducted amid the confusion and darkness of the night, proved no less honourable than advantageous to the conqueror, since it so completely disconcerted the projects of Tilly, that he remained inactive for several days; thus allowing time for Gustavus to concentrate his forces in the camp of

Werben, which by indefatigable labour he had rendered unassailable.*

At this important juncture, when the eyes of Europe were attentively fixed on the actions of Gustavus, his royal consort, Maria Eleonora landed in Pomerania, accompanied by numerous reinforcements. On her arrival at Wolgast, she was received by Bogislaus with every flattering mark of respect; but what proved far more grateful to her affectionate heart, she was present at the celebration of a public festival, in commemoration of the anniversary of their deliverer's landing. A short time afterwards the Marquis of Hamilton entered the Oder at the head of six thousand hardy mountaineers. An expedition, so little honourable to the military character of a warlike nation, imposes upon an English historian the paramount obligation of investigating the causes of its failure.

Though the talents of Hamilton were by no means calculated to add increasing lustre to the Caledonian name, yet his illustrious descent, the romantic gallantry of his disposition, a taste for magnificence which bordered on profusion, and perhaps, more than all, the advantage of being allied to the royal house of Stuart, captivated the admiration of the exiled Queen of Bohemia, who not only treated him with the consideration due to a kinsman, but selected him for her confidential adviser. This ill-founded partiality pointed him out to the court as the fittest person to be entrusted with the command of the troops, intended to assist in recovering the palatinate.

* Gualdo, i. 37. Galetti, i. 197. Lotichius, i. 920. Burgus, 220.

To have levied them openly in the royal name, and thus rendered the interference of England a national act, would have been far more consistent with the dignity of the sovereign, and the exalted character of the nation.* But the inextricable labyrinth in which Charles was entangled, prevented his acting with vigour. Instead of publicly espousing the protestant cause, as he was exhorted to do by his ambassador,† he suffered himself to be amused by the insidious professions of Spain and Austria; and even when taught by repeated failures that it was in vain to attempt the re-establishment of his unfortunate brother-in-law by the lenient modes of negociation, he resolved to preserve a pacific countenance, chusing rather to allow a powerful subject to trench upon the prerogatives of royalty, by raising an army in his own name, than to involve himself in hostilities with Austria.‡

No sooner had Hamilton obtained the king's permission, than he sent proposals to Sweden, offering to raise six thousand men upon certain conditions. The bearer of the dispatches|| was cordially welcomed by Gustavus, who after complimenting the marquis upon the zeal which he manifested for the protestant religion, and the attachment which he

* His majesty not finding it convenient to appear in it himself, resolved it should pass for the voluntary assistance of his subjects, to which he should only give way.—Burnet's Memoirs of Hamilton, 6.

† Sir Thomas Roe.

‡ To enable the marquis to raise his men, the king granted unto him a lease of the customs of wines in Scotland for sixteen years.—Rushworth's Hist. Collect. ii. 62. Burnet's Memoirs of the Duke of Hamilton, 10.—A letter inserted in the preceding page of Rushworth's Collection from Charles to the electress will sufficiently shew, that neither prevarication, nor insult, could convince him of the perfidy of Spain.

|| Colonel Hamilton, brother to the Earl of Hadington.—Burnet, 6.

professed for his royal person, requested to be made acquainted with the time and place of his landing, that he might prepare an escort of four thousand infantry to receive him; this escort was to remain with the British troops, and be supported during a year at the expense of Sweden. The marquis having requested a reinforcement of two thousand cavalry, as essential to the success of his future operations, Gustavus promised that every possible exertion should be made to procure them. It was farther agreed that unless the king should be present, the marquis should enjoy the supreme command of all the troops; but in order to give additional energy to his deliberations, as well as to obviate the possibility of any misunderstanding, he should be constantly attended by a Swedish officer, well acquainted with the country, and competent to assist him with salutary advice. With respect to the territories which Hamilton might conquer, it was stipulated, that they should belong to the crown of Sweden, but the revenues and contributions were to be left entirely at Hamilton's disposal, provided no unwarrantable depredations were committed. And lastly, both Hamilton and his followers were required to take an oath of fidelity to Gustavus.*

It is a singular circumstance, that no notice should have been taken of the unfortunate Palatine, the ostensible object of British interference: but whether this omission proceeded from negligence, or inattention, has never been satisfactorily ex-

* This treaty may be found at length in Burnet, 7.—It was signed at Stockholm by the King of Sweden, May 30th, 1630, but was not ratified by Hamilton till March 1st in the following year.

plained. Other clauses were so carelessly worded, as to admit of different interpretations ; and hence, from the very moment of Hamilton's landing, no cordiality subsisted between him and his illustrious ally. It is impossible, however, to deny, that the marquis at first fulfilled the agreement with zeal and sincerity ; and so popular was the cause in which he had embarked, that volunteers in crowds flocked daily to his standard, among whom were comprised many experienced officers, who had served with distinction under Spinola and the Prince of Orange, those consummate masters in military tactics.

The known integrity of Gustavus precludes the suspicion of premeditated duplicity, and the clearness of his intellect renders it equally improbable, that he should have been mistaken ; we are therefore compelled, notwithstanding the laboured apology of Burnet, to admit, with the partisans of the Swedish monarch, that Hamilton was in fault, though it is highly probable, that his was an error of the understanding, and not of the heart. Accustomed to admiration from the servility of dependants, ever prone to offer idolatrous homage at the shrine of power, he may have been led to entertain exaggerated notions of his personal consequence and abilities ; an opinion calculated to expose him to the severest mortification, when he found those talents less highly appreciated by a prince too much enlightened to tolerate presumption and vanity, notwithstanding they were decorated with all the splendid insignia of royal favour ;* and who valued men neither for their

* Hume describes him as a man, the subtleties and refinements of whose conduct, and whose temporising maxims, though accompanied with good

descent, their wealth, nor their titles, but for the soundness of their judgment, and the purity of their morals.*

Convinced that a battle must shortly take place, Gustavus exhorted his Caledonian ally to embark with all possible expedition. Meanwhile commissioners were issued to Lord Reay and Farenbach, for raising four additional regiments, which were probably destined to join the English forces, in conformity to the promise given to Hamilton.† This project, however, was rendered abortive by the treachery of Farenbach, who deserted to the imperialists with all the money allotted for recruiting.‡

On the 16th of July, Hamilton sailed from Yarmouth, with a fleet consisting of forty vessels; but, being informed upon his arrival off Bremen, that no escort was ready to receive him, and that the

intentions, continually excited suspicion, and whose cautious temper inclined him always toward moderate and dilatory measures, lviii. Such a person was not likely long to enjoy the confidence of the most enterprising warrior of modern times. Whitelock calls him "an unsteady man," 75. Lord Clarendon says, that "he had more outfaced the law in bold projects and pressures upon the people, than any other man durst have presumed to do."—"Though the readiest man to advise the pacification, he was the most visible author of the breach of it."—Hist. of the Rebellion, i. 119.

* Without incurring the imputation of vanity, Gustavus might have ventured to say with Ulysses,—

Nam genus, et proavos, et quæ non fecimus ipsi,
Vix ea nostra voco.—Ovid Metamorp. xiii. 140.

† This conjecture acquires additional probability, when we consider that the country in which they were to be raised (viz. Bremen, Holland, and Friesland), lay contiguous to the spot where the English were expected to land; and that their numbers corresponded exactly with those of the reinforcements promised to the Marquis: a Swedish regiment, consisting of one thousand and eight men, the four regiments of course would have comprehended only thirty-two more than the contingent. Harte, i. 317.

‡ Ibid.

adjacent country was, for the most part, occupied by the imperialists, he resolved, without farther deliberation, to steer for the mouth of the Oder.* This unexpected deviation from the preconcerted plan considerably deranged the schemes of Gustavus, because the Archbishop of Bremen had secretly promised to declare in his favour, the moment he could do it with safety. This project, however, was completely frustrated by the pride or imprudence of Hamilton, who by uniting his forces with those of the prelate, might have created a diversion extremely distressing to Tilly.†

To this circumstance must be attributed the subsequent coolness which prevailed between the king and the marquis; because it induced the former to entertain a contemptible opinion of the military talents of his ally, which unfavourable prepossession was still further aggravated by the expense and magnificence which he affected.‡ Apprehensive that an example, totally subversive of regular discipline, might prove contagious, Gustavus ordered the British auxiliaries to watch the motions of the Austrians upon the frontiers of Silesia, from

* Burnet, 16, observes a cautious silence respecting his motives, but Puffendorf seems to insinuate, that this resolution was embraced at the suggestion of the King of Denmark, apprehensive that his pretensions to the see of Bremen, would become entirely hopeless, should it fall into the hands of the Swedes, iii. 23.

† Whitelock tells us that so little care was taken to provide food and accommodation for the soldiers, that they arrived in a sick and shattered condition, and mouldered away in a short time, 15.

‡ According to Harte, the splendour of his equipage, of his table, and of his retinue, would have been more consistent with the magnificence of a royal establishment, than with that of a subject, however illustrious his birth, or great his fortune. He was constantly served by forty pages, the sons of gentlemen, and attended by a guard of four hundred men, all clad in the richest uniforms, i. 320.

whence Horne was recalled, with directions to leave four thousand men, to reinforce the Caledonians.*

Justly mortified at having suffered some of his best disciplined regiments to be surprised, Tilly flattered himself to efface the intolerable stain by a decisive victory, and accordingly he advanced, by hasty marches, in the hope of being able to overwhelm the Swedes in their camp at Werben, before their entrenchments were brought to perfection. Unwilling, however, to trust entirely to the prowess of his troops, he contrived to establish a secret correspondence with some officers in the service of Gustavus, who undertook, in consideration of a competent reward, to spike the cannon, and to set fire to Werben, at the moment Tilly should commence the attack. The plot being discovered, enabled the king to entangle the enemy in the snare prepared for his own destruction; and he accordingly suffered them to approach within musket shot, without manifesting an inclination to oppose them; but just as they were preparing to leap into the trenches, a tremendous fire was suddenly opened from all his artillery, which instantly threw them into confusion. A vigorous sally completed their overthrow; they fled precipitately, and were followed by the Swedes to a considerable distance, leaving little less than six thousand dead upon the field of battle, according to the testimony of many respectable writers.† These numbers, though probably much exaggerated, shew at least that the action was highly advantageous to the victors, and

* This Burnet positively denies, asserting that two hundred horse, and three hundred foot, were all the auxiliaries sent him, 17.

† Puffendorf, iii 21. Harte, i. 307.

no less injurious to the reputation of Tilly, whose pride was wounded to such a degree, that he became more ferocious than ever.* It was in this action that Bernard, Duke of Weimar, gave early proofs of that consummate skill which afterwards illustrated his military career, in consequence of which he was raised by Gustavus to the rank of general.†

Finding the opinion which he entertained of the King of Sweden's talents to be totally erroneous, and that to valour the most enterprising he united the opposite, and almost contradictory qualities of prudence and penetration, Tilly despaired of being able to force him to an engagement upon disadvantageous terms; and perceiving that his troops began to suffer severely from want of water, he retired to Eisleben, a town of Saxony, justly conspicuous in the annals of modern Europe, as the place of Luther's nativity. Unwilling, however, to waste his strength in total inactivity, he detached a column to chastise the Archbishop of Bremen, who being too feeble to resist the overwhelming torrent, was not only forced to deliver up his levies to the imperial commissaries, but even to renounce his engagements with the Leipsic confederacy.‡

Meanwhile, Furstenberg having overrun the circles of Swabia and Franconia, without experiencing the slightest resistance, was preparing to

* Khevenhiller relates the following anecdote, which is highly descriptive of Tilly's character. A few days after his defeat, he issued an order, forbidding his troops to give quarter to the Swedes; and sixty of the enemy having shortly after been slain in a skirmish, he would not allow them to be buried. *Hist de Gust. Adol.* 361, note i.

† Ibid. *Harte* i. 308. *Galletti*, i. 198.

‡ 1631. *Schiller*, ii.

direct his victorious arms against the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, flattering himself to be able, in a few weeks, to accomplish what Tilly had left undone. Impelled by the desire of gratifying both avarice and pride, he had actually arrived, by hasty marches, in the vicinity of Fulda, when all his projects were suddenly suspended.

Convinced of his inability to resist the storm, and determined never to submit, the landgrave repaired to the Swedish camp to solicit the protection of Gustavus. During his short residence there, the final arrangements were given to a treaty, of which the groundwork had been previously laid, and which served as a model for all the subsequent alliances contracted between the protestants and the crown of Sweden.

The security of the landgrave being the chief object in contemplation, the king engaged, during the continuance of hostilities, to defend him to the utmost of his power, to consider the enemies of William as his own personal foes, and never to conclude a peace with Austria, unless that gallant prince should be reinstated in the full enjoyment of every prerogative which he possessed before the troubles in Bohemia. It was farther stipulated, that all the towns and fortresses belonging to the landgrave, which might be occasionally occupied by his allies, should be given back with all their military stores and artillery. He was also to retain the supreme command of the Hessian troops, and even to direct the operations of the auxiliary Swedes which might join his standard, provided the king was not present. By an additional clause, permission was granted to the friends of the landgrave, to join the confederacy, provided they did it within the space of three

months. William pledged himself in return to adhere to Gustavus with unshaken fidelity, to place his towns and castles entirely at his disposal, and never to enter into any negociation, without having previously obtained his consent. He moreover promised to issue a decree, enjoining his subjects of every rank, who might be engaged in foreign service, instantly to repair to the national standard, and to punish their neglect by confiscation.*

Intelligence of this transaction having reached the Austrian general, he addressed a manifesto to the inhabitants of Cassel, exhorting them to provide for their own security, and to avoid the destruction about to overwhelm them, in case they persisted any longer to defend a sovereign, rash enough to sacrifice the prosperity of his people to unbounded schemes of ambition, and who had justly forfeited every claim to their allegiance, by his rash and inconsiderate conduct.† These admonitions, however, being received with scorn, Tilly at length discovered, to his utter astonishment, that no power is so secure, as that which reposes upon the solid basis of affection.

The equivocal policy of the Elector of Saxony had for some time afforded serious alarm to the court of Vienna. After every attempt had failed to dissolve the confederacy of Leipsic, the pride of Ferdinand disdained forbearance, and believing himself strong enough to enforce obedience, he resolved to

* Puffendorf, iii. 25. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 356. This treaty, which may be found in the appendix to Harte, is remarkable for the fidelity with which it was observed on both sides, amid the various vicissitudes of fortune. The constancy of Hesse remained unshaken, and was nobly rewarded, by the gratitude of Sweden, at the peace of Westphalia.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.* Harte, ii. 2.

reduce John George to unconditional submission by the compendious means of coercion. This determination was no sooner embraced, than preparations were made for carrying it into execution. An army was assembled on the borders of Silesia under the command of Tieffenbach, destined to penetrate into the eastern provinces of the electorate, while Tilly, advancing on the opposite side, carried terror and desolation to the gates of Dresden. Previously, however, to the adoption of this vigorous system, the emperor, in consideration of former services, or more probably from the wish of justifying to the world his subsequent conduct, directed Tilly once more to offer terms, before he commenced hostilities. The language of authority, however, being far more congenial to the ferocious temper of that veteran chieftain, than the gentle tone of persuasion, he sent two plenipotentiaries to Merseburg, where the elector resided, to admonish him of his danger, or rather to signify with dictatorial insolence, the only conditions upon which he would be permitted to retain the empty title of a sovereign. The persons selected for this important mission were the Barons Metternich and Schonberg; the former of whom was the catholic administrator of the diocese of Magdeburgh, a man of moderate principles and insinuating address, and of course calculated to succeed in diplomatic affairs. But lest his natural urbanity might induce him to relax from that haughty style which was mistaken by Tilly for magnanimity, his colleague was endowed with qualities exactly the reverse. Proud, insolent, and presumptuous, he would have regarded it as highly derogatory to his dignity to have obtained by argument, what it was

possible to extort by compulsion. Contemplating the majesty of the imperial throne through the magnifying medium of prejudice, he considered grandeur and despotism as synonymous terms, and thought power debased if exercised with moderation.

Being admitted to an audience, they delivered their credentials in a letter from Tilly; in which, after expressing his astonishment that warlike preparations should continue in every part of the electorate, notwithstanding the repeated admonitions of the emperor, he proceeded to enumerate the various evils which must necessarily accrue, should the present system be suffered to continue. "The elector's conduct," he said, "being taken as a precedent by most of the protestant princes, it became doubly important that it should afford an example of loyalty and obedience, instead of tending to disseminate the seeds of disaffection." He farther contended, that a spirit of hostility had been manifested upon various occasions by the Saxon family, but more particularly by the unfounded murmurs so studiously circulated respecting the indiscipline of the Austrian armies. He then proceeded to observe, that notwithstanding the transactions of the illegal assembly, convened at Leipsic under the patronage of the elector, had been publicly annulled by an imperial edict, no steps had been taken to suspend the levies, no symptoms had been manifested of intentional compliance.

To tolerate any longer these undisguised attacks upon all legitimate authority, would be no less derogatory to the dignity of the sovereign, than repugnant to the true interests of the nation, and he accordingly admonished him, that the emperor was resolved no longer to suffer himself to be insulted

with impunity, but to exercise the power with which he was invested by Providence to vindicate his regal prerogatives. Admitting that necessity might sometimes have tempted the imperial troops to transgress the bounds of moderation, he contended that their behaviour toward the Saxon princes had been invariably regulated by the strictest principles of justice and amity. Should any occurrence have taken place of a contrary tendency, he assured the elector that it had happened without the knowledge, and in direct contradiction to the wishes of Ferdinand, who would be ready to attend to every well-founded complaint at the approaching diet, to be held at Francfort, for the purpose of regulating the claims of the protestants respecting "the edict of restitution." The address concluded with a solemn exhortation seriously to reflect upon the perils which surrounded him, to desist from the farther prosecution of measures which could not fail of being attended with the most disastrous consequences, to unite his forces with those of the League; and finally, by his influence with the evangelical party, to induce them to return within the pale of duty.*

It was hardly possible to have chosen a more improper moment to urge this imperative demand. The persecution of the Lutherans, the pillage of Magdeburg, and the desolation which accompanied the progress of the imperialists, had justly excited the elector's indignation; but as he preferred to discuss those important topics in his answer to Tilly, he conversed with the ambassadors only

* Lotichius, i. 922. Puffendorf, iii. 26. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 361.

upon general subjects, contenting himself with assuring them of his sincere attachment to the person of the emperor, but studiously avoiding to make the smallest disclosure respecting his future intentions. Those sentiments, however, were clearly manifested at a splendid entertainment, to which Schomberg and Metternich were invited. Deceived by the exact imitation of nature, one of them injured a tooth by attempting to crack a walnut made of porcelaine; upon which John George sarcastically requested the ambassador to remember, "that there were certain fruits to be met with in Saxony somewhat difficult of digestion."*

The following morning they were dismissed with an answer no less firm than laconic, which began by expressing unbounded reverence toward the imperial throne, but at the same time declaring that he purposely abstained from recapitulating the motives which had induced him to arm, because they had been repeatedly announced in official documents. After professing that nothing could equal his regret on account of the troubles which agitated Germany, he concluded by adverting to the important services which he had rendered to the emperor upon various occasions, and which justly entitled him to the most friendly treatment, instead of exposing him to threats and reproaches.†

Tilly plainly foreseeing the result of a negotiation calculated to aggravate and not to appease, had prepared for aggressive hostilities, without waiting for the return of his ambassadors; and being joined

* Harte, ii. 5. Galetti, i. 200. *Theatrum Europ.* 430.

† Lotichius, i. 925. *Hist. de Gustave Adolphe*, 363.

by Furstenberg, he resolved no longer to defer the execution of a project, from which he expected to reap an abundant harvest of glory. In a council of war, it was decided, to pass the Saal, at Halle, and after reducing Torgau, Wittemberg, and Leipsic, to plant the victorious eagle on the towers of Dresden. The plan of the campaign being thus arranged, without attending to the difficulties which it presented, the imperial army poured into Misnia, spreading terror and desolation wherever they came.

Rendered furious by the intelligence which hourly arrived of the barbarities perpetrated by the invaders, and satisfied that no mitigation could be expected from the clemency of Ferdinand, John George embraced with reluctant resolution the only hope which presented itself to a mind lacerated alike by anguish and despair. Resolved in future to unite his fortunes with those of Gustavus, he issued orders for assembling his forces under the walls of Torgau, and dispatched Arnheim to supplicate the protection of the warlike monarch, whose proffered friendship he had so often rejected.*

Though secretly delighted at finding the elector reduced to the necessity of imploring his succour, the King of Sweden received the Saxon plenipotentiary with cold and dignified reserve, telling him, that "he had long foreseen the tempest about to burst over his master's head, and had even forewarned him of the danger, which might have been averted, had he condescended to attend to his friendly admonitions, instead of suffering himself

* Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 364.

to be misled by the fallacious counsels of men, notoriously pensioned by Austria. Had the elector," continued he, "been prudent enough to listen to the offers which I formerly made him, I should have considered myself bound to defend him, by the double tie of gratitude and honour. Unable to resist the overwhelming storm which his own imprudence has raised, he now solicits my alliance from necessity, not from inclination. Under such circumstances, it behoves me seriously to reflect, that the Swedish army affords the only remaining barrier, which the protestants can oppose to the despotism of Austria. I must also remember my engagements with the Elector of Brandenburg, and with the princes of Lower Saxony, who must be inevitably stripped even of the shadow of power, should I rashly endanger their only resource, for the sake of a sovereign, whom his perfidious ministers would advise to desert me, in case the emperor should disavow the insolence of Tilly, and order hostilities to be suspended. Another consideration of no less importance is the relative situation of the belligerent armies. What might have been effected before the junction of Furstenburg, could not now be attempted with prudence; yet it shall never be said, that I avoid an engagement, provided I am certain of finding a safe retreat, in case it should terminate disadvantageously, and that my gallant companions shall not perish from hunger, before the eventful moment arrives."*

Arnheim was too well acquainted with the character of Gustavus to doubt that his resentment

* Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 364.

might be easily disarmed by a forcible appeal to his generosity. Besides, it was impossible for the king to reject the alliance of Saxony, without deviating essentially from the precepts of policy. Feeling, however, that Gustavus had real cause for complaint, he attempted to mollify him by every argument which an artful statesman could employ, imputing the reluctance with which the elector had received his former offers to the timid suggestions of incapacity. "Since it is no longer possible," said Arnheim, "to recal the past, let us endeavour to obliterate the unfavourable impression by acting more wisely in future. I readily acknowledge the precautions to be just, which your majesty is pleased to require; let me therefore intreat you clearly to explain the terms upon which the elector may hope to recover your friendship; for to you alone he looks for protection, convinced, that however great his errors may have been, your magnanimity will remember only his present distress."

"Enough," replied Gustavus hastily, "the sincerity of his professions shall be immediately tried; let Wittemberg be consigned to a Swedish garrison; let the electoral prince repair to my camp as a hostage for his father's fidelity; let my troops receive three month's pay; let the elector dismiss, and bring to trial the faithless ministers who have so often deceived him; let him sign a defensive and offensive treaty, and I will instantly march to his assistance.*

The powers entrusted to the Saxon negociator being inadequate to such important concessions, he

* Harte, ii. 9. Puffendorf, ii. 27. Lotichius, i. 908. Galetti, i. 202.

requested permission to return to Merseburg, which Gustavus readily granted ; but, as the distressing situation in which the elector was placed, presented no possible alternative between unconditional compliance and inevitable destruction, his determination might be easily foreseen: the king accordingly broke up his camp, and had actually advanced within a few miles of Wittenberg, when he was met by Arnheim, now authorized to accede to his wishes in their fullest extent. Delighted to obtain a respite upon any conditions, John George directed his ambassador to hasten back with the utmost expedition, and to acquaint his generous benefactor, that not Wittemberg alone, but the strong fortress of Torgau, and even Dresden itself, should be placed at his disposal ; and that so unbounded was the confidence reposed in his honour, that he was ready to repair to the Swedish camp with all his family, and to remain there, if required, as hostages. He farther requested the king to designate the persons whose fidelity he suspected, assuring him that they should be instantly delivered into his hands, to be punished at his discretion. The Swedish army he promised to pay with the exactest punctuality, intreating Gustavus to consider him in future as unalterably devoted to his service, and prepared to sacrifice even life itself in defence of his interest and his glory.

The heart of Gustavus could not endure to be outdone in generosity, and as he no longer doubted John George's sincerity, he instantly relaxed in his demands. "The want of confidence," said he candidly, "with which I have been treated, was sufficient to excite my suspicions ; but the unbounded reliance placed in my honour has effaced

them. All that I now require, is one month's pay to my soldiers, and I faithfully promise the elector that he shall never repent his liberality.*

When both parties are inclined to understand each other, the forms of diplomacy are few and simple. Gustavus having engaged never to sheath the sword till he should have driven the imperialists out of the electorate, Arnheim departed in order to procure his master's ratification to the treaty. Overjoyed at the fortunate issue of a negotiation, which at least suspended his fall, the elector thought it impossible to do too much for so generous an ally, and accordingly promised to join the Swedes with his whole army the moment they should have crossed the Elbe; leaving to the superior judgment of Gustavus the entire direction of all military affairs, and covenanting never to negotiate with any of the belligerents, unless his consent should be previously obtained. All the fortresses upon the Elbe were placed entirely at the king's disposal, and forage and provisions of every kind were abundantly provided for his soldiers.†

The situation of Gustavus was now materially changed; he had contracted an alliance with the most powerful prince of the protestant party; had obtained possession of several fortified towns, which if adequately garrisoned were deemed impregnable; had nearly doubled his force by the accession of Saxony, and had gained footing in a country, covered with rich and populous cities, and plentifully stocked with corn and cattle. Thus he en-

* Gualdo, i. 43. Le Vassor, x. 42. Puffendorf, iii. 27.

† Ibid. This treaty is inserted at length in l'Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 365.

tirely disconcerted the projects of Tilly, who with shame and indignation beheld himself compelled by a juvenile warrior to alter the whole plan of the campaign; and, what tended still more to embitter disappointment, was the galling reflection, that this sudden revolution in the political hemisphere would be generally attributed to his own indiscretion.

The infatuation of Ferdinand, in obliging John George to throw himself into the arms of Gustavus, cannot be accounted for, except by supposing, that he regarded the contest to be finally terminated by the capture of Magdeburg, and was eager to liberate himself from those heavy obligations, which he was either unwilling, or unable to discharge: for by the confession of Tilly, after the battle of Leipsic, it clearly appeared, that he had acted in conformity to orders transmitted from Vienna, and not from the impulse of wounded pride, or the irritation of hasty resentment. But even supposing this assertion to be correctly true, it by no means effaces the stain which attaches to the reputation of Tilly; because, though he may have never been consulted respecting the policy of the enterprise, for the errors of the execution he was solely responsible.

The plan which he formed for the invasion of Saxony could have been justified only by the supposition, that he was desirous of concealing from the eyes of the world, the devoted object of his hostility. But so far from attempting to disguise his intentions, he publicly announced that he was marching to Dresden, in order to punish its refractory sovereign. Without attempting to controvert the practicability of the undertaking, it may be

sufficient to observe that, according to the opinion of the most competent judges, he was far from displaying any extraordinary talents in the execution. By crossing the Elbe at Magdeburg, he might possibly have succeeded in surprising Wittemberg, and even Torgau, before the elector was aware of his intention;* the possession of which would have prevented the junction of the Swedes and Saxons, and would probably have compelled John George to deprecate destruction by the immediate dissolution of the Leipsic confederacy. The distance from Wolmerstadt to Wittemberg, by the way of Magdeburg, is considerably shorter than that by which Gustavus must have marched; and as the garrison of Wittemberg was far from numerous, and ill provided with military stores, there could be little danger of meeting with a repulse. How far these conjectures are founded in truth it is difficult now to decide; but when we reflect upon the indecisive character of the elector, and the acknowledged venality of his ministers, it is hardly possible to doubt, that he would have submitted to the yoke without a single effort, had it been practicable to reduce him to a similar dilemma.

The natural harshness of Tilly's disposition being exasperated to the utmost of human ferocity by the untoward current of events, he endeavoured to compensate for want of prudence by want of humanity, devastating the country through which he passed with the sanguinary fury of a barbarian. Zeist, Merseberg, Naumburg, and Jena, having

* Such is supposed to have been the advice of Pappenheim, whose genius was capable of justly appreciating that of Gustavus.—*L'Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*. 365,

been reduced within the space of a few days, by the resistless valour of Pappenheim, and treated with a severity which, fortunately for mankind, has been rarely imitated by the leaders of civilized nations, the generalissimo recalled his predatory columns, and advanced into the fertile plain of Leipsic, sweeping away every thing that could contribute to the comforts of man with the desolating violence of a hurricane.* A haughty mandate having required that wealthy city to admit an Austrian garrison, the governor, who had previously destroyed the suburbs, requested permission to consult his master—an indulgence which was peremptorily refused. It is fair to acknowledge, that his means of resistance were extremely circumscribed, the city being surrounded by a simple ditch, which, though filled with water, was neither deep, nor difficult of access; the works for the most part constructed of earth had been suffered to fall into decay, while the garrison consisted solely of municipal troops, unacquainted with the most common principles of tactics, and more attached to the palpable profits of commerce, than to the unpalpable glory of military renown. Yet in spite of every difficulty, the governor amused himself, while the danger was remote, with the parade of preparation, alarming his fellow citizens with the boastful determination of burying himself amid the ruins of Leipsic, rather than sully the

* Swedish Intelligencér, 124. The pages from 121 to 124 by mistake are twice numbered. "Now were Pagan, Lutzen, Waisenfelt, and other places spoyled. Here were the ladies and gentlewomen, and others, like beasts and dogges yoked and coupled together to be led into the woods and ravisht, who for resisting had their clothes stript off, their bodies whipt, their eares cropt, and so sent back again."

splendour of the Saxon name. A second message from Tilly, however, threatening the inhabitants with death, unless the gates were instantly opened, dispelled this heroic resolution, though the dread of exposing himself to universal contempt, or of incurring the punishment attached to cowardice, prevented his complying immediately. But as soon as he beheld the batteries mounted, and the obscurity of night irradiated at intervals by a shower of bombs, he thought it prudent to enter into a capitulation, which was shortly concluded, as the Austrian general consented to grant the most favourable terms, upon receiving a moderate contribution.*

The capture of Leipsic was no sooner announced in the Swedish camp than Gustavus invited the two electors to a council of war.† Too sagacious not to foresee the possibility of a reverse, he explained to his friends the evils which might arise from hazarding a battle with the diffidence inseparable from enlightened heroism, never prone to overrate its own resources, nor to undervalue those of an enemy. He then detailed the advantages which could not fail to accrue from remaining entirely in a defensive posture, harassing the imperialists by frequent skirmishes, intercepting their convoys, and cutting off, by safe and judicious movements, their foraging parties. Such a system, he contended, if adhered to with steady and perse-

* 1631. Gualdo, i. 44. Swedish Intelligencer, 124. Harte accuses the governor of treachery; but, under the circumstances in which he was placed, protracted resistance might have exposed the city to utter destruction, and with the fate of Magdeburg, fresh in his memory, it required more than common fortitude to resist.

† Brandenburg and Saxony; the former of whom had joined the army.

vering courage, must soon compel them to retire, without endangering the security of the protestant religion, or risking their own independence. "But should you prefer," said he, his countenance kindling with animation, "to measure your arms with those of Austria, remember that your stake is infinitely greater than mine; for supposing even that Providence should ordain my ruin, and that of my army, the throne of Sweden will be still secure. A warlike people, and a well-disciplined fleet, will protect our coasts from invasion; but in the event of a defeat your fortunes are desperate; for what compassion can be expected from an implacable foe, already in the heart of your dominions?"

The doubts of Gustavus were those of piety, submitting with the resignation of an enlightened Christian to the divine decree; the confidence of John George was that of presumption, no less suddenly elevated by the first glimmering of prosperity, than it had been depressed by the gloom of adversity. Stimulated by the desire of recovering Leipsic, and rescuing his subjects from plunder, the latter deprecated the smallest delay, and burned with impatience for the momentous conflict, on the event of which his future destiny depended, declaring that he had rather encounter Tilly with his new raised levies, than suffer him any longer to lay waste a country enriched by the speculations of successful commerce, and adorned by the improvements of agriculture.*

"If such, sir, be your determination," replied

* Puffendorf, iii. 28. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 371. Schmidt, v. 4. Galetti, i. 203. Harte, ii. 12. Burgus, 222.

Gustavus, with a gaiety predictive of success, "the Swedes shall partake in the glorious undertaking. We will march," continued he, "with the firm resolution of liberating Germany from the oppression of Austria, or perishing nobly in the attempt."*

This plan being embraced with unanimous assent, no more time was lost in deliberation, because it was highly expedient to bring Tilly to an engagement, before he was joined by Aldringer and Tieffenbach. The united armies therefore were instantly put in motion, and having crossed the Mulda advanced towards Leipsic by hasty marches, under the command of their respective sovereigns: previously however to their breaking up, the Elector of Brandenburg took leave of his friends with the most ardent wishes for their prosperity, and returned to Berlin, though his motive for abandoning them at this momentous crisis has never been clearly explained.†

Tilly, after leaving a garrison sufficient for the defence of Leipsic, encamped at Breitenfeld, a village situated in the midst of an extensive plain, for the most part allotted to tillage. It was there he received the unwelcome intelligence that a junction had been effected between the Swedes and Saxons, and that their united forces were advancing to give him battle. The most secret deliberations of statesmen and generals are frequently recorded by historical writers with an affectation of accuracy, which could only be tolerated had they been present themselves at the consultation. But without fear of incurring similar censure, we may fairly infer, that the mind of Tilly was tumultuously agitated

* Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 371. † Puffendorf, iii. 28.

by violent emotions, when preparing to set on a single cast the fortunes of Austria, his own reputation, and the permanent ascendancy of the papal religion. In contradiction to his usual mode of proceeding, he is said to have manifested strong marks of indecision, and long to have fluctuated between the opposite extremes of caution and courage. The former however at length prevailing, he determined to remain in a defensive posture till joined by Aldringer, of whose arrival at Erfurt he was informed.

This sagacious plan, when submitted to the consideration of the general officers, was strenuously combated by the impetuosity of Pappenheim, who, when glory presented itself to his dazzled imagination, disdained all councils but those of temerity.*

The enthusiasm of Pappenheim was always seducing, and received additional weight from his popularity. Though unconvinced by his arguments, Tilly felt that it would be difficult to reject his advice without subjecting his motives to misrepresentation, and perhaps seeing himself deprived disgracefully of the command, to which Pappenheim openly aspired. Too proud however entirely to abandon a scheme which his judgment approved, and too weak to pursue it in opposition to the majority of the Austrian commanders, he appears to have chosen a middle course, the most pernicious of any in such a situation; because it is liable to all the inconveniencies attendant on both, without possessing the advantages of either. Having thrown up intrenchments in front of the camp, and

selected the extensive plain which stretches from Breitenfeld to the gates of Leipsic, for the field of battle, he awaited the event in awful expectation, as if conscious of the ruin which impended. According to the testimony of contemporary writers, his character had undergone a complete revolution; his courage and confidence, the result of victory in thirty-six decisive engagements, at once forsook him; and the guilt of Magdeburg overshadowed his soul, leaving it a prey to the most gloomy anticipations.*

The allied army advanced with so much rapidity, that on the evening of the day on which they broke up their camp, they arrived within sight of the enemy.† No sooner had Gustavus obtained a view of their numerous tents, covering an eminence on the opposite side of the richly-cultivated plain, than calling together his generals in the open air, and placing himself in the middle of the warlike circle, he conversed with them for a considerable time, respecting the important business in which they were about to engage. Observing that some of them seemed to treat it lightly, he endeavoured to impress them strongly with the idea that they were going to contend with troops of a very different description from those so often defeated in Poland. "Fellow soldiers," said he, addressing his conversation to all who heard him, "I wish not to disguise the danger by underrating the merits of a veteran army inured to service; but I confide in the valour of my own officers and men, little doubting that they will shew themselves worthy

* Schmidt, v. 4. Harte, ii. 16. Puffendorf, iii. 29.

† Sept. 17th.

of the glorious cause, for which we combat. It is probable, that we shall be greatly outnumbered by the enemy; but let us trust implicitly in the protection of Providence, and REMEMBER MAGDEBURG.”*

Riding through the lines he inspected each regiment with the minutest attention; and, with a countenance beaming with cheerfulness and resignation, explained the nature of the service which it was particularly destined to perform. He could not however conceal his uneasiness, when he compared the accoutrements of his own cavalry with those of the imperial curiassiers; the latter being completely cased in iron, and mounted upon large and powerful chargers, while his own, for the most part, were destitute of armour, and rode on horses comparatively weak and diminutive. In order to render the superiority of the Austrians less decisive, he directed his dragoons to advance briskly, without discharging their carbines till within pistol shot of the enemy, and to aim their blows at the heads and necks of the horses; by which means the ranks might be more easily broken, and in case the rider should be dismounted, his cumbersome cuirass might render him incapable of farther exertion.†

The Swedish army passed the night in the open air, prepared to begin the momentous conflict at the dawn of morning, while their heroic monarch conversed in his carriage with Teuffel, Horn, and Banier. No sooner did the horizon brighten than the signal was given to advance; the Swedes, con-

* Harte, ii. 18, professedly copying Chemnitz.

† Ibid. Galetti, 205. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 376.

sisting of eight thousand foot, and seven thousand horse, were stationed on the right; the Saxons on the left, in nearly equal strength, though four thousand were cavalry.*

The wide plain of Breitenfeld extends with little interruption over the whole of Misnia, affording a spot peculiarly calculated for military evolutions.† The Austrian camp was situated on an eminence, gradually sloping to a small rivulet, the banks of which were rendered swampy by frequent inundations. Before it was possible to commence the attack, Gustavus was obliged to pass the morass, which was practicable only at the village of Dscholka; and even there must be traversed upon a narrow causeway; so narrow, had Tilly availed himself properly of the advantage of his situation, it would not have been difficult to have impeded the progress of the enemy; but the apprehension of bringing on a general engagement, which even to the last he seems studiously to have avoided, prevented him from acting with decision.‡

From the most authentic documents, it appears,

* Authors differ materially with regard to the disposition, and even the numbers of the contending armies; but I have adopted the statement of Harte, who professes to follow Chemnitz.—Gualdo, 19, makes the force of the allies amount to forty thousand combatants. Puffendorf, iii. 29, contents himself with saying, “*Supra septuaginta quinque millia bellatorum patentissima planitie concurrebant.*”

† I have been thus particular in describing a spot, which has been lately the theatre of those important events which have restored independence to Europe.

‡ Puffendorf, *ibid.* In the critical examination of this famous battle, affixed to Francheville's History, the author, who repeatedly inspected the field of battle, is of opinion, that if the Austrian general had attempted to defend the pass in question, he must have abandoned the important post of Podeluritz, and laid open his flank to the Saxons, who might have traversed the swamp at another spot, 414.

that Tilly was determined to decline a battle, if it could be avoided without the sacrifice of character; and that Pappenheim, having penetrated his intention, resolved to prevent its execution; and, in consequence, offered to reconnoitre the enemy's dispositions at the head of two thousand cuirassiers. Unwilling to comply with a proposal that tended directly to frustrate his scheme, Tilly started various objections, and even at length, when he gave a reluctant assent, it was in consequence of a promise from Pappenheim, so far to bridle his natural impetuosity, as not to be tempted by any circumstances to engage even in a desultory skirmish. Led on by an insatiate passion for glory, and rather courting than shunning a conflict, Pappenheim advanced with his accustomed impetuosity; and, being naturally short-sighted, found himself enveloped by a detachment of Swedish horse, before he was aware of the danger. Determined to expose himself to every risk, rather than tarnish his reputation by a disgraceful retreat, he sent information to Tilly, that unless a reinforcement of two thousand cavalry immediately came to his assistance, both he and his escort must perish. In this distressing dilemma no alternative remained; because the safety of two, the best disciplined regiments in the Austrian service, depended upon his instant compliance. But, in issuing the order, he clasped his hands in an agony of despair, exclaiming, in all the bitterness of a wounded mind, "That madman is born to rob me of my reputation, and to deprive the emperor of his crown!" The colonel, who commanded this detachment, was directed to acquaint Pappenheim, that if he did not immediately com-

mence a retreat, his head should answer for his disobedience.* To turn his back upon an enemy, however, was a disgrace to which Pappenheim could never consent; and, even had he been inclined to attempt a retreat, his situation was actually become so critical, that the measures most agreeable to his undaunted character were perhaps the safest that he could have pursued.

Satisfactorily to delineate the intricate movements of contending armies is the province of the military historian; yet I am led to indulge in minutest details, when I consider the vast importance of this memorable engagement, which was destined to extend its beneficial influence to the latest posterity.†

Upon receiving intelligence that the vanguard had traversed the morass without opposition, Gustavus exclaimed, "Now, comrades, we must prepare for serious fighting!" A responsive acclamation of "Long live the king!" vibrated through the line, manifesting the alacrity and the affection of the soldiers.

At this moment an officer presented to Gustavus the plan traced by Arnheim for the disposition of the Saxons; which he examined attentively, making several remarks with a pencil as he proceeded. The Swedes now advanced in order of battle; the king, clad in a simple uniform of grey cloth, but sufficiently distinguished by the green feather which adorned his hat, and the uncommon colour of his

* This account is taken from the interesting notes to the last edition of the *Florus Germanicus*, 236, which are commonly attributed to General Fugger.

† Harte, ii. 20.

charger,* led the right wing in person, with Banier for his lieutenant; General Teuffel, assisted by the gallant Hepburn, commanded the centre, while the left was entrusted to the genius of Horn, perhaps the ablest of all the Swedish commanders.† The troops were drawn up in two lines, only six deep, the infantry formed into slender divisions, and interspersed with small bodies of cavalry.‡ The elector, who commanded his own army in person, took post in the centre, having Binthauf on his left, and on his right Arnheim.

The imperialists, to the number of four-and-forty thousand, were drawn up in large and ponderous squares, in conformity to the ancient system of tactics, as practised by Alva and Spinola. Pappenheim being opposed to the Swedish monarch, while Tilly undertook to direct the centre, leaving the right wing to oppose the Saxons, under the guidance of Furstenberg. The Austrians wore, as they did at the assault of Magdeburg, white ribbons in their hats, or helmets, and on their right arms scarfs of a similar colour; the Swedish caps and casques were ornamented with green branches, their only mark of distinction.§ As they gradually ascended the sloping ground, after crossing the

* A flea-bitten grey.

† Gualdo, i. 46.

‡ This is supposed to have been the first instance of any commander's venturing to diminish the depth of the files, which till then had consisted of eighteen men.—Harte, i. 25. It was also in this action that the King of Sweden first introduced the modern system of firing by platoons. Galetti, i. 206.

§ According to Gualdo, some of the Swedish banners bore for motto, GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, FIDEI EVANGELICÆ DEFENSOR; others had the following inscription, SI DEUS PRO NOBIS, QUIS CONTRA NOS? The imperial standards had the usual epigraph, PRO ECCLESIA ET PRO IMPERIO.

rivulet, a tremendous fire was opened from the imperial batteries, which was instantaneously returned by the Swedish artillery. The Austrian commander having had the choice of position, both wind and sun were in his favour; and several of the fields having been recently ploughed, a cloud of dust, intermixed with smoke, extremely incommoded the assailants. Determined to extricate himself from this distressing situation, the king attacked the right wing of the enemy with so much impetuosity, that he drove it from its station, notwithstanding the intrepid resistance of Pappenheim. This movement having unavoidably occasioned an opening, the Duke of Holstein attempted, with masterly skill, to penetrate the Swedish line; and probably would have succeeded, had not Banier advanced, with the utmost celerity, at the head of the reserve. A sanguinary conflict now ensued, in which the duke, after displaying heroic bravery, was mortally wounded, and the greater part of his regiment annihilated. Pappenheim, however, though compelled to retire, was not defeated. Rallying his troops, with desperate courage, he led them on to seven successive charges, in the third of which he had nearly overpowered Gustavus, when Banier again arrived to his assistance.*

Though the king was victorious where he commanded in person, the left wing was exposed to imminent peril, from the dastardly behaviour of the Saxon cavalry, consisting almost entirely of provincial levies, serving according to feudal principles, under some of the wealthy barons.† Flattering him-

* Harte, ii. 30. Galetti, i. 207. Puffendorf, iii. 29. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 378.

† Harte, *ibid.*

self that this advantage, if vigorously pursued, might prove decisive, Tilly poured fresh troops upon the disheartened Saxons, persuaded that, if they were put to flight, the Swedes would be unable to maintain their ground against an enemy so superior in numbers; while he simultaneously attacked the left wing of the Swedes, at the head of those veteran bands of infantry, so long the terror of Germany. Confident of success, when the Saxons fled, he exhorted his victorious cohorts to suspend the pursuit: "Let us return," said he, "to complete the business so prosperously begun, and the empire will be our own for ever!" The thirst after plunder, however, was not to be restrained, either by the prospect of glory, or the dread of disgrace; the baggage belonging to the fugitives presented attractions too strong for rapacity to withstand, while the glory of avenging the insulted majesty of Austria impelled ferocity to continue the carnage.*

Hurried away amid the general tumult, or panic struck at contemplating the disastrous spectacle which presented itself to his sight, the elector abandoned the field of battle: outstripping his subjects in the career of terror, he was the first who arrived with the melancholy tidings at Eidenberg, a small town upon the Mulda, about ten miles dis-

* Puffendorf, iii. 29.—"Steinau, a Saxish colonel of horse, was with four cornets taken prisoner by the ennemie; who perceiving the king's partie to prevaile, broke through the ennemie, and assisted his owne side. The imperialists now seeing the Saxons flying, cry, Victoria! victoria! follow! follow! follow! But the old lad, their general, quickly countermanded that, saying, 'let them goe, we shall overtake them time enough; but let us beate the Swede too, and then all Germanie is our owne.'"—Swed. Intel. 123.

tant from Leipsic, where, looking forward to irreparable ruin, he endeavoured to drown his affliction in floods of wine.* A few regiments, however, still kept their ground, and by a gallant resistance rescued from obloquy the national character.†

Furstenberg meanwhile, having returned from the pursuit with the Italian and German cavalry, directed his triumphant squadrons against the left wing of the Swedes, then closely engaged with Tilly, and their flank being uncovered by the flight of their allies, nothing less than the heroical courage of Horn could have resisted the impetuous shock. The incalculable superiority of Swedish tactics was now clearly illustrated by a variety of evolutions, no less conspicuous for the intelligence with which they were conceived, than astonishing for the celerity with which they were executed. Accustomed to the slow and clumsy movements of his heavy battalions, Tilly was so confounded by the novel spectacle, that he no longer retained the coolness requisite to counteract the schemes of his enterprising and judicious antagonist.‡

Pappenheim's division had been so repeatedly

* Before night he was so completely intoxicated as to be totally insensible to his misfortune. Grimoard, ii. 445.—The love of drinking appears to have been a family failing, as the Marechal de Grammont speaks of his son in the following terms: "Ce prince etait entierement gouverné, et n'avait d'autre application que celle de boire excessivement tous les jours de sa vie; qualité rare dont il avait hérité de l'électeur son pere. Ses principaux conseillers etaient absolument dependans de l'empereur. . . il etait fort zélé pour la religion Lutherienne, et le jour quil communiait, il portait ce respect au sacrement, de ne pas s'enyvrer le matin; mais aussi en revanche, le soir il reparait l'omission, et buvait toute la nuit, jusqu'a ce qu'il tombait sous la table, de meme que tous les convives." This extract is taken from a note to l'Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 377.

† Schmidt, v. 4. Gualdo, i. 52.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.* Galetti, i. 208. Francheville, 418.

repulsed, that there seemed little probability of its ever rallying again; the king therefore was left with a disposable force to be employed as necessity might require. Leaving the right wing under the direction of Banier, he hastened to the centre, and ordered it to advance. Teuffel obeyed with his accustomed alacrity; but, as he was leading on the column, he was unfortunately killed by a musket-ball. Unacquainted as yet with that melancholy event, Gustavus animated the soldiers to fresh exertions by the prospect of an adequate reward, or remunerated their prowess by hasty commendations. Observing some regiments under the command of Callenback less warmly engaged than their comrades, he exclaimed with eagerness, "Charge, man! In God's name, charge!" Stimulated by the exhortations and the example of his sovereign, that gallant officer endeavoured to merit his approbation, but fell as he led his gallant companions to a fresh and more vigorous attack.*

The king's attention was suddenly attracted by large bodies of infantry advancing rapidly. Though assured by the officers nearest his person that they were Swedes, he mistrusted their information; because he thought it impossible that any part of his army should have deviated so materially from its original destination. Spurring his charger, he galloped forward to ascertain the fact. "They are imperialists," said he, returning hastily, "as I supposed, for I can clearly distinguish the Burgundian cross upon their banners." Having made every arrangement for their vigorous reception, he hast-

* Galetti, i. 208.

ened impetuously to another quarter, where he thought his presence still more essential.*

Though it was near four in the afternoon, the main body of both armies were still unbroken, having confined themselves almost entirely to a distant cannonade. On both wings, however, the issue of the combat was so decidedly unfavourable to the Austrians, that Gustavus, no longer doubting of ultimate success, collected his forces for one decisive effort, against the centre of the enemy. That massive body originally comprehended eighteen regiments, for the most part Walloons, accustomed by an uninterrupted series of triumphs to regard the imperial authority and their own impetuous valour as equally irresistible. Against this hitherto impervious phalanx, now considerably weakened by successive detachments, the Swedish monarch led his Dalecarlian infantry, men of gigantic stature, ferocious countenances, and inured from their cradles to incessant fatigue. Till now those hardy warriors had never encountered an enemy whom they deemed it glorious to overcome; for they looked down with contempt upon the pompous effeminacy of the undisciplined Pole, distinguished only by the splendour of his accoutrements; and disdained alike the sanguinary cos-sac, whose callous soul mistook ferocity for courage. But they now confronted adversaries, whose firm and skilful resistance was destined alike to consign to immortality the victors and the vanquished. Every inch of territory was manfully contested; and, though the Swedes gained ground, it was almost imperceptibly.

* Galetti, i. 208.

The sun was set, and the premature obscurity of an autumnal evening rendered the conflict more terrible, if not more destructive. Notwithstanding they had been repeatedly pierced and divided, the ranks of the imperialists were again closed ; and so obstinate was the perseverance with which they contended, that they may be said rather to have been exterminated than defeated. Notwithstanding they were hurried by an overwhelming force to a considerable distance from each other, five veteran regiments * formed themselves again into a compact body, impelled by instinctive courage, and a long acquaintance with military evolutions ; and, though abandoned entirely to their own discretion, they retreated with slow and sullen steps to an eminence skirted by almost impervious thickets. Determined to resist to the last man, they withstood the fury of a victorious army ; and even when reduced to less than six hundred, they disdained to ask, or even to accept of quarter.†

With this small remnant of a hitherto invincible army fled the only remaining hope of Tilly, who amidst the wreck of his ruined fortune preserved at least the melancholy consolation of feeling, that though he possibly might be blamed for erroneous judgment, he never could be accused of want of intrepidity.‡ Till the moment when he was borne from the fatal field by the officious tenderness of his friends, he displayed fortitude truly heroical ; but

* Harte says four, ii. 33, and this assertion is corroborated by the testimony of the Soldat Suedois, 72. Francheville, 419.

† Harte, *ibid.* Galetti, 209.

‡ Les fautes qui se firent du côté des impériaux contribueront aux succès des Suedois autant que la valeur et l'habileté de Gustave Adolphe. Francheville, 421.

when the fortune of the day was irrecoverably decided, he is said to have been affected even to the shedding tears, at beholding the unavailing slaughter of men, to whom he was indebted for many a triumph. Disdaining to fly though almost singly opposed to the victorious cohorts of Sweden, and nearly exhausted with the loss of blood, he was actually falling beneath the blows of a Swedish captain,* to whom he obstinately refused to surrender when he was fortunately rescued by the Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, and escorted to Halle by six hundred Walloons, the remnant of a once formidable body.†

The Swedes being now undisputed masters of the field of battle, Gustavus threw himself upon his knees, testifying his gratitude for this signal instance of divine favour, by the fervour and sincerity of his devotion.‡ Having thus discharged a duty which to enlightened piety appeared indis-

* Called, on account of his gigantic stature, "der lange Fritz."—Galletti, i. 209.

† Swedish Intelligencer, i. 127.—"Tilly himself, thus wounded as hee was, made shift to flie into Hall that night, seven Dutch miles from the place of battell, from whence in a hackney-coach he and Pappenheim fled next day towards Halberstadt.—Reported it was, that Tilly should have his wounds dressed by the town barber of Hall, who (it seemed) affirmed that Tilly's body was *hard-shot*, or *shot-free*, and that the bullets had not pierced his flesh, but made bruses rather in his arme, necke, and shoulder; and that to this horrible torment, he was faine to endure to have the brused flesh cut out to the very hard bone. Whether this was so, or no, we leave upon the barber's credit; and because we have not heard it seconded out of Germanie, we are loath to charge so brave a warrior with so base an imputation as to owe his life unto a charm, which is practised by none but the reprobate raskalitie of the army. This is sure, that an Italian gentleman avowed that his owne eyes sawe Tilly's blood runne into his bootes, which, if so, then surely he was not *shot-free*."—"No man since the King of Portugal" (meaning, I presume, Don Sebastian), "has beene so often killed and revived as Tilly hath beene," i. 127. A good specimen of the taste and credulity of the age.

‡ Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 380.

pensable, he gave orders for his cavalry to pursue the fugitives, as far as the obscurity of the night would permit,* while pealing bells from the adjacent churches alarmed the vigilance and the resentment of an irritated peasantry. Seven thousand of the imperialists were left for dead on the plains of Breitenfeld, and many more were killed during the pursuit, which being added to the multitude of wounded and prisoners, occasioned such a defalcation in the Austrian army, that Pappenheim acknowledged that they were never able to collect more than half their original numbers.† Their camp equipage, also, with hoards of plunder, disgracefully amassed by years of rapacity, was abandoned to the victorious Swedes,‡ who took all the baggage, great part of the artillery, and upwards of one hundred standards.¶ On the side of the victors the loss did not exceed three thousand men, two thousand of whom were Saxons. After minutely examining the Austrian camp, the king gave directions for a Swedish regiment to occupy the spot where an Austrian had been formerly stationed; nor was any man permitted to plunder beyond the limits of this allotment, under penalty of incurring the severest punishment.§

Thus terminated the battle of Leipsic, than which

* This Burgus confesses. "Sequebantur graviter Sueci victoriam, et ad internecionem Cæsareos delevissent, ni a supervenientibus tenebris detenti essent." 243.

† Harte, ii. 33.

‡ Of the value of this we may form some idea, when we are told, that hardly a soldier was found, either among the slain, or the prisoners, with less than twelve ducats in his pocket—Harte, i. 39.

¶ Galetti, i. 209.

§ Monro's Expedition, ii. 71.

the pages of history record few events more important, or more decisive. It may appear presumption in any except a military historian to censure the disposition of a celebrated tactician, or to investigate the causes of his defeat. It may not, however, prove unwelcome to the intelligent reader, to be made acquainted with the errors of which Tilly has been accused, and to which his ruin is generally imputed. Neither can it be denied, that the accusation, if substantiated by satisfactory proofs, applies to faults almost incredible in a commander, to whom contemporary authors are fond of ascribing talents not inferior to his experience. But may it not, therefore, be reasonably inferred, that his high reputation was less the result of intrinsic merit than of the fortunate concurrence of fortuitous circumstances, which enabled him to achieve exploits comparatively splendid, against men whose resources were inferior to his own, and whose abilities were still more inferior. Hence his diminished star, when brought into contact with that of Gustavus, was offuscated by its transcendant radiance.

The moment Tilly beheld the Saxons in confusion, he believed the battle won, and accordingly determined to complete the victory by directing his efforts against the fugitives, without attending sufficiently to the situation of Pappenheim.* The formation of his infantry into ponderous masses, may, in some measure, be justified by the highest authority, though it contributed essentially to his ruin, by necessarily obliging him to contract his front, and thus exposing himself to be turned.

* Francheville, 422.

These remarks are intended merely to shew that the talents of Tilly were imitative and not creative. He took up his profession exactly as he found it ; and, satisfied with excelling in the practical part, seems wholly to have neglected the theory, and to have studied war like a geometrical problem, and not as a science of invention.

By erecting batteries on the heights which he afterwards abandoned, his artillery, by being placed in the rear of his army, was in great measure rendered unserviceable. During the action his attention seems to have been exclusively confined to the post where he was stationed ; hence he omitted to send reinforcements to Pappenheim, who had separated himself from the main body, with a view of outflanking the enemy.

Indeed, the whole conduct of the action did little credit to any of the imperial generals ; and it has been frequently remarked by competent judges, that although most of them displayed the intrepidity of grenadiers, not one of them performed, with tolerable ability, the more arduous duty of a commander. No orders were issued with clearness or precision ; no precautions were employed to cover the retreat, which unless it had been facilitated by the obscurity of night, would have become absolutely impracticable,

If, on the contrary, we examine the plan of Gustavus, we shall find every thing arranged with such admirable judgment and perspicuity, that even the cowardice of the Saxons created but little confusion. And so perfectly did he anticipate all the movements of the enemy, that had he been gifted with the power of diving into futurity, he would scarcely have found it necessary to vary a single disposition, which the prescience of genius inspired.

CHAP. XIII.

The important consequences arising from the battle of Leipsic. Gustavus regarded by the German protestants in the light of an avenger sent by Heaven to vindicate the cause of religion. He deliberates how to follow up the blow; motives which induce him to direct his victorious arms against the members of the Catholic League, instead of penetrating directly into the hereditary dominions of Austria.—The Saxons undertake the conquest of Bohemia; while the King of Sweden marches toward the Rhine. He takes possession of Erfurd, passes the Thuringian Forest, and carries the citadel of Wurtzburg by storm; his clemency and magnanimity. He leaves Horn to complete the subjugation of Franconia; and, after reducing all the fortresses upon the banks of the Mayne, makes his triumphal entry into Francfort.—Tott and Banier drive the imperialists out of Mecklenberg, and compel them to evacuate Magdeburg.—Devastations committed by the Austrians in Lusatia.—Arnheim enters Bohemia, and makes himself master of Prague.—Consternation at Vienna; the emperor solicits assistance from the pope, but meets only with reproaches. He proposes to Wallenstein to resume the command; his offers received with coolness.—Wallenstein forms the most extravagant designs; negotiates with the King of Sweden for the total subordination of the Austrian army, upon conditions which render him independent. Raises troops with a facility which astonishes the world; and, by intrigues and artifices, prepares for usurping the Bohemian throne.

THAT formidable army was nearly annihilated, which had so long held Germany captive; and with it was dissolved that potent charm, which, by subjugating the mind, had almost effaced every vestige of Teutonic independence, and subverted the protestant religion. The battle of Leipsic ought in consequence to be regarded as forming an important epocha in the annals of the reformation, because it awakened its partisans from that disgraceful torpor, into which they had been plunged by a long series of calamities, and which was rapidly approaching

to despair. The dawn of a fresh and brighter day now broke upon their misery, irradiated by the delightful visions of hope, and confirmed by the sober suggestions of reason.

When the melancholy intelligence was first communicated to the emperor, he was so entirely subdued by the violence of his feelings, as to be utterly incapable of concealing his disappointment: but long habits of dissimulation soon enabled him to resume a more cheerful countenance, and to attend to the various and momentous concerns which crowded upon him; and couriers were accordingly dispatched to Italy to recal his troops with the utmost expedition to the assistance of Tilly.*

Neither was the impression less forcible, which the splendid success of the Swedish arms produced upon the minds of the protestants. The enthusiasm excited by the virtues and the valour of the conqueror was suddenly kindled into idolatry. To have doubted that he was commissioned by the bounty of Providence to become the champion of the Lutheran faith, would have been reprobated as the foulest of heresies. Various prophecies and predictions, which till then had been treated with contempt or ridicule, by all except the illiterate rabble, were collected and distorted for political purposes, and even received with veneration by the more enlightened classes of society; while the absurdest romances of dreams and apparitions, the delight and nourishment of vulgar superstition, were no longer contemplated with merited scorn by men of polished educations. Never was the image of saint or martyr

* 1631. Khevenhiller, xi. 1876.

more widely dispersed, or more affectionately cherished. It was worn in the bosom of almost every Lutheran; it was suspended alike in the cottage and the castle; and was even regarded by many as gifted with those extraordinary powers, which were attributed by the catholics to their most precious relics. Wherever he appeared, Gustavus was treated with the profoundest respect, and the warmest effusions of love, and even sometimes compelled, however reluctantly, to become the object of honours approaching to deification, and far too excessive for a mortal to receive.*

The zealous catholics, on the other hand, found themselves reduced to a most distressing dilemma. Having treated the triumphs of the imperial army as incontestible evidence of the predilection of Heaven toward the orthodox church, and being loath to acknowledge that they had either forfeited the divine protection, or had been misled by mistaken enthusiasm, they endeavoured to reconcile presumption with piety, by treating the intelligence as an impudent fiction.†

* The ingenuity of admiration at length discovered that the word *sued*, if reversed, was *deus*.—Schmidt v. 5.

† *Victoriæ regis nostri non reperere fidem in Polonia, post confirmatæ regem totamque aulam, ac clerum mirificè conturbarunt ac etiamnum quasi in luctu tenent, quasi male ominantes non sibi solum, sed pontificiis omnibus. Erat magni nominis vir, qui auditis successibus regis mei, erupit in hæc verba, nunquam credere se, deum factum esse Lutheranum.*—Oxenstiern's Letters, Nov. 4, 1631.—Patriotish. Archiv. vi. 173. In a publication approved and patronised by Urban VIII. and written by Scioppius, we find the following extraordinary assertion: "Articulus fidei est, quod justam causam deo fretus defendens, non possit vinci." *Fundam. Pacis in Sacr.—Rom. Imper. Theoph. Sanctofidei.* 154. And in the same page the author says, "Illi (namely, the supporters of the orthodox faith) etsi minime alioquin a peccatis immunes credere debent se victores futuros, quam certo credunt mundum a deo creatum, cum æque utrumque a deo revelatum sit."

Meanwhile the conqueror of Tilly was left at liberty to follow up his brilliant success with little fear of interruption. On the morning after the battle he summoned the garrison of Leipsic to surrender; but perceiving that preparations were making to resist, he left the conduct of the siege to the Saxon general, who, apprehensive of ruining that wealthy city by a bombardment, allowed it to capitulate upon honourable terms. Meanwhile the king, having gained possession of Merseburg without the necessity of firing a single shot, advanced to Halle, and made himself master of the town and citadel with almost equal facility.* The greater part of the prisoners who fell into his hands enrolled themselves in the Swedish army, which thus became considerably stronger than it was before its contest with the Austrians. Finding the city of Halle abundantly provided with every thing requisite for the comfort of soldiers, Gustavus allowed them a few days repose, which were partly allotted to public acts of devotion, and partly in arranging in concert with his allies a plan for their future operations. Letters were also written to all the German princes, who had seceded from the communion of Rome, explaining the advantages which might be expected from the recent change in the political horizon, provided they availed themselves of the fortunate crisis, and co-operated with Sweden in her patriotic efforts for restoring independence to the empire. Such the king solemnly protested was his only motive for engaging in a contest with Austria; declaring himself ready to

* Puffendorf, iii. 30. Harte, ii. 44.

grant protection and indemnity to any catholic state, even though subject to an ecclesiastical sovereign; provided it faithfully observed the laws of neutrality. Chemnitz and Rellinghen were likewise dispatched upon an ambulatory mission to the protestant members of the circles of Franconia, Swabia, and the Rhine, with proposals for forming a general confederacy, for the purpose of reducing the imperial authority within its ancient and constitutional limits.*

During his residence at Halle, Gustavus received visits of congratulation from the Princes of Weimar and Anholt, whose prepossessions were strengthened by his popular manners into a warm and lasting attachment.† There too he was joined by the Elector of Saxony, overwhelmed with confusion on account of his dastardly behaviour. Trembling to encounter the frowns and reproaches of an indignant protector, John George approached with trembling steps, and an averted countenance; but these apprehensions were quickly dissipated by the generosity of his ally, who, instead of upbraiding him with cowardice, addressed him in language best calculated to afford consolation. “Permit me, sir, to congratulate you,” said the magnanimous victor, “upon an event which has delivered you from such troublesome guests, and which is in great measure due to the fortitude which you displayed in so strenuously advising a battle.” No less enchanted with the modesty of the Swedish hero, than thankful for the service which he had performed, the elector promised to adhere to his interests with inviolable

* Harte, ii. 49. Puffendorf, iii. 32.

† Galetti, i. 212.

fidelity, and to exert all his influence with the protestant party, that he might be chosen King of the Romans.* In the first effusions of gratitude, John George may perhaps have poured forth the genuine sentiments of an overflowing heart; but if his feelings at the moment were sincere and ardent, his ministers and generals, all venally devoted to the Austrian court, soon found means to abate his enthusiasm, by instilling into his weak and versatile bosom a thousand unfounded suspicions.†

The system to be adopted for prosecuting the war was debated in a military council, at which all the Saxon princes assisted. The inutility of attempting to follow the imperialists, now rapidly retreating toward the Weser, was readily admitted without one dissentient voice, because it must unavoidably have transferred the theatre of hostilities into Lower Saxony, and thus exposed the protestants, who constituted the majority of its inhabitants, to plunder and devastation. For these reasons it was deemed expedient to direct the brunt of the war against the members of the Catholic League, and particularly against the emperor's dominions, where a large body of people, justly exasperated by the infringement of their most valuable privileges, might be expected to declare in favour of a monarch, the champion of liberty, and of religious toleration.

These preliminary principles having been established as the basis of their future operations, only two roads presented themselves, by which it was practicable to carry the project into execution;

* Galetti, i. 31.

† Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 382. Galetti, i. 213.

but, respecting the selection of these, some variety of opinions existed. The direct route to Vienna, through Bohemia, presented neither many, nor insuperable obstacles; on the contrary, with the exception of a few defiles, such as usually occur in mountainous countries, it was accessible both for cavalry and artillery, and conducted through provinces, whose natural exuberance was rendered still more productive by industry. With a victorious army the conqueror of Tilly might enter the capital of Austria in triumph; neither Prague nor Presburg were prepared for a siege, and both Bohemia and Hungary were nearly destitute of troops. Too feeble to resist the overwhelming torrent, the humiliated emperor would be compelled to abandon the imperial residence, and seek an asylum among the mountains of Stiria; while a treaty, dictated by the victor in the palace of Ferdinand, could hardly fail to ensure to the protestant party the most ample indemnity for every grievance, as well as the fullest security for the future enjoyment of their civil and religious immunities.

The boldness and brilliancy of thus carrying the war into the heart of the enemy's country, and perhaps of reducing him to unconditional submission, presented attractions so seducing, that scarcely any man, placed in the situation of Gustavus, would have possessed fortitude to withstand the temptation. But if we attentively examine the conduct of that illustrious monarch, we shall invariably discover, that his sagacity in the cabinet surpassed even his prowess in the field. Before he suffered ambition, or the love of glory to decide in favour of any splendid undertaking, he consulted prudence with dispassionate judgment; and having balanced

the difficulties likely to arise against the dictates of vanity, and the admiration of mankind, he never hesitated to sacrifice the most tempting chimeras of popular adoration to the substantial benefit of his allies.

By marching to Vienna, through Bohemia and Moravia, the direction of the war in the provinces contiguous to the Mayne and Rhine must necessarily devolve upon the Elector of Saxony, whose moderate abilities, and unsteady disposition, rendered him totally unfit for that important command. The weakness of his intellect inspiring presumption, a defect cherished by flattery and artifice, he still aspired to the glory of becoming the head of an independent party, capable of preserving an equal balance between Sweden and Austria, by throwing occasionally its preponderating influence into the lighter scale. To place such a man in a situation, where his example might furnish a plausible excuse for every weakness, must have been attended with numerous evils, particularly as Tilly, after his junction with Fugger and Aldringer, was enabled to resume an offensive posture; and, if opposed by no better general than Arnheim, might find himself strong enough to compel the protestants to renounce the confederation of Leipsic; even supposing the Saxon to act for once with prudence, resolution, and sincerity. Should the Austrians be suffered by mistake or treachery to recover their ascendancy in the empire, it would be of little importance for Gustavus to extend his conquests to the banks of the Danube. Neither could he reasonably cherish a well-founded expectation of exhausting the resources of a mighty monarchy, whose

sovereign had resisted with unshaken resolution the rudest shocks of adversity.*

Far less splendid, indeed, but more certain and permanent, were the advantages to be derived from directing the torrent of hostilities against the members of the Catholic League, notwithstanding many local impediments still remained to be surmounted. The Thuringian forest abounded in defiles, and not in provisions; the roads were, for the most part, deep and narrow, and in a rainy season impracticable for carriages of every description. Yet, in spite of these obstacles, the Swedish monarch determined to confine his operations for the present to the western circles, leaving Bohemia and Moravia, more easy conquests, to the precarious fidelity of the Saxons.

That this decision was founded on the justest principles, few men perhaps would be inclined to doubt, did they not know that it had been disputed by two consummate judges, Folard and Oxenstiern.† When that enlightened minister met Gustavus at Francfort,‡ he insinuated his disapprobation of the step he had taken in the following ingenious compliment: “Sir,” said the chancellor, “though I rejoice most sincerely at your uninterrupted success, I should have been still more delighted to have offered you my congratulations at Vienna than at Francfort.”

* Schiller, iii. Harte, ii. 144. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 385.

† In his commentaries upon Polybius, the former says, “Gustave Adolphe, comme un vrai Annibal, ne se rendit pas moins digne du compliment (alluding to the words of Asdrubal to Annibal, *Vincere scis victoria uti nescis.*) apres la bataille de Leipsic. En allant droit à Vienne, il eut chassé l'empereur effrayé, et consterné de la deroute de son armée presque exterminée. Ferdinand n'avait pas plus de troupes à lui opposer, que les Romains n'en avaient à Rome. Il negligea de le faire.” i. 90.

‡ Puffendorf, iii. 31. Or at Mayence, according to other historians.

Such are the different arguments adduced in defence of either opinion by the friends of Gustavus, who, of course, believed him actuated by no other motives than those which he publicly professed. There are many, however, who justify his conduct upon different principles. "What satisfactory evidence," they demand, "has ever been produced, that the views entertained by the Swedish monarch were really as disinterested as his enthusiastic admirers have pretended."—"May he not," they inquire, "with some appearance of reason, like many who preceded him in the career of glory, have covered ambition with the seducing garb of patriotism, in order to render the hearts of the protestants subservient to his secret designs."* The subjugation of Germany, and its natural consequence, the annexation of the imperial crown to that of Sweden, could not be accomplished without prolonging hostilities; because, by extending the flame over a wider surface, events might occur, amid the general conflagration, to realize his most chimerical wishes. Neither are they disposed to admit, as an incontrovertible fact, that his march to Vienna would have been unobstructed; on the contrary, they contend, that the smallest retardation might have allowed time for the emperor, then vigorously assisted by the Elector of Bavaria, to have assembled an army sufficiently strong to have protected the capital of Austria. They further suppose, that too rapid a progress would have excited the jealousy of every member of the Leipsic confederacy, as it did of their volatile leader; and this they maintain could not have been avoided, except by adopting

* Puffendorf, iii. 31.

such measures as tended to inspire unlimited confidence, and thus connected all the enemies of Ferdinand by the permanent link of gratitude, interest, and affection.* That the Saxons, when abandoned to their own discretion, would have been able to check the operations of Tilly, none were sanguine enough to believe; on the contrary, when joined by the numerous reinforcements marching to his succour, he might have cut them off from all communication with the northern provinces, whence their military resources were derived. By establishing himself in the centre of Germany, Gustavus became the soul and arbiter of every deliberation; and was in a situation to watch, with an attentive eye, the intrigues and tergiversations of the elector, ready to seize the first favourable opportunity of cancelling obligations, grown burthensome from his incapacity, or his unwillingness to discharge them, by abandoning his protector, when he no longer needed his assistance. Another motive, supposed to have operated powerfully upon the conduct of the king, was his disinclination to remove to a distance from Francfort, lest Ferdinand, by assuming a tone of moderation, and by consenting to suspend the “edict of restitution,” might assuage the fears of the protestants, whose generous credulity accepted excuses, though palpably fallacious, from insurmountable indolence and timidity. This latter consideration appeared so important to Gustavus, that he resolved to proceed with the utmost circumspection, and to subjugate the Electorates of Mentz and Coblenz, even at the hazard of exciting the jealousy of France, before he attempted to penetrate into Bavaria.†

* *Seri Memorie Recon.* vii. 350. *Puffendorf*, iii. 31. *Gualdo*, i. 76.

† 1631. *Puffendorf*, iii. 31.

The plan of operations thus judiciously traced, John George was entrusted with the reduction of Bohemia, while the king directed his march towards Erfurt, the capital of Thuringia, but in some measure dependant upon the Elector of Mentz. Conscious of their inability to resist the torrent, the magistrates attempted to avert the danger by the warmest protestations of respect, assuring the victor that they should ever regard it as a signal honour if he would condescend to reside among them; but humbly intreating him to spare them the disgrace of admitting a garrison of foreigners. The king solemnly protested that his intentions were amicable, but at the same time declared, that while he had a regiment of his own to guard his person, he would never trust to the fidelity of strangers. Desirous, however, of avoiding the necessity of military coercion, he directed the Duke of Weimar to follow the deputies, and to take possession of the gates as they entered. These orders having been punctually executed, Gustavus repaired to the town-house in triumph, where in a studied oration he thanked the citizens for having by their early submission prevented the effusion of blood, and explained to them the motives which induced him to interfere with the internal politics of Germany; assuring them, that it proceeded from a zealous attachment to the protestant faith, and not from the wish of extending his military renown, or of adding to his paternal dominions. "Provided you demean yourselves peaceably," he graciously added, "you may confidently rely upon my protection; and, as a pledge that my intention is not to deceive you, I shall leave you my queen--the object of my tenderest affection."*

* Harte, ii. 52. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 386. Galetti, i. 214.

He next visited the cathedral, where he was received by the chapter with as many marks of veneration as could have been paid to the sovereign pontiff; but, as he observed, that their homage was the effect of fear, he hastened to dispel their apprehensions, by declaring himself the friend of religious toleration. But his behaviour to the Jesuits was less encouraging. "I fear," said he sternly, "that you have much to answer for before the tribunal of heaven, on account of the troubles which you have excited. To your intrigues and artifices, the blood which has flowed in this destructive contest is chiefly imputable. I must therefore admonish you, to attend more carefully to the duties of your profession, and the pious offices of charity, preaching peace instead of discord to mankind."* However severe this censure might appear, it was mercy in comparison of what they expected; because they knew no better way of expressing their attachment to the religion they professed, than that of persecuting the members of all other communions. Happy to escape with reproaches alone, they poured forth their gratitude in the mellifluous language of hypocrisy, in which practice had rendered them the greatest proficient.†

William Duke of Saxe-Weimar, a prince deservedly popular, being appointed governor of Thuringia, received directions to repair the fortifications of Erfurt, and to levy troops in the adjoining provinces. Confiding in the discretion and fidelity

* Hist. de Gust. Adolp. 387. The mildness with which he treated the catholic priests induced Ricci to say, "that he was not far removed from the light of the papal communion." This opinion, however, is controverted by every action of his life, and particularly by his hatred of persecution.

† Puffendorf, iii. 32. Schmidt, v. 5. Gualdo, i. 63. Harte, ii. 53. Swed. Intell. ii. 3.

of his ally, for the safety of a place so valuable on every account, Gustavus prepared for his departure, having entirely gained the affection of the inhabitants, astonished at discovering so much justice and humanity in a sovereign, whom his enemies had represented as more ferocious than Attila.

Before we follow him any farther in the career of victory, let us pause to examine his situation more minutely, which, in spite of the glory with which he was surrounded, was by no means exempt from embarrassment. At the first glance he appears looking down from an eminence upon the rest of mankind, while all the protestant states were compelled to subscribe, without the smallest hesitation, to whatever conditions he imposed. But a critical eye will already discover, in the extent of his conquests, the cause of their controlment. For as the terror excited by the ascendancy of Ferdinand progressively subsided with every defeat, the fears even of the protestants took a different direction; and they beheld with jealousy the triumph of a gothic conqueror, who in the intoxication of victory might attempt to overturn their ancient constitution; while the papists persuaded themselves, that fanatical zeal might lead him to abolish the catholic worship, so venerable from its pomp and antiquity. Hence, scarcely had the Lutherans recovered from their fears, than they began clandestinely to thwart his design. Thus he had not only to contend against the gigantic power of an exasperated enemy, but also to struggle against the secret machinations of perfidious allies. Persevering courage, unbounded generosity, and a judgment too penetrating for artifice to deceive, at length enabled him to surmount every obstacle that superstition or treachery could oppose. While by

his magnanimity he subjugated the enlightened—by his bounty he captivated the interested. A cautious respect for national prejudices, the excellent discipline maintained by his army, unvaried reverence for ancient establishments; but, above all, his veneration for the religious opinions of every sect, awakened universal esteem. Even his enemies themselves were compelled to acknowledge, that they suffered less from the hostility of the Dalecarnians, than from the protection of Cossacs and Walloons.*

Though it is impossible to deny that the King of Sweden was chiefly indebted to the transcendant powers of genius for his rapid success, yet it is equally true, that he was superlatively favoured by extrinsic circumstances, and the fortunate coincidence of events. By removing the theatre of hostilities into the territories of the members of the Catholic League, he both recruited and supported his numerous armies at the expense of the enemy, and was thus enabled to wage an offensive war in various quarters, without exhausting his revenues, and even without fettering industry by fiscal expedients. His opponents, on the contrary, divided by the pursuit of different objects, and frequently remiss in their exertions from the well-founded dread of Austrian despotism, acted without concert, and of course without effect; their commanders being no less deficient in authority than their troops in discipline and obedience. Scattered over a wide-extended surface, and guided by no regular system, they pursued distinct, and sometimes discordant objects, whenever the pride or rapacity of an independent chieftain tempted him to deviate from the general outline.

* Schiller, iii.

Thus, while the imperial commanders frequently set at defiance the Austrian cabinet, and even neglected the orders of Ferdinand, the plan and execution of every enterprise exclusively centered in Gustavus. From him all authority emanated; he was the soul of the confederacy, unaccountable to no one for what he undertook, and consequently secure that the designs which he meditated could never be betrayed to the enemy. With such incalculable advantages, it is not astonishing, that a prince endowed with abilities, no less rare than transcendent, should have proved irresistible.

Breaking up from Erfurt, he prepared to traverse Thuringia, a country abounding in woods and mountains. His army, consisting of twenty thousand men, was divided into two columns, in order that they might perform the long and painful march with greater expedition. The corps destined to proceed by the western route was entrusted to Bauditzen, an officer of cool and intrepid courage, but of a mean and rapacious disposition. Pushing forward with celerity, he crossed the dreary hills which encircle Franconia; reduced Meirungen, Gotha, Smalcalden, Hamelberg, and Carlstadt; and on the eighth day joined his master under the walls of Wurtzburg.* Meanwhile, the king, advancing with equal rapidity, scarcely allowed his soldiers time to repose: and as the shortness of an autumnal day† would otherwise have obliged him to abbreviate his journies, he caused lanterns to be suspended on lofty poles, at proper distances, as beacons to guide them by night. After taking Ilmenau and Masfeld, he appeared unex-

* Harte, ii. 55. According to Gualdo this column was commanded by Ruthven, a Scotchman. 65.

† This march was performed at the latter end of September.

pectedly before Königshofen, a strong fortress belonging to the Bishop of Wurtzburg, and justly regarded as the key of Franconia. On account of its strength, it had been selected by the Austrians as a depot for military stores, and chosen by the neighbouring barons as a secure asylum for their plate and jewels. Notwithstanding it was defended by a numerous garrison, and well provided with food and ammunition, it capitulated without any resistance; and this dastardly behaviour was adopted by the commander of Schweinfurt, as a precedent for his own imitation.*

The rapid progress of the Swedes, which appeared fully to justify the severe remark of Wallenstein, "that they had made themselves masters of the empire,† before a courier had time to carry to Vienna intelligence of their irruption," spread universal dismay and consternation. The Bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, who had imprudently confided in the protection of Austria, began seriously to tremble for their revenues, if not for their faith; and they already beheld in idea the basis of their power irrecoverably shaken; their churches profaned by heretical pollution; the sacred images of saints and martyrs trodden under the feet of impious Vandals; and their relics, deprived of their miraculous charm, exposed to vulgar derision.

The same groundless alarm, which excited the fears of the opulent prelates, operated still more efficaciously upon the unlettered minds of the vulgar. The thousand tongues of Fame represented the Swedes as equally the enemies of God and man; and so strong was this prejudice, that it could be obliterated neither by pro-

* Swed. Intell. ii. 7. † Franconia ranked as the first.

testations of clemency, nor by the most striking examples of justice. While the wealthy landholders fled in every direction from the sanguinary sword of persecution, the Bishop of Wurtzburg abandoned his diocese, and hastened to Paris, in hopes of persuading the all-powerful cardinal to stretch forth his arm in defence of the orthodox church, and to rescue its altars from the fury of a barbarian, more cruel than Genseric or Tottila.*

Availing himself of the terror which preceded his arms, the victor presented himself before the gates of Wurtzburg, a rich and populous city, situate upon the banks of the Mayne. Defended only by a decaying rampart, and a municipal militia, the citizen felt happy by a moderate ransom to purchase an exemption from pillage. The castle of Marienberg, erected on the summit of a craggy rock, rising perpendicularly from the banks of the river, had been rendered almost impregnable by well-constructed fortifications. Thither, as to a place of perfect security, the opulent burghers had retired with their families, and most precious effects. Thither also had fled the whole order of priesthood, with their chalices, relics, and treasures; and, having blown up the bridge which communicated with the city, they derided the impotence of the besiegers.

Determined to make himself master of a place which commanded the navigation of the Mayne, Gustavus had not a moment to lose; because Tilly, reinforced by the Duke of Lorraine, was marching with an army forty thousand strong, for the purpose of raising the siege. The difficulty of the enterprize, however, was greatly increased by the

* Schiller, iii.

natural benignity of his disposition, which revolted at the thought of exposing helpless children, and innocent females, to the dangers inseparable from an assault. Anxious to spare those who regarded him as a destroying fiend, he found means to transport a considerable body of troops across the stream, though every boat was moored on the opposite shore under the guns of the fortress. The courage and dexterity of a Scotch lieutenant, named Ramsay, undertook the arduous task of traversing the broken arch upon a single plank, raised forty-eight feet above the water, and exposed to the fire of the Austrian batteries. By his exertions, a boat was at length procured, and a handful of soldiers having crossed the river, sent back two or three additional vessels; in which, during the obscurity of an autumnal evening, numbers were conveyed to the opposite bank, who by incredible exertions effected a lodgment upon the summit of the hill, within musket shot of the castle. From this commanding spot the Swedish artillery soon effected a breach; but, as the governor still refused to capitulate, an order was issued for storming. Though twice repulsed with considerable loss, the perseverance of the assailants at length prevailed, Keller the commander being taken prisoner by Tortenston, so celebrated for heroic exploits. Irritated by a resistance now totally unavailing, and eager to retaliate upon a sanguinary foe for the barbarities in which oftentimes they had wantonly indulged, the Swedes exterminated all who fell in their way, crying out with indignant fury, "Magdeburg! Magdeburg!" Many hundreds are supposed to have perished during the carnage; and among the number several friars, who, forgetting that their vocation was to

preach to mankind, had taken up arms with the pious intention of extirpating heresy.*

The rage of the victors being at length restrained by the personal interference of the king, the monks, citizens, and women, were permitted to depart without farther molestation. The booty, however, far surpassed the expectation of the conquerors; a secret vault having been discovered, laboriously excavated in the solid rock, and filled with inestimable treasures. In this cavern the wealth of the diocese was deposited, together with a large sum in specie, sent by the Elector of Bavaria to Tilly. Thirty pieces of ordnance, arms sufficient for the equipment of seven thousand men, immense magazines of corn and ammunition, a splendid service of massive silver, a stable of horses, remarkable alike for strength and beauty, and a well-selected library of books belonging to the Jesuits, rewarded the valour of the conquerors. This valuable collection was immediately presented to the university of Upsal, by way of reprisal, as the Elector of Bavaria, after the capture of Heidelberg, had sent the Palatine manuscripts to the Vatican.† The remainder of the booty was abandoned to the soldiers, as an incentive to similar enterprizes. It is well worthy of observation, because it clearly demonstrates the admirable discipline which at that time prevailed in the Swedish army, that amid the general tumult, not a nun was violated, nor a matron insulted. It was against the murderers of the protestants that the indignation of the victors was solely directed; but in the presence of the weaker sex it subsided, and toward them they behaved

* Swed. Intell. ii. 15.

† Khevenhiller, xi. 1881. Puffendorf, iii. 33. Harte, ii. 65. Gualdo, i. 65.

with that tenderness and indulgence, which are the characteristical ornaments of bravery.*

The example of the capital was followed by the entire diocese, which submitted without further resistance. Gustavus having received an oath of allegiance from the different municipalities, established a council of regency, consisting of twelve members, half of whom were protestants, and half catholics. The dreadful alarm, which had been artfully excited in the breasts of the people, began visibly to decrease, when they had an opportunity of comparing the behaviour of the Swedes with that of their ancient protector. For notwithstanding the members of the reformed communion regained possession of those churches from which they had been forcibly expelled, no oppression was exercised toward the papists, who so long as they demeaned themselves with prudence and moderation, were sure to be treated with humanity.†

The great importance of Wurtzburg determined Gustavus to strengthen the fortifications; and, as he daily expected a visit from Tilly, his soldiers laboured with such indefatigable industry, that the work was shortly completed. That veteran com-

* When the king entered the fortress, he was affected at beholding the pavement covered with apparently lifeless bodies; but, upon nearer inspection, discovering that few countenances bore the ghastly impression of death, he with a voice of benignity commanded them to arise, assuring them that their lives should be spared. This exhortation produced a miraculous effect; the dead started instantly from the ground, and with blessings and thanks poured forth their gratitude for an act of humanity, most astonishing to men unaccustomed to the feelings of pity.—Harte, ii. 66.

† Puffendorf, iii. 35.—To some of his generals, who advised him to retaliate, Gustavus humanely replied, "Wurtzburg no longer belongs to an enemy: besides, I come to unfetter the consciences of my fellow creatures, and not to enslave them."—Harte, ii. 65.—The man who acted consistently with such elevated sentiments was surely formed to conquer the world.

mander, being at length joined by reinforcements from Italy, panted after an opportunity of effacing the stain contracted at Leipsic. By an irruption into the territories of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, he flattered himself to allure the Swedes into a mountainous country, peculiarly fitted for defensive operations; but perceiving that his adversary was too sagacious to fall into the snare, he advanced to Fulda, apparently with the intention of hazarding another engagement. While waiting in expectation of a large body of troops, which the Duke of Lorraine* was conducting to his assistance, he is said to have employed every possible argument to persuade Maximilian to consent to his giving

* Charles Duke of Lorraine was born in 1604, and educated at Paris for the ecclesiastical profession; but his volatile disposition inducing him to abandon the mitre for a helmet, he entered into the Bavarian service, and was present at the battle of Prague. After the demise of his uncle, who died without male issue, he married his cousin Nicola, and took possession of the duchy in his own name, and in that of his consort. Too proud, however, to owe his authority to a female, he found means to exclude the duchess from the regency, and compelled the states to do homage to him, as their sole and legitimate sovereign. The position of Lorraine rendering its possession highly important to France, Cardinal Richelieu resolved to secure it, either by reducing Charles to a state of vassalage, or by expelling him from his dominions. Justly exasperated at the idea of losing his duchy, Charles wisely endeavoured to counteract the scheme by contracting alliances with the enemies of France. With this view he offered an asylum to the Duke of Orleans, when compelled to fly from the resentment of Richelieu; promoted a marriage between the fugitive prince and his sister Margaret, entered into a clandestine correspondence with the emperor, and began actively to prepare for hostilities. These warlike appearances affording a pretext for actual aggression, Louis entered Lorraine at the head of an army, and made himself master of several fortresses. The haughty spirit of Charles was not to be subdued by an aggravation of injuries, and he accordingly took advantage of the intestine troubles which disorganized France, to declare in favour of Ferdinand. With a prodigality ruinous to his contracted revenues, he levied regiment after regiment, accoutering them magnificently, without reflecting that they were deficient in almost every essential quality, and commanded by a young and inexperienced officer, vain enough to believe that the destruction of a hero was reserved for their presumptuous incapacity.—Coxe's House of Austria, i. 855. Le Vassor, x. 28.

battle to the King of Sweden. That prince, however, far too prudent to expose his tottering fortunes to an event so precarious, forbade the attempt; and Tilly is reported, with tears in his eyes, to have read the letter which enjoined inactivity.*

This fatal resolution, which exposed the judgment of Maximilian to the severest censure, and even tempted many to question his sincerity, allowed time for Gustavus to complete the conquest of Wurtzburg.† The situation of Tilly, thus cruelly forced to inactivity, became highly distressing to a lofty spirit, not reconciled as yet to adversity; neither was it less injurious to his reputation, because in the opinion of the world he was unjustly blamed for the result of measures, which he was no longer permitted to direct. The necessity of consulting the Elector of Bavaria, before he could venture to make any decisive movement, gave an air of indecision to all his subsequent actions, which led many now to undervalue his talents, as much as they had formerly overrated them. Notwithstanding he was entrusted with the command of forces nearly double in number to those of his opponent, he was obliged to content himself with recovering those towns, which the King of Sweden was unable to garrison. Once indeed he came in sight of the Swedish army, encamped under the walls of Wurtzburg; but finding that they were already masters of the citadel, he retired behind Tauber, with the inward conviction, that it was totally in vain to con-

* Khevenhiller, xi. 1884.

† I find in Schmidt that Maximilian attempted to justify his conduct by publishing his correspondence with Tilly, from which it appeared, that the imperial army had suffered so much from fatigue and hunger, as to be no longer in a condition to face the enemy. But as this statement is contradicted by most other historians, I did not feel myself authorized to adopt it.—Schmidt, v. 5.

tend against a warrior, who subjugated provinces in as little time as was usually spent in travelling through them.*

Too weak to resist the overwhelming torrent, he attempted to avert it by every external mark of respect, in the hope of being permitted to retain his dominions, till the ascendancy of Austria might once more enable him to brave the Swedes with impunity. Too honest himself to suspect others of deceit, Gustavus received the bishop's excuses with his accustomed benignity, and signified the conditions upon which he was ready to admit his neutrality. No sooner, however, was the theatre of hostilities transferred into the Palatinate, than the prelate, unmindful of every promise, delivered all his fortresses into the hands of the Austrians. This perfidy was of little avail. A body of troops, under the command of Horn, inflicted the chastisement which perfidy merits, and the unfortunate subjects of a worthless ecclesiastic were thus exposed to the alternate depredations of friends and enemies.†

The retreat of the imperialists‡ whose unsteady behaviour had encouraged the indecision of the

* Puffendorf, iii. 34.

† Harte, ii. 59.

‡ Thus ended the splendid visions of the Duke of Lorrain, and with it vanished the chimerical hope of obtaining the electoral dignity. Covered with ridicule and disgrace, he thought himself fortunate to escape; and so universal was the contempt into which he had fallen, that as he traversed a village in the Brisgau during his hasty retreat, a peasant struck his horse with a whip, exclaiming sarcastically, "You must mend your pace, sir, if you expect to escape from the great King of Sweden."—*Siri Memorie Recondite*, viii. 446.—The remainder of the life of this extraordinary man presents a series of inconsistencies, in which it is hard to determine which is most an object of scorn, the fickleness of his temper, or the depravity of his morals. After resigning his dominions to his brother, the only means of preventing them from becoming a province of France, he repudiated the faithful and virtuous Nicola, in order to marry the

Franconian states, left them at liberty to follow their inclinations in future. Gustavus was accordingly received at Husenberg with every mark of veneration. In songs and acclamations the citizens extolled the benignity of a conqueror, who treated the vanquished with paternal regard. The exuberant fertility of a well-cultivated province filled the camp of Gustavus with abundant supplies, while his natural courtesy augmented daily the number of his admirers, and the popularity of his cause drew recruits by thousands to his standard.*

Having entrusted Horn with the defence of † Franconia, the king hastened to the banks of the Rhine, which were threatened with an incursion from the Spaniards. After liberating them from the impending danger, he flattered himself to experience no insuperable difficulties in reducing the ecclesiastical electorate, the possession of which would necessarily open more extensive resources for the farther prosecution of hostilities. Directing

widow of the Prince of Cantacroix, of whom he had been long enamoured. She too was soon dismissed, and the duchess recalled to be again sent away, that he might renew his connexion with the princess. Her reign, however, proving of short duration, he contracted himself to Isabella, Countess of Poussai, and abandoned her for the daughter of a banker at Nancy. He again espoused, in a moment of compunction, the Princess of Cantacroix upon her death-bed, and concluded his amours by marrying, in his sixty-first year, the Countess of Aspremont, who was only thirteen. The following epitaph is highly descriptive of his follies :

Ci git un pauvre duc sans terre,
Qui fut, jusqu'à ses derniers jours,
Peu fidele dans ses amours,
Et moins fidele dans ses guerres.

Il donna librement sa foi,
Tour à tour à chaque couronne,
Et se fit une étroite loi,
De ne la garder a personne.—Coxe, i. 865.

* Harte, ii. 91.

† With eight thousand men.

his march along the banks of the Mayne, he subjected Steinheim, Aschaffenburg, and Seligenstadt without meeting with the smallest opposition, as the imperial garrisons withdrew at his approach, and even Tilly retreated before him.*

Hanau also was surprised, and proved an acquisition of infinite moment; because it enabled the king to concentrate his forces upon the banks of the Rhine, without fear of molestation from the enemy; and as the greater part of the garrisons in the captured towns usually entered into the Swedish service, his numbers augmented with his conquests.

The imperial city of Francfort, so justly renowned for its commerce and its fairs, was however the principal object which attracted his attention.† Upon his first landing in Germany, he endeavoured, by a clandestine correspondence, to pave the way for an amicable reception, whenever a favourable opportunity should occur. That moment was now arrived, and he accordingly dispatched an officer from Offenbach, requiring a passage for his army. Though secretly disposed to favour the champion of the established church, the mercantile timidity of a commercial senate shuddered at a step so decisive, and zealously petitioned for permission to adhere to that happy state of neutrality from which they had derived such essential advantage, and

* Puffendorf, iii. 36. Swedish Intell. ii. 30.

† The approach of the Swedes put an end to the diet, convened for the purpose of deceiving the protestants, under pretence of terminating all religious disputes. The grand master of the Teutonic Order, who presided over the assembly, was the first to fly, a man equally despicable for violence and timidity, who in the cool moments of reflection had publicly declared, that the only certain method of restoring tranquillity to the empire, would be to massacre every protestant above the age of seven.—*Le Vassor*, x. 54.

which was the only one compatible with their real interests, as a trading and industrious people.

Borrowing from the Scriptures an important maxim, and one highly applicable to political affairs, the Swedish monarch declared, that "he must in future consider all those who were not for him, as being against him." Experience, having instructed him to regard neutrality as the refuge of treachery, he announced his pretensions in a tone of authority which precluded farther prevarication. Great was the terror inspired by the Austrian arms; but the dread of Gustavus was greater still; for they felt with anxiety, that the smallest hesitation might blast in a moment the successful speculations of a century, and destroy all their municipal privileges. It was in vain for the deputies to implore a few days delay, to allow time for consulting the Elector of Mentz, upon whom they were in some measure dependant; it was in vain for them to expatiate upon the danger to which their lucrative traffic and free constitution might eventually be exposed from imperial resentment, in case the current of fortune should vary. This language was unintelligible to the magnanimous sovereign to whom it was addressed; for his liberal mind was unable to comprehend, that the feelings of the heart could be so narrowed by barter and calculation, that men should talk of staples and contracts, and furs and china, when religion and liberty were concerned. He in consequence told them, with honest indignation, that "after finding a way into every fortress between the Baltic and the Mayne, he had little apprehension of being excluded from Franckfort." He farther declared, "that the anxious desire of emancipating Germany from the Austrian yoke, had

solely induced him to unsheath the sword; but having once embarked in the glorious undertaking, he could not sacrifice the interests of the protestant worship to a mistaken delicacy for the prejudices of a people, who contemplated every object through the narrow medium of trade, and not as members of the Christian republic.* Having solemnly protested, that no considerations should induce him to relax in a single demand, the deputies returned to consult their superiors, and were followed by Gustavus to the gates of Saxenhausen, a well-built suburb, connected with Francfort by a magnificent bridge, where, having drawn up his troops in battle array, he awaited the result of their deliberation.†

The hesitation manifested by the senate having proceeded solely from commercial apprehensions, and not from the bias of political attachment, the balance did not remain long in suspense, when summoned to decide between the tyrant and the deliverer of Germany. Besides, they secretly flattered themselves, that the inability to resist, even in the estimation of a despot, might serve to mitigate the guilt of apostacy. The gates were accordingly thrown open, and the Swedish army in triumphal pomp traversed the city, after leaving a garrison in Saxenhausen. Its heroic leader, mounted on a beautiful charger, rode through the streets with his head uncovered, conversing courteously with every order of citizens, who flocked in crowds to behold the splendid procession. He afterwards assisted at a sumptuous banquet prepared by the magistrates for his entertainment; but when requested to occupy a stately apartment in the imperial palace, he de-

* Harte, ii. 93. † Puffendorf, iii. 37. Lotichius, i. 961.

clined the invitation, adding with a smile, "that he never required a more convenient lodging than his pioneers were able to prepare."* The rejection, however, arose from motives more valid than the contempt of parade. The reduction of Höchst was in contemplation; and with such impenetrable secrecy had the plan been conducted, that the town was surprised, and compelled to surrender, before the imperial commanders, who were stationed in the neighbourhood, received any intimation of its danger.

While on the banks of the Mayne, the king was advancing in an uninterrupted career of victory, his generals were employed, with equal success, in completing the conquest of Mecklenberg. Rostock and Wismer, the only fortresses which the imperialists had been able to retain, having surrendered to Todt, were restored to their legitimate sovereign.† Even the ruins of Magdeburg were at length abandoned, when the miserable hovels which disfigured a spot, the once celebrated emporium of trade, were immediately occupied by the Swedes.‡

This sudden revolution in the tide of affairs produced one equally striking in the public opinion. The states of Lower Saxony, by a constitutional vote, provided funds for the equipment of three provincial regiments, to be employed for the defence of the circle. Even George Duke of Luneburg, notwithstanding he had formerly served in the Austrian armies, embraced the cause of the victor,

* Puffendorf, iii. 37. Lotichius, i. 961. Harte, 94.

† Puffendorf, iii. 45.

‡ Khevenhiller, xii. 107.

to whom, by his enterprising courage, he afterwards rendered essential service.*

Meanwhile Tieffenbach and Goetz, to whom Ferdinand had entrusted the defence of Silesia, no sooner heard that the Swedes had directed their march toward the Thuringian forest, than they made a sudden irruption into Electoral Saxony. Pushing eagerly forward into Upper Lusatia, the former made himself master of Bautzen and Zittau, carried terror and desolation to the gates of Dresden. The success of the latter in Lower Lusatia was no less rapid and destructive. Adhering implicitly to the sanguinary tactics of Tilly, he suffered no village to escape unplundered, and even wantonly set fire to many. Fortunately, however, for the industrious peasantry, the inundation was transient; as the Saxons, advancing in conjunction with Banier, compelled both to retire. This unexpected reverse created at Vienna a general alarm for the safety of Bohemia. Ashamed of his folly in having driven the elector into the arms of Gustavus, the emperor resolved to recover his influence at the Saxon court, if bribes or hypocrisy could retrieve his imprudence; and, as a preparatory step to the conciliatory offers which he was preparing to make, he directed his generals to evacuate the electorate, and even to abstain in future from all acts of hostility. But as he would have regarded condescension toward a rebellious vassal (and in that light he treated all the princes of Germany who ventured to resist his authority) as highly derogatory to the paramount dignity of the imperial sceptre, he engaged the Spanish

* Galetti, i. 219.

Puffendorf, iii. 49.

ambassador, then resident at Vienna, to undertake the office of mediator. But as it would have been equally degrading to Castilian pride, to have quitted the splendour of Vienna for an electoral court, the business was entrusted to Colonel Paradeiser, an able and active negociator.

Convinced that it was impossible to justify the behaviour of Ferdinand, the insinuating diplomatist attempted to throw all the odium of the invasion upon the violent temper of Tilly, whom he falsely accused of having entered Saxony without the consent or even knowledge of the emperor. After expatiating upon the regret which that monarch had felt when made acquainted with his general's temerity, he assured John George that all possible reparation should be instantly made, and even offered to give a satisfactory guarantee to the protestants for the unmolested enjoyment of their privileges, both religious and civil. The many advantages which had resulted to the electoral house from the alliance of Ferdinand, were artfully exhibited in the most striking colours, as well as the inconveniences which were likely to occur from adhering to the fortunes of an adventurous stranger, whose rashness had been crowned with transient success, but who, in spite of the capricious favours of fortune, could not long contend, without certain destruction, against the gigantic resources of Austria. These considerations, he said, joined to the ardent wish of restoring tranquillity to the German empire, had induced the King of Spain to offer his mediation. As a preliminary step toward a permanent reconciliation, the elector was requested to state in writing, the various grievances of which he complained, and to nominate a plenipotentiary empowered to negotiate

with the envoy of Ferdinand, in presence of the Spanish ambassador.*

The modest language of Paradeiser contrasted so forcibly with the overweening arrogance of the imperial cabinet, that it was difficult for John George to conceal his indignation at the insult so undisguisedly offered to his understanding. A few minutes reflection, however, enabling him to reply with tolerable calmness, he enumerated the many services which he had rendered to Ferdinand, even at the expense of his own reputation. Rejecting with disdain the contemptible subterfuge by which the court of Vienna attempted to palliate ingratitude, "It was ridiculous," he said, "to suppose that a commander so remarkable for prudence as Tilly, should have ventured to attack the dominions of an ancient ally, without positive instructions from the emperor. Had not the designs of the enemies of the protestant religion been providentially frustrated by the genius of Gustavus, the invasion of Misnia would have been celebrated as a triumph instead of being deplored as a misfortune." He farther declared to Paradeiser that he was grossly mistaken, if he believed him ignorant of the emperor's perfidious designs; as he knew, from unquestionable authority, that a plan had actually been formed, for transferring the electoral bonnets of Saxony and Brandenburg into other families as the rewards of servility, had they not been preserved by the valour of Gustavus. "With respect to the injuries to which he had been subject, they were too notorious," he added, "to need farther illustra-

* Khevenhillier, xi. 1702.

Puffendorf, iii. 50.

tion; neither did the alliance contracted with the King of Sweden require to be justified in the eyes of Europe, since he had been compelled to implore his powerful aid by the ingratitude of Ferdinand, desirous of stripping him of his patrimonial dominions, as a recompense for having placed him upon the imperial throne, and preserved Bohemia from impending destruction. After recovering his independence by the assistance of Sweden, he should deserve to be stigmatized by the contempt of mankind, as the meanest and most unthankful of mortals, were he ever to forget that important obligation." He concluded by expressing his earnest desire for peace, but positively declined to enter into a separate negociation, because it would be no less repugnant to his individual interest, than inconsistent with his political engagements.*

Every hope of accommodation being now laid aside, Arnheim was directed to enter Bohemia; and the forces which he commanded being far superior to those which opposed him, his progress was without interruption. Preceded by a column under the orders of the elder Thurn, he occupied Teschen, Aussig, Reudnitz, and Leitmaritz, where he found abundant magazines both of military stores and provisions.† The oppressive conduct of Ferdinand had so completely alienated the hearts of the Bohemians, that they regarded the Saxons in the light of deliverers. The torrents of blood inhumanly shed after the battle of Prague, and the confiscation of property which accompanied it, had proved insufficient to satiate a tyrant's re-

* Le Vassor, x. 61. Puffendorf, iii. 50. Lotichius, i. 967. Gualdo, i. 67.

† Ibid.

sentment, or to glut the sanguinary zeal of the Jesuits. The system established for the conversion of the Bohemians was scarcely less cruel than that, which had been formerly practised by the bigotry of the Spaniards for the instruction of the native Americans. The same intolerant spirit, which had deluged in blood the states of Montezuma, now laid waste every province of Bohemia. Even a few days previous to the invasion of the Saxons, the fraternity of Jesus had been actively employed in the holy work of proselytism, and had carried their perquisitions into the remotest villages, delivering over to the vindictive fury of an infatuated soldiery all whose delicate consciences, recoiling at the idea of a perpetual miracle, rejected the irrational doctrine of transubstantiation. Aware that such a system was ill calculated to conciliate the minds of a people enthusiastically wedded to the opinions of Huss, the members of the government grew seriously alarmed for their personal safety, as well as for the riches which they had unjustly amassed, and they accordingly omitted neither threats nor intreaties to induce the citizens of Prague to concur with them in defending the city. The treatment which awaited their wives and daughters, from the brutality of an undisciplined army, was represented in colours most likely to alarm the tender fears of husbands and fathers. The facility of defending a fortified town, till Tiefenbach could arrive, was employed as an argument to dispel the apprehensions which mercantile timidity might indulge; while as an additional incentive the danger was magnified which would justly await them from the indignation of Ferdinand, should they attempt to surrender with dastardly

precipitation. But no reasons which subtlety was able to adduce were half so persuasive as the hope of escaping from the shackles of a despot so odious, that they looked forward to every possible change with the confident hope of amelioration.

Balthasar di Marradas the imperial commander was unwilling to take any decisive step without the concurrence of Wallenstein, who, as the reader has seen in a preceding chapter, resided in the capital of Bohemia. Too proud to advise, when destitute of authority to enforce his opinion, Friedland, though assailed by repeated solicitations, declined to interfere, and retired to his estate in Moravia. Indeed by many he was suspected of having invited the Saxons; but if this charge was unfounded, it is certain, at least, that he greatly facilitated the reduction of Prague by his inactivity.

Being left to the guidance of his own discretion, and rendered irresolute by his master's unpopularity, Marradas deemed it expedient to abandon the city, while a passage was open for his escape. His retreat being regarded as a signal for flight, all the members of the government who foresaw that an opportunity would soon be afforded for an exasperated people to avenge the blood of their friends, repeatedly shed under the prostituted forms of legal prosecution, departed in secrecy for Budweis, where they carried the crown and regalia,* and were followed by a numerous train of monks and ecclesiastics, eager to escape from the fury of heretics, justly provoked by the most sanguinary persecution. Of all the religious orders the capuchins alone remained in their pious retreats; for

* Puffendorf, iii. 51. Lotichius, i. 971. Swedish Intell. ii. 202.

they felt secure in the conviction, that when men have nothing to lose, they can have little to fear from a revolution.

As the Saxons advanced, they were astonished at meeting with no opposition, and at finding the capital as free from commotion as in times of profoundest tranquillity. No preparations were made for its defence; not a cannon was fired in defiance. Attracted by curiosity, the burghers, unarmed, walked out in crowds to contemplate a spectacle no less striking than singular; whose cheerful countenances seemed rather to indicate hospitality, than stern and repulsive hostility. From their concurrent testimony the Saxon general first acquired intelligence of the evacuation of the city. An event so unexpected could not fail to excite his suspicion; because, having previously learnt that powerful succours were expected from Silesia, he thought those pacific appearances might be employed as stratagems to allure his army to certain destruction, in case an assault should be rashly attempted. In this state of suspense he accidentally met a confidential domestic, belonging to Wallenstein, and as the general report having received confirmation from his unquestionable veracity, "The city is our own without striking a blow," cried Arnheim, in a transport of joy, and immediately ordered it to be summoned.*

This summons was obeyed with alacrity, as a great majority of the citizens, being secretly attached to the doctrine of the reformers, were delighted at the prospect of changing masters, upon a promise being given that no injury should be offered either

* 1631. Schiller, iii.

to their persons or the property of the inhabitants. The gates were thrown open, and Arnheim entered in triumph.* He was shortly followed by the elector, anxious to gratify his vanity with the homage of a people to whom he had granted his protection, without ever reflecting upon the precariousness of the tenure by which he held his authority. The insolence and severity with which they had exercised power, alarmed the papists with the dread of reprisals; but all their apprehensions were quickly removed by the clemency and moderation of the new government. The catholics, indulged in the uninterrupted enjoyment of their favourite ceremonies, were deprived of no more than four churches, which had formerly belonged to the Lutherans. Of all religious fraternities the Jesuits alone were excepted from the general amnesty; for being justly regarded as the promoters of all the sanguinary edicts for the extirpation of heresy, they received positive injunctions to quit the kingdom without the smallest delay.†

The capture of Prague being followed by that of most of the principal cities, produced a total revolution in the general aspect of affairs. Many of the protestant barons, who had been driven into exile by the intolerance of Ferdinand, recovered their estates. The reinstatement of his adherents afforded Thurn a noble recompense for all his sufferings in vindication of liberty. He now found himself loaded with blessings and honours in the very place where he had formerly been proscribed, and where, had he fallen into the hands of an implacable despot, he would inevitably have perished upon a

* November, 11th.

† Ibid.

scaffold. Indignant at beholding the heads of those, whom he regarded as martyrs in the cause of freedom, exposed on the gates of the city, he ordered them to be buried with funeral pomp in a chapel belonging to the Calixtines. He now took possession of his valuable estates, and magnificent mansion, which had been recently decorated by the vanity of Michna, by whom it was selected as a residence. Neither had the value of the farms in the least deteriorated in the hands of the usurpers; on the contrary, the breed of cattle had been greatly improved by a proper attention to rural economy. The happy change introduced in every department of the government revived the drooping spirits of the protestants, who now repaired to the celebration of the Lutheran rites with an eagerness bordering upon enthusiasm.* Many who had formerly abandoned their religion as the only means of preserving their lives now publicly recanted the errors of a coercive apostacy, to indulge in a worship which their consciences approved, with all the zealous fervour of Neophytes. A revolution so rapid could hardly be effected without sometimes exciting commotions, and we accordingly find that in various districts the people revenged their injuries in the blood of their oppressors.†

The rapid progress of the enemy excited at Vienna a general panic among people of every

* This pleasing picture does not entirely agree with the account given by Pebzel, who accuses the Saxons of having violated the capitulation immediately after it was concluded; and even upbraids the elector with having set the example, by carrying away all the valuable curiosities, and works of art, with which Rodolph II. had enriched the capital of Bohemia, and which filled upwards of fifty waggons.

† Harte, ii. 89, endeavours to palliate those atrocities, which Pebzel openly proclaims. 765.

description, which was augmented by the exaggerated reports continually arriving from the different armies; but when it was publicly known that the imperial treasure had been privately sent into Stiria, the citizens expected every moment to behold the enemy at the gates.

In the public opinion every concurring circumstance seemed clearly to indicate the approaching fall of the Austrian monarchy. A protracted contest had consumed the vigour of the hereditary states, impoverished their resources, and exhausted their numerous population. Those mighty armies, which had formerly spread terror and desolation from the frontiers of Bohemia to the banks of the Rhine, no longer possessed the power of oppression. The splendour of their victories was suddenly eclipsed, the impression of invincibility, which like a magic charm had so materially aided them in the career of conquest, was effaced by the superiority of Swedish discipline. Dispersed, and disheartened, the broken columns were no longer able to extort from the fears of an impoverished nation, those enormous contributions which had supplied materials for oppression by the plunder and exhaustion of its members. Of the numerous allies who had hitherto supported the throne of despotism, a considerable portion had been disarmed, and the fidelity of the remainder was scarcely proof against the rude ordeal of adversity. Even Maximilian of Bavaria, the firmest pillar of the Catholic League, appeared to be wavering between interest and inclination; and it was evident, that if he rejected the neutrality offered him through the mediation of France, it was not from attachment to Austria. The bishops of Bamberg

and Wurtzburg, the Elector of Mentz, and the Duke of Lorraine, were either compelled to abandon their dominions, or trembled for their personal safety. Too feeble to withstand the overwhelming torrent, the Elector of Treves attempted to avert impending ruin by courting the protection of Richelieu; while Hungary was exposed to the incursions of Ragotzy, who with the power of Bethlem Gabor had inherited also his turbulent ambition. A dangerous insurrection had likewise broken out in Upper Austria, where the doctrines of Luther were so deeply rooted, that persecution might increase, but could never extirpate them. Thus, after an almost invariable series of prosperous fortune, Ferdinand was again involved in the same difficulties and dangers, which threatened him with destruction at his accession to the throne; and should Bavaria be tempted to abandon his cause, and France openly declare in favour of Gustavus, the power of Austria might receive a blow from which it would never recover.*

To these formidable evils Ferdinand opposed processions and pilgrimages; flattering himself that ceremonies the most puerile might possess efficacy to alter the divine decree, and render Heaven propitious to tyranny and persecution. To his astonishment, however, he found that neither pilgrimages nor processions could arrest the rapid progress of Gustavus; and his piety was confounded at the unexpected discovery, that the Almighty should favour a heretic. Desirous of propitiating the offended saints, he assembled council after coun-

* Adelzroiter, 271. Schmidt, v. 6. Galetti, i. 252. Khevenhüller, xi. 1918.

cil, consulted monks and civilians, and became more rigid than ever in all his religious duties; but still no miracle was wrought for his protection. His cares were then extended to more laudable objects; the public expenditure was curtailed, his household reduced, and all useless offices were abolished. Embassies were dispatched to stimulate the zeal of his desponding allies, while the Pope was earnestly solicited to contribute to the support of a cause so important to all orthodox Christians.

The bigotry of Spain supplied abundant donations—the piety of Tuscany was scarcely less bountiful;* but when Cardinal Pasman addressed himself to the Pope, instead of generously opening the treasury of St. Peter, Urban complained of the poverty of the apostolical chamber, which he artfully attributed to the unavoidable expenses incurred by the holy see, when the invaders of Mantua extended their depredations beyond the Po, and even threatened the fertile plains of Bologna.

More offended at the manner in which his request was rejected, than affected by the loss of a subsidy, Ferdinand appointed Savelli ambassador extraordinary, with positive injunctions to renew the demand with imposing solemnity, and at the same time to insinuate to his numerous adherents, in the sacred college, the danger which might accrue to the general interests of Christendom from the avarice and indifference of a pontiff, guided en-

* Many wealthy subjects made liberal donatives. Cardinal Dietrichstein subscribed £8000; the Prince of Eggenberg £50,000; Count Michna £16,000, &c. Five regiments were also raised by the Jesuits.—Harte, ii. 100. Swed. Intell. ii. 219. Lotichius, i. 979.

tirely by worldly considerations, and more deeply read in the writings of Tacitus and Machiavel, than in those of the fathers and the evangelists.*

Enlightened and impelled by the love of economy, Urban treated the fears of the imperial plenipotentiary with the contempt of a statesman, who perceived that the emperor was actuated entirely by mundane considerations, while he professed to vindicate the cause of Christianity. The war between Austria and Sweden was represented by Savelli as a contest in which the permanent ascendancy of the rival religions of Rome and Luther must be finally decided. The Pope, on the contrary, affected to treat it as a struggle for temporal power, imputing the distress to which Ferdinand was reduced entirely to his own imprudence, in having listened to the violent counsels of Spain, instead of regulating his conduct by the salutary advice which he had constantly received from the Vatican. "Does the emperor suppose," said the pontiff indignantly, "the treasures of the church to be inexhaustible, that he applies for a subsidy, after having compelled me to expend more than four millions of crowns in order to secure the patrimony of St. Peter against the rapacity of his Croats? I am well acquainted," continued he, "with the artifices employed by the partizans of the League, to persuade the world, that the King of Sweden entertains the impious ambition of extirpating our holy religion; but I am too well acquainted with his real character to give credit to the fallacious report. He is much too sagacious to have formed so desperate a plan, the discovery of which might

* Le Vassor, x. 113.

in a moment cloud his future prospects, and overwhelm a name so deservedly glorious with external infamy. The disasters of Austria are much to be lamented, and I sympathize most sincerely in her misfortunes; but, as they originated solely in the pernicious suggestions of the court of Madrid, the riches of Peru, and not those of the church, ought to extricate the emperor from his distress.*

Having thus vented his fury, and proclaimed his poverty, Urban gravely assured the ambassador, that notwithstanding his exhausted coffers prevented him from affording pecuniary relief, he would willingly give, what might probably be considered by the piety of his master as more efficacious than millions of dollars. By prayers and processions he promised to intercede with Heaven for the success of his arms; to grant him permission to levy a stipulated tax upon all ecclesiastical property within his own dominions, and even to extend his paternal care to the unequivocal length of publishing a general jubilee.†

These concessions, though totally repugnant to rational policy, were so adapted to the prejudices of Ferdinand, that they ceased to be ridiculous, and were only satirical. But as the necessity of his situation required a remedy more active than the pageantries of superstition, to avert the ruin of a monarchy, which had hitherto concealed its internal debility under the splendid delusion of a mighty name, the imperial ministers endeavoured to direct their master's attention to objects more tangible, and actually subject to human control. For German pride, revolting at the idea of acknow-

* Le Vassor, x. 114. Puffendorf, iii. 52.

† Le Vassor, 120.

ledging the superiority of Swedish tactics, was forced to adopt some other solution less mortifying to the feelings of a warlike people; and accordingly attributed the victories of Gustavus to the advantage which he derived from being at liberty to avail himself of every favourable occurrence, without the necessity of applying to superior authority. It was neither to the genius of the monarch, nor to the discipline of his soldiers, that his rapid success was imputable; it arose from a circumstance which tended alike to give harmony to his plans, and rapidity to their execution. It was not in the number or the quality of her troops that Austria was defective; she wanted nothing but a general. The reputation of Tilly was for ever tarnished, and with his reputation he had lost his popularity. Supposing him, however, still to retain the confidence and attachment of the army, it would be little less than insanity to confide the destiny of Austria to the fidelity of a commander so blindly devoted to Bavaria, that he never ventured to move without consulting Maximilian. For these reasons it was expedient to remove him from a station, to the laborious duties of which he was rendered incompetent by the pressure of years; and to select a successor possessing sagacity, courage, and activity, sufficient to contend against the modern Attila, and who would be exclusively attached to the imperial family by the triple tie of gratitude, affection, and interest.*

These arguments were so striking, that in the enthusiasm of the moment Ferdinand proposed to head his armies in person, hoping, by his presence,

* Puffendorf, iii. 52.

to kindle in the bosoms of other men the same ardent courage with which his own was inflamed; but, with the transient fervour of a heated imagination this rash project evaporated, to make way for counsels less fraught with peril. That scheme being relinquished, the Spanish cabal, grown more powerful than ever since the marriage of the infant with the King of Hungary,* suggested that no measure was so likely to restore courage and confidence to the disheartened troops, as to place them under the command of their future sovereign, already conspicuous for strength of mind, a cultivated understanding, and a soul undaunted by danger. Called by his illustrious birth to the protection of kingdoms, two of whose crowns he already wore, the sight of a prince, so deservedly cherished for his talents and virtues, would give vigour and animation to every enterprize, and extinguish at once that fatal jealousy, which had rendered the wisest projects abortive. It might indeed be objected, that Ferdinand III. was as yet a novice in the science of war, that he wanted maturity of judgment, and was totally unacquainted with active service. These, however, they said, were defects which must daily diminish, and might be totally obviated by a prudent selection of military advisers, who under cover of his authority might direct the operations of the different armies; and, while they guided his inexperience, might restrain his impetuosity.†

However urgent the motive alleged by the secret partizans of Spain in support of their opinion, various causes combined to prevent its adoption;

* Ferdinand's eldest son.

† Gualdo, i. 55. Puffendorf, iii. 52. Le Vassor, x. 64. Galetti, i. 256.

and it is probable, that the jealousy entertained by a despot toward his successor, was by no means the least preponderant. The hazard of confiding the fate of Austria to a prince destitute of experience in military affairs, was forcibly painted by the numerous friends, who still adhered to the fortunes of Wallenstein. Neither was the expense incidental to a royal establishment a trifling objection in the impoverished state of the imperial finances; because those sums might be more profitably expended, in procuring troops to replenish the chasms occasioned in every regiment by the rashness of Tilly. The imprudence of exposing the presumptive heir of so many crowns to the perils of war, afforded additional matter for animadversion. Even supposing the King of Hungary to be actually endowed with every brilliant quality which his fondest admirers could desire, still a most important consideration remained; because it was not only necessary to provide a commander, but an army was also required. Since the Duke of Friedland's deposition, the imperial generals had acted without concord and energy. No undertaking had prospered, as if Providence had intended to make the emperor sensible of his error. Since that unfortunate period Ferdinand had been reduced to the degrading necessity of depending chiefly upon the activity of his allies, instead of dictating laws with uncontrolled authority to all the members of the Germanic constitution. To extricate him from a situation no less disgraceful than dangerous, a powerful army was wanting; but where were the resources to be found? * One man only was en-

* The distress of Ferdinand is thus eloquently painted by Pietro Pomo:

dowed with talents adequate to contend against the northern conqueror; one man only was qualified to surmount every obstacle by the transcendent powers of his genius; but that man had been, unfortunately, driven from the service with marks of indignity, which it was hardly possible for a mind, so feelingly alive to the most romantic sentiments of honour, to consign to lasting oblivion.

These arguments were calculated to make a strong impression both upon the heart and the understanding of Ferdinand. Yet, notwithstanding he was ready to acknowledge his indiscretion, in having deprived himself of the services of Wallenstein, he hesitated to take the only step which appeared likely to retrieve his affairs. Pride revolted at the thought of gratuitously exposing the imperial dignity to the disgrace of a refusal: neither was he totally insensible to the artful insinuations of the Spanish faction, who endeavoured to alarm his suspicious temper by a thousand chimeras. Friedland's haughty character, they said, had alienated the affections of the whole German people, and was supremely odious to the electors; it could not be expected, therefore, that the Duke of Bavaria would patiently endure the exaltation of a man, no less remarkable for the unbending arrogance of his disposition, and the implacable violence of his resentments, than for the extent and splendour of his mental endowments. The friendship of Maximilian was too valuable to be slighted; because, if seriously offended, his correspondence with France, which hitherto had been confined to secondary objects,

“ L'erario esausto, le provincie distrutte, gl'amiei sospetti, i sudditi disleali, angustie d'ogn' intorno, è difficoltà,” 51.

might terminate in a definitive treaty. They farther contended, that it would be highly imprudent to commit the destinies of Austria to the integrity of a man who had been so grievously offended, and whose recent behaviour was of a nature to excite the strongest suspicion of his being actually engaged in a traitorous correspondence with the Saxons, and even of having excited them to undertake the invasion of Bohemia.*

Wallenstein, who was minutely informed of every thing that passed in the imperial cabinet, perceived that the moment was at length arrived for gratifying his pride and his resentment. Fortune had avenged his wrongs by a series of disasters, which progressively assailed the Austrian monarchy with continually accumulating disgrace. Removed at a distance from the splendid theatre, where riches and renown were the rewards of success, his haughty soul contemplated with sullen delight the downfall of an edifice which he had contributed to raise, but which he was no longer permitted to support; while under the pompous display of theatrical dignity, he studiously concealed the desperate designs which he revolved in his distempered imagination. Though a prey to the torments of disappointed ambition, and burning with impatience for the delightful period, when the humiliation of an ungrateful master might afford him ample revenge, he affected the utmost indifference for all political transactions, declaring, that he had never enjoyed substantial happiness, till he tasted the charms of domestic retirement. All the favours conferred by the imperial court, exalted rank, unbounded wealth, and even

* Galetti, i. 256. Schiller, iii.

the splendour of a ducal crown, when weighed in the scale of vanity, were regarded as recompenses inadequate to his deserts ; while his important services presented themselves, through the delusive medium of pride, under forms of gigantic magnitude. The unmerited treatment which he had received from Ferdinand cancelled all former obligations, and rendered retaliation a paramount duty. Occupied incessantly with the chimeras of a waking dream, and believing every thing attainable by perseverance and courage, his enthusiastic fancy was neither dismayed nor astonished by the vastness of a conception, but indulged itself in fabricating plans so extravagant, that they might have been mistaken for the visions of frenzy.

The unbridled authority which he had formerly exercised at the head of the Austrian armies proved sufficient to content his most inordinate wishes ; because, while he was suffered to trample upon all the princes of the empire, he totally forgot that there existed a superior, whose mandate he was bound to obey, till the blow inflicted by the diet of Ratisbonne dispelled the flattering vision, and awakened him to a sense of dependance. While possessed of power, scarcely inferior to that of the emperor, he consecrated his sword to the sustentation of despotism, satisfied with the honour (or rather the infamy) of occupying the most distinguished place among its numerous champions. But no sooner did he feel the sting, which he had so often inflicted upon others, than contemplating tyranny with the indignation of a patriot, he secretly resolved to overturn the idol, whose motions he was no longer permitted to direct.*

With a mind unalterably bent upon revenge, he no sooner heard of the victorious progress of Gustavus, than he earnestly strove to obtain his esteem, and employed Thurn as an agent in that intricate negociation. Through him he assured the king, that if would detach fifteen thousand troops into Bohemia, he (Wallenstein) would raise an equal number at his own expense; and, putting himself at the head of the united force, would engage, in the course of a single campaign, to wrest that kingdom, together with Moravia, from the dominion of Austria, and even to drive the emperor out of Germany. In return, he asked to retain, during life, the ducal title of Mecklenburg, in addition to his Bohemian estates; and farther, required the King of Sweden to guarantee to him the uninterrupted possession of all the territories which he might eventually subjugate in the prosecution of hostilities.*

Undazzled by the brilliancy of an offer, by which, if successful, Austria would have been degraded to the rank of a secondary power, Gustavus proceeded with his wonted caution; and, in spite of the intreaties and protestations of Thurn, continued equally to question the practicability of the enterprise and the sincerity of its author. Unwilling, however, irreparably to offend the implacable duke, he confined himself to expressing, in general terms, the high admiration which his talents inspired, assuring him, that he should be happy, upon all occasions, to contribute to his aggrandisement.† Delighted at a message, which was merely complimentary, Wallenstein repeated the offer after the

* Khevenhiller, xii. 1110. Schmidt, v. 6.

† Ibid.

battle of Leipsic ; when he discovered, to his disappointment, that the wary conqueror was too prudent to confide in the fidelity of a person, who courted his alliance by proclaiming himself a traitor. But, as Gustavus was desirous of continuing upon terms of friendship with a man, whose talents he admired, though possibly without duly appreciating them, he endeavoured to soften the refusal by studied apologies, expressing much regret that the losses which he had sustained would not allow of his detaching more than two regiments. It must be acknowledged, that the king seems entirely to have mistaken the character of Wallenstein, and to have regarded him in the light of a desperate adventurer, rash enough to set fame and fortune on every throw, and constantly indulging in chimerical projects, which he wanted resources, and perhaps inclination, to realize. Convinced of his error, he attempted in vain to renew the correspondence ; the decisive moment had been suffered to escape, and Friedland's pride was too deeply wounded for him ever to forget, or even to pardon, the indifference with which he had been treated.*

Though frustrated in his expectations of support from Sweden, Wallenstein could not relinquish his schemes of revenge ; but turned towards Saxony, whose assistance might afford the two-fold gratification of punishing both Gustavus and Ferdinand. It appears, indeed, that his correspondence with Arnheim had never been interrupted, and the knowledge which he possessed of the elector's character left little doubt on his mind that he would catch, with eagerness, at any proposal which tended to li-

* Khevenhiller, xii. 1110. Schmidt, v. 6.

berate him from every engagement which necessity had compelled him to contract. After detaching John George from his connexion with Sweden, he foresaw the possibility of forming an independent party in Germany, whose proceedings he doubted not to be able to guide by the preponderating influence of genius.

Specious, however, as this project appeared, an army was required for its execution devoted to its commander with obsequious attachment, and ready to support him against every competitor: but how was it possible to assemble such an army, without exciting suspicions of disaffection? No hope, therefore, presented itself, of ultimate success, unless he should once more be placed at the head of the Austrian forces, and commissioned to recruit for the imperial service. Pride, however, forbade him to solicit the appointment; because, independently of the humiliation to which it would expose him, he could never expect voluntarily to be invested with that unlimited authority, which appeared essential to the accomplishment of his vast designs. Fully satisfied that nothing, except the extremest peril, would overcome the emperor's scruples, or induce Spain and Bavaria to consent to his elevation, he resolved, by secretly favouring the projects of the enemy, to augment the embarrassment of Ferdinand. Hence there is great reason for believing, that the invasion of Bohemia, by the Saxons, was undertaken with his approbation, if not at his request. It was also generally supposed, that in an interview with Arnheim, at the castle of Kautitz, he explained to his friend the extent of his projects, and even traced out a plan for their attain-

ment.* Meanwhile, his partisans were employed at Vienna in expatiating upon every topic most likely to irritate the public feelings, or to add to the general consternation; not forgetting to dwell upon the incapacity of the commanders, and the imprudence of Ferdinand, in displacing a hero, to whose triumphant car victory had been inseparably chained. "Had the Duke of Friedland continued at the head of our armies, these disasters would never have happened," exclaimed the credulous populace in every street; and their remarks were repeated with venal exaggeration by the courtiers in the imperial palace.

No artifices, however, were any longer required, to make the emperor sensible of his error; because repeated defeats had illustrated his folly in language too plain to be mistaken. Neither did it require much rhetoric to convince him, that Wallenstein was the only person capable of repairing his misfortunes. The enormous riches which he possessed, the rapidity with which he had formerly assembled an army, supported entirely by his own resources, without ever recurring to the imperial treasury, and the zeal with which he vindicated, upon every occasion, the honour and dignity of the imperial crown, had made a lasting impression upon Ferdinand. Yet still the struggle between pride and interest was highly painful; and it required no inconsiderable share of magnanimity, for a monarch educated in all the lofty prejudices of the court of Madrid, so far to subdue his natural character, as to supplicate the assistance of an offended subject. Yet, notwithstanding

* Gualdo, i. 91. Schmidt, v. 6.

the opposition of the Spanish ambassador, and the dread of displeasing Maximilian, Ferdinand yielded at length to the suggestions of reason, and empowered Wallenstein's friends to negotiate for his return.

Thoroughly acquainted with all the transactions of the Austrian cabinet, the Duke of Friedland resolved to satiate his inordinate pride. The hour of retribution, after which he had long and ineffectually panted, was now arrived, and his imperious soul exulted at the prospect of asserting the well-founded superiority of genius over the accidental distinctions of birth and fortune. He accordingly received with affected indifference the first proposals which were brought by his cousin, Maximilian Wallenstein, whom Ferdinand had selected as a person most acceptable to his illustrious relative, and supposed to be honoured with his unlimited confidence.

With preconcerted eloquence, Friedland expatiated upon the delights of retirement, protesting that, till he had relinquished all political occupations, he had been a stranger to real felicity. To his enemies, he said, he felt greatly indebted, because they had taught him to value the only blessings which can alleviate the burthen of life; for without their malicious attack, he should never have tasted the pleasures of independence, and those refined gratifications which a cultivated understanding must ever derive from consecrating superfluous riches to the improvement of agriculture, the patronage of the arts, and the encouragement of genius in all its ardent and various pursuits. These tranquil enjoyments induced him to look down with merited contempt on the phantom glory, which he had formerly worshipped with almost idolatrous

devotion. Fortunately, however, he had discovered his error before it was too late to relieve it; and he solemnly protested, that nothing should tempt him, during the remaining period of life, to sacrifice tranquillity to popular admiration, or, what was still more precarious, to royal favour. For these reasons he declined, though with the strongest expressions of gratitude and respect, an invitation from Ferdinand to Vienna; but, after much persuasion, he consented to remove to Znaim, in Moravia, that he might receive the emperor's orders more expeditiously.*

Questenberg and Wertemberg, who had formerly been chosen to convey the intelligence of his disgrace, were now selected for the more welcome office of appeasing the implacable temper of Wallenstein. The humiliation of Ferdinand, however, was so gratifying to his vanity, that all their solicitations were unavailing. Neither was the authority offered him sufficiently extensive to satisfy his unbounded ambition. The ill-judging jealousy of the imperial ministers had nearly frustrated the negotiation at its commencement; for though they could not but know that his haughty spirit would disdain the idea of subordination, they imprudently attempted to control his power, by proposing, that the heir of the Austrian monarchy should be permitted to study the science of war under a master of such consummate ability. Indignant at a scheme, of which he instantly penetrated the real motive, he declared his resolution never to accept of a divided command. "Do not suppose," said he, unable to check the impetuosity of his temper,

* Galetti, i. 256. Harte, ii. 102. Le Vassor, x. 66. Burgus, 280.

“that I am so easily deceived. Is the emperor still such a stranger to my character, that he can believe me capable of degrading my honour? Can he suppose, that I will suffer another to enjoy the fame of victories, the result of my combinations and fatigues? If such be his opinion, he mistakes me strangely. No; were the Almighty Ruler of the universe to descend from heaven to command an army, the Duke of Friedland would scorn to become his lieutenant.”

This haughty reply convincing Ferdinand that Wallenstein's services were to be purchased only by the most humiliating concessions, he instantly dispatched his confidential minister, with permission to subscribe to any conditions, not totally inconsistent with the imperial dignity: the long intimacy which had subsisted between Eggenberg and Friedland gave additional weight to his endeavours. Yet notwithstanding he alternately chided and caressed; now extolled the transcendent talents of his friend with exaggerated commendation, now censuring his obstinacy for refusing to shield his expiring country from absolute ruin, and even condescended to humble the imperial sceptre at the feet of a Bohemian baron, Wallenstein still continued inexorable. With truth Eggenberg protested, that notwithstanding appearances, Ferdinand had never ceased to regard him as the champion and the ornament of Germany; and of this favourable opinion he actually gave him the most unequivocal proof, in wishing to confide the safety of the empire to his superior genius. “It would,” continued he, with increasing animation, “be a sacrifice truly worthy of a soul that emulates the splendour of Roman magnanimity, to immolate re-

sentment at the shrine of patriotism. It is by the lustre of his actions that the Duke of Friedland ought to silence the imputations of calumny. A victory like this over offended pride is the brightest triumph which a hero can obtain, and is the only thing wanting to transmit the name of Wallenstein to the latest posterity, with unrivalled glory, as the saviour of Germany.*

These humiliating condescensions appearing an ample atonement for every injury, the indignant chieftain ultimately yielded with affected reluctance to the pressing solicitations of his friend. Too artful, however, to extricate an ungrateful master from all his embarrassments, by an act of unqualified generosity, he acceded only in part to the emperor's request; in order, by apparent indecision, to enhance the value of the service, which still remained to be performed. He accordingly signified his determination to accept the command for the short period of three months, during which he undertook to raise, and to organize an army; but positively refused to charge himself with the direction of any military operations, or even to receive the smallest recompense for his exertions; desiring that the enormous salary destined for his remuneration might be appropriated to warlike preparations.

The minister of Ferdinand was so entirely satisfied that his friend's resolution was not to be shaken, that he desisted from farther persuasion, and returned to Vienna to communicate to the emperor the result of the negociation. But that prince's condition was now so desperate, that he regarded

* Schmidt, v. 6.

even the momentary acquisition of Wallenstein's services as an object of serious triumph.

Such indeed to Wallenstein it proved in reality ; and he now looked forward with confidence to the speedy accomplishment of his most chimerical wishes. By the formation of an army, strong enough to cope with the northern conqueror, he flattered himself to display to the astonished world the magnitude of his resources, and to convince mankind that the preservation of the Austrian monarchy depended upon the caprice of a subject. He was perfectly certain that an army, created by the magical influence of his own popularity, could be kept together by no power less impulsive than that by which it was originally organized ; and he felt that the consciousness of this important secret must necessarily constrain the emperor to subscribe implicitly to every condition which his vanity might hereafter exact.*

Elated at contemplating the unbounded prospect which opened to his ambition, Friedland exerted all the energies of his active mind to realize a promise, which to the generality of mankind appeared unattainable, and which even Gustavus ridiculed as fantastic. The machinery of the undertaking however had been long prepared, and nothing was required except to set the different wheels in motion. No sooner was it known that Wallenstein had resumed the command, than officers of experience came flocking in crowds from the remotest provinces, to seek fame and fortune under so renowned a leader. Many of them had partaken in his former victories, and knew from experience

* 1631. Schmidt, v. 6.

Galetti, i. 257.

that if he punished misconduct with more than Roman severity, he recompensed merit with at least equal profusion. Delighted at finding himself still an object of admiration to his ancient companions in glory, he received with benignity their offers of service, recalled to their recollection a thousand dangers which they had shared together, spoke with enthusiasm of various actions in which their valour or intelligence had been displayed, and even won them for ever by the magnificence of his promises, of which he was no less liberal than of his praises. The poor he assisted with presents, the rich he encouraged by the hope of renown, thus engaging many to levy regiments at their own expense, upon the assurance of obtaining the command. In the appointment of officers, he wisely abolished all sectarian distinctions, inquiring only into the talents of those who sought promotion, without attending to their religious opinions. By augmenting the pay of the common soldiers, he enticed thousands to his standard, who preferred the rapid emoluments of plunder to the tardy returns of husbandry, rendered still more precarious by martial visitations.* Convinced that nothing could be effected of permanent utility without the most absolute devotion from all his followers, he threw aside that unsocial and forbidding austerity, which, though it created respect, could never inspire affection; conversing with the officers in a

* Schildknecht, who served as an engineer in the Swedish army, in his ingenious treatise upon Fortification informs us, that the following expeditious method was employed by Wallenstein's officers for raising recruits. "Ils entroient chez les particuliers, et mettoient sur une table de l'argent et une corde, on n'avoit que la choix, ou de prendre parti, ou de se faire pendre."—Francheville Tableau Militaire. 249.

tone of familiarity more captivating from its being unusual.*

Neither was he less actively occupied in various negotiations with foreign powers for procuring assistance in men and in money. From the Duke of Lorraine he received the strongest assurance of speedy and efficacious support, procured a considerable reinforcement of cossacs from Poland, and collected arms and ammunition from Italy. Before three months were expired, forty thousand men were actually assembled in Moravia,† provided abundantly with military stores, and panting for the signal of glory.

During the eventful period which this enterprising chieftain had allotted for the regeneration of the Austrian forces, his bosom was torn by every tumultuous passion which follows in the train of ambition. At one moment he contemplated the arduous undertaking with the despondency of superstition, alarmed by some sinister occurrence, which credulity treated as ominous; but if Seni encouraged him by the cheering assurance that the constellations announced a propitious result, he anticipated with rapture the delightful moment, when he should be enabled to hurl defiance against all his enemies from the throne of Bohemia.

‡ The promises of Wallenstein having been com-

* *Sarrasin Conspiracy de Valstein*, 99. This entertaining production has been treated by Harte in the light of a romance, but I can discover no greater reason to question its authenticity than that of the *Catilinarian conspiracy* so beautifully described by Sallust.

† Gallas was second in command, and under him served Monteuculi, Tieffenbach, Balthazar di Marradas, Holk, Tertzky, Piccolomini, and Isolani.—Harte, ii. 105.

‡ Though Wallenstein was not invested with the supreme command till the following spring (1632), yet I am unwilling to sacrifice the advantages of connexion even to chronological precision.

pletely realized before the period allotted for his retirement, he intreated the emperor to name a commander, into whose hands he might resign the authority. He was however fully aware, that in making the offer, he ran no risk of its being accepted; for so devotedly was the army attached to its leader, that the moment it had been deprived of the vivifying influence of that extraordinary man, to whose exertions it owed its existence, it would have disappeared like a magical phantom. Scarcely an officer could be found upon whose affections he had not a powerful hold, either by the grateful recollection of former favours, or the still firmer bond of recent obligations. Many of the regiments were commanded by his relations, or dependents; the most confidential of whom were entrusted with the superintendence of several battalions, upon the plausible pretexts of reducing expense, and of training the recruits with greater facility.*

No sooner however was his inclination for retirement made known at Vienna, than the ambassadors of Spain and Bavaria exhorted the emperor to accept his resignation; the former with a view of placing at the head of the Austrian armies a prince whom, by the influence of an amiable consort, they accepted implicitly to govern; while the latter was actuated by the dread of being exposed to the resentment of an all-powerful rival. This advice was supported by various arguments, which it is unnecessary now to repeat, because they differed in no material point from those employed by the enemies of Wallenstein in order to prevent his recal.

* Sarrasin, 99.

No reasons however were capable of producing the smallest effect, when opposed to the torrent, which threatened to overwhelm the Austrian monarchy, and to sap the foundations of the orthodox church. Such at least it appeared to the desponding emperor, who justly attributed the opposition of Maximilian to interested motives; persuaded that the elector would willingly hazard the existence of the imperial crown, provided the sacrifice was likely to conduce to the preservation of his personal authority. An intercepted letter is supposed to have fallen into Ferdinand's hands, from which it clearly appeared, that a negociation was carrying on between Sweden and Bavaria; and this discovery excited a suspicion, that the principal motive which impelled the latter to oppose the reinstatement of Wallenstein, was the apprehension that the vigilance of a wary politician might create additional obstacles to his treachery.

Convinced that nothing short of the extremest distress could have tempted Ferdinand to restore him to power, and no less satisfied that the moment the storm should be dissipated he would be immolated to the jealousy of his enemies, Friedland determined to profit by the favourable conjuncture, and establish his authority upon a foundation so solid, that it might set envy and ingratitude at defiance. Adhering pertinaciously to this resolution, he rejected every overture successively made, till the humiliated emperor was reduced to the necessity of granting every demand, however extravagant, which the presumption of Wallenstein imposed. Thinking nothing too degrading to pacify the hero on whom the safety of his dominions depended, Ferdinand sent a deputation to Znaim.

At the head of the mission was placed the Prince of Eggenberg, accompanied by the metropolitan of Austria, a respectable prelate, and by Chiroga, a Spanish capuchin of insinuating manners, an intriguing character, and eminently gifted with the versatile talents of a negociator.

The same farce that had been acted during the former conference was repeated with still greater affectation, till Eggenberg's patience being completely exhausted, he warned him of the danger to which his obstinacy might expose him. "The emperor," he said "had offered every atonement, which the most delicate honour could require; and should he find his concessions treated with disdain, a due regard for the dignity of the imperial crown might compel to adopt a different system, in order to convince the world that he was not unable to punish, though he greatly preferred to reward."*

Wallenstein, whose extensive estates were for the most part situated in the Austrian provinces, was fully aware that the menace might easily be carried into execution. It was not however to fear that he yielded, but to the certain conviction, that the terror inspired by the victories of Gustavus had effaced every scruple from the bosom of Ferdinand.

In order to preclude the possibility of future misunderstanding, Eggenberg requested his friend to specify his pretensions in writing, assuring him that the emperor would readily accede to any proposals which might appear essential to his future

* Schiller, iii. *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 468.

security. Studious to avoid the imputation of premeditated presumption, Wallenstein demanded a day for reflection, at the expiration of which he delivered a paper to the following purport :

In the first place, he required the most unlimited authority over all the troops employed in Germany, of whatever nation they might be composed, together with the amplest power to punish, or remunerate, without ever becoming responsible for his actions. He positively insisted, that neither the emperor, nor the King of Hungary, should visit the army, nor in any way interfere with his military arrangements ; and that the former should engage neither to pardon an offence, to bestow a gratification, nor even to fill up a vacancy, without having previously obtained his consent. As a remuneration for his services, he claimed the reversion of some Austrian principality, as well as the entire disposal of all the confiscated property, with full permission to appropriate to his private emoluments the territories which he expected to conquer, without being subject to the jurisdiction of the aulic council, or of any other tribunal whatsoever. He farther demanded a solemn promise, that peace should never be concluded without his approbation ; that his own re-establishment in the duchy of Mecklenberg should be made an indispensable article in the treaty ; that every requisition he might make for pecuniary supplies should be instantly complied with ; and that, in case of necessity, the hereditary dominions of Austria should be open to his retreat.*

* Schimdt, v. 6. Galetti, i. 259. Puffendorf, iii. 52. Swed. Intell. i. 325. Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 469. Theatr. Europ. ii. 597. Burgus, 284. Pietro Pomo, 52. Siri. Mem. Recond, vii. 454.

In vain did the negotiators endeavour to mitigate these exorbitant terms, which they knew, if acceded to, would create an authority no less absolute than that which, in moments of imminent peril, the Romans invested a dictator. To all their arguments, however, he contented himself with opposing the difficulties of his own situation, and the danger which threatened his country. Decision and vigour, he said, were essentially requisite for the preservation of the empire; and how could either be expected, unless the authority of the commander should be uncontrolled. Should the King of Hungary be allowed to join the army, it would be totally inconsistent with his exalted rank to fill any, except the highest station; and to entrust an inexperienced youth with the conduct of the war, would be no less inconsistent with prudence. The absolute disposal of all confiscated property, as well as the power to punish, or reward, was equally essential to future success. The emperor might, otherwise, be misled by artful suggestions, to pardon transgressions which admitted not of extenuation, or to leave meritorious service unrequited; thus paralyzing the operations of hope and fear—those powerful incitements to heroic exertion. Few men, he contended, were induced to submit to the fatigues and privations of a military life from the love of glory alone; on the contrary, avarice and ambition were the ordinary motives which impelled them to sacrifice their health, their comforts, and even their existence, in the pursuit of riches and power. By constantly presenting to their dazzled imaginations wealth and honours, as the rewards of exertion, they were rendered capable of the most hazardous enterprizes; while the

assurance, that a speedy and ignominious death would be the inevitable consequence of indiscipline, and disobedience, prevented them from becoming robbers and assassins.

These reasons were plausible; but had they even been destitute of all appearance of speciousness, the agents of Ferdinand would have been equally constrained to submit without farther hesitation.

Notwithstanding the emperor was tempted to ratify this preposterous treaty, it is probable that his imperious temper never cordially pardoned the bitter humiliation attending it, though he concealed his resentment with studied composure beneath the insidious veil of hypocrisy. In every province of his extensive dominions public prayers and processions were solemnly enjoined for the purpose of propitiating Heaven, and drawing down its benediction upon the efforts of a warrior, whose success would have proved the destruction of Austria.* Too enlightened to believe that the sluggish virtues of a monk can be grateful to a Being, who destined the first and noblest of his creatures to the highest attainments by industry and perseverance, Wallenstein resolved to merit the favour of Providence by proceedings more rational than the pageantries of Rome; convinced that they only are likely to be crowned with laurels, who deserve them by the sagacity with which their expeditions are planned, and by the energy with which they are executed.

Though the pride of Spain was deeply offended

* Ipse (Ferdinandus) aliorum exemplo, intecto capite, pede, pia majestate supplicationibus adesse, templa visitare, sacris concionibus, ecclesiasticisque omnibus functionibus interesse.—Burgus, 286.

at beholding the paramount dignity of the imperial diadem prostrated before the footstool of arrogance; yet, being utterly incapable of providing a remedy against the impending danger, she prudently chose to make a merit of necessity, and accordingly sent the golden fleece as a token of profound veneration for the man, whom she would with pleasure have followed to the scaffold.

The appointment of the Duke of Friedland, like a magic spell, revived the drooping spirits of the soldiers; and his name in a moment became so popular, that even his vices were idolized, while the singularity of his character was regarded as a symptom of superior wisdom;* so true it is that eccentricity, by vulgar understandings, is almost always mistaken for genius.

* Sarrasin, 106. Khevenhiller, xii. 13. Schiller, iii.

CHAP. XIV.

Tilly, unable to face the Swedes, avails himself of their absence to plunder the Margraviate of Anspach; besieges Nuremberg, but is repulsed.—Progress of Gustavus in the Palatinate: he passes the Rhine in face of the Spanish army, and reduces all the contiguous fortresses; enters Mentz in triumph, where he establishes his head quarters, and renders it the centre of all political negociations.—Intrigues of the catholics to excite the jealousy of Louis XIII. frustrated by the ascendancy of Richelieu.—Gustavus proposes an interview with the King of France.—Negociations respecting the neutrality of Bavaria.—Ferdinand attempts a reconciliation with Saxony; and endeavours by flattery to prevent Maximilian from accepting the offers of Louis.—Gustavus receives the Elector Palatine with the greatest kindness and attention.—Banier gets possession of Magdeburg.—The King of Sweden enters at Nuremberg in triumph, and prepares for the invasion of Bavaria, whither Tilly had retired; takes Donauwerth, and advances to the Lech, where, finding the imperialists strongly posted, with a determination to oppose him, he forces a passage, after a sanguinary conflict, in which Tilly is slain.—Maximilian flies to Ingolstadt, where he is besieged by the Swedes. The French ambassador interposes in his favour.—Spirited reply of Gustavus to Charnace. He enters Munich. His magnanimous behaviour when solicited to burn that wealthy city in retaliation for the destruction of Magdeburg. His brilliant position when compelled to march against Wallenstein.

THE acquisition of Francfort, without the necessity of firing a single cannon, produced compliments and congratulations from every quarter. These, however, were not always dictated by honest admiration; because the rapid progress of Gustavus had already created a serious alarm, even among those who possessed for him the warmest attachment. These princes of Hesse were impelled to worship the rising sun from opposite motives. William Landgrave of Cassel, a steady friend to civil and religious toleration, spoke the

language of truth when he offered up his prayers for the prosperity of Sweden; nor did he confine himself exclusively to barren vows; for he not only conducted a powerful reinforcement* to the camp of Gustavus, but contributed personally to the humiliation of Ferdinand, by reducing Minden, Göttingen, and Vacca. George, Landgrave of Damstadt, was of a different character. Notwithstanding his birth and education had rendered him adverse to the errors of popery, he secretly adhered to the Austrian interest, though he concealed his duplicity under the mask of patriotism, deluding the protestants with pacific overtures, and even with proposals for assembling a general congress, in which he offered to assume the office of mediator. Gustavus, who was thoroughly acquainted with his principles, received his professions with studied indifference; nor did he hesitate to tell him, that it would have been far more consistent with the dignity of an independent sovereign, to have united with the confederacy of Leipsic, instead of suffering himself to be diverted from the path of honour by the illusory promises of Ferdinand. In consideration, however, of his having espoused the daughter of the Elector of Saxony, he consented at length to his remaining neuter; and even dispensed with the payment of any military contribution, though he positively insisted, that a Swedish garrison should occupy the castle of Russelheim.†

Meanwhile Tilly exhausted his rage and disappointment in laying waste the Margraviate of Ans-

* According to Harte it amounted to 6,000 infantry, and nearly half that number of cavalry. ii. 96.

† 1631. Swed. Intell. ii. 40. Harte, ii. 96.

pach. Not satisfied with plundering the retreats of industry, the bigoted barbarian extended his profanation to the venerable mansions of the dead; the magnificent sepulchres, where the reigning family slept for generations, were inhumanly stripped of every tributary decoration, which pride or piety, or filial affection, had consecrated to the memory of their illustrious progenitors.

The misunderstanding, which had arisen between the generalissimo and Pappenheim, in consequence of the battle of Leipsic, made it impossible for them any more to act with concert. The latter, therefore, was sent with a separate command to oppose the Swedes in Westphalia, while the former attempted to draw Gustavus from the banks of the Rhine, by undertaking the siege of Nuremberg. To a summons to surrender, however, the governor replied by a general discharge of artillery. Convinced that it would be difficult to intimidate a man of so decided a character, and unwilling a second time to contend with Gustavus, who was actually on his march to Franconia, the imperial general thought fit to retire to the frontiers of Bohemia, under pretext of allowing his harassed troops a little repose.*

Being now delivered from all apprehensions on the side of the imperialists, the King of Sweden crossed the Mayne, and in a short time reduced that romantic tract of cultivated mountains, which is known in Germany by the appellation of Bergstrass, and which extends with little interruption from Darmstadt to Heidelberg. Before he ventured

to besiege the latter city, he deemed it essential to his future security to make himself master of Oppenheim; because, by affording a retreat to the Spanish forces, it enabled them to molest his operations. Previously, however, to commencing the siege, it was necessary for him to cross the Rhine; an enterprise not easily accomplished, as all the vessels in the vicinity had been destroyed by the enemy, who were strongly posted on the opposite bank, with the firm determination of disputing the passage. Hurried on by an impetuosity of temper, which too often disdained the control of prudence, he crossed the river in a little boat, in order to inspect the position of the enemy with greater precision; but scarcely had he landed, when he was suddenly attacked by a party of Spanish horse, from whom he escaped with the greatest difficulty. At length, however, by unremitting perseverance, he succeeded in procuring a couple of barges, capable of containing three hundred soldiers. Aware of his intention, the Spanish general permitted them to land without molestation,* and then assailed them with superior force; but, contrary to his expectation, this chosen band resisted the efforts of his heavy cavalry with such undaunted bravery, that they maintained their position till the king had time to arrive to their assistance. The passage of the Rhine, effected without the smallest loss, while it gave additional lustre to the Swedish arms, overwhelmed the imperialists with consternation.†

* A marble lion, with a casque on its head, and a naked sword in its right paw, was erected on the spot, as a memorial to posterity of this signal exploit.—Puffendorf, iii. 42. Khevenhiller, xi. 1905.

† Francheville, 362.—This author enters into an elaborate discussion in order to prove that the Spaniards never seriously contested the passage;

Considering flight to be their only resource, the troops of Lorraine evacuated Worms, after committing a thousand depredations; while the Spaniards sought shelter within the walls of Oppenheim and Frankenthal; the former of which, however, was taken by storm, after a long and gallant resistance.*

Not a moment was wasted by the Swedish monarch, which it was possible to employ to advantage. Preparations were therefore made, with unabating activity for the reduction of Mentz, where the flower of the Spanish army had retreated. For this purpose, the Landgrave of Cassel was directed to encamp on the right bank of the Rhine, in order to prevent supplies from being thrown into the city, while the Swedes invested it on the left. In this hopeless state the besieged at first displayed much resolution; and Don Philip Sylva, depending upon the valour of two thousand Walloons, who had been recently added to the electoral garrison, publicly boasted, that to himself and his gallant companions, was reserved the glory of prescribing bounds to the career of the northern conqueror.†

In order to prevent the approach of the vessels equipping at Francfort, a strong chain was drawn across the mouth of the Mayne where it empties it-

as that is the only cause which he is able to assign for its being accomplished so easily.

Swed. Intel. ii. 47.

† When asked by the elector if two thousand men would be equal to the defence of his capital, the haughty Castilian contemptuously replied; "Such a question, though pardonable in the mouth of a churchman, could never have been tolerated from a soldier. Your highness may repose in perfect security; for, with a garrison like that which I have the honour to command, I should not be afraid of three such kings as Gustavus."—Swed. Intell. 49.

self into the Rhine, and large fragments of rock were likewise sunk more effectually to obstruct the navigation. Yet, no sooner had the enemy advanced to the foot of the ramparts, than the confidence of the commander abated; no longer insensible to the dreadful destiny which awaited the inhabitants, should the victors be tempted to render the magnificent residence of an ecclesiastical elector a memorable example of justifiable vengeance, in retaliation for the cruelty of Tilly; Sylva proposed a capitulation, and shortly obtained from a generous conqueror permission to retire to Luxemburg.*

On the thirteenth of December, 1631, Gustavus entered in triumph, and fixed his residence in the electoral palace. Delighted with the romantic beauties of the scenery, no less than with the valuable booty which fell into his hands,† he strengthened the city with additional fortifications, which were carried to such an extent as to be capable of containing twenty thousand combatants. Bridges likewise were constructed over both the rivers, which unite under the walls of Mentz, to facilitate the communication with the adjacent country;‡ which, being supplied with every thing requisite for an army, the king prudently resolved to allow his troops a short relaxation after all their fatigues. Previously however to their entering into winter quarters, the Hes-

* Gualdo, i. 74. Puffendorf, iii. 42. Galetti, i. 222.

† It consisted of eighty pieces of artillery, besides an immense supply of ammunition and provisions. A contribution amounting to 80,000 florins was imposed upon the citizens, exclusively of the Jews and clergy, who were compelled to purchase redemption by an abundant sacrifice of superfluous wealth. The electoral library, a valuable collection, was intended as a present to the seminary at Westeraas, but was unfortunately lost in the Baltic.—Galetti, i. 222.

‡ Swedish Intelligencer, 51.

sians made themselves masters of Königstein, Reifenberg, and Falkenstein, while the Rhinegrave Otto Lewis a Swedish commander, after cutting off a detachment of Spanish cavalry, reduced all the country, between Poppart and Baccharach. The strong towns of Landau and Weissenburg declared in favour of the champion of protestantism; Spires offered him reinforcements as the price of neutrality,* while Mannheim, surprised by Duke Bernard of Weimar, almost completed the conquest of the Palatinate†.

The king, having fixed his head quarters at Mentz, applied himself diligently to political affairs. For the first time, since his arrival in Germany, he displayed the magnificence of a royal establishment. His court became the centre of European negotiations, and was graced with the presence of five sovereign princes, besides a numerous train of ambassadors. Among the former the most conspicuous was the unfortunate exile, who once held the Bohemian sceptre; among the latter were Vane and Anstruther, as the representatives of Charles I. and de Brezè and Charnace as those of Louis XIII. Anstruther, whose object was avowedly to procure the restitution of the Palatinate, was received with distant civility, and dismissed without a satisfactory answer. The business of de Brezè, invested with the character of ambassador extraordinary, on account of his connexion with Richelieu,‡ requires farther explanation; because it conduces to shew,

* Swedish Intelligencer, 59.

† Ibid. Khevenhiller, xi. 1903.

‡ Whose sister he married.

that meanness and jealousy are usually the bane of all political confederacies.*

While the King of Sweden was occupied in subjugating the provinces contiguous to the Rhine, his enemies were endeavouring, by every artifice, to excite the pious scruples of Louis; and would unquestionably have succeeded in detaching him from a cause, which they represented as hateful in the eyes of the Almighty, had not their machinations been fortunately counteracted by the superior discernment of Richelieu. After having foolishly sacrificed his temporal emoluments to a blind attachment to Austria, the Bishop of Wurtzburg sought an asylum at Paris, where he availed himself of the plan adopted by Gustavus for humbling the League, to represent him as more inveterate toward the catholic church than Julian, Nero, or Dioclesian. It was generally expected that the Swedes would have directed the torrent of hostilities against the Elector of Bavaria, after reducing the circle of Franconia. But when the enlightened conqueror forsook the path which vulgar understandings had traced for his progress, few were able to penetrate his real designs; and being ashamed to acknowledge their want of capacity, they had recourse to explanations no less absurd than contradictory. The utter subversion of the catholic worship, and even the romantic project of marching to Rome, in order to expel the venerable successor of St. Peter, denominated the antichrist in his blasphemous vocabulary, from the throne of the apostles, as a prelude to rearing the empire of Theodoric, were among the

* The chief occupation of Charnace was to direct the presumptuous incapacity of his colleague.

follies attributed by the Jesuits and their partisans, to the most humane and most sagacious of heroes. As a step toward the completion of this impious enterprise, he was represented as carrying on a clandestine correspondence with the Calvinists in France, convinced that it would be impossible to accomplish his nefarious purpose, while a sovereign, devoted to the orthodox faith, should govern that powerful nation. They farther asserted, that his only object in crossing the Rhine, was to occupy a country, from which he might easily assist the malcontents when they should be prepared for an insurrection.* These insinuations were calculated to make a lasting impression upon the mind of a prince, who would have been regarded by posterity as one of the most despicable puppets which ever disgraced a crown, had he not been rescued from contempt by the genius of his minister. Too prudent to alarm the prejudices of his master by treating the faction with ridicule, the cardinal pretended to examine their allegations with cautious attention; and the result of his inquiry was a positive assurance, that nothing was to be apprehended for the internal tranquillity of his dominions.

No man knew better than Richelieu to disguise his feelings, when the occasion required hypocrisy; he accordingly received the German prelate with as many protestations of attachment toward the papal see, as if he had really believed the triple crown to be the firmest pillar of Christianity. His sovereign, he said, was so laudably devoted to the religion of his ancestors, that he would never hesi-

* Puffendorf, iv. 1.

tate to sacrifice even life itself in its defence. "This you may easily imagine," added the crafty statesman, "to be a sentiment which I zealously encourage. But if the German catholics are exposed to danger, it arises entirely from their own indiscretion. The humiliation of Austria (I speak with confidence) is the only object for which the King of Sweden contends; and if he occasionally directs his victorious army against any of the members of the Catholic League, it is because they have been the aggressors. By recalling their troops, and engaging to observe a strict neutrality, even the Duke of Bavaria, the head of the League, may depend upon receiving no farther injury. But if they persist in hostilities, either open or concealed, it is absurd for them to expect to escape with impunity. Cannot the catholic worship be supported in Germany, and even maintain its ancient pre-eminence, independently of the despotism of Ferdinand? True policy dictates a different system; and to set bounds to the extravagant pretensions of Austria, appears to me no less necessary to the happiness of all orthodox Christians, than it is essential to the disciples of Luther or Calvin."*

The cardinal's behaviour at this important crisis displays admirable prudence and sagacity. The clamour excited by the Jesuits, on account of the allegiance contracted by his Christian majesty with the avowed champion of heresy, however contemptible in the eyes of reason, was too loud and too prevalent to be despised by a man, decorated with the honours of the Roman purple. The offer of mediation so artfully made, served, however, to

* Le Vassor, x. 74.

rescue the character of Richelieu from the charge of impunity, without forcing him to abandon the noble project which he had traced for the aggrandizement of his country. If he succeeded in persuading the members of the League to withdraw their contingents, a most important object would be attained; because the emperor, thus deprived of all his allies, would be reduced to his hereditary resources; while the King of Sweden would be enabled to employ his undivided efforts for the humiliation of a power, openly aiming at universal dominion. But even supposing the offer to be rejected, it was a point of infinite importance for France to have manifested to the world her inviolable attachment to the ancient religion; in so doing she had fulfilled her duty to the utmost extent; and in case the catholic princes should think proper to reject her advice, it was not to the indifference of Louis but to their own invincible obstinacy, that their ruin must be ascribed.*

This plan was embraced by Richelieu with greater ardour, because it tended to deliver him from the embarrassment occasioned by the pressing solicitations of Maximilian. For some time past that wary prince had been engaged in a clandestine correspondence with Louis, not totally consistent with his professions to Austria, but by which he hoped to secure under every reverse the electoral dignity to his descendants. Notwithstanding the specific object of this alliance was too clearly defined to admit of an equivocal interpretation, Maximilian endeavoured to extend its operation to his actual distress; and as a necessary

* Le Vassor, x. 74.

consequence of this explanation, implored his assistance against Gustavus. The sagacity of Richelieu was not to be duped by insidious constructions, and he accordingly informed the Bavarian minister,* that the treaty was confined exclusively to Austria; was moreover merely defensive: whereas the difficulties, into which his master had fallen, were created entirely by his own inadvertence; for so long as his troops were employed against the Elector of Saxony, the ally of Sweden, it was in vain for him to hope for tranquillity. Unwilling, however, irrecoverably to offend the only German prince entitled to dispute the imperial crown in case of a vacancy, he promised to exert his utmost influence with the Swedish monarch, in order to induce him to consent to the neutrality of Bavaria. This offer, though highly advantageous, proved very inadequate to the elector's expectations, whose chief object was, by creating a coolness between the courts of Paris and Stockholm, to stop Gustavus in his rapid career.†

During the time employed in this delicate negotiation, the French court resided at Metz, where troops had been collected for the purpose of compelling the Duke of Lorraine to disband an army, supposed to have been assembled with the design of supporting the Duke of Orleans, at that moment at variance with his brother. Louis and Gustavus took advantage of their vicinity to address complimentary embassies to each other; but as the latter was averse to perform by delegation, what he could execute more expeditiously in

* Puffendorf, iv. 1.

† Le Vassor, x. 76.

person, he directed Horn to propose a personal interview as the surest means of preventing all future misunderstanding. This plan, though perfectly consistent with the habitual sincerity of the Swede, was by no means equally agreeable to his royal ally, who trembled at the idea of exposing himself to derision, by bringing his defects both mental and bodily,* in competition with the eloquence, and manly graces of a prince, so deservedly the idol of Europe. Brezè accordingly received instructions to elude the proposal; but finding himself unable to combat the arguments adduced by Gustavus, in support of his opinion, he indiscreetly attempted to screen his master's incapacity, by offending the pride of Gustavus. Pretending that the infirm constitution of Louis would make it dangerous for him to undertake a journey in the depth of winter, he ventured to request that Richelieu might be suffered to appear as his substitute. Gustavus took fire at the insinuation, not being accustomed to view the merits of the cardinal through the delusive medium of flattery. "Know, sir," said he indignantly, "that I hold myself inferior to no potentate in Christendom. If the king your master prefers to treat by the mouth of an agent, I will immediately dispatch a confidential servant to meet his minister."†

* An unsurmountable defect in the organ of speech rendered the incapacity of Louis more palpable; because, even when he was master of any subject, a circumstance which did not often occur, he was seldom able to express himself intelligibly.

† The behaviour of this prince upon another occasion was equally dignified. Desirous of protecting the ecclesiastical states against the resentment of the Swedes, S. Etienne inadvertently dropped an expression which Gustavus interpreted into a menace. "Should your master," cried the monarch with honest pride, "be desirous of measuring his arms with

The brother-in-law of Richelieu now clearly discovered, that in spite of their discernment, neither the cardinal, nor father Joseph, had penetrated the real character of Gustavus.

When the question of neutrality came under discussion, still greater impediments arose. However urgent the motives which stimulated Louis to shield the catholics from the calamities of war, those which influenced Gustavus to withhold his consent were no less imperative. Convinced by irrefragable proofs that the animosity of the League toward the protestant religion was irreconcilable, and their attachment to Ferdinand too deeply rooted to yield to persuasion, Gustavus felt that he had less to dread from their open hostility, than from their clandestine intrigues, if they were allowed to conceal their insidious attacks under the ambiguous cloak of neutrality. Besides, as he was compelled to provide resources for the prosecution of hostilities at the expense of his enemies, he clearly subjected himself to great inconvenience, by consenting to diminish the number of his foes without augmenting that of his allies.

Being anxious, however, to manifest to the world a pacific disposition, he traced the outline of a plan upon which alone he consented to admit the neutrality of Bavaria. The terms prescribed, though undoubtedly severe, were nevertheless such as a victor might be expected to impose. In the first place, he insisted that Maximilian, as well as all the other members of the Catholic League, should

mine, he shall be spared the trouble of a long and difficult march; for I will meet him, at the head of a hundred thousand men, under the walls of his capital.—*Le Vassor*, x. 103. *Puffendorf* relates the same anecdote, but supposes the reprimand to have been addressed to Brezé, iv. 1.

restore to the protestants whatever they had usurped since the commencement of the troubles in Bohemia; that they should reduce their forces to twelve thousand men, and employ them solely for the protection of their own dominions: he further required, that the disbanded troops should not be permitted to enter into the service of Austria; and, that Ferdinand should no longer be suffered to recruit in the territories of those princes who professed themselves neuter; neither should an asylum be granted to his armies.* From the benefit of this treaty the Bishop of Bamberg was expressly excluded, because he had particularly incurred the conqueror's displeasure by premeditated perfidy.

Degrading as these conditions must appear to a prince so lately the head of a powerful party, yet so distressing was the situation to which Maximilian was reduced, that the French plenipoten-

* 1632. Swed. Intell. ii. 62. Puffendorf, iv. 1.

Some authors pretend that he submitted to De Brezè a plan for a general peace, but some of the articles are sufficiently extravagant to warrant a suspicion that they were fabricated by his enemies for the purpose of alarming the protestants. The silence of Puffendorf seems to confirm this opinion. I allude particularly to the following; by the first of which he stipulated for his own succession to the imperial throne in case of a vacancy; and by the second insisted, that all the chapters should be composed equally of protestants and of catholics. The other conditions were such as the good sense and humanity of the Swedish monarch would have naturally inspired; viz. that the edict of restitution should be repealed; the free exercise of their religion confirmed to the protestants; the ancient constitution of Bohemia restored; and the exiles reinstated in full possession of their sequestered estates. For the Elector Palatine he positively demanded his dominion and dignities; and, farther insisted, that the city of Augsburg should be permitted to establish that form of government which the majority of its inhabitants should approve; and, lastly, that the Jesuits should be banished as public incendiaries, and their possessions divided among the other orders.—Harte, ii. 139. Khevenhiller, xii. 86. *Theatrum Europe*, 592.

tiary by no means despaired of inducing him to accept them; and he even prevailed upon Gustavus to consent to a truce, in order that time might be allowed for making the attempt. As the King daily received the most satisfactory accounts respecting the progress of the negociation, this delay might have been attended with serious consequences, had not an intercepted letter, from the Elector to Pappenheim, furnished indisputable proofs of Maximilian's insincerity;* and clearly evinced, that his only motive for carrying on a negociation, was to gain time to complete his preparations.

The Elector of Treves proved more successful in his attempts at neutrality, because his situation was too critical to admit of duplicity. The negociation, notwithstanding, had nearly failed through the indiscretion of the prelate, who being previously assured of the good offices of Richelieu, assumed a tone too lofty for a suppliant. Though deeply mortified at beholding his dominions a prey to the rapacious insolence of the Spaniards, his bigotry was still more alarmed at the idea of confiding his capital to the precarious honour of a heretic.† In this perplexing dilemma he threw himself upon the protection of France, whose enlightened minister caught with avidity at an opportunity of extending her influence in Germany. A numerous army was accordingly assembled for the defence of the electorate, at

* Khevenhiller, xii. 76.

Speaking of the dukes of Bavaria, an illustrious statesman says, with equal ingenuity and truth, *La géographie les ampeche d'être honnêtes gens.* *Memoires du Prince Eugene*, 15. It is scarcely possible for any remark to be more accurate, because it was not only applicable to the author's cotemporaries, but has proved prophetically descriptive of the political conduct of their posterity.

† Lotichius, i. 991.

the approach of which the Spaniards retired. Still, however, the principal object by which the fugitive sovereign was supposed to have been actuated, had completely failed, because Gustavus refused to ratify the treaty till all his requisitions were obeyed.*

The cabinet of Vienna grew seriously alarmed at the intercourse subsisting between the courts of Munich and of Paris; apprehensive that if Maximilian should abandon the contest, his example would be followed by the other members of the confederacy. But when the elector discovered that the influence of Richelieu with the Swedish monarch was too limited to ensure the safety of Bavaria, and that so far from attending to the remonstrances of France, Gustavus announced his intention of reinstating the palatine, he immediately dispatched a minister to Vienna, with positive instructions to conclude a treaty upon the most advantageous conditions which could be obtained. For as he foresaw the possibility of losing the palatinate, he was eager to extort from his ancient friend a renewal of the security formerly granted upon the hereditary dominions of Austria.

Conscious that his master's conduct was not exempt from duplicity, Donnersberg endeavoured to obliterate the unfavourable impression by the warmest assurances of attachment, protesting solemnly, that Maximilian had never departed in the minutest article from his original professions, though he admitted that events had recently occurred calculated to excite unfavourable suspicions. He frankly acknowledged that Wallenstein's elevation had proved highly disagreeable to his master, be-

* Puffendorf, iv. 2. Khevenhiller, xii. 76. Swed. Intell. ii. 71.

cause as that general had been deposed by the advice of the diet, he ought not to have been reinstated without their consent. His confidence, however, in the emperor's justice continued still so unbounded, that he was disposed to attribute this hasty resolution to necessity alone, not doubting that proper instructions would be given, in order to secure the safety and tranquillity of Bavaria.

Thus far the demands deserved serious attention, but the main object of the embassy was far more objectionable, because it was difficult to suppose that Austria would consent to alienate any part of her extensive dominions, either to indemnify Maximilian for the expenses of the war or to compensate the loss of the palatinate. A question so delicate required to be treated with the utmost precaution, and Donnersberg accordingly referred his claim to the generosity of Ferdinand, offering, as an additional incentive, the entire disposal of the Bavarian forces, and magnifying the services which the elector had rendered, in having summoned the nobility to arm their vassals, and fortified every place by which it was practicable for the enemy to penetrate into Austria.*

However gratifying these offers might have formerly appeared to the imperial ministers, they lost much of their value upon the present occasion, from being evidently dictated by necessity. Convinced that it was no longer practicable for Maximilian to abandon Austria, without exposing himself to inevitable ruin, they advised their sovereign in his reply to confine himself entirely to ambiguous professions, but studiously to avoid all specific engage-

* Le Vassor, x. 151.

ments. With this view they imputed Friedland's recal to its real motive, the impossibility of finding another general with talents adequate to the danger, neither did they hesitate to promise, that no precaution should be omitted which could tend to the security of Bavaria ; but with respect to indemnities, they carefully abstained from investigating the subject, contenting themselves with assuring the Bavarian envoy, that the elector might depend upon never ultimately suffering from his meritorious attachment to the imperial throne.* Notwithstanding the language of the Austrian ministers unquestionably indicated that the intrigues of Maximilian had not been conducted with sufficient secrecy to escape their observation, yet no alternative remained, except to seek shelter under the wing of the imperial eagle, or to be swept away by the hurricane which rapidly approached. Wallenstein, however, was less easily satisfied. Being made acquainted with the conduct pursued by Maximilian respecting his appointment, he was unable to restrain the warmth of his feelings, but publicly threatened to make his rival repent his indiscretion ; a menace which was shortly accomplished.†

At the expiration of the armistice concluded with Bavaria,‡ no preparations were omitted by the Swedish monarch for renewing the war with increasing activity. During the cessation of hostilities, the Swedish armies had been greatly augmented by fresh enrolments, or the accession of powerful allies, so that Gustavus found himself in a situation to oppose the house of Austria in every quarter with the fairest prospect of success. In

* Le Vassor, x. 152.

† Ibid.

‡ January 24, 1632.

Saxony, Banier was sent against Pappenheim, the ablest of the imperial commanders. Horn was left to defend the diocese of Bamberg against the superior strength of Tilly. To Arnheim and Thurn the reduction of Bohemia and the adjacent provinces was entrusted. William, Duke of Weimar, commanded in Thuringia; Ruthven and Todt, with separate corps, were left to act as occasion might require; while the Dukes of Mecklenberg and of Luneberg were placed at the head of strong detachments, destined principally for the protection of their paternal dominions. The Marquis of Hamilton remained at Francfort, accompanied by Vane, the English ambassador, endeavouring to negotiate the restitution of the palatinate. Gustavus, says Harte (of whose information I avail myself much more readily than of his language), has been censured by many of the British historians, for assuming a tone of dictatorial authority, which they affect to consider as totally inconsistent with his former professions. To this accusation, originating solely in national prejudice, no candid inquirer can subscribe. The conduct of England, on the contrary, appears far more reprehensible. The pusillanimity of James, and the indifference of his son for the distresses of a sister, were not only liable to sinister interpretations, but were calculated to expose the national character to universal derision. Nothing, therefore, could be obtained from the Swedish conqueror, except a general assurance, that he would invariably conduct himself conformably to the dictates of justice and honour.* Fatigued by continued importunities, he at length of-

* Harte, ii. 165.

ferred to guarantee the restitution of the Palatinate, provided Charles would maintain an army in Germany, consisting at least of eight thousand foot and three thousand cavalry; but this proposal, being received with indifference, served only to corroborate the king's suspicions respecting the sincerity of his British ally.*

Gustavus, however, never lost sight of an object which had been blazoned to the world among his principal inducements for commencing hostilities. It is also certain that he had repeatedly urged the King of France to concur with him in the re-establishment of a prince, whose ancestors had supported his illustrious father against the machinations of Philip II. Apprehensive that the obligations previously contracted with the Duke of Bavaria might prove an insurmountable obstacle to this proposal, he is said to have offered, as an expedient for obviating this difficulty, the creation of another electorate, a measure afterwards adopted by the Congress of Munster.† Finding, however, that little was to be expected from the generosity of Louis, he thought it essential to his future reputation, that his projects should be rightly understood; and he accordingly signified to the friends of Frederic, that it was his sincere intention to replace that unfortunate prince on the electoral throne, provided he would engage to grant his Lutheran subjects the free exercise of their religion; but at the

* Harte, ii. 170.—Vane declared that this would be purchasing the country at nearly double its value; and in a mercantile point of view the calculation might be correct, but to the understanding of Gustavus, the question presented itself under a different aspect; for he felt that national honour could never be supported too dearly.

† Puffendorf, iv. 4.

same time he declared, that the fulfilment of this promise must necessarily be subject to the contingencies of fortune, like every event whose accomplishment depended upon military success.* An intimation being also communicated to Frederic, that a personal interview would be highly agreeable to Gustavus, he immediately prepared for his departure; before he quitted the Hague, in full assembly he returned thanks to the states for their hospitality, recommending, with all the warmth of parental affection, his family to their future protection. A numerous escort of horse accompanied him to the frontiers of Hessa, where he was met by a detachment of the landgrave's troops, which attended him during the remainder of the journey. His reception at Francfort, both from the King and the Queen of Sweden (for the latter had lately joined her illustrious consort) was highly gratifying to the feelings of the royal exile, since he could not have been treated with greater respect, had he been actually seated on the throne of Bohemia.†

While Gustavus was occupied in preparing for more splendid achievements, the Saxons carried on their operations in Bohemia with an unvarying current of success. The Austrian power in that and the contiguous provinces was reduced so low, that Arnheim, by pursuing the plan which had been traced for his conduct at the commencement of the campaign, might have penetrated, without difficulty, into Moravia, and even succeeded in overwhelming the new raised levies of Wallenstein, before they were ready to take the field. But so negligent did

* Harte, ii. 170.

† Puffendorf, iv. 4. Burgus, 299.

he shew himself upon every occasion where the fortune of Friedland was concerned, that he never attempted even to prevent the desertion of his own soldiers, who, attracted by the magnificence of that ambitious chieftain, went over to the enemy in prodigious numbers.* The perfidy of the general was unquestionably overlooked, if not secretly encouraged by his master, who contemplated the rapid aggrandisement of Sweden with no less horror than he did the despotism of Austria; and who probably intended by unnecessary delays to allow leisure for the emperor to recruit his forces, that he might be able to arrest the impetuous torrent which threatened to inundate the whole of Germany, flattering himself to preserve, by his superior sagacity, an equal balance between the belligerents.

That this was his design may be fairly inferred from the general tenor of his actions; for though he studiously refrained from ruining a prostrate foe, when one additional effort might have accomplished his destruction, still he rejected every overture for a separate treaty. Ferdinand was too well acquainted with the elector's character, to believe that his attachment to the Swedish monarch would be preserved with unshaken fidelity; and as he knew him besides to be always open to the suggestions of interest, he determined, if possible, to regain his friendship by flattering his vanity and avarice. Desirous of giving the utmost importance to this delicate negociation, he selected Francis Albert, a younger brother of the Duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, for his ambassador; a man fitted by nature

* Puffendorf, iv. 4.

for the darkest intrigues, cold and unfeeling, treacherous and insinuating, and who never reflected whether an action were virtuous, provided he knew it to be profitable. Under the pretext of a sudden disgust, he resigned his commission in the imperial service, and repaired to Dresden, hoping that his arguments might operate more efficaciously, when apparently dictated by disinterested friendship. The project, however, completely failed; because the affairs of Sweden were in too prosperous a state to allow a prince so zealously devoted to worldly advantage, to embark in an enterprize, which if unsuccessful, was sure to overwhelm him with ruin and disgrace.*

The operations of the armies in northern Germany require a moment's attention, before we follow Gustavus to the Danube: but as they refer only to objects of secondary importance, they shall be treated with all possible brevity. The duplicity of Gramb, an Austrian commander, in violating the articles of capitulation after the surrender of Wismar, added to the atrocities committed during his march, exasperated Todt to such a degree, that he sent a detachment of cavalry in pursuit of the garrison, with positive directions to give them no quarter, except upon condition of their entering into the Swedish service. The fugitives being overtaken and rudely assaulted, after losing their commander, whose baseness had justly precluded mercy, readily accepted the proffered alternative.†

The capture of an important maritime station, and its consequent annexation to the dominion of Sweden, alarmed the jealousy of Denmark, whose

* 1632. Le Vassor.

† Puffendorf, iii. 46.

unwarlike sovereign immediately dispatched a confidential officer to remonstrate with Todt upon the occasion. The answer returned was bold and laconic: for it was an invariable rule with Gustavus never to be guilty of an action which he was ashamed to acknowledge, or unable to justify. "My master's intention," said the gallant Swede, "in occupying Wismar, is to prevent the Spaniards from penetrating into the Baltic; an object impracticable for its ancient sovereign, because it cannot be accomplished without a powerful fleet, and a spirit to employ it efficaciously."*

The conquest of Mecklenberg being now completed, it became unnecessary any longer to employ an army in that quarter, and Todt in consequence advanced toward the Weser, that he might be ready to act as circumstances should require.

After making himself master of Magdeburg, Bannier was sent into Bohemia, that he might inspire the Saxons with activity; and he accordingly waited with the utmost impatience for the expiration of the term, when that city was to be evacuated, according to a convention with the Austrians. But while anxiously expecting the completion of his wishes, he accidentally discovered that a plot was in agitation for his destruction. Two English soldiers, as they were wandering about in search of plunder, met a peasant carrying a loaf of bread. Resolved not to return with empty hands, they seized it with instinctive rapacity, and dividing it between them discovered a letter, addressed to the commander of Magdeburg. This paper being instantaneously

* Puffendorf, ix. 7.

conveyed to Banier, was found to contain a promise from Pappenheim to raise the siege, provided the garrison would co-operate by a vigorous sally. While Banier was meditating how best to counteract the schemes of the enemy, a message was brought him from Mansfeldt, by which that gallant officer, too proud to avail himself of dishonourable means, signified his intention of defending the city to the last extremity. It was now impossible for Banier any longer to doubt that Pappenheim had employed some safer method of communicating with the governor; and as he had positive orders never to hazard a battle without a moral certainty of success, he determined immediately to decamp.* Another motive which impelled him to embrace a resolution so inconsistent with his enterprizing spirit, was a misunderstanding which had arisen between him and Hamilton, whose arrogance was grown insupportable. Soon after his separation from the Swedish general, the haughty Scot returned to his native island, accompanied by little more than five hundred men, the miserable remnant of six thousand gallant mountaineers, who had been sacrificed to the folly of their leader, and whose loss was compensated by no adequate benefit—not even the barren advantage of glory.†

William Duke of Weimar being informed of the embarrassment to which Banier was exposed, hastened to his assistance with so powerful a reinforcement, that he compelled Pappenheim to take refuge behind the Weser. The superiority of the

* Puffendorf, iv 7.

† Galetti, i. 231. The editor of the Swedish Intelligencer endeavours in vain to justify Hamilton, iv. 116.

enemy precluding the possibility of retaining Magdeburg, Mansfeldt was directed to abandon it. All the scanty comforts, which had been rescued from the fury of the devouring flames, or from the still more destructive rapacity of the Walloons, became the prey of insatiate barbarians; the wretched hovels, which sheltered the miserable inhabitants from the inclemency of the elements, were levelled with the ground; the windmills were destroyed, the fortifications demolished, and the greater part of the artillery thrown into the Elbe for want of horses to remove it.* Scarce a building was left, except the cathedral, whose massive walls resisted the shock of an explosion; yet so strong is the attachment of men to their native soil, that the citizens clung with religious affection to the ruins; numbers also returned, when a proclamation was issued by the Swedish general, inviting them to revisit that desolate spot, and promising to assist in rebuilding the mansions where their industrious ancestors had formerly tasted the charms of prosperity. An address so flattering to the tenderest sympathies of human nature, could hardly be read with indifference; new colonists arrived by hundreds, whose patriotic exertions at no distant period produced one of the strongest fortresses of Germany, and one of her richest commercial emporia.†

Meanwhile Pappenheim retired without molestation, and displayed military talents which would have immortalized his name, had he not sullied his reputation by acts so atrocious, that they would have dishonoured the leader of a banditti. His

* Gualdo, i. 80.

† Khevenhiller, xii. 104.

march was designated in traces of blood ; rape and assassination, the usual relaxation of undisciplined savages, were always connived at, and sometimes even encouraged, as a compensation for regular pay.*

The capture of Creutznach having liberated the Palatinate from the Spaniards, Oxenstiern was entrusted with its defence, while the king, at the head of a numerous army, prepared to transport the torrent of war into the provinces south of the Danube.† The possession of Franconia had been obstinately contested between Horn and Tilly ; for though the latter attempted to overwhelm his antagonist by numerical strength,‡ Horn conducted his retreat,§ even after the loss of Bamberg, with so much ability, that he was no less admired for his skill in the field, than beloved for the clemency of his government.

A force sufficient for the preservation of Lower Saxony having been placed under the command of Todt, Gustavus ordered Duke Bernard to join him in Franconia.|| Too weak, or too prudent, to hazard an engagement, Tilly fell back upon Bavaria, cautiously abstaining even from desultory skirmishes. At the head of little less than forty thou-

* Lotichius, i. 1010. Puffendorf, iv. 5. † Ibid. 10.

‡ Tilly's force exceeded sixteen thousand men ; Horn's did not arrive at ten thousand.—Harte, ii. 179. Puffendorf, iv. 9.

§ Fuissetque totus Hornii exercitus ea die deletus, nisi rupto ab hostibus Hastattiano ponte, nostri in eo reficiendo detenti essent.—Burgus, 312.

|| That gallant prince had been left in conjunction with the Palatine of Birkenfield to conduct the military operations upon the banks of the Rhine, under the superintendence of Oxenstiern ; but after the king's departure, a jealousy arose between the two commanders, which might have been attended with fatal consequences, had not the chancellor immediately informed his master of their misunderstanding.—Puffendorf, iv. 10,

sand combatants, Gustavus appeared under the walls of Nuremberg, one of the wealthiest cities in Germany, and no less conspicuous for its steady attachment to the opinions of the reformers.* The victorious champion of that popular cause was welcomed of course with the most enthusiastic expressions of gratitude. The manly beauty of his person, corresponding exactly with those ideal graces which fancy attributes to heroism, confirmed the favourable impression which his conquests had previously excited ; while the courtesy with which he replied to the addresses of the senate, rendered him the idol of universal adoration. After ratifying in person every article of the treaty, originally negotiated on the shores of the Baltic, he animated the citizens by friendly exhortations, to persevere in the contest with unshaken fortitude, till the enemy of their religion should be constrained to acknowledge, that it is the inalienable right of every human being to worship his Creator according to the forms which his conscience and understanding prescribe. While the burghers beheld with delight the brave advocate of universal toleration, the king could not contemplate his rapid prosperity without the strongest emotions of wonder. To find himself received with triumphal honours in a city situate in the centre of Germany, within eighteen months after his landing, afforded subject for serious me-

* We learn from Le Vassor, that before his departure from Mentz, the king required from De Brezé an explicit declaration respecting the destination of the armament assembling upon the frontiers ; and that he received from the ambassador a positive assurance that it was not intended for the protection of Bavaria ; who further protested, that Gustavus need not be apprehensive of the smallest interruption on the part of France, while occupied in the abasement of Austria, x. 161.

dition, and was sufficient to have inspired the most exaggerated hopes of universal dominion, to a mind less powerfully controlled by the empire of reason, and less alive to the precepts of religion.*

The negligence of the imperialists in omitting to occupy a city so highly important, both as a financial resource and a military station, and which on account of its extent, and the debility of the garrison, could hardly have withstood a vigorous assault, was regarded as an unpardonable error. But as there is little probability that these considerations should have escaped an experienced commander, we may fairly infer that Tilly was deterred by motives with which we are unacquainted, but which appeared to him satisfactory.†

To afford a momentary respite to a fugitive enemy would have been totally inconsistent with the policy of Gustavus, who knew that among the qualities which constitute a great commander, none perhaps is so essential as activity. Tearing himself therefore away from the amusements and honours which awaited him at Nuremberg, he prepared to follow the imperialists, who had concentrated their whole force in Bavaria. The dread of transporting the theatre of hostilities into his own dominions rendered Maximilian uncertain what plan to adopt. By instructing Tilly to retire into the mountains of Bohemia, where there could be little doubt of his meeting with an asylum, a different direction would have been given to the torrent; but he at length resolved to encounter every danger, rather than expose his defenceless capital to the fury of

* Gualdo, 83. Lotichius, i. 1019. Swed. Intell. ii. 129.

† 1632. Harte, ii. 186.

heretics. Had the King of Sweden been consulted respecting the operations of the hostile army, and attended only to his personal advantage, this is probably the conduct he would have recommended. Every step that he took for the protection of Munich conducted the hero of the League to a greater distance from Wallenstein; and, while separated from him, Tilly could not be formidable. Neither was this the only benefit likely to accrue from transporting the theatre of hostilities to the south of the Danube. For many years Bavaria had been totally exempt from the calamities of war, and being naturally fertile, was sure to afford abundant supplies to the Swedish army, without exhausting the resources of their allies.* Gustavus having learnt that all the bridges, except that of Donauwert, had been destroyed, hastened forward in hopes of surprising that town before the garrison could be prepared for his reception. Rodolph, Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, having refused to capitulate,† the king invested the place with so much vigour, that it became impossible to defend it, even long enough for Tilly to be consulted. Determined, however, to encounter the extremest danger rather than surrender himself prisoner of war, Lauenburg attempted to evacuate the city, and executed his design with such consummate ability, that the greater part of the garrison escaped unhurt, notwithstanding the bridge, over which they retreated, was flanked by the Swedish artillery.‡

The rapid progress of the Swedes astonished Maximilian, who had calculated that Lauenburg

* Harte, ii. 186.

† Harte, ii. 190.

‡ Swed. Intell. ii. 137. Khevenhiller, xii. 110. Harte, ii. 192.

would have been able to detain them, till a formidable force could be collected. Overwhelmed with consternation, he dispatched courier after courier to Vienna, describing the misery to which he was reduced, and imploring immediate assistance. Convinced, however, that Ferdinand had rendered himself a slave to the caprices of Wallenstein, and was destitute of the power, even if he possessed the inclination, to afford him relief, distress got the better of pride, and he condescended to supplicate his haughty rival to rescue Bavaria from destruction. Far, however, from being softened by the melancholy picture which the elector drew of his situation, that insolent chieftain refused to move upon the most frivolous pretexts, secretly enjoying the twofold gratification of impairing the glory of Tilly, whom he always disliked and frequently envied, and of beholding Maximilian reduced to the necessity of courting ineffectually the man he detested. Neither was the emperor displeased at his general's behaviour, because he was desirous that his army should be more perfectly organized, before it faced the invincible Goth. He could not, however, consistently with decency, avoid mentioning the subject to Friedland, and apparently urging him to comply; but the facility with which he accepted the most trifling excuses, clearly indicated, that he was not displeased to see the Swedes harrassed by the fatigues of active service, while his own reposed in perfect security.*

The impending danger, instead of appalling the courage of Maximilian, served only to stimulate

* Le Vassor, x. 162.

his activity; and he manfully resolved either to stop the career of the northern conqueror, or to perish on the banks of the Lech, which serves as a frontier to the electorate. Orders were accordingly issued for the immediate demolition of all the bridges between Rayne and Augsburg, as well as for throwing up intrenchments at every point, where a passage was practicable. These precautions taken, the army was stationed in different divisions on the Bavarian side of the river; and, as Tilly anticipated the plans of Gustavus, he had erected numerous batteries at the very spot where the efforts of the enemy were principally directed.

It was the beginning of April when the Swedes appeared on the shores of the Lech; a season of the year when the Alpine streams are swollen by the dissolution of the snow, which, accumulated during winter on their frozen summits, pours down in cataracts, in every direction, under the influence of a milder atmosphere. The idea of forcing a passage over a rapid torrent, impetuously rolling between high and rugged banks, in face of an army, not inferior in strength to the assailants, presented difficulties almost insuperable. Gustavus hesitated, and deemed it prudent to assemble a council of war, before he ventured on the desperate enterprise. The high character which Horn universally enjoyed for judgment and courage, emboldened him to combat the wishes of his sovereign, by arguments so forcible, that they appeared unanswerable to most of his colleagues. After commenting successively upon every local impediment, he contended, that a repulse would not only revive the drooping spirits of the enemy, but might be attended with disastrous consequences, in a country inter-

sected by rapid rivers, where it would be utterly impossible to avoid a battle, in case Wallenstein should approach to cut off their retreat. He therefore earnestly besought the king to renounce, for the present, the conquest of Bavaria, and to employ the army in fortifying the frontier towns, both in the Upper Palatinate and Bohemia. This plan of operations would not only frustrate the projects of Friedland, should he in reality have formed a plan for intercepting the Swedes, but might probably impede his junction with Tilly, and even furnish an opportunity of attacking him to advantage, before his enormous preparations were completed.*

The king having listened, with visible impatience, scarcely suffered his favourite general to conclude, when he exclaimed, with an emotion bordering upon anger, "Have we not passed the Baltic, the Elbe, the Rhine, and the Danube, without sustaining the smallest loss? and shall we suffer ourselves to be stopped in our glorious career by a miserable rivulet? Besides, what is there to apprehend, so long as Donauwert secures a retreat? No, never shall it be in the power of man to upbraid Gustavus Adolphus with having suffered a fugitive enemy to escape!"

This decision, however, rash as it may appear, was neither dictated by presumption, nor by the contempt of Austrian tactics; but was the result of reflection, after having examined the spot with the minutest attention, and discovered that it presented many local advantages to the assailants, which would have escaped a less accurate observer. In

the first place, the river formed a curve,* projecting toward the Swabian shore, a circumstance which would enable him to erect his batteries at the extremity of the arch, so as entirely to prevent the imperialists from approaching the centre of the segment, the point chosen for constructing a bridge.† The elevation of the bank on the side from which the attack was to be made, contributed also essentially to the success of the enterprise, because it gave a decided superiority to the Swedish artillery.

Gustavus had no sooner embraced the resolution of passing the Lech, than he prepared for carrying it into execution. All the artificers and engineers belonging to the army were diligently employed in fabricating a bridge, upon a novel construction, under the immediate direction of their indefatigable sovereign. In order to provide timber for this important undertaking, the king was reduced to the painful necessity of causing several houses to be demolished. Having ascertained, by repeated experiments, that the bed of the river was far from level, he ordered trestles to be made, of different heights, which being firmly attached to long poles, and sunk by means of ponderous stones, appeared just above the surface of the water. The difficulty arising from the inequality of the ground having been thus overcome, the trestles were connected by planks and beams, in such a manner, as to re-

* This circumstance, says the author of the Swedish Intelligencer, gives cause to admire God's great providence, in creating such a place as this crooking of the Lech (and God surely had a purpose in it); so it wonderfully commends the king's judgment, for so suddenly and solidly apprehending the advantages of it, ii. 148. The reader, perhaps, will be surprised to learn, that the writer of this extract was not a monk.

† Pietro Pomo, 66.

sist the impetuosity of the torrent.* A thick smoke, continually nourished by pitch, and straw, and other combustibles, concealed the progress of the work, while the thunder of the cannon not only hindered the approach of the enemy, but prevented them from hearing the noise of the workmen.

The apparent rashness of the enterprise, in some degree, conduced to facilitate its execution, by rendering Tilly less attentive. The ground, on the side where he lay encamped, was swampy, but at a small distance from the river, gradually rose with a gentle acclivity, covered almost entirely with trees and bushes. The army of the League was advantageously posted on the summit, bodies of infantry being skilfully dispersed in different parts of the thickets.

Early in the morning of the fifth of April, 1632, under cover of a tremendous cannonade, a chosen body of infantry crossed the Lech in two small vessels, commanded by the king in person. A mound of earth was instantaneously raised in front of the bridge, thrown across with incredible expedition; so that when the vapour, so common in marshy soils, was dispersed by the glowing sun, Tilly beheld, with astonishment, the preparations of the enemy completed; and, while he gazed with admiration, blended with terror, upon this stupendous effort of human activity, he could hardly persuade himself that it had been accomplished by human industry, unaided by the magic powers of sorcery. It was in vain for him to attempt to demolish the machinery, because the Swedish artillery swept every thing away, and to dislodge them was equally

* Pietro Pomo, 66. Harte, ii. 198.

impracticable; he therefore determined to remain upon the defensive, and trust to the strength of his position.

Meanwhile the Swedish infantry, led by Wrangel and Gassion, passed by companies, and formed under cover of the batteries. Convinced that Bavaria must be irrecoverably lost, unless something decisive was attempted, the imperial commander again changed his plan, and, descending from the heights, at the head of those veteran bands which he had so often conducted to victory, he attacked the Swedes with an impetuosity which clearly demonstrated the intention of perishing, unless he should prove victorious. The nature of the ground preventing Gustavus from extending his line, he, for the first time, shewed symptoms of hesitation; but, while absorbed in doubt,* the Swedish cavalry, having fortunately discovered a spot where the river was fordable, advanced in order of battle, and, after routing a body of Bavarian horse, pushed forward to the support of the infantry.† The issue of the battle seemed still precarious, when Tilly, being struck by a cannon ball, fell senseless from his horse, and was transported to a carriage belonging to the elector. A few minutes after Aldringer received a wound in the head, which compelled him also to leave the field. The loss of their ablest commanders was enough to discourage the boldest warriors. It is not therefore surprising, that the efforts of the imperialists should have visibly

* Harte, ii. 202. The Swed. Intell. ii. 147, doubles that number.

† Burgus (323) ascribes the victory entirely to the exertions of Gustavus. "*Iamque inclinabat acies, cum rex accurrens præsentia, verbis, manu ignavos increpans, confirmans strenuos, atque hostes repellens, ordines restituit.*"

abated; gradually retreating, they at length reached the intrenchments, though not without some confusion.*

The lateness of the hour would have prevented the king from following them, even had his harassed troops been equal to the attempt; but they were too much exhausted to think of renewing the combat. On the side of the enemy, however, the consternation was extreme. A council of war assembled during the night, in the presence of Tilly, whose natural fortitude seems to have been subdued by pain, advised the elector to abandon a position, which might still have been maintained with the fairest prospect of success.† Such at least was the sentiment of Gustavus, who, when he visited the intrenchments which the enemy had quitted, could not refrain from exclaiming, “Had I been in possession of a post like this, I would have continued

* *Sublato campi ductore facile est vel conjectura assequi, quanta celebritate se ejus exercitus in tutiora loca receperit, quem non segniter insectus hostis, totam late Bavariam infestavit. Thomæ Carve Itinerarium, Mogunt. 1639. 25.*

Lethali glande petitus

*Tilliades metitur humum, curruque parato
Impositus, gemitus inter, sævique doloris
Diram intemperiem, leges et jura supremi
Hic subiit fati; quod si prius astra dedissent
Claudere, sanguineis feritas quam barbara jussis,
Traderet infræno Madeburgica tecta furori,
Et quam Lipsiacis Areton splendere trophæis
Vidisset, famam potuit virtute mereri*

Perpetuam, priscasque ducum pertingere laudes.—Adolph. x. 28.

† Gualdo. i. 86. Pietro Pomo endeavours to exculpate his favourite hero, by pretending that, even in the agonies of death, Tilly preserved his wonted intrepidity, strenuously exhorting Maximilian to contest every inch of ground. But, upon preparing to carry this advice into execution, the army appeared in too great disorder, to allow of the trial being made, 69.

to defend the entry of my dominions, even though my beard had been singed by a cannon ball.”*

The passage of the Lech confirmed so unquestionably the prodigious superiority of the Swedish tactics, that, while it excited the amazement of one half of Europe, it covered the other half with dismay. Upon receiving intelligence of this memorable exploit, the imperial ambassador at the court of Rome† is reported to have exclaimed, in accents of despair, “Then all is over!”‡ But whether it was the fall of the papal dominion, or merely the humiliation of Austria, that he lamented so pathetically, is a question not easy to resolve. Louis XIII. also discovered much uneasiness at the splendid success of his ally, and, in the course of conversation, said to Soranzo, the Venetian minister “that it was time to oppose some efficacious barrier to the overwhelming torrent which threatened to inundate Europe.§ But, as sincerity was by no means the characteristic virtue of the sort of Henry

* *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 485. In the above account I have compared Harte, Puffendorf, and Gualdo, with Burgus, Francheville and the Swedish Intelligencer. I think it necessary, however, to observe, that there are few events in history related with greater variations; though, with the exception of Schmidt, Wassenberg, and Adebzreiter, I never met with an author, who does not place it among the most brilliant achievements of heroism. But the former, who is evidently not *the gratuitous* champion of Austria, never loses an opportunity of throwing out insinuations against the probity, and even the genius, of Gustavus, imputing to him projects which never existed, except in the fabulous fabrication of his enemies. The latter was chancellor to Maximilian, and wrote officially to vindicate the character of his master. For the opinions of Wassenberg I cannot so easily account. They all, however, agree in asserting, that the elector effected his retreat in excellent order, with the loss of no more than fifty men.—Schmidt, v. 7.

† Cardinal Pasman.

‡ *Actum est!*—Swed. Intell. ii. 148.

§ *Siri Mem. Recond.* vii. 547.

IV. it is possible that his object may have been merely to disguise his real sentiments, in order to penetrate those of the Venetians.

Abandoning his capital to the mercy of the victor, Maximilian retreated to Ingolstadt, where the unfortunate Tilly breathed his last, after lingering for a fortnight in the most excruciating torture. This celebrated personage, once the hero of the catholic world, had the misfortune to outlive his reputation.* Till brought in contact with Gustavus, whose transcendent talents were calculated to improve every science to which he applied, he was equally admired for valour and ability. That illustrious monarch, however, so entirely changed the whole system of tactics, as to render war a different study; and Tilly, to his confusion, at length perceived that the cumbersome evolutions, so highly extolled by the admirers of Spanish discipline, served only to expose him to disgrace and discomfiture. This fatal discovery appears to have depressed the Austrian veteran with the humiliating conviction of conscious inferiority, though he continued to adhere with unconquerable obstinacy to the lessons of Alva and Spinola, too proud to improve by the example of a foe, whose youth, and whose country he equally despised. Candour, however, must acknowledge that he had been highly distinguished upon various occasions, and rendered essential service to Austria; but, unfortunately for his glory, his setting star was eclipsed by the

* No observation was ever more just than that of the Latin poet:

——ultima semper
Expectanda dies homini, dicique beatus
Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debet.

splendour of a constellation, by whose transcendent radiance all inferior luminaries were offuscated. In him the religion of Rome lost a zealous champion, and the Elector of Bavaria a faithful servant, who with his latest breath exhorted him immediately to make himself master of Ratisbonne, that he might secure a passage over the Danube.*

By the catholic writers he is extravagantly praised for the monastic virtues of temperance and chastity; but even admitting that he possessed them in the highest degree, their influence was confined within a narrow compass, while extensive was the misery occasioned by inhumanity at Magdeburg and new Brandenburg. Many of his most commendable qualities were carried to so great an excess, as to be scarcely distinguishable from the opposite vices; thus his piety always was sullied by superstition, and his severity frequently degenerated into ferocity. His disinterestedness in having resisted the temptations of wealth, at a time when prodigious fortunes were amassed by so many commanders, was an object of general admiration; but while he nobly disdained to enrich himself by plunder,† it would have redounded still more to his honour, had he exerted his authority, in restraining the rapacity of his lieutenants, and protecting the innocent peasant from their depredations.

After making himself master of Rayne, Thierhaupten, and Friedberg, the Swedish monarch, appeared with all his forces before the gates of Augs-

* Schmidt, v. 8.

† *Paupere proprior quam opulento, inter tantas ditescendi facultates ad ultimum usque spiritum.*—Adehzreiter, 264. Consult. Burgus. 327.

burg, and summoned the Bavarian garrison to surrender. Justly alarmed at the idea of sustaining a siege, the magistrates attempted to avert their fate, by representing to the king, that the opposition he experienced ought not to be imputed to them; because they had not courted the protection of the elector, but had been reluctantly compelled to receive it. Gustavus's humanity, revolting at the thought of destroying a rich and populous city, the cradle of protestantism, he consented to suspend all hostile proceedings, that time may be allowed the Bavarians to evacuate the city. In the capitulation, however, which immediately followed, he positively objected to the insertion of an article in favour of popery, having previously resolved to reinstate the Lutherans in the full enjoyment of all municipal authority, which Ferdinand had recently transferred to their opponents, by an arbitrary edict.* The ancient magistrates having resumed their functions, and the protestant religion being restored, the king entered the city in triumphal pomp, attended by a numerous train of princes, generals, and nobility. His first business was to visit the magnificent church of St. Agnes, where service was performed according to the Lutheran ritual, and a sermon preached by Fabritius, one of his domestic chaplains. After returning thanks to the Almighty, for the protection vouchsafed to the protestant cause, he walked to the splendid mansion of Fugger, one of the richest merchants in Europe; and placing himself at a window, where he might be distinctly seen by the numerous spectators, he received from the

† *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 491. *Gauldo*, i. 94. *Pietro Fomo*, 72.

burghers an oath of allegiance, and confirmed in return all the various privileges which they claimed under the sanction of ancient charters.* The oath being read by Count Kohenloe, was repeated by the citizens in succession, who were at the same time informed that no coercion would be employed to enforce their compliance; but that all who might feel the smallest repugnance, would be permitted to remove with their property. And it is worthy of remark, that not a single person took advantage of the permission.

There are few actions in the life of this illustrious monarch, which have furnished such ample materials for invective. "At last," cried the Catholics with malignant exultation, "we have discovered the real object of this disinterested defender of religion and of liberty; who so zealously labours for the good of mankind from the most exalted motives of universal philanthropy, and whose magnanimous soul is superior to the suggestions of personal interest, or worldly aggrandisement."

These insinuations, though destitute of solid foundation, were calculated to produce a deep impression upon understandings unaccustomed to logical precision. For nothing surely can be more repugnant to reason, than to expect that a sove-

* Khevenhiller, xii. 129. Puffendorf, iv. 15. Schmidt, v. 8. The form of the oath is thus given in the *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 493.—*Nous jurons et vouons au serenissime et tres puissant Prince Gustave Adolphe, &c. &c. notre tres gracieux roi, et seigneur, et a la couronne de Suede foi, homage, obeissance, & service; d'empêcher de toutes nos forces tout ce qui pourrait etre prejudiciable aux interets du dit roi, et couronne de Suede; de faire tout ce qui sera de leur service et utilité, et de remplir tous les devoirs de bons et fideles sujets.*

reign should expose himself to the hardships and dangers of war; and sacrifice his health and national treasures, without the smallest indemnity for such unwearied exertions. A generous sympathy for the sufferings of the protestants, was unquestionably the original, and the strongest motive which impelled Gustavus to make war against the emperor; but does his subsequent behaviour, if impartially examined, in any respect militate against his professions?

Another event, which took place almost simultaneously, gave rise to additional calumny. The infirmities of Sigismund had long excited an expectation that the throne of Poland would soon become vacant; but toward the close of the preceding year,* the prospect of that event was greatly accelerated by a sudden attack of an apoplexy, which deprived the king of the use of his faculties. The intrigues of faction commenced as usual with the greatest vivacity. The sons of Sigismund had each a numerous party, though they had to contend against the powerful influence of Austria, which, being exerted in favour of Archduke Leopold, essentially weakened the Catholic interest. To these the Prince of Radzivil, one of the most potent members of that turbulent aristocracy, being anxious to oppose a protestant candidate, directed his eyes toward Gustavus. In a journey expressly undertaken for the purpose of inducing that illustrious monarch to become a competitor, he offered him the crown, assuring him that he would no sooner enter the lists, than his rivals would abandon the contest. Delighted with the glory of add-

* 1631.

ing another sceptre to that which he had received from his ancestors, the Swedish king listened to the proposal with those emotions of pleasure, so natural to youthful ambition. Yet, notwithstanding he was endowed with every brilliant quality, which can seduce the imagination, or captivate the heart, the business was conducted with so little address by his ambassador, that a memorial, imprudently presented to the diet, was condemned to be publicly burnt: this sentence was accompanied by an order for the envoy instantly to quit the territory of the republic, under pain of the most exemplary punishment.* Ashamed of having chosen so clumsy an agent, the king endeavoured to screen himself by disavowing his minister, whom, in order the better to deceive the world, he committed to temporary confinement. This attempt, however, as might easily have been foreseen, failed to produce the desired effect, because his enemies were too deeply interested in the disclosure, to suffer a transaction to escape observation, which, when adorned by the fertile invention of the Jesuits, might serve to afford irrefragable proof that their implacable enemy ambitiously aspired to universal dominion.

While Gustavus was apparently diverting himself with the festivities of Augsburg, the German politicians with industrious folly predicted that it would prove a second Capua to the northern Anibal, the Swedish generals were far from inactive; but, after making themselves masters of Memminghen, Kempten, and Nördlingen, they remounted the Lech, extending their conquests as far as Fue-

* Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 405.

sen, situated in a fertile and romantic valley at the foot of the Tirolian Alps.

The wise men of Austria however shortly discovered that they had calculated upon erroneous principles, when they supposed that the formidable foe of Ferdinand was detained solely by pleasurable pursuits ; for no sooner were the necessary arrangements completed, than he advanced against Ingolstadt, under the walls of which the elector lay encamped. Gustavus hoped, that notwithstanding the strength of the position, he should experience little difficulty in dislodging an army, disheartened by repeated disasters. While reconnoitring the works, he approached so near, that his horse was killed by a cannon ball. Upon beholding their beloved monarch covered with blood, the soldiers were overwhelmed with consternation ; but the alarm was transient, as scarcely a moment elapsed before they saw him vault with agility upon another charger. The happiness occasioned by this providential escape rendered the army less sensible, than it would otherwise have been, to the death of the prince of Baden, who fell by the side of Gustavus.* “Though the voice of nature makes me sensible that I am a father,” replied the old margrave with Roman fortitude to one of the generals who condoled with him upon his loss, “yet I hope never to forget that I am also a Christian. The fate of my son ought not to be lamented, because his end was that of a hero.† They only are objects of regret, who perish ingloriously. Besides, we have

* Puffendorf, iv. 16.

† Thanks to the Gods, my boy has done his duty!—May not Addison have called to mind the heroism of the margrave, when he put that noble sentiment into the mouth of Cato?

all so much reason to rejoice on account of the king's preservation, that every misfortune must be regarded as comparatively light, however afflicting to the feelings of an individual."*

While the Swedes were occupied in the siege, an ambassador arrived from the King of Denmark, under pretext of congratulating the victorious monarch upon his rapid success, but with the secret intention of retarding his gigantic career, by an illusory treaty with Ferdinand. The duplicity of Christian did not escape the penetration of Gustavus, yet he affected to receive his proffered mediation with the utmost cordiality, declaring to the envoy, that a permanent peace, calculated to secure to the protestants an equal enjoyment of all political privileges, would ever continue the leading object of his ambition; he however greatly feared that such a treaty could never be obtained, unless it were practicable to unite all the different members of the reformed religion in a general confederacy. It would, he said, materially conduce to the success of the undertaking, if his Danish majesty would set the example to all the northern powers; unless this should be affected, it would be a waste of time to enter into a negotiation.†

Scarcely was the Danish ambassador dismissed, when S. Etienne arrived in the Swedish camp with fresh proposals from Maximilian. Some faint conception may be formed of the talents of the negotiator from his undertaking an office, from which nothing could be expected but personal disgrace. Desirous of mortifying the vanity of a man, whose fatuity excited his contempt, Gustavus received

* Lotichius, i. 1026.

† Puffendorf, iv. 18.

him in presence of the Elector Palatine, and surrounded by his principal officers. Having listened with patience to a long harangue, he expressed his astonishment that any one in the least acquainted with his character should have believed him capable of being so easily duped ; since no argument should persuade him to confide in the professions of a prince by whom he had been already deceived. S. Etienne attempted to defend the elector, but was suddenly interrupted by the king, who angrily told him, "that he might spare himself the trouble of farther protestations, because he was actually in possession of an intercepted letter, which unquestionably demonstrated the perfidy of Maximilian ; and proved that his only motive for entering into a negociation, was to allow time for the Duke of Friedland to march to his assistance." "He mentioned this circumstance," he said, "merely to shew that he was thoroughly acquainted with the designs of the enemy, not because he dreaded their execution." On the contrary, he professed himself delighted at the prospect of beholding fifty thousand Austrians assisting to devour Bavaria. "If such," he said, "was the elector's intention, he would advise him to prepare for the hospitable entertainment of such generous guests ; as he could assure him, that the Dalecarlians were not easily satisfied."*

Notwithstanding the conqueror's firmness was calculated to afford no flattering prospect of success, still S. Etienne attempted to exculpate Maximilian at Tilly's expense, whom he basely accused

* Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 500. Le Vassor, x. 169. Puffendorf, iv. 19.

of having exceeded his instructions upon various occasions; and even let fall some expressions in the heat of debate, which Gustavus mistook for a menace. "Though for once I pardon your ignorance," said he with a warmth of temper, which he was totally unable to restrain, "yet I think it necessary to inform you, that such indecent levity can never again be tolerated. From your language it appears that you are unacquainted with the convention subsisting between your master and me; and I have consequently every right to infer, that you are not acting at present by his instructions. You must not therefore expect to be treated with the distinction due to an ambassador, unless you produce your credentials. Till then I advise you to assume a different tone, as this affected importance is totally inconsistent with the character of a suppliant."*

Aware of his indiscretion in having exasperated a prince whom it was so much his interest to appease, S. Etienne apologized in the humblest manner for every inadvertence, earnestly beseeching the king to specify the conditions upon which he would consent to the neutrality of Bavaria. "That," replied Gustavus, "requires little reflection. Let the elector restore to my allies whatever he has unjustly usurped; let him desist from affording the smallest assistance, either directly or indirectly, to my enemies; the moment I receive a satisfactory pledge that he will faithfully observe these engagements, I promise to evacuate his dominions."

The powers entrusted to S. Etienne being une-

* 1632. Le Vassor, 170.

qual to the acceptance of such humiliating terms, he contended that nothing could be more unjust, than to render Maximilian responsible for the conduct of troops, which he was no longer in a situation to control. These excuses confirming the suspicions of Gustavus, he would not suffer the envoy to proceed, but terminated the conference abruptly, allowing no more than twenty-four hours for the elector's decision; at the expiration of which Maximilian, he said, should have reason to know what it was to have him for an enemy.*

"Your majesty," replied S. Etienne with inconsiderate ardour, "may possibly accomplish this menace; but it is my duty to warn you, that the king my master will be highly dissatisfied at your treating his ally with so much asperity; and allow me to say, that after the important sacrifices to which he has consented for the sake of the protestants, he has a right to greater attention."

Difficult as it must have been for an indignant conqueror to restrain his feelings, when insulted by the petulance of a coxcomb, still the king was sufficiently master of his temper, to answer with cold disdain, "I have communicated my wishes to M. de Charnace, who seems better acquainted with his master's intentions. On his friendly assurance I confidently rely; but should my brother suffer himself to be misled by the artifices of the Jesuits, so far as to break his alliance with Sweden, I never will be diverted from my purpose. The cause I have undertaken is sanctioned by justice, and I may therefore expect the protection of the Almighty, which I have hitherto experienced in no

* Le Vassor, 170.

common degree. At least, the world shall never have reason to say, that I have rendered myself unworthy of it by my dastardly conduct.”*

To a declaration so unequivocal no arguments could be opposed, without danger of adding fresh fuel to the flame, the envoy accordingly availed himself of the liberty he still enjoyed, to convey to Maximilian the melancholy tidings, which overwhelmed him with dismay and consternation.

Unwilling to waste in the reduction of Ingolstadt a moment capable of being consecrated to more important enterprizes, Gustavus directed his march toward Munich,† taking Mosberg, Landshudt, and Freysingen in his way. No regular force attempted to impede his rapid progress, but fanaticism had kindled the most inveterate hatred in the breast of every Bavarian. The zeal of an ignorant and intolerant clergy had taught the peasants that men wicked enough to dispute the infallibility of the Pope, must be monsters nourished with human flesh, to whom crimes the most atrocious were pastimes. Under the influence of this fatal delusion, it was natural for the inhabitants, contending as they believed against the outcast children of Satan, to dispense with every precept of humanity. All the tortures, which the most sanguinary bigotry could inflict, were accordingly exercised upon every Swede who fell into the hands of those infatuated savages. Neither is it surprising, that the sight of their mangled carcasses should have subjected the murderers to a dreadful retaliation. Gustavus however omitted no precaution to restrain the just

* Le Vassor, 173. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 502. Khevenhiller, xii. 135. Harte, ii. 222.

† Burgus, 343.

indignation of his troops, disdaining to sully his spotless reputation by punishing a misguided people for crimes which did not proceed from innate depravity, but which were solely imputable to the mistaken fervour of ill-directed patriotism, and the pernicious counsels of superstition. For he regarded mercy as the noblest attribute of religion, whose fundamental principle is charity, and whose sacred truths he studied to disseminate by a practical illustration of that beautiful precept.*

The approach of an army, represented by the clergy as ten times more ferocious than that of Attila, spread terror and consternation throughout the capital, left totally destitute of defence. No hope therefore remained except what proceeded from the generosity of the victor, and to that, desperate as it seemed to their perverted judgments, the affrighted inhabitants resorted. A deputation composed of the principal citizens advanced to Freysingen to supplicate mercy. To their humble address an answer was returned, "that no violation should be offered to private property, provided no resistance should be attempted."† "You have acted most prudently," said Gustavus to the magistrate who delivered the keys of the city, "your early submission has disarmed my resentment; though I might have justified to the world the most exemplary severity in return for the destruction of Magdeburg. Go back to your families in perfect security. My word is a pledge for their safety, and is better than a thousand capitulations."‡

Nothing now remained except to determine the amount of the contribution, which being finally

* Puffendorf, iv. 21.

† Lotichius, i. 1029.

‡ Adebzreiter, xvii. 288.

settled,* Gustavus entered the capital of Bavaria, accompanied by the exiled King of Bohemia, and a numerous and splendid retinue. Having taken up his abode in the electoral palace, one of the most magnificent edifices in Germany, he was so much delighted with the beauty of the building, and the sumptuous decorations of the state apartments, that he enquired the name of the architect; and being told that every thing had been planned by Maximilian—"I wish he was here," said Gustavus smiling, "for I should like to employ so able an artist at Stockholm."—"That may not be so easy as your majesty thinks," replied the attendant with naivetè, "for I am sure he will take especial care to keep out of your clutches."†

Could any proofs be required to establish the magnanimity of the Swedish hero, his behaviour at Munich might supply them abundantly. Contented with the triumph of conducting Frederic into the palace of the prince, who had usurped his dominions, he scorned to tarnish his glory with ignoble revenge, though repeatedly urged by the illustrious companions of his victories (and even according to some historians by the unfortunate Palatine),‡ to destroy the pompous residence of the Dukes of Bavaria, as a punishment for the atrocities committed by Tilly. This proposal however was rejected with horror. "Let us not," said Gustavus, "copy the example of our unlettered ancestors, who, by waging war against every production of genius, have rendered the name of Goth

* 300,000 rix-dollars.—Gualdo, 96.

† *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 505.

‡ Khevenhiller, xi. 141, asserts the fact, but is positively contradicted by Harte.

universally proverbial of the rudest state of barbarity."

All the plate and jewels belonging to the electoral family had been previously transported to Salzburg, whither the electress had also retired; the king however expected to find a valuable booty in the arsenal, one of the finest at that time in Europe; but to his utter astonishment no cannon could be discovered, though their carriages had not disappeared. This latter circumstance seeming clearly to indicate that they could not have travelled far, perquisitions were made in order to detect the place of their concealment. Money seldom fails of procuring a key to every secret. In a second visit, Gustavus went directly to the spot where they were buried; and, ordering the pavement to be removed, a spacious vault was disclosed, containing one hundred and fifty pieces of different calibre, twelve of which, adorned with exquisite workmanship, were denominated the twelve apostles. Many of them were decorated with the arms of Brunswick, of Denmark, and of the Palatinate, and in one of them thirty thousand golden ducats were hidden.*

The disclosure of this important secret was by many imputed to the Jesuits, because Gustavus had visited a monastery belonging to that order, with scarcely any attendants, and passed a considerable time in private conversation with some of the fathers. But, according to the testimony of the most authentic writers, his time had been less dedicated to less useful pursuits, if it be true that he entered into a theological disputation with the rec-

† Khevenhillier, 142.

tor, concerning the mystery of transubstantiation.* Discussions which cannot lead to conviction must ever be nugatory ; but, when they are managed by a royal disputant, it is fortunate for his antagonist if they are only ridiculous. The most extraordinary feature in this polemical combat, is its having been conducted without virulence, and having terminated without animosity. Gustavus treated the disciples of St. Ignatius with a benignity to which they had been little accustomed from the piety of an orthodox sovereign ; and left them impressed with the strongest conviction, that heresy, though it may pollute the purity of the soul, renders kings neither monsters nor tyrants.

To the capuchins, whose disinterested zeal in the service of religion appears to have excited his admiration, he made a handsome donation ; and when one of them carried his gratitude so far as to attempt to reclaim him from the errors of Lutherism, he listened with patience to the dull exhortation, attributing his folly to mistaken fervour, and not to the vanity of scholastic erudition.†

Thus the suavity of his manners soon dissipated the terror which the exaggerations of bigotry had excited ; for the human heart is formed of “ penetrable stuff,” and will be always accessible to gratitude and affection, when unperverted by sophistry,

* The catholic account of this interview is diverting. “ Si diede à visitar le chiese, è frà l'altre quella de padri Gesuiti, dove entrando in discorso co'l rectore del collegio, manifestossi in quel punto, senza particular senso di religione, et havendo per fede ogni fede, seguitar solo un largo creder morale, diceva, Dio esser quel sommo Ente, adorato in astratto da tutte le natione, nè, pur que si convenga nel unità del oggetto, diversificarsi con le maniere diverse dell adoratione.”—Pietro Pomo, 77.—Philosophy most certainly formed no part of this writer's study.

† Gualdo, 96.

unsullied by superstition, and undegraded by oppression. Not only the citizens of Munich, but all the inhabitants of the earth, may be conciliated by kindness, or estranged by severity. No wonder then that the former should contemplate with delight the affability of the victor, which contrasted so forcibly with the forbidding reserve of their hereditary sovereign, who lived secluded in solitary grandeur like an eastern despot, and who would never have been known to the greater part of those whom Providence had subjected to his sway, had they not been occasionally reminded of his existence by the pressure of taxation.*

Unfortunately, however, the change which had taken place in the opinions of men was confined to the capital and its immediate vicinity. The infatuated peasantry still continued in arms, and the spirit of hostility, instead of abating, extended so rapidly, that the king deemed it advisable to proceed against the insurgents in person. A contest of this nature could not long remain doubtful. A few squadrons of cavalry succeeded in routing numerous bodies of rebels, without sustaining the most trifling loss. Repeated discomfitures at length opening the eyes of the deluded populace, they threw down their swords, imploring mercy, which was readily granted upon the condition of their delivering up the leaders, by whose desperate folly they had been instigated. To this demand they readily consented; because they began to discover, that while they believed themselves fighting the battles of the Almighty, they were in reality

* Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 507.

sacrificing their dearest interests to the intrigues of fanaticism and rapacity.*

Meanwhile Ossa, an imperial general, had invested Biberach with seven thousand men, the residue of the Italian army; but, upon the approach of the Swedes, he retired to Lindau, near the lake of Constance, after submitting to the disgrace of being repulsed by the women, who, not content with exhorting their husbands to fortitude, assisted them in throwing down ponderous stones, and boiling water upon the heads of the assailants.† Having left Duke Bernard to pursue the fugitives, the king returned to Munich with the utmost expedition, upon receiving intelligence that Cratz, an enterprising officer in the service of Bavaria, had made a strenuous effort for its recovery. Foiled in the undertaking by the vigilance of Hepburn, Cratz directed his fury against Weissenburg; but, being unable to subdue the resolution of the garrison by open force, he tempted them to surrender by the illusive offer of an honourable capitulation, which was no sooner concluded than violated. Instead of meeting with the treatment to which their valour entitled them, and which had been confirmed by the solemnity of a specific convention, they were perfidiously massacred upon refusing to enter into the service of a prince, whose troops had degraded themselves, by their treachery and inhumanity, below the level of common banditti.‡

This atrocious breach of national honour exasperated the King Sweden to such a degree, that he

* Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 507. Galetti, i. 246.

† Ibid, 247.

‡ Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 514.

swore to have ample satisfaction. He in consequence deferred, till a more convenient opportunity, his intended visit to Ulm, where the most splendid preparations were making for his reception; and proceeded to Donauwert, where all the detachments were ordered to repair.

Thus far the northern conqueror had conducted his operations with an unvaried current of prosperity. The greater part of the empire was already occupied by his victorious legions; every enterprise had been attended with signal success, and the wisdom of the plan, so sagaciously traced after the battle of Leipsic, was exemplified in a series of triumphs. Notwithstanding the interested timidity of some of the princes who had embraced the doctrine of the reformers, and particularly that of Denmark and Darmstadt, had prevented the formation of a general confederacy for the abasement of Austria, he had either disarmed or crippled all the members of the Catholic League, and supported the war at their expense. The free cities, with hardly a single exception, were firmly attached to the protestant party, both from interest and inclination; and so long as he maintained his superiority in the field, no change in their politics was to be apprehended. The possession of all the fortresses on the banks of the Rhine, by cutting off the Spaniards from the Lower Palatinate, prevented them from co-operating with Austria. Even the volatile heroism of the Duke of Lorraine had been cooled by the events of a single campaign. Neither had the necessity of providing sufficient garrisons for the captured cities diminished the strength of Gustavus, because the splendour of his name, and the popu-

larity of his cause, drew recruits by thousands to his standard, Thus with an army more numerous than when he first entered Saxony, he found himself in the heart of Bavaria, crowned with laurels, surrounded by friends, and prepared to accomplish his ultimate object by penetrating into the interior of Austria.

CHAP. XV.

Wallenstein takes the field; and, in order to avoid assisting Maximilian, marches against the Saxons in Bohemia. His dark and ambitious projects for the humiliation of Ferdinand; he attempts to detach the Elector of Saxony from the Swedish alliance, and is seconded by Arnheim. Finding himself unable to accomplish his purpose by intrigue, he commences hostilities; and, after taking Prague, compels the Saxons to evacuate Bohemia. He prepares for invading the electorate, but is forced to suspend the execution of his design, and to hasten to the defence of Austria. He unites his forces with those of Bavaria; his first interview with Maximilian described.—Operations of the Swedes in the Palatinate, Suabia, and Saxony.—Cruelty of the Austrians under Holk and Gallas. Nuremberg threatened by the imperialists; Gustavus encamps under the walls, and is besieged in his lines by Wallenstein and the elector; in which difficult situation he displays the extent of his military genius: defending himself till the arrival of numerous reinforcements enables him to resume offensive operations, he attacks the imperialists in their entrenchments, and, after offering them battle, decamps without molestation.—Wallenstein abandons Nuremberg, and enters Saxony, with the view of obliging the elector to sign a separate peace. He is followed by the king, who advances to Naumburg, for the purpose of joining the Saxons before he gives battle to the Austrians. Reasons which induce him to alter his plan.—Battle of Lutzen.—Gustavus slain. His character. Extraordinary circumstances attending his death, which excite the suspicion of his being assassinated.

WITHOUT injuring his reputation, or betraying his designs, it was hardly possible for the Duke of Friedland to remain long inactive; but, being desirous for the present to abandon Bavaria to its own resources, he determined to amuse the public with the shew and bustle of war, without deigning to listen to the intreaties of Maximilian, though at length seriously backed by the authority of Ferdi-

nand.* At the head of an army, strong enough to have annihilated the Saxons at a single blow, he confined himself entirely to desultory skirmishes, preferring, if possible, to accomplish by intrigue what might have been more easily effected by vigorous exertion. These dilatory proceedings excited a general belief, that he wished rather to conciliate than to subdue the elector, whose assistance he thought essential to the execution of those ambitious schemes which he meditated, for the usurpation of Bohemia; and having already corrupted the fidelity of Arnheim, he hoped in future to direct the Saxon councils, and even to prevail upon the elector to abandon Sweden.

Such, at least, was the opinion which generally prevailed amongst his contemporaries; yet we are fully aware, that from the period of his reconciliation with the imperial court, to the latest moment of his existence, the conduct of Wallenstein was frequently involved in impenetrable mystery, and almost always presented a thousand inconsistencies, which it is by no means easy to explain. The difficulty of discovering a satisfactory clue is also greatly augmented by the circumstances attending his death; because the atrocity of commanding the assassination of a general, to whom the emperor was indebted for the preservation of his dominions, required much ingenious casuistry to render it palatable, even in the eyes of a people accustomed to regard the mandate of a despot as paramount to every moral obligation. Various projects were therefore imputed to this celebrated victim of royal ingratitude, some of which are totally unsupported by

* Pietro Pomo, 31.

legal evidence, and consequently may never have been seriously entertained. The stain of blood could not be effaced from the imperial diadem, without loading with obloquy the memory of a man, who, with all his eccentricities, and all his defects, was born to excite the astonishment of his contemporaries, and to fix the admiration of posterity.

Certain, however, it is, that he left nothing unattempted which appeared likely to induce the Elector of Saxony to break his engagements with Gustavus.* Neither was the negociation enveloped in so much secrecy, as to escape the observation of Ferdinand, who seems at length to have repented his folly in having offended a prince, once so blindly devoted to his interest, and so totally immersed in sensual indulgences, that nothing less than the unprovoked invasion of Misnia could have roused his lethargic indolence. Convinced, however, that no important concessions could be obtained from that weak and inconstant prince, without gratifying his avarice, which he endeavoured to conceal under the mask of religion, Wallenstein proposed, as a basis for the intended treaty, that the protestant princes should be permitted to retain all the secularized bishoprics; that they should recover those hereditary dignities and possessions, of which they had been unjustly deprived; and, lastly, that to the imperial cities should be restored those ancient municipal privileges, which had been successively abolished by arbitrary decrees.*

These offers, it must be acknowledged, comprehended almost every thing for which the friends of the Reformation contended; and it is, upon this ac-

* Puffendorf, iv. 25.

† Ibid. Pietro Pomo.

count; highly improbable, that the elector should have rejected them, had he not been restrained by the apprehension of incurring universal contempt, if he perfidiously abandoned his protector. It is possible also, that he may have doubted the sincerity of Wallenstein, or questioned the amplitude of his powers: without pretending to explain the real grounds of his refusal, it may be sufficient to observe, that John George, with a firmness, by no means natural to his character, refused to enter into a separate negotiation; though he expressed himself ready to treat in concert with his allies. This apparent disinterestedness, however, was far from extinguishing the hopes of Wallenstein, whose expectations were founded upon the assistance of Arnheim, with whom he carried on a secret correspondence: but, as he knew resentment to be a principle more active than gratitude in a heart so corrupted as that of the Saxon commander,* his chief reliance was placed in the implacable hatred which Arnheim was known to entertain toward Gustavus, by whom he had formerly been upbraided with cowardice.† Intimately acquainted with the most secret sentiments of his master, the insidious favourite was fully aware that he beheld with jealousy the growing intimacy subsisting between the Swedish monarch and the house of Weimar; fearful that the services, which they daily rendered to the protestant cause, might induce the conqueror to reinstate them in the possession of those an-

* Sparra, a colonel in Wallenstein's army, and a friend to Arnheim, is supposed to have decided his future conduct by a present of fifty thousand crowns.—Gualdo, 97.—Galetti pretends that Wallenstein had a private interview with Arnheim, 261.

† Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 511. Puffendorf, iv. 24.

cient rights, of which they had been unjustly deprived, on account of their attachment to the opinions of Luther. He knew also, that the elector's vanity, which was, if possible, even greater than his meanness, led him to contemplate with envy the ascendancy of a foreigner, though to that foreigner he was indebted for independence.

Anxious to dissipate scruples, which were those of decency, and not of integrity, Wallenstein directed his ancient friend to attack the imbecility of the elector with the arguments best suited to his feelings. By magnifying the immortal glory which awaited the pacificator of Germany, he stimulated his vanity; by describing the advantages likely to accrue from an office of such unlimited influence, he tempted his avarice; and, by representing the conduct of the Swedish monarch in a suspicious light, he called into action all those despicable passions, which that mean-spirited prince, not daring to avow, attempted to disguise under the appellation of patriotism.

Notwithstanding the impression produced upon the mind of John George was deep and lasting, yet the dread of incurring the resentment of an indignant conqueror was attended with consequences similar to those which gratitude or honour might have generated. Convinced that the motives best calculated to operate upon a sordid mind are fear and interest, Gustavus recalled to his recollection the tyranny of Ferdinand, the cruelty of Tilly, and the utter destruction of the protestant religion, should the edict of restitution be enforced. He warned him, moreover, to beware of the perfidy of Austria, whose affected moderation was intended as a snare, to divide the friends of toleration, that she might

acquire the ability to crush those separately, whose united efforts she was unable to resist.*

These arguments, reposed on a foundation so solid, that they defeated the projects of Arnheim. Unwilling, however, to trust entirely to the operations of reason, and apprehensive, that in case John George should be persuaded to desert the coalition, a general schism might ensue, the king endeavoured, by openly flattering his vanity, to fix his inconstant disposition, and accordingly recommended to him, in the strongest terms, to take advantage of his prosperous fortune for the establishment of a general peace, as well as for the formation of a comprehensive confederacy, composed of the protestant states. In order to facilitate the execution of a project, so eminently conducive to the good of humanity, he proposed to invite the members of the reformed church to a general congress; and even offered to relinquish those pretensions which might interfere with the elector's dignity, as head of the Lutheran party.†

This plan, though intended merely as a political expedient, to sound the inclinations of John George, served totally to disconcert the artifices of Wallenstein; because the elector was so forcibly struck with the candour and generosity of his ally, that he solemnly promised never to abandon his interests, and even declared himself ready to concur in every measure which might tend to promote a general coalition.‡

Convinced, by repeated failures, of the inefficacy of intrigue, Friedland prepared to accomplish by force what he had ineffectually attempted by ne-

* Hist. de Gustave Adol. 513.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid, 313.

gociation. In directing his march toward the capital of Bohemia, he appears to have had two important objects in contemplation; first, to compel the elector to sign a separate peace; and, secondly, to make himself master of a country, where he intended hereafter to fix his dominion, conformably to that article of the treaty of Znaim, by which Ferdinand engaged to recompense his services with one of the hereditary possessions of Austria. The indifference of the elector for every honourable pursuit, and the perfidy of his general, conduced equally to facilitate the enterprise; though, from different motives, they both beheld the mighty armament collecting in Moravia with as little concern, as if it had been destined for the protection of Saxony. Neither did they open their eyes to the ruin which awaited them, till the vanguard of the enemy was distinctly seen from the walls of Prague; where the Saxons, wallowing in licentious pleasures, seemed totally to have forgotten, that there were any occupations belonging to a military profession, except those of sensual indulgence. An Austrian regiment having been secretly introduced, by the treachery of a friar, the garrison retired to the citadel; but rather with the hope of obtaining an honourable capitulation, than with that of protracted resistance. Finding themselves abandoned, without the smallest prospect of relief, they soon consented to lay down their arms; thinking themselves fortunate to purchase life at the expense of their ammunition and their artillery!

The recovery of Prague being treated by the superstition, or the policy of Ferdinand, in the light of a favourable augury, was celebrated at Vienna with ostentatious festivities; but the delight which

it occasioned to the zealous papists was far inferior to that of the victor, who justly considered it as an important step toward the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.* By allowing the Saxons to retire with the greater part of their baggage, he flattered himself to have secured the good opinion of the elector, to whom he immediately dispatched another officer, with fresh proposals, hoping, that while the impression of his generosity was unimpaired, they might meet with a more favourable reception. But, while he employed the insidious arts of negotiation, together with their usual concomitants, corruption and flattery, he endeavoured perfidiously to avail himself of the security which his offers perhaps were solely intended to excite. By possessing himself of the defiles between Leutmeritz and Aussig, he would have cut off the retreat of the Saxons, and several regiments were accordingly sent to occupy the different passes. This plan, had it succeeded, would have inclosed the enemy in a narrow valley, where the want of provisions must have shortly compelled them to surrender at discretion. Arnheim, however, was too deeply versed in the science of treachery, to be easily entrapped; and having penetrated the design of his old preceptor, carried on the negotiation with so much art, as completely to deceive that most consummate master of deceit.† Meanwhile the baggage continued to move; and, being at length arrived in a place of security, he broke up his camp in the dead of the night, and continued his march with uninterrupted activity, till he arrived at Pirna, an impregnable position, in the vicinity of Dresden. This retreat, though highly creditable to the military talents of

* Gualdo, 99.

† Lotichius, i. 1049.

the general, occasioned the loss of Bohemia, which was again reduced under the Austrian dominion, with as much facility as it been formerly conquered by the Saxons.*

Less interested in promoting the glory of Ferdinand, than in accomplishing his own sinister projects, and exasperated at finding himself circumvented by a man whom he had instructed in the wiles of intrigue, Wallenstein prepared, without farther delay, to carry hostilities into the enemy's country; persuaded that, when he appeared before the gates of Dresden, the elector would no longer hesitate to comply with his demands. Circumstances, however, obliged him to postpone the execution of his plan to a more convenient opportunity: for, while he was indulging his love of popular applause, by the reduction of Bohemia, the King of Sweden had penetrated to the frontiers of Austria, and had even excited an alarm in the capital. Between Munich and Vienna no fortress existed capable of retarding his victorious career. Lintz and Passau were both untenable; while the discontented peasants in Upper Austria were actually occupied in organizing an insurrection, intending to explode at the approach of Gustavus. No hope, therefore, presented itself to the degraded despot, who so lately trampled upon the laws and the constitution of Germany, except from the exertions of Wallenstein; and even that was damped by the humiliating conviction, that another such victory as that of Leipsic could not fail to annihilate all the remaining resources of that gigantic power, which had so lately intimidated Europe. Neither was it unlikely that the gratitude and admiration

* 1632. Khenvenhiller, xii. 20.

of those, whose fetters he had broken, might be tempted to place the triumphant Goth upon the throne of the Cæsars. Courier after courier was dispatched, with positive orders for Friedland to march towards Vienna; but the emperor discovered, to his utter confusion, that he had surrendered his authority into the hands of a dictator, whom he was no longer able to control. Indifferent alike to the intreaties of Maximilian, and to the injunctions of Ferdinand, that haughty chieftain appeared to derive an ungenerous pleasure, from contemplating at his ease the distresses of those by whom he considered his honour to have been irreparably injured. Till the entire conquest of Bohemia had deprived him of every pretext for further delay, he constantly alleged, in excuse for disobedience, the disadvantages which must accrue from relinquishing an enterprise so essential to the success of his future operations, and so nearly conducted to a prosperous issue; and even when the Saxons no longer afforded an excuse, many difficulties still remained to be overcome, before he would consent to a junction with Maximilian. The jealousy subsisting between the elector and Wallenstein had been embittered by recent events: the haughty temper of the latter was utterly incapable of disguising his resentment; and, if the former could more easily command his feelings, it was not because he was more inclined to forgive. Rendered more arrogant than ever by the unlimited authority he enjoyed, Friedland looked upon himself as little inferior to the Bavarian in rank, and infinitely superior to him in military renown. Maximilian, on the contrary, who derived his descent from one of the most illustrious families in Europe, beheld with disdain the upstart

insolence of a Bohemian baron, educated in the humble capacity of a page, at the little court of Inspruck. Supremely degrading, therefore, must it have appeared to the dignity of a prince, who had espoused the emperor's daughter, to be subjected to a man so infinitely below him in all those factitious distinctions, which the pride of aristocracy idolizes: but Wallenstein, who regarded all conventional institutions as naturally subordinate to the splendour of genius, treated the claims of his rival with studied contempt, alleging, in defence of his own exorbitant pretensions, the treaty of Znaim; in virtue of which no person, however elevated, could pretend even to share with him in the command. "Were the emperor in person to join the army," said the arrogant duke, "the supreme authority would be still vested in me!"*

However severe the mortification of being compelled to serve under a Bohemian subject, no alternative remained for Maximilian, except to gratify the vanity of an insulting foe, or to forego every hope of recovering his dominions. Pride, therefore, at length was constrained to submit; though it was not till after warm and protracted discussions, that an arrangement was concluded, which stipulated that Wallenstein should direct the military operations of both armies, so long as they continued united, without suffering the elector to make the smallest alteration, either in the disposition of a battle, or the general plan of a campaign. In return for these important concessions, the imperial commander engaged never to interfere with the internal economy of the Bavarian troops; and, in the

* Khevenhiller, xii. 150. Hist. de Gustave Adolphe, 516.

event of a separation, the supreme command of the electoral army was again to revert to Maximilian.*

These preliminaries being settled, the rival chieftains met at Egra, after mutually promising to bury in oblivion every former grievance. All the ceremonies of a reconciliation were punctiliously observed; according to agreement, they embraced each other in presence of their respective armies, professing in future the warmest attachment, though implacable hatred rankled equally in the bosoms of both. In mute attention the surrounding multitude watched their behaviour; not a look escaped their observation. Deeply versed in the intricate science of dissimulation, Maximilian was sufficiently master of his countenance to prevent it from betraying the violence of his emotion, while with the cordiality of friendship he greeted the man, into whose heart he would have rejoiced at plunging a dagger. Wallenstein, on the contrary, felt too elated with his triumph to play the hypocrite. External decency was the only thing to which he attended, but his eyes betrayed a malignant gratification, at contemplating the humiliation of a rival. His colour changed, and his lips quivered with convulsive agitation, while he reluctantly breathed out professions of amity, which his implacable temper belied. More than once he appeared on the very point of giving unbridled scope to his indignation, had not the elector ingeniously directed the conversation to indifferent topics. Scrupulously adhering to the character which he had assumed, Maximilian observed the same delicacy, even in the retired society of his confidential friends, to

* *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 516. *Khevenhiller*, xii. 150.

whom he always spoke of the talents of Wallenstein with the warmest expressions of admiration. Not so the Duke of Friedland: for no sooner was the theatrical exhibition concluded, than he not only forbore to conceal his delight, but publicly exulted in his ungenerous triumph.

Wallenstein now found himself at the head of sixty thousand men; a force so superior to that of Gustavus, that all Europe anticipated his destruction. The imperial general, however, was less confident of success, and estimated the abilities of his adversary more justly; conscious that genius can often compensate numerical deficiencies, or perhaps desirous of postponing a conflict, which, if it terminated prosperously, must strip him of his authority; and, should the event prove unpropitious, overwhelm him with disgrace.*

Gustavus appears to have been mistaken in his calculations respecting the conduct of his antagonists. The inveterate animosity which prevailed between them, inspired him with the belief that they would never be reconciled, and he accordingly neglected the necessary precautions to impede their junction, till it was no longer in his power to prevent it.

Conceiving that the first impetuosity of the torrent would be directed against the Elector of Saxony, and nobly resolved to encounter every danger in defence of his ally, he sent Duke Bernard to watch the motions of the enemy, directing him to join the main army, in case Friedland should attempt the siege of Nuremberg instead of penetrating as he expected into Misnia.† The movements of

* Khevenhillier, xii. 151.

† Lotichius, i. 1050.

the imperialists, however, soon dispelled the mystery, and convinced Gustavus, that all the transcendent powers of his unrivalled genius must be called into action, if he wished to escape from the overwhelming storm with unblemished reputation. Too feeble to face the enemy in the field, no choice remained, except to throw himself into Nuremberg, at the hazard of being reduced to a disgraceful capitulation, or to submit to the ignominy of abandoning a city, which had implicitly trusted to his valour. His decision, when summoned to the succour of his allies, was, however, prompt and resolute; and he determined to bury himself under the ruins of Nuremberg, rather than shew himself indifferent to the call of honour.

This resolution, so worthy of his spotless fame, was no sooner embraced, than he prepared for carrying it into immediate execution. Orders were accordingly dispatched to all the Swedish generals to hasten to his assistance, and a positive assurance was at the same time conveyed to the magistrates of Nuremberg, "that he was decided to risk both life and glory, rather than abandon them to the fury of the Austrians."

It was not, however, to the safety of the city alone that he trusted for the consummation of his military renown, but he aspired also to preserve from ruin the suburbs and the beautiful villas, so precious in the estimation of mercantile opulence. An enterprize more hazardous was perhaps never attempted by human fortitude; for even should he succeed in repelling the attacks of an enemy, at least three times superior to him in numbers, by

* Lotichius, i. 1050.

what means were provisions to be procured? From an army barely sufficient for the defence of their lines, no detachments could be spared for conveying stores, drawn from distant provinces, or remote magazines.

The first object, of course, which engaged his attention, was the selection of a spot for his encampment. After mature deliberation, he ordered the town, at the distance of about three quarters of a mile from the walls, to be surrounded with a regular ditch, twelve feet wide, and eight feet deep; and, as an additional security, he caused eight towers to be constructed at regular distances, besides an infinite number of redoubts and batteries, furnished with no less than three hundred pieces of heavy artillery.* The approach of the enemy allowing little leisure for the execution of this wonderful undertaking, seven thousand men were constantly occupied with the spade and the mattock, who were regularly relieved at stated periods; so that the labour continued without the smallest intermission, and, in the short space of eight and forty hours, was so far advanced, as to render the position unsailable. The Swedish troops now entered the intrenchments, and having pitched their tents in the intermediate space between the ditch and the city, continued the work with unabating activity, till it was brought to the utmost perfection.

Meanwhile, Wallenstein advanced, and having reviewed his army between Neumark and Frey-stadt, he contemplated with exultation the magnificent spectacle. More than four hundred standards floated in the air, enriched with various de-

* Swedish Intel. iii. 6.

vices; eighty cannons of heavy calibre threatened destruction to all who opposed him, while the march was closed by upwards of four thousand waggons, and an innumerable multitude of women.* Anticipating the glory which he was about to acquire, he exultingly exclaimed, "the world shortly will see, whether Wallenstein or Gustavus shall be master of Germany!"†

Terrible as the shock of such an army must prove, the Swedish monarch beheld its approach with unshaken constancy; and having received intelligence that the artillery had been sent forward to Neumark with an escort of only four thousand soldiers, he conceived hopes of being able to surprise it. With this view he dispatched Taupadel,‡ an intelligent officer, to reconnoitre the position; who, being misled by an erroneous report, attempted to anticipate his master's wishes by a gallant exploit. But the strength of the enemy proving infinitely greater than he expected, the action terminated in the captivity of Taupadel.§

Desirous of conciliating the good opinion of a prince, whose virtues he so highly admired, Wallenstein received the prisoner with many tokens of respect, and, ordering his ransom to be instantly paid out of his own private purse, he sent him back with a respectful message to the king, expressive of the veneration which his matchless talents inspired. This compliment was accompanied by

* Burgus estimates them at 15,000, and supposes the number of sutlers and servants, who attended the army, to have been nearly equal. 364.

† Khevenhiller, xii. 151. Puffendorf, iv. 35.

‡ This officer is called Dewbattle by Harte and all the French historians, but I have adopted the orthography of Puffendorf, and of the Germans.

§ Swed. Intell. ii. 238,

an offer of peace, and a declaration from Wallenstein that he should esteem that moment the happiest of his existence, in which he should be fortunate enough to promote a permanent reconciliation between Austria and Sweden.* These proposals were immediately communicated to the senate of Nuremberg, who were requested to decide for themselves, without attending to any thing but their own immediate welfare. "I came here," said the king, "for your protection; but should you be of opinion that a negociation with the imperial general is the most likely method of averting the storm, let me be no impediment to the treaty. I am ready to decamp at an hour's notice, and I do not entertain the smallest apprehension respecting the consequences of a retreat."†

Fearful that his presence might fetter the freedom of debate, he instantly quitted the assembly; but his example had inspired magnanimity, and awakened sentiments of the most generous devotion. By unanimous acclamation the senators announced the unshaken resolution of adhering to the fortune of their generous protector, and of sacrificing, if necessary, their lives and their fortunes for the preservation of their religion and independence. The flame, thus kindled at the shrine of patriotism, spread with almost electric rapidity. Every citizen capable of bearing arms offered his services to the state; and, so universal was the enthusiasm, that before the expiration of the following day, thirty thousand names appeared on the register.‡ Out of this number twelve chosen battalions were formed, four of which regularly mounted guard on the ram-

* Galetti, i. 267. † Ibid. ‡ Histoire de Gustave Adolphe, 526.

parts. The immense magazines, where grain sufficient at least for the consumption of a year was always deposited, were immediately opened, and corn regularly distributed to the Swedish soldiers. By this wise precaution during the long blockade bread was generally procured with tolerable facility; and, when any scarcity arose, it proceeded entirely from the want of mills for preparing the flour. Other provisions of course augmented in price, and were not always attainable even for money: but so attentive were the magistrates to the distresses of their fellow citizens, and so admirable were the regulations established, that not a single person is supposed to have perished from hunger.*

In the opinion of most of the European politicians the ruin of Gustavus was inevitable;† and this apparent change in the current of fortune produced a notable difference in the language employed by the imperial ministers. With presumptuous confidence they publicly boasted that the northern hero was enveloped in a net from which he could never disentangle himself. Even the firm mind of Richelieu for a moment gave way to despair: seriously alarmed at the prospect before him, he earnestly endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between Louis and his brother; but the folly of Gaston delivered him at once from all his apprehensions, involving in the ruin, which his temerity occasioned, the gallant and amiable Montmorency.

Aware of the unfavourable impression which his

* Khevenhillier, xii. 161.

† According to Galetti this sentiment was so prevalent, that in many catholic towns, and particularly at Cologne, prints were publicly sold, representing the Swedish army in the act of laying down their arms. i. 276.

apparent distress was likely to produce on the minds of all who were unacquainted with the extent of his resources, Gustavus addressed a letter to Louis, assuring him that his overthrow was far less certain than his enemies predicted.* Wallenstein however seems fully to have appreciated the difficulties which he had to encounter. From his camp, on the western bank of the Pegnitz, he beheld with admiration the astonishing efforts of his antagonist; and probably regretted that he had lost the opportunity of attacking him, before his intrenchments were completed. But when urged by Maximilian to make the attempt, he calmly replied, "The interests of the emperor impose a different system. Would to God his generals had been less fond of fighting! for, in that case, we should not at the present moment have to contend for the existence of the house of Austria, in the very centre of Germany.†

The caution of Wallenstein in avoiding an engagement was highly applauded by Ferdinand,

* Le Vassor gives the following extract from this letter, bearing date the 24th of August, x. 345.

"Nous avons cru devoir avertir votre majesté que nous ne sommes pas si foibles que nos ennemis le publient, a l'occasion de quelques avantages qu'il sont obtenus. Nous pouvons leur opposer d'aussi grandes forces que jamais, et le courage ne nous manquera qu'avec la vie. Nous sommes tous les jours dans le champ de Mars, afin de leur faire sentir ce que peuvent ceux qui n'ont les armes a la main, que pour le bien public, et pour la liberté des princes et des peuples, qui gémissoient sous leur tyrannie. Dieu qui sonde le cœur des hommes, nous a toujours conduit dans nos justes desseins." &c. &c. The style of this letter may perhaps appear a little suspicious to the present age, accustomed to behold professions of a similar nature employed for the vilest purposes of deceit. But the heart of Gustavus was as averse from treachery as it was incapable of fear; and when he promised independence to the German nation, it was not with a view of enslaving it.

† Swed. Intell. iii. 13. Le Vassor, x. 354.

who repeatedly exhorted him to act with circumspection, and not to risk the destruction of the only army which remained to cover Vienna.* An attempt to assault the Swedish camp, even supposing it crowned with the most brilliant success, must necessarily have been accompanied with an enormous carnage; and though Friedland might perhaps have beheld with indifference the effusion of blood, provided he ultimately carried his point, he was not ignorant that the best concerted plans are often frustrated by accidents, against which prudence cannot provide, and was convinced, that a defeat in his situation must be attended with utter destruction. He therefore determined gradually to consume the hostile army by the slow but regular process of a blockade, which by affording to his adversary no opportunity for displaying his impetuous courage, deprived him of one of the most powerful instruments which had hitherto rendered him invincible. Could he succeed in intercepting the Swedish convoys, of which he seems to have entertained but little doubt, he knew that the provisions accumulated in the granaries of Nuremberg must be shortly exhausted, when he flattered himself with beholding the famished foe reduced to unconditional submission.

But while he anxiously expected that glorious event, his sanguine temper appears entirely to have overlooked a thousand obstacles, against which he had to contend, and to have forgotten, that in proportion as his numbers were considerable, the difficulty of feeding them increased. This evil was greatly augmented by the ferocious behaviour of

* Galetti, i. 266. Puffendorf, iv. 35.

his soldiers. The industrious farmers had fled with their property from the rapacious fury of the croats; and the few sources of sustenance, which it had been impracticable to remove, became objects of daily contestation. The necessities of life could be acquired only by the sword; so that it was dangerous to forage without a numerous escort.* In the Austrian army the commissariat department was radically defective. The troops were accustomed for the most part to subsist by plunder; and what was obtained by injustice, was usually squandered with prodigality.

Among the Swedes a different system prevailed; every thing was conducted with order and economy, and comfort and salubrity were the consequences. So long as supplies could be procured from the adjacent territory, the store-houses of Nuremberg were untouched; but, when the impoverished country was no longer able to administer relief, the wants of the army were abundantly provided for by a generous ally, while the imperialists were constrained to draw their supplies from distant provinces.†

A valuable convoy collected in Bavaria, at an enormous expense, had actually reached Freystadt, where it was waiting the arrival of a powerful escort. This circumstance having been privately communicated to Gustavus, Taupadel and Gassion were sent to attack it; and conducted the enterprize with so much ability, that the town was surprised in the dead of night, and upwards of a thousand head of cattle, together with two hundred

* Nam devastatis circum agris, consumptisque prodige frugibus, ad quinquaginta passuum millia aliquando Norimberga procul pabulatum ire erat necesse.—Burgus, 363.

† Galetti, 267. Khevenhiller, xii. 161.

waggons laden with corn and military stores, were carried off in triumph by the victors.*

Notwithstanding the acquisition of so important a prize averted the horrors of famine, the Swedes suffered materially from the want of wholesome water ; because the diminished Pegnitz, from which they were chiefly supplied, became putrid from the intense heat of the weather, as well as from the carcases of horses and oxen, with which indiscretion or malignity had almost choaked up its channel.†

Insubordination may be regarded as the inevitable consequence of distress. With unspeakable regret the king beheld that admirable discipline, which distinguished his troops from the banditti of Austria, declining daily, to make way for lawless rapacity. Resolved to stop the progress of the evil before it attained to an incurable height, he summoned the staff-officers to his tent, where he addressed them in a speech equally honourable to his feelings as a man, a soldier, and a Christian. "Gentlemen," said he, with an expression of sorrow, which penetrated to the hearts of his auditors, "it is with inexpressible affliction that I daily hear of the extortions and cruelties committed by men who wear my uniform. Your negligence in suffering this disorderly conduct to escape unpunished, I blush to say it, excites my contempt and indignation in an equal degree. God, to whom alone our inmost thoughts are disclosed, knows, that no precaution has been omitted by me, which could tend to repress their enormities. But my wisest regulations have been set at defiance ; and by your inhumanity toward those whom it is your duty to pro-

* Hist. de Gustave, 528. Harte, ii. 273.

† Burgus, 363.

tect, you have afforded our allies just cause to complain, that they have suffered more from their defenders than from their enemies. A reproach like this I cannot endure ; and, if you really love me, you will spare me the ignominy of ever hearing it repeated again. It wounds me to the soul to find my gallant Swedes compared to croats. Can it be necessary for me, when speaking to Christians, to remind them of the precepts which the gospel enforces ? but you seem to have forgotten that the motive for which we drew the sword, was to protect, and not to destroy. Need I recal to your recollection the many hardships which I have endured for your sakes (addressing himself particularly to the Germans) : for you I have sacrificed my domestic comforts, and, what is infinitely dearer to me, the comforts of my people. It is your inhumanity towards your mother country that has tarnished the glory of my victorious subjects ; for the perpetrators of the crimes, of which I complain, are almost exclusively Germans.

“ You may perhaps attempt to palliate the turpitude of your behaviour, by alleging your pecuniary distress ; yet no man can upbraid me with want of punctuality in paying my troops, which I have always done to the full extent of my ability. Your depredations, however, by destroying my credit, must soon deprive me of the means of providing for your support. Heaven can witness, that my only object in commencing hostilities against Austria, was to restore to every man his legitimate property ; and, with respect to the conquests which our valour might achieve, it was my decided intention to divide them impartially among my German allies. What portion have I reserved for my-

self? No, I solemnly protest, that since my landing in Pomerania, I have not sent a single dollar to Sweden; but, on the contrary, have drawn prodigious sums from my patrimonial estates, as I can prove from unquestionable documents. I do not mention this, because I set an improper value on riches; for no one can behold them with greater indifference. It is from the paucity of my wants that I wish to be opulent, and not from the extent of my possessions. But there is another sacrifice which I cannot contemplate with equal apathy—the loss of many brave and excellent officers, whose merits no praises can equal. Nature and gratitude demand this tribute to their memory, and while my heart continues to beat, their services shall never be forgotten.

“I implore you therefore, gentlemen, as you value my friendship, seriously to reflect upon what I have said: for I must, and I will be obeyed. Suppose not, however, that I mean to tax you with want of courage, when facing the cannon of the enemy; for, in that situation, I am proud to say, you have always behaved like heroes. It is your licentiousness and your cruelty which excite my indignation, because they sully the splendour of every triumph.”*

According to the report of an illustrious author,† the king addressed his auditors with so much emotion, that many of them were moved even to tears. Not a syllable was uttered in their excuse. By their silence they acknowledged the justness of the reproof, and secretly resolved never more to deserve a similar censure.

* 1632. *Swedish Intelligencer*, iii. 24. *Harte*, ii. 276.

† Khevenhillier.

After explaining his intentions to the chiefs in a pathetic discourse, he communicated them to the army by a proclamation, in which he solemnly denounced the severest punishment against every delinquent, without the smallest regard either to his rank or to his services. "Beware of attempting to desert, or to mutiny," such was the menace applied to the German auxiliaries, "for I have Swedes enough remaining to exterminate you all, even in the presence of Wallenstein; and, so long as my proceedings are sanctioned by justice, I am resolved that my orders shall be implicitly obeyed."*

Determined to carry this menace into execution, unless a total reformation should ensue, he caused a lieutenant to be hanged for pillaging; and, shortly after, being informed that a common soldier had stolen a cow, he ordered out the regiment to which he belonged, and, seizing the culprit with his own hands, delivered him over to the executioner. "It is better friend," said the king, with tender emotion, "that thou shouldest expiate thy offence by the sacrifice of life, than that thy crime should draw down the vengeance of the Almighty upon me, and thy gallant comrades: for though I consider every soldier in the light of a child, yet I am destined to perform the duties of a judge, no less than those of a parent."†

Meanwhile, the different detachments of the Swedish army were rapidly collecting; but, as they were scattered over the various provinces which extend from the Baltic to the Tirolian mountains, their union was attended with many difficulties, and afforded room for the display of those astonish-

* Harte, ii. 279. *Histoire de Gustave*, 524.

† Ibid. Harte, *ibid.*

ing talents, with which the generals of Gustavus were endowed. Aware of the danger to which rashness might expose them, the king thought it expedient to caution Oxenstiern against the perils incidental to precipitation. "Do not imagine," said he, "that I am reduced to such distress, as to make it necessary for you to brave every danger for my relief; proceed with circumspection, without suffering your apprehensions for my safety to warp your judgment; for, depend upon it, I shall be able to look my enemies in the face much longer than they are inclined to believe."^{*}

The measures adopted by the different commanders corresponded exactly with these instructions. William, Duke of Weimar, having assembled the forces in Lower Saxony, proceeded to Schweinfurt, where, being joined by a body of auxiliary Saxons, he crossed the Thuringian forest, and arrived in safety at Wurtzburg, the place appointed for his junction with Oxenstiern. The chancellor on his part had been equally active in collecting the troops employed in the provinces contiguous to the Rhine; and, being reinforced by Banier, and a body of Hessians, advanced to meet the Duke of Weimar, after leaving Horn, with a strong detachment, to watch the motions of the Spaniards. Finding himself at the head of little less than fifty thousand men, he directed his course by the shortest route toward Nuremberg, where he arrived without experiencing the smallest molestation.[†]

This fortunate event was celebrated by a general thanksgiving; for, amid the public distress, the piety of Gustavus regarded festivity as presump-

^{*} Khevenhillier, xii. 161.

[†] Puffendorf, iv. 41.

tuous. Being now superior to the enemy in numerical strength, he resolved no longer to remain on the defensive; Wallenstein, on the contrary, determined at all events to avoid an engagement: and, in order that nothing might compel him to relinquish his plan, he surrounded his camp with additional fortifications.

The augmentation of numbers, though it delivered the king from all apprehensions on the part of the enemy, was far from putting an end to his distress. To behold the brave companions of his victories swept away by fevers and dysenteries, was a calamity too severe for fortitude to endure; yet no remedy presented itself which reason could approve. He examined repeatedly the enemy's lines; he consulted his generals respecting the possibility of storming them; but all opinions agreed in pronouncing the enterprize impracticable. Drawing up his forces in order of battle, he daily endeavoured to tempt his antagonist to quit his intrenchments; but the prudence of Wallenstein was immovable. Batteries were constructed in front of the Austrian camp; no batteries, however, were raised to oppose them. Friedland pertinaciously adhering to his system, contented himself with removing to a more elevated spot, out of reach of the Swedish artillery.*

The patience of Gustavus being at length exhausted, in a moment of irritation he resolved upon an undertaking so desperate, that nothing but the extremest necessity ought to have suggested the attempt, because nothing but victory could justify it.

* Galetti, i. 271. Puffendorf, 22.

On the 24th of August, (the fifty-eighth day after his encampment under the walls of Nuremberg) intelligence was communicated, by an Austrian prisoner, that Wallenstein, reduced to the utmost distress, was preparing to quit his position.* The courage of Gustavus kindling at the idea of surprising the enemy during a retreat, he ordered his troops to prepare for combat; great, however, was his disappointment, when, upon nearer inspection, he discovered that the movement was for the purpose of occupying an ancient castle, which commanded their lines; and from which, if suffered to fall into his hands, they might be severely annoyed. Incensed at having allowed himself to be so easily deceived, the king was no longer master of his temper; but, giving way to the dictates of wounded pride, hastily resolved to persevere.† Pushing forward with an impetuosity which nothing could withstand, he compelled the Austrian outposts to retire precipitately to the camp, which occupied an eminence between the Rednitz and the Biber.‡

The post of honour was allotted to the Germans, who, after the most brilliant display of personal bravery, were compelled to retire with considerable loss. Exasperated at an occurrence which he might easily have foreseen, the king led the intrepid Finlanders to slaughter; men unconscious of fear, and never known to turn their backs on danger. But intrepidity now was of little avail; for all that it

* There is great reason to believe, that this information was received from a confidential servant belonging to Aldringer, sent on purpose to deceive Gustavus.—Swed. Intell. i. 40.

† Ibid. 251.

‡ The rivers Pegnitz and Rednitz unite at Furth. The Biber runs into the former below Nuremberg.

could arrive at, was the sterile honour of immolating life unprofitably. Brigade succeeded to brigade, exposed for hours, without the smallest covering, to the tremendous fire of one hundred and forty pieces of heavy artillery; while Wallenstein, secure behind a triple intrenchment, derided their impotent fury. The whole hill was involved in flames; yet no sooner was one regiment overpowered, than another was ordered to replace it; so that in the course of an action, which continued without intermission during ten hours, every corps was successively engaged.

The oldest generals universally agreed, that they never before witnessed so tremendous a scene. Duke Bernard and Wallenstein had their horses shot under them, and the king himself experienced a narrow escape, the heel of his boot being carried away by a cannon ball.* The combat continued with unabating ardour, though it clearly appeared to every officer, except to Gustavus, that he was sacrificing the lives of gallant men, without the smallest prospect of victory. The Landgrave of Hesse, afflicted to see this waste of blood, ventured to remonstrate: "Sir," said the indignant monarch, interrupting him hastily, "you are at perfect liberty to retire. I will reserve the glory for my own subjects, if German courage is so easily depressed." This reproach was totally unmerited; but rage and disappointment had so entirely occupied the soul of

* "A Dutch officer reports me a pretty storie of a compliment (or an allegiance rather) between an humble bullet and the king; namely, that a piece of the sole of his majestie's boote, neare unto the great toe of his right foote, was carried away with a shot. This bullet knew his place for a king should be touched no higher." A curious specimen of style and judgment!—Swed. Intel. 49.

Gustavus, as to render it insensible to the suggestions of prudence, and deaf to the cry of humanity. Never, perhaps, was persevering fortitude displayed more conspicuously; never, perhaps, was commander more ably supported. Banier and Torstenson were particularly distinguished, and Duke Bernard displayed those splendid talents, which rendered him worthy to succeed to the immortal Gustavus. At the head of the left wing he fought heroically against the right of the Austrians; though conscious that he was leading his followers to certain death, he climbed the rugged mountain, and, after incredible efforts, gained possession of an eminence which commanded the enemy's intrenchments.* But all the blood that had been shed had flowed ineffectually; the approach of night made it impossible for him to pursue the advantage, and a torrent of rain, which fell before morning, rendered the ground impracticable for cannon. A few hours reflection convincing the king that fortune for once had deserted him, he sent for Bernard; and, after a hasty conference, the trumpets sounded a retreat; which was conducted with so much skill and regularity, that Wallenstein never attempted to disturb it, even by the desultory evo-

* When Gustavus received intelligence of this gallant action, he appears to have entertained a gleam of hope, that it might lead to some decisive result. Anxious, however, to gain more minute information, he went in search of an officer on whose judgment he could rely, and accidentally meeting Hepburn, requested him to examine the ground. That gallant Scot, from an idea that his merit was not adequately rewarded, had signified his intention of quitting the Swedish service, and was actually preparing to leave the army, when he was attracted to the field by the resistless impulse of courage. "This, sire," said the intrepid warrior, "is an order which I will readily execute, because it is accompanied with danger."—Swed. Intell. iii. 44.

lutions of the croats. Nothing is more difficult to ascertain than the respective losses sustained in a battle, since both parties are interested in misrepresenting them; but we may fairly conclude the Swedes to have been the greatest sufferers, on account of their exposed situation.*

This sanguinary conflict appears to have inspired each commander with increasing admiration for the military talents of his opponents.† During fourteen days they continued in sight of each other; and, though both of them endured the severest distress, neither was inclined to renounce the barren gratification of beholding an adversary retreat. In the bosom of Wallenstein pride, however, was the predominant passion; humanity in that of Gustavus. The former, in consequence, would have seen the last soldier expire with hunger, rather than depart from the resolution of never moving, till the Swedes had set him the example. But the compassionate heart of the latter could ill endure the thought of occasioning by his obstinacy the destruction of those whom he had undertaken to defend; and, so long as the armies remained in the vicinity of Nuremberg, it was impossible that the malady should abate. Ten thousand of the inhabitants had already fallen victims to a pestilential malady, which daily augmented with alarming rapidity; and, in the Swedish camp, nearly double that number had perished. From the adjacent fields every vestige of vegetation had disappeared; the farm-houses and

* According to Galetti three thousand Swedes were slain (275); but most authors considerably diminish the number.

† A very spirited account of the whole proceedings may be found in Burgus, 377, ac.

villages were reduced to ashes ; and their miserable tenants, stripped of every thing necessary for the sustentation of life, filled the air with their curses and lamentations. Impregnated with the noxious effluvia of putrescent carcases, every breeze dispersed contagion.

With a bosom bleeding for the evils which he had been compelled to inflict, and utterly despairing to subdue the stubbornness of his rival, the Swedish monarch broke up his camp on the eighth of September. This sacrifice of pride to compassion might probably have been sooner consummated, had he not been detained by the dread of exposing his faithful allies to the fury of Wallenstein, who repeatedly swore to punish their obstinacy by a memorable revenge. These apprehensions, however, were in great measure dissipated by the gallantry of Kniphausen, who spontaneously offered to defend the city with four thousand men, under the penalty of losing his head. Unwilling even at last to abandon his post without the entire approbation of the citizens, Gustavus, having requested that an extraordinary assembly might be called, addressed himself thus to the senate: "Gentlemen," said he, pointing to their destined governor, "this gallant officer once defended an open village, for several days, against all the efforts of Tilly."* All fears being now dispelled, they not only agreed to the the king's proposal, but undertook to maintain the Swedish garrison at their own expense. Delighted at finding so much magnanimity among men of commercial pursuits, Gustavus explained to them the

* Gualdo, 135,

many difficulties which Wallenstein must encounter, should he rashly undertake a long and arduous siege at the approach of winter; "but should he attempt it," added he, "no distance nor obstacles shall prevent me from immediately marching to your relief."*

The Swedish army, before it decamped, presented battle to the imperialists. Far however from accepting the challenge, their prudent commander positively forbade even a cannon to be discharged, for fear a skirmish might ensue. Convinced by repeated failures that no insults could induce him to hazard a battle, the king proceeded by easy marches to Windesheim, where he allowed the troops a few days repose, in a country abounding in wholesome sustenance, and enjoying the blessing of an uncontaminated atmosphere.

Far from entertaining any hostile designs against Nuremberg, Wallenstein does not appear to have considered his own position as perfectly secure. Apprehensive that the retreat of the Swedes might be intended as a stratagem to draw him from his intrenchments, he never moved till he had received unquestionable information that they were actually approaching the frontier of Bavaria.† This intelligence having been confirmed from various quarters, he prepared for his departure, after setting fire to a prodigious quantity of baggage and military stores.‡ A great number of casques, and cuirasses, and other martial implements were left behind, which were religiously preserved as military trophies in the arsenal of Nuremberg.

Unable to satiate his vengeance in the blood of

* Harte, ii. 321.

† Schmidt, v. 9.

‡ Burgus, 388.

the citizens, Friedland indulged his relentless fury, by effacing the few remains of civilized life which had escaped the ferocity of the croats. Thick columns of smoke, ascending in every direction, announced the melancholy destiny which would have awaited the city, had his power been equal to his resentment. Crossing the Rednitz, he marched to Forheim, laying waste the country like an angry demon, whose highest gratification is to destroy.*

In order to follow Gustavus with uninterrupted attention, we have been tempted to neglect those military operations in which he was not personally engaged; and, as a moment of leisure is afforded for the inquiry, to them we shall now return.

In the preceding pages we saw the Archbishop of Treves endeavouring to escape from the rapacity of the Spaniards, by putting himself under the protection of Louis XIII. But the army destined for the defence of the electorate, proving too weak for the recovery of Coblentz, the French were reduced to the humiliating alternative, of either abandoning the enterprize altogether, or of soliciting the assistance of Sweden. However mortifying this necessity might prove to the feelings of a people, whose vanity was always unbounded, they preferred a conquest effected by the co-operation of an ally, to the disgrace of an unsuccessful campaign. No sooner was Horn apprised of their distress, than he flew to their succour; and soon compelled the city to surrender.

All communication being now cut off between the Lower Palatinate and the Netherlands, Gus-

* Puffendorf, iv, 53. Khevenhiller, xii. 157. Gaudetque viam fecisse ruine;

tavus is supposed to have formed the design of reinstating the unfortunate Frederic; and, as a preparatory step, sent orders to Horn to follow up the advantages already obtained, till he had forced the Spaniards to evacuate the Palatinate; while the Rhinegrave Otho Louis was directed to attack the imperialists in Alsace.*

Montecuculi, whose skilful and enterprising courage was destined to great and merited renown, had lately been appointed to the command of an army, assembled in the vicinity of Constance, and designed for the protection of Brissac. The local strength of that important fortress rendered it at once a receptacle for military stores, and a place of rendezvous for the numerous levies which were training in the adjacent provinces. Hearing that the Swedish force had been considerably weakened by repeated detachments, Montecuculi, whose troops were daily deserting from want of pay, resolved by the plunder of the Duchy of Wirtemberg to procure at least a temporary supply. No sooner was the duke apprised of his intention, than he hastily assembled the militia, and marched toward the frontier to meet the enemy; but, finding them superior both in numbers and discipline, he prudently retired to the impenetrable fastnesses in which the interior of Suabia abounds.†

Impelled by the necessity of providing subsistence for his famished soldiers, the Austrian general advanced with celerity at the head of the cavalry, to whom he allowed, as a substitute for regular pay, the unfettered indulgence of every

* Puffendorf, iv. 37.

† Gualdo, 123, recounts events in which he was himself an actor.

brutal appetite. The small town of Knitlingen was abandoned to the flames, because the indigence of its inhabitants afforded nothing to satiate rapacity.*

While these savage banditti were gratifying their ferocity with this fiend-like amusement, intelligence arrived that an Austrian column had been surrounded, as it was marching for the purpose of surprising Wiseloch, and unless speedily succoured must soon be forced to surrender at discretion. Apprehensive of the consequences of entangling himself in a country covered with forests, Montecuculi prudently hesitated; but Ossa, an officer of great experience, who was second in command, allured by the prospect of an abundant booty, (as most of the wealth of the adjacent provinces was known to be deposited at Wiseloch) insisted that the enterprize could not be declined without exposing the army to eternal disgrace: Montecuculi, taking fire at the imputation, suffered courage to get the better of judgment. The event however fully justified his suspicions; for, being attacked by the rhinegrave, who issued unexpectedly from the adjacent woods, the whole body was instantly thrown into confusion, and the greater part of them cut in pieces. It was to the speed of their horses that Montecuculi and Ossa were indebted for safety.†

The invasion of his dominions, without any previous declaration of hostilities, determined the Duke of Wirtemberg to accede to the treaty so repeatedly proposed by the King of Sweden.‡

* Gualdo, 123. Swed. Intell. iv. 40.

† Gualdo, ib. Swed. Intell. 44. Puffendorf, iv. 51. ‡ Gualdo, 127.

The example of a prince, more celebrated for prudence than for courage, was followed by many of the Alsacian barons, by whose assistance Gustavus was enabled to raise several additional regiments, and to draw supplies from a country, whose natural exuberance still afforded ample resources.* Availing themselves of the friendly disposition of the natives, the Swedish commanders reduced the greater part of that fertile province, and were even received at Strasburg with cordial marks of attachment.†

In Saxony affairs wore a less favourable aspect, because they were conducted with less ability. All endeavours having failed to induce the elector to accede to a separate peace, the court of Vienna determined to effect by coercion what it had ineffectually attempted by solicitation. Orders were in consequence issued for the Silesian army to enter Lusatia. Fire and devastation accompanied their steps, according to the usual practice of Austria, who constantly acted, as if she thought the calamities incidental to war too lenient for the gratification of orthodox hatred, unless heightened by gratuitous cruelty. Lubben, Zittau, and Gorlitz, having fallen successively a prey to the brutality of the victors, the elector grew alarmed for the safety of Dresden, and began seriously to prepare for its defence. Under pretence that a diversion would be the most effectual method of averting the storm, Arnheim entered Silesia, where he invested Glogau; and, having carried it by assault, put every man to the sword, in retaliation for the atrocities committed in the electorate. Crossing the Oder upon

* Histoire de Gustave, 530.

† Swed. Intell. iv. 125.

a temporary bridge, he followed the imperialists, who fled to Breslau, where they expected to find an asylum. But as neither threats nor intreaties could procure them admission, they sought a refuge behind the ramparts of Lissa, while the Saxons advancing, without the smallest opposition, reduced nearly the whole of Silesia.

This enterprise, though apparently glorious to the Saxon arms, was so eminently deficient in common prudence, as to create a suspicion that Arnheim had pushed his conquest to the frontiers of Hungary, for the purpose of leaving his master's dominions a prey to the fury of Wallenstein: for no sooner was the haughty dictator informed of the defenceless state of the electorate, than he sent **Holk** with directions to ravage the country with fire and sword: for the execution of a plan so repugnant to the feelings of a generous mind, no fitter instrument could have been selected. Whatever was clothed in a human form, from the amiable innocence of helpless infancy to the no less helpless decrepitude of age, became the object of his sanguinary fury.* To die without insult was a blessing reserved for such alone, as wanted attractions to excite those carnal appetites, which nature implanted in the breast of man, to shew how nearly he is allied to the brute creation, when his passions are no longer under the guidance of reason. From the windows of his palace the trembling sovereign beheld the towns and villages involved in flames; and the fruits of the earth unmercifully blighted by

* "Near Friberg **Holk's** men taking high displeasure at a certain minister of the country, a man of rare learning, first hewed him in pieces with their swords, and then flung him to their dogs to be eaten." Swed. Intell. iii. 100.

the torch of devastation, before they had attained to maturity.

With no less ferocity Gallas advanced by Hoff and Placien. Chemnitz and Altenburg, both flourishing towns, were reduced to ashes with wanton barbarity,* after which glorious exploits he formed a junction with Holk, a worthy coadjutor, when they compelled Freyberg to pay an extravagant ransom, in order to save from profanation the magnificent sepulchres of the Saxon family, which Gallas with more than Gothic impiety was preparing rudely to violate. Following the course of the Elbe they took possession of Meissen, so celebrated for its manufactory of porcelaine, and were actually preparing to glut their avidity by the plunder of Leipsic, when they were suddenly stopped in their sanguinary career, by an unexpected order from Wallenstein.†

Pappenheim meanwhile had supported the war in Lower Saxony with admirable skill, but with varying fortune. When compelled by Banier to abandon the Elbe, he burst into Hessa like a destructive torrent, sweeping every thing away which could embellish life, or administer to the comforts of man. After reducing the landgraivete to a perfect desert, he made a wonderful effort for the relief of Maestrich, then upon the point of surrendering to the Prince of Orange. This latter enterprize

* Swed. Intell. iii. 100.

† Khevenhiller, xii. 49. *Histoire de Gustave*, 538.—It is necessary to observe that this hasty sketch embraces events, which occurred both before and after the blockade of Nuremberg. But chronological exactness would have interrupted the narrative, which it was important to present to the reader's eye clear and unbroken. Gallas for instance was present in the camp before Nuremberg, where he commanded a division of the imperial army.

however completely failed through the jealousy of the Spanish commanders,* who had the baseness to witness the heroism of Pappenheim, without being impelled by a sentiment of honour to assist him.† Recalled in haste for the defence of Westphalia, where the Swedes, under the orders of Luneburg and Baudissen, were daily becoming more formidable, his presence by restoring confidence to the disheartened troops arrested the progress of the enemy, and even compelled them to raise the siege of Paderborn.‡

After the belligerent armies had quitted Nuremberg, the King of Sweden expected that Maximilian at least would follow him into Bavaria; but, finding that he still continued with Wallenstein, he began to suspect that they intended to abandon the country south of the Danube, with the view of making themselves masters of the Franconian fortresses, and thus intercepting his communication with northern Germany. Anxious, however, to provide against the impending storm, in whatever quarter it might burst, he divided his army into two bodies; one of which, under Duke Bernard, was destined to act on the banks of the Mayne, while at the head of the other he determined to penetrate into the hereditary dominions of Austria. This latter resolution is said to have been embraced in conformity to the advice of Oxenstiern, who felt assured that Wallenstein would be recalled for the defence of Vienna, before his master arrived at Munich. This supposition, though founded upon the most rational calcula-

* Gonsalvo di Cordova, and the Marquis of Santa Croce.

† Harte, ii. 308. Gualdo, 132.

‡ Puffendorf, iv. 44. Lotichius, i. 1033.

tions, proved erroneous; because the plans of the enemy were guided by motives very different from those by which, under similar circumstances, that honest statesman would have been actuated.

After ineffectually attempting to surprise Culmbach and Coburg, and sacking Bareuth, Friedland renounced the project of recovering Franconia, induced alike by the difficulty of the undertaking and the hope of accomplishing, without interruption, the long-meditated conquest of Saxony. Deaf to the intreaties of Maximilian, he abandoned him entirely to his own resources; and, though the Bavarian army was reduced to little more than seven thousand men, he suffered him to depart with the bitter reflection, of having wasted the blood and treasure of his subjects for no better purpose than to gratify the vanity of a rival.*

After retaking Rayne, which had been suffered to fall into the hands of the enemy, by the dastardly conduct of the governor, the king proceeded to Neuburg, in pursuit of Montecuculi, who, in spite of the exertions of his vigilant adversary, contrived to take shelter in Ratisbonne. No man rewarded merit with greater generosity than Gustavus, but he punished cowardice with no less severity. Rayne having been plentifully provided with every thing necessary for its defence, the king was so exasperated at the timidity of Mitzval, that he caused him to be beheaded in presence of the whole army, unmoved by the urgent petitions of the queen, who, with the characteristic sensibility of her sex, implored a mitigation of the sentence. Desirous of securing his conquests in Bavaria, by

* Puffendorf, iv. 55. Harte, ii. 36.

the possession of some important fortress, he was making preparations for besieging Ingolstadt, and had actually embarked his artillery on the Danube, when a courier arrived with the unwelcome intelligence that the imperial army had burst into Misnia. Not a moment was required for deliberation; his character for honour was at stake; and though he might perhaps have been able to justify to the world the abandonment of John George, his own conscience was less easily satisfied. Having left a body of troops under Prince Christian of Birkenfeldt, as provisionary commander till the recovery of Banier, who had been wounded in storming the Austrian lines, and sent directions for the different detachments to join him on his march, he hastened to Nuremberg, to arrange with Oxenstiern a plan for the defence of Franconia. Their conferences were protracted for three days, at the expiration of which the king hurried to Schweinfurth, where the virtuous Eleanora awaited his arrival; while Kniphausen followed with the garrison of Nuremberg, no longer required for its protection. After uniting with Bernard in the Thuringian forest, he found himself at the head of twenty thousand men, the bravest and best disciplined in Europe.

Nothing less than the extraordinary celerity of his march could have enabled Gustavus to get possession of Erfurt before the arrival of Pappenheim, who no sooner received intelligence of his approach than he attempted, by a bold and rapid movement, to occupy that important fortress, together with Naumburg, justly regarded as the key of the Electorate. It was before his departure from the former city, that the King of Sweden took leave of his

amiable consort, with more than wonted solemnity, as if he had anticipated the fate that awaited him.

Gustavus having received intelligence that Pappenheim was advancing, by hasty marches, to pass the Saale at Merseburg, dispatched Bernard, with some regiments of cavalry, to watch his motions; leaving him at liberty to conduct his operations as circumstances might render expedient. Yet, in spite of the skill and activity of that enterprising warrior, Pappenheim effected a junction with Friedland; who, after his separation from Maximilian, had penetrated without opposition to the gates of Leipsic, and compelled it to receive an Austrian garrison. It was evidently his intention to have proceeded to Dresden, but the rapidity of the enemy compelled him to adopt a different system; as he might otherwise have found himself entangled in the web which he had been artfully preparing for the elector, who lay with his forces in the vicinity of Torgau, and might have easily fallen upon the rear of the Austrians, while the Swedes attacked them in front.*

To frustrate the execution of this design, as well as to cut off a column under the Duke of Luneburg, which was actually on its march from Lower Saxony, appear to have been the principal objects which occupied Wallenstein. The latter would have proved no easy task, had the duke conformed to the instructions of Gustavus; but, instead of proceeding by Halle or Eichfeldt, he flattered himself to meet with fewer obstructions on the opposite bank of the Elbe; but when he arrived at Wittemberg, he found himself involved in so many diffi-

* Galetti, 289. Burgus, 392. !

culties, that he abandoned the enterprise in despair.*

On the first of November, 1632, the Swedes entered Naumburg, situated upon the Saale, in a narrow valley, about half way between Erfurt and Leipsic. The name of Gustavus was so popular in Saxony, that he was welcomed with an adoration almost idolatrous. From all the adjacent villages the inhabitants flocked by thousands to behold the hero who had so lately rescued them from the fangs of Tilly, and who now returned to protect them against the ferocity of a commander no less sanguinary and rapacious.* With prayers and blessings they crowded round him, imprinting kisses on his boots, or on the hem of his garment. Though a heart so alive to every tender feeling as that of Gustavus, was far from insensible to this enthusiastic gratitude, still he revolted at finding himself the object of veneration too profound to be offered to a mortal. Turning to his chaplain, Fabritius, he made the following observation, which the event almost rendered prophetic: "Notwithstanding every enterprise has hitherto prospered, I greatly fear that some unforeseen misfortune will shortly convince this deluded people of their folly, in addressing such unfounded homage to a being, subject like themselves to all the frailties of mortality."†

By possessing themselves of Naumburg, together with the adjacent defiles, the imperialists would have been enabled materially to obstruct the operations of the enemy, the neighbouring country being

* Puffendorf, iv. 56.

† Khevenhiller, xii. 158.

† Harte, li. 351. Galetti, 293.

particularly calculated for a defensive system of warfare. Wallenstein, when too late, perceived his error in having neglected to occupy the passes, and would probably have attempted to retrieve it by temerity, had he not been deterred from attacking the Swedes by the judicious remonstrances of Pappenheim. The opinion of an officer, so conspicuous for enterprising courage, could not fail of producing considerable effect, when he objected to a project on account of its rashness; and, on the present occasion, he estimated too justly the talents of Gustavus, to doubt that he would avail himself of every local advantage, to render his position unassailable.* He farther contended, that at the approach of winter it would be highly imprudent to expose the troops to unnecessary hardships, exhausted as they were by a series of sufferings unequalled in any former campaign; and, as an additional argument for avoiding an engagement, he urged the propriety of endeavouring to relieve the city of Cologne,† and of checking the progress of Bauditzen in Westphalia. Under these circumstances, he recommended to the generalissimo to canton the troops in the adjacent towns, which he thought might be effected in such a manner, as to allow of their being assembled at the shortest notice.‡

The idea of sending an army into winter quarters, at the very moment when an army was advancing against it, appears an enigma of no easy solution,

* Pappenheim was not mistaken; for the king was no sooner master of Naumburg, than he caused it to be surrounded with a strong intrenchment.—Francheville, 427.

† Besieged by the Duke of Berg.

‡ Khevenhiller, 186. *Histoire de Gustave*, 550.

Notwithstanding the explanation already given; because it was hardly possible to imagine, that the most enterprising general who had appeared in the world since the days of the first and the greatest of the Cæsars, should have resisted the temptation of displaying his triumphant banners on the walls of Vienna, for the sole purpose of remaining inactive on the confines of Saxony. It is, therefore, necessary to suppose, that the advice of Pappenheim proceeded from motives of which we are ignorant, since it made so strong an impression upon Wallenstein, that he not only entrusted the author of it with the defence of Westphalia, but even imprudently weakened his own army, that he might enable Pappenheim to act with additional vigour. Having thus settled a plan for their future operations, Weissenfels was abandoned* by the imperialists, though Coloredo was left with an inconsiderable force to protect the castle, and to watch the motions of the enemy.†

According to the opinion generally entertained, Gustavus did not intend to have given battle to the Austrians till he should have effected a junction with the Saxons; who, in conformity to a plan judiciously traced by that consummate master in the science of war, were to cross the Mulda at Eulemburg, and to meet him in the vicinity of Grimma.‡ To facilitate the execution of this im-

* November 4, 1632.

† Francheville, 426. The latter part of this interesting publication, comprising a long and scientific dissertation upon the battles of Breitenfeld and of Lutzen, is attributed to an officer of eminence in the Prussian service, who repeatedly examined the ground where those memorable actions took place, and drew plans of them upon the very spots where they were fought.

‡ Harte, ii. 350.

portant design, he directed his march by Wethau, Plotha, and Gleitzberg; but having gained intelligence that Pappenheim had been detached from the main army, he resolved immediately to attack the enemy, before the ablest of their generals could be recalled.*

From the most credible authorities, we learn that Wallenstein was no less astonished than disconcerted, when he was apprised by Coloredo that the Swedes were approaching.† Surrounded by difficulties, of which the greater part were created by his own imprudence, he hesitated at first in what manner to act; pride, however, presenting to his troubled imagination the ignominy inseparable from a hasty retreat, he sent orders for Pappenheim instantaneously to abandon the siege of Moritzburg,‡ and to join him with all his forces at Lutzen.

The death of the most illustrious of modern commanders has given a melancholy celebrity to the battle of Lutzen, which makes it scarcely less an object of curiosity to posterity than it proved a subject of affliction to the protestants. The eyes of all Europe were attentively fixed on the plains of Saxony, where the approaching combat was expected to determine a question, as momentous as any which had ever been decided by the sword. Compared with the enormous hosts which are sent into the field by the powerful nations of the present

* Fifth of November. Puffendorf, iv. 63.

† If this was actually the case, it is certain that Gustavus must have completely deceived both him and Pappenheim, respecting his future intentions. This, indeed, is the only supposition which can render their conduct intelligible; because they could never have dreamed of separating the army, unless they had been persuaded that he would remain upon the defensive.

‡ The citadel of Halle.

age, both Swedes and Austrians were numerically weak; but, since the destruction of republican Rome, none ever exceeded the troops in valour and discipline, and few had equalled the commanders in reputation. On one side, we behold a young and adventurous warrior, on whom fortune had invariably smiled, contending in the cause of religion and freedom; assisted by generals whom he had trained to conquest, and who were anxious to deserve the approbation of a sovereign, no less capable of appreciating merit, than prompt to reward it. Neither were the soldiers unworthy of their leaders. Accustomed from their infancy to the tempestuous blasts which sweep the Dalecarlian forests, and inured to hardships, which, to men enervated by the comforts of a more genial climate, would have appeared intolerable, they contemplated the monarch, by whom they were conducted from triumph to triumph, with sentiments of the tenderest affection, esteeming him as a friend, revering him as a father, and adoring him as a protecting divinity. His presence was their chief gratification; his safety their greatest security; his praise their proudest recompense.

Though in the character of Wallenstein, qualities the most opposite, and even the most inconsistent, were strangely blended, yet even his failings were of a nature to dazzle those, who, incapable of analyzing the human mind, mistook pride for magnanimity, confounded profusion with generosity, and regarded success as the criterion of genius. Without troubling themselves to balance the actions which he had performed, against the means which he possessed for performing them, the zealous pa-

pists extolled him as the champion of the orthodox faith, not because he was endowed with extraordinary piety, but because interest and ambition had rendered him an enemy to the protestants; while the base tools of despotism idolized him as the defender of that detestable system, which their ignorance or their servility supported.

Thus every feeling which can animate or pervert the human heart was called into action. A bigoted attachment to ancient institutions, a hatred of foreign interference, the love of glory, the force of habit, and the cry of superstition, all combined to inspire the soldiers of Ferdinand with courage or ferocity; together with the highest veneration for the splendid talents of their commander: for after every deduction it is impossible to deny, that though Wallenstein had little to inspire affection, he had much to excite admiration. Many certainly had surpassed him in the higher branches of tactics, but in cunning and artifice he was perhaps never exceeded. Though sometimes deficient in foresight he abounded in resources, and if he involved himself in difficulties from having mistaken the projects of an enemy, he invariably met them with an unshaken resolution, which more than compensated the error.

No sooner was he made acquainted with the motions of the Swedes, than he sent Isolani to dispute the passage of the Rippach, a small river which rises in the vicinity of Weissenfels, and falls into the Saale at Doehlan; but being subject to frequent inundations, renders the adjacent meadows deep and boggy. The narrow valley, through which it takes its winding course, is entirely surrounded

by lofty rocks covered with wood, and consequently affords many strong positions, eminently calculated for defensive warfare. Isolani, however, had neglected most of these local advantages, to concentrate his forces in a particular spot where he expected the enemy; by which imprudent arrangement he left another road, almost equally obvious, unprotected by cannon. The popularity of the cause in which Gustavus was embarked facilitating the acquisition of intelligence, a peasant offered to conduct him to the abovementioned place, where he might cross the marshes without molestation, and by a winding path gain the summit of the opposite hill, where the vanguard of the Austrians lay encamped. While Isolani was deceived by a false attack, the Swedish army ascended the heights, fell unexpectedly upon the rear of the croats; and, having put them to flight, advanced with all the pomp of military array against the main body of the imperialists.*

Lutzen is situated at nearly equal distances between Weissenfels and Leipsic; the high road traverses the principal street, and after leaving the town is bordered by deep ditches and lofty banks, thrown up with regularity sufficient to form a tolerable breastwork. The contiguous plain is likewise

* Francheville, 430; the only author, who, to my knowledge, gives a satisfactory account of this event. It is hardly credible, says that intelligent writer, that a general of high reputation should have neglected to occupy a defile, which, if properly defended by twenty thousand men, might have set three times that force at defiance. But this is by no means the only occurrence which tends to excite a suspicion that the military talents of Wallenstein were far from pre-eminent. The post which he abandoned was in every respect preferable to that which he afterwards occupied, and infinitely stronger than that which covered the front of the Austrian army at Breitenfels, and which Tilly has been so severely censured for neglecting to fortify.—Ibid, 432.

intersected with trenches in various directions, cut for the purpose of draining; notwithstanding which precaution, the soil is unsound, and in a rainy season presents continual impediments to military evolutions. The village of Meuchen, (called erroneously Chursitz by many historians) lies a little to the south of Lutzen, and at a small distance from the Flossgraben, an artificial canal, destined to open a communication between the Saale and the Elster, but which varies greatly in size, being in some places scarcely twelve feet wide, while in others it is more than double. The water, however, is usually shallow, unless swollen by violent showers. After crossing the Flossgraben, by means of a bridge, the road for the space of nearly half a mile follows the course of the canal, which is there from twelve to eighteen feet broad, its banks being of nearly half that altitude. The imperial army was drawn up at the distance of about three hundred yards from the causeway, and extended from the Flossgraben to a road which leads from Lutzen to Merseburg. The walls belonging to the adjacent gardens, as well as the ditches, were lined with infantry; two batteries were also erected on commanding situations, one of seven, the other of fourteen pieces of artillery.* It appears, also, that upon this occasion Wallenstein condescended to adopt the Swedish method of stationing small squadrons of cavalry in the intervals between the different bodies of infantry, though he still persevered in the ancient system of forming the latter into vast and unwieldy masses.† The Duke of Friedland in per-

* Francheville, 440.

† Harte, ii. 358. Puffendorf, iv. 63.

son commanded the centre, Coloredo the right wing, and Holk the left, but only provisionally, till Pappenheim should arrive.*

The delay occasioned in passing the Rippach prevented the King of Sweden from attacking the imperialists till the following morning; a circumstance which greatly augmented his difficulties, because it allowed time for the arrival of Pappenheim. For the sake of expedition the greater part of the baggage, and all the heavy artillery had been left behind; so that the king, being totally destitute of a camp equipage, was obliged to pass the night in his carriage. A short space, however, was allotted to repose, the greater part being spent in interesting discourse with Duke Bernard and Kniphausen. The troops were drawn up in two lines upon the field of battle, ready to commence the engagement at the dawn of day; the left wing reaching nearly to the walls of Lutzen, the right extending beyond the canal to the wood of Schoeltzig. A battery containing twenty-six of the largest cannon was erected in front of the army, while twenty pieces of smaller calibre were planted in the wings, and five were attached to each brigade.

The morning approached,† but an impenetrable fog prolonged the night beyond its usual duration. Necessitated to defer the combat till the horizon should clear, Gustavus ordered prayers to be read to every regiment,‡ while, falling on his knees, in

* It is not surprising to find so little agreement in the account transmitted by contemporary writers, respecting the death of Gustavus, because they differ materially even upon points, where no variety of opinion ought reasonably to exist. By some the command of the right wing is given to Coloredo, by others to Scomberg.

† November 6th, 1632.

‡ Puffendorf, iv. 63.

presence of the whole army, he devoutly offered up his petitions to the Almighty. Being earnestly requested to take some refreshment, he declined it. He likewise refused, though repeatedly solicited, to put on his armour, returning for answer to those who pressed for it in the language of scripture, "The Lord is my defence!" The reason usually given for this determination is, that he had lately received a contusion in the shoulder from a musket ball, which made the pressure of a cuirass intolerable. The only precaution which he could be prevailed to use, was that of wearing a waistcoat of elf's-skin, which is still preserved as a curiosity at Vienna.

About eight o'clock the mist began gradually to disperse, when mounting his horse, the king rode along the lines, exhorting his troops to do their duty. To the Swedes he addressed himself in nearly the following words: "My friends and companions in every toil, the moment is approaching when an opportunity will be afforded you of shewing the world what you really are. Conform implicitly to the orders you shall receive, and behave like men who know the value of honour, and who fight in defence of the true religion; and Heaven, I trust, will prosper your efforts: but if you disgrace the cause in which we are engaged, I solemnly swear that not one atom of your dust shall ever return to Sweden."

To the Germans he said, "I conjure you, friends, this day to second me with unshaken courage. I require of you nothing but what I will myself perform; for I hope never to be afraid of shedding my blood, when religion and liberty demand the sacrifice. Remember that now they are both at stake,

Conduct yourselves, as you have hitherto done, like valiant soldiers, and I will venture to promise you success ; but if you suffer the enemy to obtain the victory, your future portion must be slavery and contempt." Gustavus paused, when a loud and continued shout of approbation proclaimed the feelings of every combatant to be in unison with those of their heroic leader.*

The disposition of the army was nearly similar to that which had been employed with so much advantage on the plains of Breitenfeldt ; the infantry drawn up in two lines, and the battalions interspersed with squadrons of horse, while the main body of the cavalry was stationed in the wings. Gustavus, according to custom, commanded the right wing, Duke Bernard the left, and the Count of Wisingsburg the centre. The second line, consisting of nearly equal strength, was disposed according to similar principles, under the orders of Bulach, Kniphausen, and the Prince of Anhalt. Neither Horn,† Banier, nor Bauditzen were present.

No historical detail is more liable to error than the description of a battle ; even the result has been often a subject of contention ; neither is it uncommon for both parties to return thanks to the Almighty, for having crowned their arms with victory. It cannot therefore be expected that historians should agree respecting an event so interesting to their feelings as the death of a hero, who was the idol of one sect, and the terror of the other. No account that has fallen under my inspection,

* Harte, ii. 359. *Histoire de Gustave*, 558.

† Burgus makes Horn a principal actor, 410.

appears to me so satisfactory as the following, extracted from Siri, and professedly copied from a dispatch, sent by Duke Bernard to Louis XIII. almost immediately after the fatal event.*

It was nearly ten o'clock before the horizon was sufficiently clear for the King of Sweden to discover the arrangements of the enemy; he then beheld the imperial army drawn up in order of battle with every local advantage; batteries being erected in front of their lines, and the ditches (those of course which bordered the road) filled with musketeers. Their right was covered by the town of Lutzen, and their left by the Flossgraben. After attentively examining their position,† the king advanced in the finest order, notwithstanding his troops were exposed to a tremendous fire from the Austrian artillery. The Duke of Weimar received directions to commence the attack, which he did with his accustomed impetuosity; and after a stubborn resistance he drove the enemy from their intrenchments, took several of their guns, and even compelled them to evacuate Lutzen, after setting fire to some of the houses.‡

The king was no less successful where he commanded in person, having forced the Austrians to abandon the ditches with so much precipitation, that they left most of their cannon behind. Eager to avail himself of their confusion, he put himself

* *Memorie Recond.* vii. 541.

† Gustavus was accompanied by the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, by Crailshain, grand-master of his household, by a few Scotch and English gentlemen, who served as volunteers, together with three or four menial attendants.—Harte, ii. 365.

‡ According to Burgus, Wallenstein had not troops sufficient to defend the town. 405.

at the head of the Steinboch dragoons, and, crossing the trenches, got possession of one of the batteries.* Believing the fortune of the day to have been decided, he took off his hat, and expressed his gratitude to Heaven in a short thanksgiving; but perceiving two regiments of Austrian cuirassiers advancing, he charged them without hesitation, exposing himself with so little precaution, that his horse was wounded by a pistol shot, while another bullet shattered his left arm. The extreme agony of the wound compelling him to check his impetuous career, he retired from the field, attended by the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, who had lately entered the Swedish service as a volunteer.† From his anxiety to conceal the accident from his own troops, the king passed so near the enemy's line, that a colonel of cavalry, named Falkenberg, ap-

* Till after Gustavus's death, the account given by Siri agrees in all material points with that of the best historians, and is deficient only in those minute details, which were likely to have been omitted in an official paper. According to Harte (366) the ditches were defended with so much pertinacity, that some of the Swedish regiments shewed a backwardness to advance. The king observing their hesitation, hastened to the spot, and snatching a pike from one of the officers, exclaimed, in a tone of anger, "If after passing so many rivers, scaling so many fortresses, and proving victorious in so many engagements, you tremble to cross a paltry trench, remain where you are, and you shall behold your king die as a soldier ought." This reproach produced the desired effect. "Stop, sire," cried the whole body with one accordant voice, "for Heaven's sake spare your precious life, and you shall never again have cause to upbraid us."--Galetti confirms this relation, 295, as does Burgus, 409.

† His only attendants at this time were Lauenburg, his aid-de-camp, and two menial servants. Seeing him bleed, the soldiers cried out in dismay, "The king is wounded." "It is merely a trifle," replied Gustavus, "let us return to the charge." Finding, however, that his strength began to fail, he said in a low voice to the duke, "Cousin, I feel that I have had enough; assist me, I beseech you, in retiring to a place of safety."--Harte, 377. Hist. de Gustave, 560.

proached him* unobserved, and discharging a pistol in his back, wounded him so severely, that he instantly fell from his horse; but scarcely had Falkenberg perpetrated this dastardly deed, when he was killed by the aide-de-camp of Lauenburg.† A Swedish officer, who witnessed the melancholy

* This circumstance is confirmed both by Burgus and Harte; by the latter of whom we are informed, that as the king was preparing to quit the field, an imperial cavalier advanced unnoticed, and fired a pistol into his back, crying out with apparent exultation, "Long have I sought thee!"—Ibid. These remarkable words, if really uttered, tend materially to corroborate the opinion, that Gustavus fell a victim to treachery; because, as he wore no particular badge of distinction, some unfair means must necessarily have been employed, in order to designate his person. But more upon this subject hereafter. Mention is made of this circumstance in the Swedish Intelligencer, though different words are put into the mouth of the assassin, viz. "This is the right bird." His last words were, "My God! my God!" 137.

Prob furiale nefas, nulloque in sæcla piandum
Igne scelus! Gustave, jaces? nec bellica virtus
Præstitit incolumem, *posticæque* tela repressit.

Adolphid. xi. 615.

† This officer was brother to the general who defended Magdeburg so gallantly.

Mauritius contra Falkenbergius equestris legionis Gotzianæ legatus Cæsari militavit; post captus a Suecis, et paucis diebus ante dimissus, quam ad Lutzam fuit dimicandum, eidem prælio interfuit, regemque Sueciæ quem paulo ante captivus, et propter merita Theodori Falkenbergii familiariter habitus, optime de facie norat, plumbea glante sauciatum equo primus dejecit, pariterque hostili telo confixus concidit proxime regem, cui humo prostrato, fatali ictu superveniens Georgii ab Oynhausen Gotzianæ legionis equitum magistri legatus, Johannes Schneeberg ex Boekendorp diocesis Padebornensis vico oriandus, ilia ense confodit, peremit, spoliavitque exanimem. Placuit hoc recens Padebornensium militum facinus, dum vetera monumenta percensemus, hic subnectere, et verbo ad posteritatis memoriam consignare; ne qui alii ut post victoriam ignavi etiam gloriantur, hanc sibi laudem præcerpant. Nobis cum certa fides ex iis, qui prælio interfuere, tum torques aureus regi inter opima spolia a Schneebergio detractus, relatusque testis est. Neque aliud nobis propositum quam partam Paderbornensium nomini gloriam candidæ veritati asserere.—Furstenberg, Monum. Paderborn. 195.—A most glorious subject of triumph truly!

scene, flew to the assistance of the bleeding monarch, when to his inexpressible affliction he found him already in the agonies of death, and totally unable to speak. At this awful moment, some Austrian dragoons came up, and seeing Gustavus extended on the ground, inquired his name and rank in the army. Fearful of the consequences of betraying his master, the Swede simply replied that he was an officer of distinction. Not satisfied with the explanation, and unable to extort any other, they cut him down; and, having stripped off his clothes, directed their fury against the fallen hero, whom they stabbed in several places, with the ferocity of savages, and then left his naked and mangled body to be trampled upon by men and horses.*

A French officer, named Truxes, having seen Gustavus fall, carried the melancholy tidings to the Duke of Weimar,† who, hastening to Kniphausen, communicated in a whisper the fatal event, requesting his opinion respecting their future operations. Overwhelmed with consternation, that gallant officer proposed a retreat, assuring the duke, that the army was still in such a situation as to allow of its being effected securely. "Retreat?" exclaimed Bernard, indignant at a proposal so disgraceful to the memory of the departed hero, "No, never will I consent to abandon the contest, till we have avenged the death of Gustavus." The chief command now devolving on him, he prepared im-

* This narrative is said to be exactly conformable to that delivered by Chemnitz.

† According to other accounts, the first suspicion entertained of the irreparable misfortune which had befallen the Swedish army, was excited by seeing the royal charger covered with blood, and without a rider.—Khevenbiller, 191.

mediately for renewing the attack, by putting himself at the head of the regiment of Steinboch, and ordering it to charge the Austrian cuirassiers. The lieutenant colonel hesitated to comply, and even manifested an inclination to dispute his authority. Without wasting a moment in useless expostulations, the gallant Saxon ran him through with his sword, determined to enforce the most implicit obedience by a striking act of severity. This summary proceeding proved decisive, the Austrians were assailed with desperate valour, and forced again to retire; but as they continued to resist with obstinacy, the batteries were successively taken and lost. Toward evening, however, the persevering bravery of the Swedish troops bore down all opposition. Getting possession of the Austrian artillery, and turning them against their broken battalions, the Swedes compelled them to fly precipitately towards Leipsic.

Thus far the account, delivered in the dispatch, has been strictly followed; but, after the death of Gustavus, the writer confines himself to general results, as if the extent of the calamity, to which his country was exposed, had rendered him incapable of entering into details. It becomes necessary, therefore, to resume the narrative from that eventful moment, when the great champion of protestantism expired.

Instead of allowing themselves to be depressed by that irreparable misfortune, every Swedish soldier panted for revenge, while the dispositions made by Duke Bernard, upon assuming the command, proved him no unworthy successor to Gustavus. The central columns, led on by Wisingsburg, charged the enormous masses of Austrian infantry

with an impetuosity which nothing could withstand. Several cannon and standards were captured; and the confusion occasioned by this rapid success was greatly augmented by the explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder, accidentally kindled by a bomb. Believing their position to have been turned, the imperialists fled in disorder, in spite of all the efforts of Wallenstein, who employed alternately threats and exhortations. Terrified at a disaster which foreboded ruin to the catholic church, the Abbot of Fulda rode through the ranks with a crucifix in his hand, imploring the fugitives to return and exterminate the heretics, as Joshua had formerly done the Philistines. But as well might he have essayed to bridle the raging torrent, when swelled by the dissolution of the Alpine snows; for they heard with indifference the promises of paradise, though lavished with prodigality by the pious incendiary, who, while he ineffectually implored them to face their pursuers, perished the victim of his sanguinary zeal.*

At this important crisis, when dismay and tumult were rapidly spreading from rank to rank, Pappenheim arrived with his cavalry. The order to return was delivered to him, while the infantry were in the act of plundering Halle; when finding it impracticable to collect the scattered companies with the celerity which his own impatient courage and the exigency of affairs required, he set off for Lutzen with a few regiments of horse, leaving instructions for the remainder of his forces to follow, the moment it should be possible to assemble them.

* Fuldensis abbas, benedictinus monachus, ac princeps imperii, dum pie crucem præ manibus gestans manipulos ad strenue pro fide catholica pugnandum hortatur, misere ab hoste dilaniatus mortem oppetiit.—Burgus, 418.

The presence of a general so deservedly popular, did more toward reviving the drooping spirit of the Austrians, than all the priors and prelates of the papal communion could have done, had they combined in preaching extirpation. Placing himself at the head of the left wing, his destined post, he rallied the fugitives, and recovered most of the cannon.* Impatient to meet the Swedish monarch, whom he equally envied and admired, he broke with resistless impetuosity through the squadrons of the enemy, who, unable to withstand the violent shock, were again driven across the trenches. The yellow regiments, particularly distinguished through the whole of this sanguinary conflict, lay dead in their ranks upon the very spot which had so lately been the theatre of their glory.

Pappenheim was nobly supported by Piccolomini, who is said to have exposed himself with so much temerity, that he had five horses killed, and was wounded in several places.† Wallenstein also was animated with unwonted vigour; riding tranquilly amidst a shower of balls, he applauded the valiant, encouraged those of doubtful courage by the prospect of a reward proportionable to their exertions, and even impelled the timid to encounter death, by the assurance of meeting it under its most frightful form, if they betrayed the smallest symptoms of cowardice. Unmoved he beheld the dreadful carnage; and, though his mantle was perforated in va-

* Schmidt, v. 9. Harte, ii. 396. Hist. de Gustave, 566.

† Octavius Piccolomineus cum sua legione inter medios hostes intrepide usque ad praelii finem stetit; factaque septies irruptione, ac edita late strage, amissis quinque equis qui sub se fuerant confossi, ipse sex sclopi actibus saucius adhuc pugnans, optimi ducis nomen promeruit.—Burgus, 413.

rious places, he escaped unhurt, being reserved by Providence for a less glorious destiny.

Pappenheim, however, the bravest soldier in the imperial service, was not so fortunate. Impelled by the ardent wish of encountering Gustavus, he rushed into the thickest of the battle—for there he expected to meet the hero. The event of the contest seemed once more uncertain, when his thigh was shattered by a cannon ball.* Fainting with pain, he was carried to his coach, in order to be conveyed to Leipsic; but, recovering his senses before he quitted the field, he desired to be informed of the situation of the army. Upon hearing that the King of Sweden was slain, he sent for an officer in whom he confided, and ordered him to acquaint the Duke of Friedland that he was mortally wounded. “Tell him also,” added he, his closing eyes still sparkling with joy, “that I die contented, in having survived the great enemy of my religion.”† Such a sentiment might, perhaps, have been pardonable in the mouth of a monk, but in that of a gallant soldier it must excite our compassion, because it proves how much even the noblest characters may be degraded by bigotry.‡

The death of Pappenheim decided irrecoverably the fate of the battle, though the imperialists for some time continued to defend themselves with desperate valour. Led on by Tertsy and Piccolo-

* Puffendorf, iv. 64.

† Schmidt, v. 9. Harte, ii. 369, *Histoire de Gustave*, 566.

‡ Di questa morte, frà le morti reputata felicissima da soldati finì la vita nel fiore dell' età Godfredo di Poppenaim ornato delle pèu eccelse doti, ch'illustrassero giammai capitano di fama; in vita dopo Gustavo rè di Suetia, primo guerrier de suoi tempi, è nella morte, stimata solo, dal sentimento commune degl'uomini degno a bilanciare la perdita d'un tanto rè.—Pietro Pomo, 125.

mini, the German infantry behaved like heroes, regaining once more possession of the batteries, and taking several standards.* Kniphausen, however, by continually reinforcing the centre, enabled the Swedes to recover their ground. With little intermission, the action continued till the close of evening, when the imperialists at length gave way in every direction. The darkness of the night, prematurely hastened by an impenetrable fog, preserved the fugitives from total destruction; so that the victorious Bernard had reason to exclaim, in the bitterness of disappointed glory, “ Gracious God! hadst thou granted me a little more light, I should have finished the work more completely.”†

The event, however, was not so decisive as to exempt the conquerors from all apprehension; and it is even said to have been debated, in a private conference between Bernard and Kniphausen, whether it might not be expedient to retire to Weissenfels. But, upon more mature deliberation, they resolved to await the return of day upon the field of battle. Wallenstein, however, was otherwise occupied than in preparations for renewing the combat. Under cover of the night he had withdrawn his troops with so much precipitation, that the greater part of his artillery was left behind.‡ This circum-

* Harte, 370.

† Ibid. The sublime conception of the Grecian bard was thus realized on the plains of Saxony;

Ζῆν πάτερ, ἀλλὰ σὺ γ' ὕσαι ὅπ' ἥeros ὕϊας Ἀχαιῶν
Ποίησονδ' αἰθρην, δος δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι
Ἐν δὲ φάειν, ὀλισσον, ἐπεὶ νύ τοι εὐαδεν οὐρανός.

‡ Carve, 30. In periculis igitur discessum est utrinque, relictis tormentis majoribus, ita ambigue victoria, ut neutra pars sciret, victorne an victa esset.—Carve seems to have forgotten that the Swedes had no heavy artillery to leave.

stance, communicated to the Swedish generals by a prisoner, first made them acquainted with the whole extent of their success. The report was soon confirmed from different quarters, and particularly from Leipsic, where the imperialists arrived without cannon, without colours, and almost without arms of any description. Great part of their baggage was also lost, which had been plundered by the Croats with no less rapacity than if it had belonged to an enemy.*

The plain of Lutzen was covered with slain, the numbers of which are variously represented; but even according to the most moderate statements, the slaughter on both sides was tremendous. Notwithstanding a *Te Deum* was chanted both at Madrid and Vienna, in order to deceive the credulous vulgar, the conduct of Wallenstein proclaimed to the world a different story, since nothing could be less consistent with the character of a conqueror, than the haste with which he evacuated Saxony. But, dearly indeed were the laurels purchased, which decorated the brows of the victors! Scarcely had the tumult of battle subsided, when the triumph was converted into mourning. No songs of exultation were heard; no shouts of transport resounded. On the contrary every brow was clouded with sorrow, every heart was dejected with the deepest affliction. He who had so often conducted them to glory, would no longer stimulate their ardour by his commendations; he who had provided for all their wants with paternal solicitude, was numbered no longer among the living.

After a painful and almost fruitless research, the

* Burgus, 413.

king's body was discovered amidst heaps of dead, besmeared with gore, disfigured by wounds, and scarcely recognisable except from a wound received at Nuremberg. Being transported to Weissenfels with military pomp, it was embalmed; when, from the structure and salubrity of the vital parts, there was every reason to suppose that Gustavus would have attained to a very advanced age, had he not been cut off prematurely in his glorious career.

The fall of a hero whose existence was incompatible with the ambitious projects of Austria, was an event too desirable, not to subject to suspicion the character of a prince, seldom found to be scrupulous respecting the means when an object of moment was to be accomplished. At a period therefore when the spirit of party ran uncommonly high, it is by no means extraordinary that the protestants should have been tempted to accuse the great enemy of their religion with having plotted the death of Gustavus, even supposing no evidence could have been adduced to give colour and solidity to the imputation.

This opinion has been adopted by most of the protestant historians,* many of whom not only as-

* The following extract will convey the opinion of Puffendorf, who wrote in the reign, and at the express desire of Charles Gustavus, who succeeded Christina upon the throne of Sweden. As this work was printed more than fifty years after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, it is probable that the events of the "Thirty years war," were no longer contemplated through the delusive medium of prejudice; but, on the contrary, had been subjected to that dispassionate investigation, by which truth can alone be elicited. "*Pertinax eo tempore rumor erat, regi post vulneratum brachium a Francisco Alberto Lauenburgico duce lethalem ictum illatum: suspicione inde orta, quod nuper missione a Cæsare ob-tenta ad Saxonie electorem ab isto ablegatus fuerit, ut hunc regis partis abstraheret; quodque statim post proelium ad Lutzenam relictis Sue-*

sert, that the King of Sweden perished the victim of treachery, but even openly accuse Francis Albert, Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, with being the instrument employed for his destruction. The catholic writers, on the other hand, reject with indignation a charge so injurious to the memory of a sovereign, who enjoyed the rare, but unenviable glory of having risked the destruction of the House of Austria for the sake of the Jesuits.

At this distant period it would be the height of presumption to determine a question, which has been an object of long and unsatisfactory investigation. All that can be attempted with propriety is to lay before the reader the different circumstances which originally excited the report, and to leave the deductions to his unbiassed judgment. The person to whom the assassination is imputed, was the youngest of four brothers; and, being left

cis operam suam Saxoniae electori addiceret. Sane cum ad regem in castra Norribergica tamquam voluntarius miles accederet, Oxenstierna dubitare se profitebatur, quantum sibi foret fidendum. Ferunt etiam interrogatum, quare ipse, qui proxime circa regem versatus erat, illoesus mansisset, respondisse, id debere se viridi tiniae, qua corpus cinxerat, quasi eo signo a Caesarianis esset agnoscendus. Et ipse post vestem regio sanguine aspersam ostentaverat. Atque isthaec mihi omnia expetenti vero quam simillima videntur. Sanequin Coesarei crediderint, Suecorum res sola Gustavi virtute stare, eoque sublato istas quoque ultro ruituras, dubitare non licet; nec minus, ipsos omnes vias conspexisse, eundem e medio dimovendi: Ejus modi porro facinori patrando quis idoneus magis reperiri poterat, quam Franciscus Albertus, cui principis Germaniae dignatio, et sacra quae profitebatur, hactenus saltem fidem apud regem magnanimum, et in suspiciones non pronum adstruebant, ne facile sicarii personam suscepisse crederetur; coque inobservato scelere patrando occasionem per otium licebat captare, cum familiarem ad regem accessum nobilitas, et militaris vitae professio conciliaret. Ipse porro pauper, stipendiis Coesaris innutritus, quæ nulla idonea causa desertis ad hostem regem accesserat, ejusque lateri diligentius, quam pro vulgari officio adhæserat; ac peracto flagitio confestim a Suecis disgressus fuerat, quorum et partes capitali odio semper persecutus, iisque impugnandis demum mortuus est." iv. 63.

by his father almost destitute of fortune, he offered his services to the court of Stockholm, where he was received with every mark of distinction, due to a relation of the royal family.*

Notwithstanding authors differ materially concerning the origin of the quarrel, they universally agree, that a violent dispute having arisen between Gustavus and Francis Albert; the former, impelled by the impetuosity of his temper, struck the latter in presence of the queen mother. A moment's reflection however having sufficed to convince him of the impropriety of his behaviour, he not only publicly apologized for the offence, but even offered his cousin any satisfaction which wounded honour might require. A duel in consequence would have ensued, had it not been prevented by the vigilance of Oxenstiern, whose prudent exhortations at length effected an apparent reconciliation.† The heart of Gustavus was incapable of retaining the smallest rancour against any man, whom his tongue had honoured with the appellation of friend; but the character of Lauenburg was not equally ingenuous. Though it might be unjust to affirm, that for many years he cherished in gloomy silence the hateful project of revenge; yet it is impossible to deny, that many circumstances in his conduct tended to confirm the prevailing opinion, that if he did not

* Gustavus Vasa was twice married; his first wife was a princess of Saxe-Lauenberg. *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 575.

† *Hist. de Gust.* 575. In a note at the bottom of the page, I find the following extract from a letter written by Puffendorf, and inserted in a collection entitled *Biblioth. Swed.* v. 90. *Fuerat iste Franciscus Albertus, aliquot ante bellum annos in Suecia, ubicum rex cum aliquando in aula matris suæ licentius agentem deprchendisset, effervescente subito mota bile, alapam isti impegit, quo nomine in duellum descensuri fuerant, ni Axelius Oxenstierma id impedisset,*

actually perpetrate the atrocious deed, he was at least accessory to the murder of Gustavus.*

A short time after the quarrel, he quitted the Swedish service for that of the emperor, where having gained the confidence of Wallenstein, he was not only appointed to the command of a regiment, but sent upon a secret mission to Dresden.† The brilliant prospects which now opened before him, were calculated to have attached him to the Austrian court, had he been either impelled by the dictates of interest, or stimulated by the spur of ambition; yet, without the possibility of discovering any rational motive, we find him relinquishing honour and emolument for the barren glory of serving a prince, whom he cordially hated, in the humble capacity of a volunteer. Gustavus received him in the camp at Nuremberg with the cordiality of friendship, and loaded him with marks of affection; while Francis Albert endeavoured to acquire his esteem by an exaggerated zeal for the protestant church, and attentions approaching to servility. It is probable, however, that he over-acted his part; because we are assured, from unquestionable authority,‡ that his behaviour excited

* Carve seems to insinuate in the following passage that Wallenstein was concerned in the plot. *Erat forte tunc temporis nescio quis siderum inspex, qui ex astris fabulas comminiscatur, qui et Wallensteinio Bohemæ sceptrum ex ære confictum addicebat, qua fortuna homo vanissimus elatior, pro corona tali quidvis paciscatur, cum videret se id jure præstare neutiquam posse, injuria conatus est; ac primo regni æmulum Suecorum regem e medio tollendum esse putavit, quo sublato duces dein aggressus, est, cosque sibi devincere, Cæsari exosos reddere, conavit.* 82. Carve's, however, is no impartial testimony, as he has the baseness to attempt to extenuate the infamy of those by whom the Duke of Friedland was assassinated.

† The object of the negociation was to persuade the elector (to whom he was nearly related) to abandon the Swedes.

‡ Puffendorf, *ibid.*

the suspicion of Oxenstiern, who repeatedly admonished his master to be upon his guard. But unfortunately this caution proved ineffectual. The generous soul of Gustavus revolted at the idea of premeditated treachery, particularly in a person whose elevated rank ought to place him out of the reach of temptation. During the battle of Lutzen, Francis Albert like a shadow followed the king, wearing that day over his armour a green sash, the distinctive colour of the imperialists. In the heat of the engagement Gustavus was separated from most of his suite, being accompanied only by two menial servants. His new friend however stuck close to his side, attended by Heynin, his aid-de-camp, who is supposed to have acted as his accomplice. The king received a shot in the arm, and shortly after another between the shoulders. Yet Lauenburg, though surrounded by Austrian cavalry, escaped unhurt; and being questioned concerning the manner of his avoiding death, he replied, "that HIS PRESERVATION WAS ENTIRELY OWING TO THE COLOUR OF HIS SASH." Instead of carrying, as was natural, the melancholy intelligence to the Swedish generals, he rode with the utmost precipitation to Weissenfels, and did not rejoin the army till the following morning, when he heard that the Austrians were routed. With the Swedes however he remained only two days, at the expiration of which he quitted them for ever, to resume his former rank in the imperial service.*

* This account is confirmed by the testimony of Piasecius, a catholic bishop; whose evidence in this case is more entitled to credit, because it militates against his political principles. "Franciscus Albertus Lauborgicus, qui paulo ante a Cæsarianis partibus ad Gustavum defecerat, indiduius ipsius comes, in isto prælio illæsus remansit, idemque Walsteiniio

Such are the grounds upon which the accusation reposes. Though we acknowledge that the facts submitted to the reader do not amount to positive proofs of criminality, we cannot but feel that they were calculated to excite the most unfavourable impression in the bosoms even of those least influenced by popular prejudice.* In Sweden we are told that no doubt existed respecting the murder,† and very little with regard to its author.

That an opinion may be embraced with universal eagerness, and yet be totally destitute of foundation, no person conversant with the operations of party spirit will probably be tempted to deny. The reign of prejudice however is transient; and political fictions, when they have answered the purpose for which they were invented, subside with the fervour they created.‡ But when a fact con-

fuit familiarior, et prius quam transisset ad Suecum, et post illam pugnam." Chron. Gest. 520.

* Let us examine the sentiments of an enlightened foreigner. "Le Duc de Saxe Lauenburg est tres mal avec la couronne de Swede, de tous ceux qui etoient aupres du dit roi, que lui, et son dit confrere qui n'y reçurent aucune blessure, accusant le dit confident d'avoir donné le coup de pistolet qu'il reçut dans les reins," &c. Extract from a despatch addressed to the King from Dresden, and dated June 25th, 1633. *Negotiations de Feuquieres*, i. 267.

† The following circumstance contributed to confirm it. A few days before the engagement in which Gustavus fell, a German traveller pretended to take a particular fancy to a horse belonging to Gassion, and offered him in exchange another horse, no less conspicuous for its colour than for its beauty. The bargain of course was concluded, and Gassion mounted his new charger at Lutzen; but scarcely had he entered the field, when it was killed under him. Now as Gassion was known to be a great favourite with Gustavus, and was almost always near his person in the hour of danger, many strongly suspected that the horse had been given him as a mark to fire at. *Le Vassor*, x. 367.

‡ No person in this enlightened age is credulous enough to believe, that the pretender was introduced in a warming-pan; yet to have questioned the authenticity of the improbable fact at the era of the revolution, would probably have exposed the sceptic to be universally shunned as a Jacobite.

tinues to be regarded as authentic by succeeding generations, it is entitled to serious examination, before we venture to discard it as suppositious. Every inhabitant of Sweden, even at the present hour, is firmly persuaded that Gustavus Adolphus perished by the hand of an assassin. Such also was the sentiment entertained by his contemporaries, at least by those of the protestant persuasion; since which period no circumstances have transpired, tending in the smallest degree to invalidate the belief.

From the cruelty with which the king was treated by the Austrian dragoons, after his fall, it seems fair to infer that his person was recognized; because, during the tumult of battle, it is no common occurrence even for Pandours and Croats wantonly to mangle a wounded enemy. The dress of Gustavus had nothing remarkable, nothing to tempt cupidity, or to render murder a profitable occupation. Yet he was selected as a victim, and was stabbed repeatedly, when unable any longer to defend his own life, or to endanger that of his opponents. From sparing an officer of rank, some emolument was likely to accrue, but none could be derived from destroying him. Why then did he experience such barbarous treatment? and how was his dignity ascertained? The answer is easy. Lauenburg was distinguished by the colour of his sash, and he was constantly by the side of Gustavus.

Aware that he was become an object of general suspicion, Francis Albert attempted to vindicate his character in a studied manifesto; but, as the publication was totally defective in proofs, and contained only assertions unsupported by evidence,

it failed of producing the desired effect, and tended rather to establish than to efface the horrid impression. The catholic historians treat the charge with contempt, but they also confine themselves to general allegations, and instead of combating their adversaries with argument, or facts, they deem it prudent to rest their defence upon the improbability that a prince descended from the illustrious house of Saxony, should incur the heinous guilt of premeditated homicide; or that a sovereign, so conspicuous for piety as Ferdinand, should have harboured the atrocious design. This however is mere declamation. For happy indeed would it have proved for mankind, if probity and honour had been invariably the characteristics of noble birth; but every page of history evinces the contrary, and shews that the mask of devotion has often been assumed as a covering for the blackest iniquity:

No tribute more glorious can be offered to the memory of Gustavus Adolphus, than the tears of his subjects bestowed. Flattery has been often known to deify the vices of the great; poetry has adorned them with virtues to which they were utter strangers, and even history has prostituted her venal pen to palliate the greatest enormities; but the suffrage of gratitude is unimpeachable, and we may confidently pronounce that monarch to be justly entitled to the admiration of posterity, who lives enshrined in the affections of his people.*

But was Gustavus in reality so enshrined? This question shall be answered by an impartial investi-

* I feel some pride as an Englishman in relating that Charles I. entertained so high an opinion of the worth of the Swedish monarch, that he sent him in 1627 the insignia of the order of the garter—as a proof of his esteem. Harte, i. 83.

gation of his character, though after the frequent opportunities afforded the reader for appreciating his merit, this discussion must be nearly superfluous. His figure is described by the Swedish historian as no less remarkable for grace than for dignity,* equally calculated to inspire love, and to excite veneration. Though rather inclining to corpulency, he was tall and well proportioned, and possessed an air of majesty which impressed the beholder with reverence. His complexion was fair, his forehead elevated, and his hair auburn; his cheeks were tinged with the glow of health, his features regular, and his eyes large and penetrating, though unable to distinguish distant objects with precision. An open countenance announced candour and generosity, and never did countenance more faithfully pourtray the real feelings of a heart. Gay and affable in conversation, and equally accessible to all persons, without the smallest distinction of rank, he disdained to intrench himself behind those repulsive formalities, which are mistaken by the ignorant for dignity. Pre-eminent alike in wisdom and in virtue, he left ceremony and ostentation for the decoration of those who had no intrinsic qualities to adorn them. To a competent knowledge of the Latin tongue he united French and Italian; was deeply read in the best historians, both ancient and modern, and had made considerable progress in various other branches of literature.

To the seductions of pleasure he was always inaccessible: the splendour of a court he beheld with indifference; but luxury and effeminacy he su-

* *Corpus ipsi juxta proceritatem, magnæ vires, par agilitas, artus firmi beneque compacti, laboris militaris summa tolerantia, singularis in quovis actu gratia, decorque.* Puffendorf, iv. 65.

premely despised. Inured from his youth to the severest hardships, he slept no less comfortably upon a truss of straw in the meanest hovel, than upon the softest down under an embroidered canopy. These early habits not only rendered him the idol of a warlike people, but had given such vigour, both to his mind and his body, that no change of climate affected his health, no privations ruffled his temper. Whatever appeared superfluous he rejected from principle; because he knew that a sovereign can never indulge in expensive gratifications, without abridging the comforts of his people. Sincere from an elevated sense of duty, as well as from the natural bent of his disposition, it is difficult to determine, whether flattery to him was most an object of contempt or abhorrence; and so strong was this antipathy, that when addressed by a person unaccustomed to his humour, with the studied formalities of German etiquette, he replied with impatience, "Let me intreat you, in future, sir, to reserve these compliments for the queen's female attendants. My occupation is war; and I have neither leisure nor inclination to act the part of a dancing-master."*

To the protestant worship he was sincerely attached; not because it happened to be that of the country in which he was born, but because it appeared to his capacious judgment the purest and most rational of all religious institutions. In proportion as he examined the sacred truths of the gospel his conviction was strengthened; and thus

* Gualdo, xx. 157. Les esprits forts sont presque toujours des esprits faibles. L'affiche d'irreligion est independamment de cette sottise impietee, le cachet du mauvais gout.—Mem. du Prince Eugene, 68.

the example of this illustrious monarch affords an additional proof (in spite of all the cavils of the Encyclopædists) that infidelity is the system of a weak and contracted, rather than of an enlarged understanding. Conscientiously persuaded of the superior excellence of the doctrines of Christ, he was far from confining himself to barren speculation, but displayed the fruits of conviction by a practical illustration of temperance, justice, and humanity. His devotion, however, had nothing gloomy, nothing monastic. A friend to toleration, he allowed to others the glorious privilege of unfettered thought; for he contemplated mankind not through the delusive medium of superstition, with the contracted feelings of an inquisitor, but with the comprehensive charity of a Christian philosopher, who considers all the children of a common father as friends and brethren.* Hence, in the conquered provinces, the catholics being permitted to exercise their accustomed rites without molestation, soon grew to regard the change of domination in the light of a civil benefit, when they discovered that the triumphant standard of Gustavus was the symbol of equity and freedom.†

After what has been said in the preceding pages, it can hardly be necessary to observe, that the altera-

* "To guard men against the snares of the devil," he would often say, "is not the business of a king, but of a preacher.—Schmidt, v. 9.

† This panegyric becomes doubly precious from the pen of an Italian and a papist.—Gualdo, 157. Another author, of the same persuasion, pays him the following extraordinary compliment: "In suæ superstitionis impietate piissimus."—Riccius de Bell. German. 433. *La giustizia è la clemenza erano unite in lui con tempra sì forte, che mai nell' attioni sue si videro scompagnate.*—Pietro Pomo, 128. *Visse ne suoi riti religiosi osservatore delle piu esquisite virtù morali; nè i buoni (that is, the orthodox catholics) v' abbero altro a desiderare in lui, che un vero lume di fede.*—Ibid. 120.

tions introduced by the King of Sweden into the art of war completely changed the whole military system of Europe. The splendid achievements of the Greeks and Romans formed his most favourite topic of conversation, and he took delight in comparing the tactics of modern times with those which were in use among the ancients. In opposition to the opinion then generally prevalent, he strenuously contended, that it was neither the improvements which had taken place in the science of fortification, nor the invention of gunpowder, but the inferiority of genius, which had prevented any modern from subjugating the world. "Let an Annibal, an Alexander, or a Julius Cæsar arise, and no barriers," he insisted, "would any longer prove sufficient to retard their victorious career."*

No less prompt in execution than inexhaustible in expedients, he united prudence with activity, moderation with firmness, and courage, too resolute for danger to appal, with vigilance too circumspect for artifice to elude. The discipline which he established in the Swedish army has perhaps never been equalled; it was a discipline of the mind as well as the body; for his generous spirit revolted at the idea, that men, who contended in the glorious cause of religion and of freedom, should act with the ferocity of a lawless banditti. No commander was ever more scrupulously obeyed, or more ardently loved by his soldiers; because their misconduct was never overlooked, nor were their services ever unrequited.

Few persons ever possessed, in a more eminent degree, the invaluable talent of discriminating

* Schmidt, v. 9.

all the shades and varieties of the human character. This was manifested in the disposal of all civil and military appointments. It was neither the distinctions of birth, nor the caprices of favour; neither the graces of person, nor the attractions of wit, which influenced the choice of Gustavus; on the contrary, when a regiment became vacant, or an embassy was preparing, he regarded only the merits of the different candidates, and always decided, like the son of Philip with respect to the empire of the world, that it should be given to the most deserving. To this sagacious system might chiefly be ascribed the stability of a fabric erected by victory, and which, to common observers, seemed solely to repose upon the stupendous efforts of a hero. But every spring and wheel had been so nicely adapted to its respective destination, that instead of falling in pieces like the Macedonian monarchy, when no longer upheld by the gigantic strength of its immortal founder, the splendid edifice augmented both in lustre and solidity under Oxenstiern, Weimar, Banier, and Torstenson.

Such were the virtues which adorned this illustrious monarch, and they appear to have been uncontaminated by any failing, except a warmth of temper frequently ungovernable, which impelled him to behave toward those who offended him with harshness, and sometimes with incivility. A moment's reflection, however, always sufficed to restore the dominion of reason, when he never omitted to apologize, even to the meanest of his attendants, with a magnanimity truly heroical.*

* *Te Martia virtus
Heroum, populis te debita cura regentum*

To sum up his character as briefly as possible, he was eminently pious without bigotry or fanaticism; humane without weakness; firm without obstinacy, and far more careful of the lives of his soldiers than attentive to his own preservation. In the moment of victory he was just and compassionate, never forgetting the weakness and imperfection of man's brightest endowments, and most extensive power, when compared with the wisdom and omnipotence of the Almighty. And, though he unquestionably ranks high among the most enlightened statesmen of modern Europe, he enjoys the singular, and perhaps unexampled glory, of having never subjected his unblemished reputation to the suspicion of treachery or deceit.*

Actibus exemplum statuet. Sic vivere reges
Optabunt, sic posse mori. Laus una placebit
Esse tibi similem et tua per vestigia ferri.

Adolphid. xii. 308.

"Sæpe ego mecum Patres Conscripti, tacitus agitavi, qualem quantumque esse opereretur, cujus ditione nutuque, terræ, maria, pax, bella regerentur; quum interea fingenti formantique mihi Principem, quem æquata diis immortalibus potestas deceret, numquam voto saltem concipere succurrit similem huic, quem videmus. Enituit aliquis in bello sed obsolevit in pace: alium toga sed non et arma honestarunt; reverentiam ille terrore, alius amorem humilitate captavit: ille quæsitam domi gloriam in publico, hic in publico partam domi perdidit: postremo adhuc nemo exstitit, cujus virtutes nullo vitiorum confinio lædarentur."—Plin. Panegyri, iv.

* The following epitaph was placed over the tomb of Gustavus and still exists at Stockholm:

Gloria Attissimo
Suorum refugio
Sepultura potentissimi Principis
Gustavi—Adolphi—Magni,
Dei Gratia
Regnorum Succæ Regis incomparabilis,
qui
Regno undique hostibus obsesso
Ad imperium intravit:
Pacatis denique Danis,
Moscoue et Polono mitioribus factis,
Regnum ampliavit

*Summaque prudentia, regnum gubernavit,
Tandem retruso Cæsare
Germanisque a Papæ deformatione liberatis,
In pugna Lutzeni victor
Heroice obiit.*

VI. Kal. Novembr. A.D. MDCXXXII.

A comparison between Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII. who reigned over the same nation, at no great distance of time (says an ingenious modern writer), might tend essentially to place in their proper light the virtues and talents of the former. When Gustavus undertook to defend the protestant cause, he was instigated by motives the most sublime and powerful that can animate the heart of a mortal. All his plans were arranged with consummate prudence; alliances were contracted; subsidies were assured; and no precaution was neglected that could in any way tend to facilitate success, or, in the event of an unprosperous issue, secure an uninterrupted retreat. The conduct of Charles was precisely the reverse in every respect. During the whole course of his life, he invariably acted as if his sole object had been to set all mankind at defiance; best opportunities should be wanting for displaying his prowess. If victorious, the advantages to be obtained were precarious; but if vanquished destruction was unavoidable—while Gustavus ensured a fortunate termination to every enterprise by the sagacity of his measures, and the profoundness of his combinations; Charles never attended to difficulties, or rather courted them; and seems to have been perfectly satisfied if he could astonish mankind, without ever attempting to enlighten them. Before Gustavus ventured to advance to the Rhine and the Danube, he had secured the alliance of Saxony, Pomerania, and Brandenburg; but when Charles rushed forward to Pultawa, he acted in contradiction to the advice of his ablest generals, no less than to the dictates of reason, and appears to have been solely impelled by the puerile vanity of conquering a country, where the Swedish standard had never before been displayed. The reputation of Gustavus was established independently of the German expedition; and even if he had failed in that great and glorious undertaking he would at least have enjoyed the undisputed honour of having pointed out to posterity the only means by which the Austrian power could be humbled. In his wars with Poland, Denmark, and Russia, he had shewn military talents of the highest order; while the admirable institutions which he formed for securing the internal prosperity of Sweden; the amelioration of her constitution by wise and salutary laws; the encouragement of merit by liberal rewards; the establishment of manufactures, and the improvement of agriculture had deservedly allotted him an eminent station among the greatest and wisest of mankind. Stimulated by the frantic wish of subjugating the world, Charles had no object except to fight, no ambition except to conquer, no pleasure except to destroy. His only dread was the want of an enemy to contend with; and he might possibly have realized the ridiculous fable, with which historians and poets have sullied the reputation of the most illustrious of men, and wept from

disappointment the moment his chimerical project had been accomplished, and no country left for him to attack. His military system was that of a partisan, rather than of a general; neither does he appear to have entertained the most distant idea, that there could exist any glory distinct from that of slaughtering his fellow creatures, and spreading desolation and terror. To soften the rude manners of an uncultivated people by a benignant attention to their morals, their wants, and even their prejudices, was a glory to which he never could aspire, because he was utterly unable to comprehend it. Hence, while Gustavus exalted his native land to a level with the greatest of the European powers, and enabled it to support that dignified station for a considerable time after his death, the mad ambition of Charles precipitated in a moment the ruin of Sweden, and gave a blow to her prosperity, which she has never recovered.—Ferrand, *Esprit de l'Histoire*, iii. 385.

END OF VOL. I.

...the first of the year, the weather was very cold, and the snow lay deep upon the ground. The people were all dressed in heavy cloaks, and many wore hoods to keep their heads warm. The streets were very muddy, and the people walked with great care to avoid the puddles. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.

...the second of the year, the weather was very warm, and the snow had melted. The people were all dressed in light clothes, and many wore hats to keep their heads cool. The streets were very clean, and the people walked with great ease. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.


...the third of the year, the weather was very cold, and the snow lay deep upon the ground. The people were all dressed in heavy cloaks, and many wore hoods to keep their heads warm. The streets were very muddy, and the people walked with great care to avoid the puddles. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.


...the fourth of the year, the weather was very warm, and the snow had melted. The people were all dressed in light clothes, and many wore hats to keep their heads cool. The streets were very clean, and the people walked with great ease. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.

...the fifth of the year, the weather was very cold, and the snow lay deep upon the ground. The people were all dressed in heavy cloaks, and many wore hoods to keep their heads warm. The streets were very muddy, and the people walked with great care to avoid the puddles. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.


...the sixth of the year, the weather was very warm, and the snow had melted. The people were all dressed in light clothes, and many wore hats to keep their heads cool. The streets were very clean, and the people walked with great ease. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.

...the seventh of the year, the weather was very cold, and the snow lay deep upon the ground. The people were all dressed in heavy cloaks, and many wore hoods to keep their heads warm. The streets were very muddy, and the people walked with great care to avoid the puddles. The children were all dressed in their best clothes, and they were very happy to go to school. The teachers were all very kind, and they taught the children very well. The children were all very obedient, and they did all the work that was given to them. The school was very well run, and the children were all very happy to go to school.

















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